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Abstract
Federal institutional design is widely seen as one of the key forms o f the 
accommodation of multinationalism. This thesis compares the experience of two 
multinational federations, Russia and Canada, specifically the cases of Tatarstan and Quebec 
respectively, to test this proposition. In these cases, regional leaders assert that the federal 
constitutional and institutional framework does not sufficiently address their claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction. Since the constitution and federal design are themselves 
disputed, the governance of these claims does not depend only on getting the institutions 
right. Rather the governance of multinationalism in Russia and Canada depends on the 
ability of elites to engage in ongoing processes of negotiation and accommodation.
To gain more insight into the role of federal design in accommodating 
multinationalism, the thesis features two policy case studies of the language issue. Language 
policy constitutes an appropriate and interesting arena to gauge the effectiveness of federal 
design to provide recognition and jurisdiction, because it is an area on which both federal 
and regional governments adopt legislation. Policy-makers in both cases believe they 
possess sufficient autonomy to carry out their objectives: a regime of parallel official 
languages in Tatarstan and the establishment and protection of the primacy of French in 
Quebec. Although language policies in Tatarstan and Quebec are examples of effective 
federalism, the overall constitutional disagreements persist.
The thesis finds that attempts to accommodate rather than solve Tatarstan’s and 
Quebec’s disagreements may yield better insight into the effectiveness of federal design in 
creating capacity to manage multinationalism. By engaging in negotiation, elites 
acknowledge the existence of each others’ competing demands. These very processes which 
in Quebec and Tatarstan have often appeared in an ad hoc manner in turn structure and 
institutionalise federal-regional relations. These ongoing processes of negotiation provide a 
means to overcome the constitutional conflict and prevent constitutional deadlock.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 1. Introduction
For many people, the prospect o f  continual rear­
guard action to preserve the integrity o f  the 
federation is not inviting. We are consoled only in 
the thought that, as the world becomes more
democratic, the trials and tribulations o f
multinational federations may become the norm 
(Norman, 1995: 137).
Diversity is the hallmark of multinational federations, in which cleavages — ethnic,
linguistic, religious — cut across the state and through its component units. Within such
states, some of the salient debates in contemporary politics are continuously played out: 
what kind of regime reconciles diversity and unity? What kinds of institutions promote 
stable governance? Successful governance of a unitary state or mono-national federation 
posits a need for common goals and principles, as well as a common language or languages. 
The challenge of multinationaJism lies in the coexistence within the same state of different 
national groups, each with different, perhaps competing goals, languages, and concerns, 
some territorialised and others not. If  governance is the process whereby citizens and rulers 
give answers to common questions, governance of a multinational society implies that 
although different questions are posed, they yield similar, or at least compatible, answers.
In multinational federations, the balance between unity and diversity is more 
tenuous since ethnocultural distinctions may coincide with the boundaries of federal units. 
In such a state, federalism provides self-government to the national group, creating a 
context to pursue particular policies and insulating the minority from the risk of veto by the 
larger society. Hughes and Sasse point out that while many analysts of post-Soviet states 
concentrate on multiethnicity as the destabilising factor, they have neglected to consider the 
challenge posed by territorialised nationalism (Hughes and Sasse, 2001: 8). In multinational 
federations, the form of territorialisation, rather than the existence of national diversity per 
se, is the politically salient factor, which leads to what Kymlicka calls the paradox of 
multinational federalism (Kymlicka, 2001: 113). While federal arrangements provide self- 
government and autonomy to accommodate minority claims, they institutionalise the 
diversity inherent in the state. As earlier work on the strengths and weaknesses of 
institutionalised nationality demonstrate (e.g. Brubaker, 1996; Bunce, 1999), the institutional 
solution of federalism may contribute to undermine state unity, or at least, provide an 
institutional basis and support for the perpetuation of difference. Bunce identified 
territorialised ethnicity as creating fracture points along which Communist-era federations 
broke (Bunce, 1999: 77-98). Sasse’s study on Crimea is useful as it pushes us to examine a 
case where ethnic conflict was expected but did not occur and identifies factors, institutions
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and behaviours that promote institutional stability and continuity (Sasse, 1999). 
Territorialised ethnicity and multinationalism are thus not necessarily destabilising per se. 
The paradox of multinational federalism illustrates that governance in a multinational 
federation is a balancing act involving a commitment to both shared-rule and self-rule 
where the issue of state stability is always in flux.
Acknowledging and managing diversity within a multinational federation raises the 
issue of institutional or federal design. This thesis seeks to address the role of federal design 
in maintaining stability in two multinational federations: Russia and Canada. The need for 
case-based research in these areas has recently been expressed by Tully, for whom “the 
point is not to start with some general thesis about diversity versus equality, or any other 
framework, but to examine actual cases to see what the conflict is about” (Tully, 2005: 94). 
In this thesis I focus on the cases of Tatarstan and Quebec in order to examine the nature 
of the conflict as well as the means employed to accommodate their claims within their 
countries’ institutional and political frameworks.
My interest in comparing these two cases was sparked by references encountered 
within Russia to Tatarstan as ‘the Quebec of Russia’. The reference is used as a cautionary 
tale illustrating two risks: the dangers of ignoring multinational diversity and the risk of the 
paradox of multinational federalism. However, it is simultaneously used as an example of 
successful federal design and accommodation. The president of Tatarstan, Mintimer 
Shaimiev, evokes Quebec to prompt Russia to recognise and accommodate his republic’s 
demands:
Will Russia cease to be multinational? There are republics, there are national autonomous 
territories, and they will not disappear. As international experience shows, refusals to 
address a state’s [multinational character] can become a headache in any state. Think o f  the 
headache Canada has with only one Quebec. Russia may end up having many more 
Quebecs (RT, 12.4.2002).
For Shaimiev, the fact that even in Canada, “a highly developed state”, the persistence of 
Quebec nationalism is a sign of the risks of failing to address the problems of multinational 
federalism (RT, 7.3.2002). Analysts see Quebec as an attractive model for Tatarstan because 
it has been able to “attract ever more resources from Ottawa because [it] has a credible but 
not yet successful independence movement” (Goble, 2001). In other words, nationalist 
claims and mobilisation potential are means of leverage to secure power and benefits. 
Russian political scientists such as Oracheva on the other hand, view Quebec as the 
archetype Russia must avoid at all costs: “the existence of a specific institutional framework 
allowed the Quebec nationalists to turn their claims into political actions after their electoral 
victory in the province” (Quoted in RRR, 23.4.1998). Institutionalising Quebec and 
accommodating its demands are here seen to perpetuate the paradox of multinational
10
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federalism, providing an institutional basis for the articulation of claims and constitute a 
threat to the long-term stability of Canada’s federal design. That Quebec is both a negative 
and positive example merits further examination.
What is at Stake?
In Tatarstan and Quebec, the federal constitution and federal design are contested. 
Two kinds of claims are articulated. First, leaders demand that the federal constitution 
better reflect their specificity. In Quebec, this demand is represented by long-standing 
claims for constitutional recognition of Quebec as a ‘distinct society’ within Canada. 
Tatarstan demands recognition that it constitutes a ‘sovereign state united with Russia’. 
Claims for recognition address the question of status within federal design, and 
problematise the form of the overall federal structure. Second, leaders challenge the federal 
design of the state, arguing for a different division of powers and competences. In Quebec 
this challenge takes the form of demands for increased policy autonomy and constitutional 
guarantees of its jurisdictional prerogatives. In Tatarstan these claims are embodied in 
demands for bilateral asymmetrical federalism and increased protection of its autonomy.
In the empirical chapters of this thesis, I examine the articulation and evolution of 
these two claims and the ways in which they are addressed by federal leaders and within 
federal institutions. Since it is the constitutional design which is contested, the effective 
accommodation of claims depends not only on the design itself but also on federal practices 
within the states, and the extent to which political elites can devise cooperative mechanisms 
to respond to the claims emanating from Quebec and Tatarstan. The overall questions are 
the following: How does state-building and federal design come to terms with the existence 
of multinationalism? How does federal design address Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s demands 
for constitutional change? What is the role of federal practice in the promotion of stability 
of federal institutions? And finally, what does Canada’s experience contribute to our 
understanding o f federalism in Russia?
I argue that the governance of multinationalism in Russia and Canada depends on 
the ability of elites to engage in ongoing processes of negotiation and accommodation. 
Since the constitution and federal design are themselves disputed, the governance of 
Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s claims is not only a question of getting the institutions right. Thus, 
I seek to demonstrate that the absence of a consensus on the constitutional fundamentals 
does not necessarily lead to state instability. Rather, a combination of federal design and 
federal practice creates a basis for ongoing accommodation of Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s 
differences. By engaging in negotiation, elites acknowledge the existence of each others’ 
competing claims. Thus, while the federal and federated units seek, ultimately, to
11
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institutionalise or constitutionalise their competing claims, ongoing processes of negotiation 
provide a means to overcome the constitutional conflict and prevent constitutional 
deadlock. These very processes, which in Quebec and Tatarstan have often appeared in an 
ad hoc manner, in turn structure and institutionalise federal-regional relations. It is important 
to note that the consolidation of a federal institutional framework does not necessarily lead 
to the consolidation of a democratic regime (Stepan, 1999; Hughes and Sasse, 2001: 8-11). 
Federalisation and democratisation in Tatarstan remain distinct processes; the separation of 
regime stability and regime quality questions the long-term viability of these 
accommodation processes.
To sharpen the comparative perspective and gain more insight into the role of 
federal design in accommodating multinationalism, I focus on language policy. Language is 
chosen as a policy case study because it is a constant theme of discourse and state activity in 
both Tatarstan and Quebec across the political spectrum, from moderates to nationalists. In 
both cases, federal and regional governments have legislated on language. Thus, language 
policy constitutes an appropriate and interesting arena to gauge the effectiveness of federal 
design in providing the recognition and autonomy to Quebec and Tatarstan in order to 
carry out their objectives. As I examine further in the next chapter, a key theoretical 
assumption is that an institutional solution of individual and collective rights can help foster 
governance capacity in a multinational context and diffuse potential constitutional conflict 
or disagreement. The language case studies in this thesis allow us to test these assumptions. 
Leaders in Tatarstan and Quebec possess the competence and autonomy to implement 
most of their objectives in the field of language policy, yet the overall constitutional 
disagreements persist. This forces us to reconsider some of the assumptions about the 
challenges inherent in the governance of multinationalism.
The theoretical arguments advanced in the thesis are not new. The study’s key 
contribution lies in a verification of the ways in which theoretical claims about the 
accommodation of the multinationalism and federal design work in practice.
Regarding the challenges of multinationalism, ‘successful’ accommodation depends 
on the institutional characteristics of the regime, on the nature of the unit’s demands (a 
claim for outright secession will be difficult to accommodate, even among political leaders 
with the best intentions), and on the extent to which federalism provides a framework for 
ongoing negotiation and discussion of the claims. As Kymlicka reminds us, “ ... we can see 
the success of multination federalism if we rid ourselves of the traditional assumption that a 
‘successful’ political community is one in which questions of secession do not arise” 
(Kymlicka, 2001: 119). Similarly, successful accommodation depends on our abandoning 
the belief that success means that the constitution or federal design must be immune from
12
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contestation. Kahn theorises that the act of negotiating mortgages reciprocity and 
entrenchment in future relations for an increase in autonomy in the present. But that 
autonomy is guaranteed by nothing but the last successful negotiated settlement” (Kahn, 
1998: 37).
Federal design — one of the main means of responding to national units’ claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction — represents a balancing act between majority and minority; 
shared- and self-rule. A particularity in both Tatarstan and Quebec is the persistence of 
claims for some measure of asymmetrical federal design. Yet the view prevalent among the 
majority of theorists of post-communist transition is the risk inherent in asymmetrical 
federalism of exacerbating the paradox of multinational federalism. The argument against 
asymmetry as a way of responding to claims for recognition and jurisdiction is predicated 
upon a normative argument, examined in greater length in the next chapter, which elevates 
the value of equality and state stability at the expense of recognition and difference. This 
thesis builds upon previous debates surrounding the benefits and risks of asymmetry and 
accommodation in order to relate them to the real-world cases of Tatarstan and Quebec. 
Existing studies give short shrift to empirical and case-based examinations of the ways in 
which federal institutions — asymmetrical or not — operate in practice in the Russian 
Federation. The policy case studies featured in this thesis, examinations of court cases, 
legislation and the comparison with Quebec serves to flesh out previous general arguments 
(e.g. Zverev, 1998; Hughes, 2001b) about the positive role of asymmetry. Gaining a better 
understanding of the ways in which federal institutions and federal politics are carried out in 
practice strengthens existing theoretical propositions, and provides a measure of their 
usefulness.
As I seek to demonstrate in this thesis, negotiation and settlement, although they do 
not “solve” the stateness dilemma, are evidence of a degree of stability and legitimacy. 
Political elites possess enough desire or trust to engage the other party to respond, to some 
degree, to ongoing claims. The thesis builds on Sasse’s findings on post-Soviet Ukraine that 
accommodation of multinationality is a process as much as a result (Sasse, 1999). For his 
part, Tully points out that accommodating multinationalism — in other words engaging in a 
politics of recognition — is best viewed not as a finality but as unfinished and reiterative: 
“Any form of mutual recognition should be viewed as an experiment, open to review and 
reform in the future in response to legitimate demands for recognition against it, and so 
viewed as part of the continuous process rather than as the telos towards which the activity 
aims and at which it ends” (Tully, 2001: 20).
13
Chapter 1. Introduction
Definition o f Concepts and Approach
Federalism denotes both an end (the institutional framework) and the means of 
accommodation (the process by which claims are accommodated). Federalism as an end is 
commonly conceived as an institutional form which divides power so that federal and 
regional governments are both coordinate and independent within given spheres of 
competence, and established in a written constitution (Wheare, 1946: 11). While Riker 
shares this definition, he is particularly concerned with identifying the incentives provided 
by the institutions to persuade players to remain within the federal system and be locked 
into the institutional and constitutional arrangement (Riker, 1964). In this thesis, the 
institutional framework — federal design — is defined as “an institutionalised division of 
power between a central government and a set of constituent governments, in which each 
level of government has the power to make final decisions in some policy areas but cannot 
unilaterally modify the federal structure of the state” (Amoretti, 2004: 9). The constitution 
plays a key role in establishing the balance between federal and federated units. But as 
Hughes points out, the objective inherent in many theories of federalism is the preservation 
of state integrity, not necessarily devising means to organise power to facilitate an 
accommodation of diversity (Hughes, 2001b: 37-9).
The study of federalism as an institutional structure alone is fraught with limitations. 
Federalism is more than just an institutional structure, but denotes a means of governance 
which promotes both self-rule and shared-rule. Federal practice, therefore, is the process 
whereby the extent and content of this autonomy are established: “ ... the study of 
federalism directs the attention of political science away from a principal concern with the 
nature o f regimes to a principal concern with the character of political relationships — 
between political units, between governors and governed, between members of the body 
politic” (Elazar, 1987: 31-2). This leads Dikshit to argue that federalism is not only about a 
strict division of power but about inter-governmental relations and cooperation. For him, 
viewing governments in a federation as coordinate and cooperative facilitates the study of 
federalism as both means and end: “Modern federalism is, therefore, basically a federalism 
of functions rather than of powers — a federalism more of politics than laws” (Dikshit, 
1975: 8). F ed e ra l^  must be viewed as a continuing process, its institutions and 
instrumentalities evolving with time and changing needs. In this sense, it embodies the view 
that politics is unfinished business. It is recognition of the fact that issues cannot be 
immediately foreseen or forever resolved and as Duchacek contends, is “the whole point 
and the political merit of a federal formula” (Duchacek, 1987 [1970]: 193). The importance 
of federal design for many theorists and analysts of transition, as I examine in the next
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chapter, reveals a teleological bias. Federal design is posited a means to an end, such as 
stability, symmetry or order. As I have argued above, a greater contextualisation of the 
institutions is required to better grasp the ways in which federalism helps create or hinder 
governance capacity. As Livingstone notes, “it is the operation, not the form, that is 
important; and it is the forces that determine the manner o f operation that are more 
important still” (Livingstone, 1952: 88). The operation of federalism is related to the 
context: history, political configurations and the role and behaviour of political elites.
This composite definition o f federalism carries with it assumptions regarding the 
role and importance of institutions. As I examine in the following chapter, the role of 
institutions in processes of post-communist transition is a matter of significant debate. In 
many of these debates, institutions are posited as defining the parameters of political 
activity, what March and Olsen define as “the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, 
strategies, organization forms, and technologies around which political activity is 
constructed” (March and Olsen, 1989: 22). As North points out, the role of institutions “is 
to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to 
human interaction” (North, 1990: 6). In studies of political transition institutions are 
endowed with a foundational aura. They are the product of initial “high politics”, and once 
established are expected configure the political practice and subsequent rule-making and 
institution-building (Robinson, 2000: 2-3). The primary concern, thus, is to insulate 
institutions from political challenge. Elster defines this process as the institutionalisation of 
agency, where the “rules according to which political and distributional conflicts carried out 
are relatively immune from becoming the object of [...] conflict” (As quoted in Robinson, 
2000: 3). Consequendy, the stability of the state relies on the successful creation of formal 
first-order institutions, immune from negotiation and bargaining (Filippov, Ordeshook et 
al., 2004: 36).
However, the emphasis on institutions as foundation to politics is limiting and as 
North suggests, “gives us an inadequate and frequently misleading notion about the 
relationship between formal constraints and performance” (North, 1990: 53). Neo­
institutionalism, with its simultaneous focus on institutions as “independent” and 
“dependent” variables, as configuring but also configured by agency, is a more useful 
framework for my purposes (Peters, 1996: 205). Since Quebec’s and Tatarstan’s 
constitutional disagreements consist of claims which contest their states’ formal institutions 
— the constitution, federal design — these institutions are not immune but wrapped up in 
politics and are the subject and object o f political struggle. Indeed, as Hay and Wincott 
suggest, institutions may be viewed as structures whose functionality or dysfunctionality in a 
given context is an open question (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 954). The relationship between
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structure and agency is a key element of the processes of fashioning consensus on the rules 
of politics and where institutional change “is seen to reside in the relationship between 
actors and the context in which they find themselves, between institutional ‘architects’, 
institutionalized subjects and institutional environments” (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 955). 
Thus, it calls for bringing the politics back into the study of institutions and institutional 
change to focus on the interaction between structure and agency in the fashioning of the 
rules of politics.
The value of such a process-based view of institutions and institutional change is 
twofold. First, it emphasises the role of agency. As Steinmo and Thelen write, outcomes do 
not result solely from institutions (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992: 2). While institutions serve to 
constrain and refract politics, agency and political choices also shape institutions. The 
relationship is dynamic. The effects of institutions are contingent, mediated by other 
institutional or non-institutional factors (Weaver and Rockman, 1993: 463). Second, it 
provides for a more contextual analysis of the processes of institution-making and 
institutional design. Gel’man contends that analysis of the processes of institutional choice 
in Russia’s regions contributes to our understanding of the influence of institutions on 
political behaviour (Gel'man, 2000: 103). Sasse’s study of multinationalism in Ukraine 
shows that processes of negotiation of institutional frameworks are part of the solution to 
conflicts in divided societies (Sasse, 2001: 95; Sasse, 2002).
Thus, the interplay between formal and informal processes, between formal 
institutional design and the politics that occur within are important in assessments of 
institutional performance (North, 1990: 53). Beissinger seeks precisely to determine the role 
of agency in the nationalism which characterised the late Soviet period by viewing 
nationalist mobilisation as an interaction between an existing institutional order and the 
actions of those seeking to alter or overturn that order through the production and 
multiplication of disruptive events (Beissinger, 2002: 19). Consequently, these events shape 
a new institutional order, which, in turn, is subject to disruption. Similarly, Gorenburg 
focuses on nationalist mobilisation within Russia’s autonomous republics to show that it is 
not the existence per se of these units which determined successful nationalist mobilisation, 
but the ways in which nationalist appeals are formulated by a particular elite, the existence 
of institutional resources to support and perpetuate the appeals and importantly, the extent 
to which nationalists can elicit popular approval (Gorenburg, 2003: 5-18).
The paradox of multinational federalism, therefore, must be viewed within a larger 
context of competing political demands and political responses articulated by different 
levels of government, which beget institutional change or continuity. Changes in political 
structure create new and different opportunities and the basis for further elite activities. For
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my purposes, then, whether federal design helps or hinders the accommodation of 
multinationalism will depend on the qualities of the institutional framework but also the 
behaviours and strategies of actors within this framework.
M ethodology
As Coppieters (2001: 4) writes, “The strength of comparative federal analysis resides 
primarily in providing access to the wealth of experience of successful and failed federal 
practices”. I believe comparative analysis of these cases can yield useful findings, particularly 
to identify options, mechanisms and institutional configurations which may be overlooked 
when examining each case sui generis. The approach to the case studies in this thesis is 
configurative (Ragin, 1987: 3), aimed at examining the processes of accommodation as a 
configuration of relationships between institutions and actors (Katznelson, 1997: 96). The 
primary objective of the “focused comparisons” is to generate understanding as to the logic 
of politics as pertains to the role of federal institutions in the accommodation of 
multinationalism (Peters, 1998: 65).
The purpose of relating Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s respective claims and institutional 
and political responses is to draw attention to similarities and differences which may be 
underestimated. Tatarstan and Quebec constitute two key cases in studies of Russian and 
comparative federalism. As such, they provide an opportunity to refine our understanding 
of the challenges of multinationalism and the kind of institutional and political responses 
they elicit. Ultimately, the comparison identifies areas which existing theories and post­
communist have overlooked and should be developed further. The policy cases in particular 
test theoretical assumptions about the role and appropriateness of a degree of asymmetry or 
collective rights in addressing multinationalism. In sum, the case studies and comparison 
aim to ground theoretical accounts of multinational federalism and Russian federalism in a 
more comprehensive and empirical manner.
My purpose is not to present the case of Quebec as a panacea, or point to elements 
of Canada’s political system which should be transplanted in Russia. Moreover, it is beyond 
the scope of this study to compare federal-provincial relations in Canada and Russia as a 
whole. The complexity inherent in a federation of 89 units versus Canada’s ten provinces 
and three territories would reduce the usefulness and validity of a comparative study. Within 
Canadian studies of comparative federalism, the case of Tatarstan — and Russia more 
generally — is not well-known. Similarly, in the context of studies of Russian federalism, 
analysis of the Canadian case is often superficial.1 In recent years, a number of conferences
1 For instance, Ross provides an erroneous appreciation o f  Canada’s division o f  powers (Ross, 2002: 10). 
Moreover, Oracheva’s and Goble’s analyses quoted above mistakenly blame Quebec nationalists for
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and workshops have been organised in an effort to draw parallels between both countries 
and identify lessons for Russia’s federal design (e.g. Solomon, 2003). Policy-makers in 
Tatarstan and Russia are keen to understand how federal experiences and institutions in 
Quebec and Canada relate to their own and how these can help.2
The focus of the thesis is on constitutional and federal design in Tatarstan and 
Russia; in Quebec and Canada. Besides policy case studies on language, I concentrate 
mainly on constitutional and institutional relations and policies. In the thesis, there is little 
discussion of the role of political parties, nor does it consider the international context and 
how it affects institutional and political developments or of elite interests, particularly 
economic interests in the discussion of federalism. I also leave aside the role of religion in 
Tatarstan. Although the place of Islam (and number of mosques) has grown in the republic 
since 1991, religion has not been a salient factor in nationalist mobilisation or in Tatarstan’s 
claims vis-a-vis the federal government until now (a position confirmed in other studies of 
Tatarstan, such as Graney, 1999; Kondrashov, 2000). Presidential advisor Rafael Khakimov 
states that the Islam practiced in Tatarstan tends to be what he calls Euro-Islam, a 
pragmatic, non-politicised form (Interview with Khakimov, 2004). Demands for 
recognition of Tatarstan as a multinational, multilingual and multi-confessional state have 
trumped demands for its recognition as an Islamic republic.
Sources
The thesis is theoretically informed by studies of post-communist transition, 
federalism and multinational accommodation. It provides analysis of material from across a 
number of disciplines, and as such brings studies of transition and Russian federalism into 
greater contact with approaches developed by scholars of multinational federalism and 
minority rights. It is based on a wide array of primary sources and documentary evidence 
such as constitutions; laws; court rulings; as well as government reports available in Russian, 
English or French. This primary material is supplemented with semi-structured elite 
interviews of between thirty and sixty minutes in Kazan, Ottawa and Quebec City as well as 
newspaper and media reports accessed in Tatarstan during a period of fieldwork in Kazan 
in Spring 2004 and in Canada over the course of several shorter trips in 2003 and 2004. 
Through my fieldwork, particularly in Tatarstan, I sought to gain knowledge of the
perpetuating the stateness dilemma. Quebec’s constitutional struggle is not only a struggle for secession; 
provincial governments o f  all stripes have demanded the federal constitution grant more recognition and 
jurisdiction.
2 While in Kazan, I had the opportunity to attend no less than three international conferences on federalism 
and the benefits o f  comparative analysis, one o f  which was attended by officials from Canadian and Quebec 
governments. The conference in question was organised by the Kazan Institute o f  Federalism, entitled 
Scientific-practical Conference on Federalism in Russia, Canada and Belgium: The Experience o f  Comparative 
Analysis, Kazan, 17-18 May 2004.
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processes and mechanisms which underpin language policy in the republic, on which litde 
primary or secondary material exists. Moreover, it provided a crucial insight into elite 
perceptions of the language issue and of the state of federal-regional relations in Russia.
A N ote on the Cases
The republic o f Tatarstan is located 800km south-west of Moscow. The capital, 
Kazan, is located at the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers. Measuring 68,000 square 
kilometres (0.3 per cent of Russia’s area), it is Russia’s eighth most populous region, with a 
population of 3.8M, of which 51 per cent are Tatars, 41 per cent Russians and the 
remaining eight per cent are members of other nationalities (Chuvash, Ukrainians, etc.) 
(Data from 2002 census). However, ethnicity and language competence do not necessarily 
correspond. The overwhelming majority of Tatars are fluent in Russian, whereas overall 
competence in Tatar is lower.3 The population of Tatarstan represents approximately three 
per cent of the overall population of Russia. State-wide, Tatars are Russia’s largest national 
minority (3.8 per cent o f the population). Two-thirds of Russia’s Tatars live outside the 
borders of Tatarstan. Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodoxy are the traditional religions. 
Tatarstan is one of 89 “federal subjects” (territorial units) of the Russian Federation, and 
one of twenty-one republics. State-wide, Russian is the sole official language. In Tatarstan, 
both Tatar and Russian have the status of state languages.
Quebec (capital: Quebec City) is the largest province of Canada, measuring 1.5M 
square kilometres (15 per cent of Canada’s total area). Quebec is the second most populous 
province (24 per cent o f Canada’s population), with 7.6M inhabitants, of which 
approximately 81 per cent are francophone, 8 per cent anglophone and 10 per cent 
allophone (speaking another language). 80 per cent of the population is of French descent. 
Quebec is one of ten provinces and three territories. French and English are the official 
languages of Canada. French is the official language of Quebec.
Overview of Thesis
In Chapter 2 ,1 examine in greater detail how the challenges of multinationalism and 
multinational federalism are theorised. The chapter gives particular attention to the ways in 
which scholars have addressed the case of Russia in their frameworks. Scholars of Russia’s 
transition from authoritarianism argue that national unity is a pre-requisite for stable
3 As Gorenburg notes, while 96.6 per cent Tatars in Tatarstan claimed Tatar is their native language in the 
1989 census, respondents often gave the same answer to the question on native language as on ethnicity, thus 
overstating Tatars’ competence in their native language (Gorenburg, 2005: 3). Subsequent studies have found 
that 97.4 per cent o f  rural Tatars and 65.1 per cent o f  urban Tatars consider themselves fluent in their native 
language (Iskhakova, 2001: 39-40; Gorenburg, 2005: 3 -4 ).
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institutions and regime consolidation. This chapter challenges this assumption and examines 
the way in which the lack of constitutional agreement can be bridged in multinational states.
Chapter 3 turns to the case of Tatarstan, examining the nature of its claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction. It focuses mainly on the expression of Tatarstan’s demands for 
status, its 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty and 1992 Constitution, and on the federal 
constitution and institutions implemented by the federal government in 1993. I examine the 
nature of the constitutional disagreement which emerged between these two governments 
and the process which led to the conclusion of the bilateral treaty and a series of power- 
sharing intergovernmental agreements in 1994 to bridge the constitutional divides.
In Chapter 4 ,1 follow the evolution of Tatarstan’s claims during the Putin era. After 
2000, federal reforms and increased political measures were adopted by the central 
government to reassert the primacy of the federal constitution and rollback the asymmetries 
which had appeared de facto since 1990. During this period, the nature of Tatarstan’s 
demands evolved — by and large the republic now acknowledges Russia’s constitution and 
accepts its place, as a federated unit, within Russia’s federal design. But republican elites 
continue to demand differentiated status and argue in favour of federal practice which 
would be more protective of its jurisdiction and autonomy.
Chapter 5 focuses on language policy in Tatarstan. Demands for increased status 
and utility for the Tatar language was a feature of nationalist mobilisation at the end of 
perestroika. I provide an assessment of Tatarstan’s language policy and show that its 
shortcomings are most often due to a lack of domestic political resolve rather than a 
constraining federal design. Indeed although tensions between the federal and republican 
governments exist, overall the extent to which Tatarstan has been able to implement its 
language policies demonstrates that federalism in Russia is conducive to the 
accommodation of demands for competence over language.
In Chapter 6, I examine the case of federal design in Canada and the responses to 
Quebec’s claims for recognition and jurisdiction. This case is characterised by repeated 
failures and inabilities to accommodate Quebec’s claims within the federal constitution. The 
persistent nature of Quebec’s constitutional demands emphasises the importance and role 
of intergovernmental negotiation and agreements in developing de facto accommodation of 
the province’s demands. I focus on the case of intergovernmental agreements on 
immigration to show that notwithstanding the constitutional conflict, accommodation of 
Quebec’s claims is possible and ongoing.
Chapter 7 studies language policy in Quebec. In the province language was closely 
linked to questions of political status. Yet as I show, from the very beginning, Quebec 
possessed the constitutional and jurisdictional autonomy required to carry out ambitious
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measures in the field of language. Although the federal government has too implemented 
language laws and policies, the objectives of which compete with Quebec’s, I find that the 
overall situation is stable. The case of language in Quebec is, like Tatarstan, an example of 
successful federalism.
In Chapter 8, I seek to provide a more sustained comparison of the cases of 
Tatarstan and Quebec. Starting with a succinct examination of the ways in which claims for 
recognition, jurisdiction and language policy are addressed in both cases, I turn to analyse 
the characteristics of these regimes. Intergovernmental accommodation and negotiation has 
created federal stability in these cases. I examine some of the drawbacks inherent in an 
over-reliance on intergovernmentalism in a discussion of the importance of balance 
between institutions of inter-state and intra-state federalism. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of some of the limits of institutional stability in these cases, which include 
disagreement on the role of the courts, territorial structure and political competition.
The concluding Chapter 9 summarises the main findings and research questions and 
reconsiders the proposal that Tatarstan is the Quebec of Russia. It draws conclusions on 
the prospects for continued accommodation of Tatarstan’s demands within Russia’s federal 
system.
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Lack o f  consensus makes constitutional change 
necessary. The same lack o f  consensus makes 
constitutional change particularly difficult... 
Because the constitution lacked consensus, it had 
to be debated. But the same lack o f  consensus 
made it impossible to agree on a new one.
(Banting and Simeon, 1985: 25)
We can only hope to ‘manage’, not to solve, 
conflicts arising from ethnocultural diversity. 
(Kymlicka, 1998: 3)
In the context of Russia’s transition from authoritarianism, scholars, following Linz 
and Stepan (Linz and Stepan, 1996; 1997), have viewed multinationalism in Russia as 
characterising a ‘stateness’ dilemma, the resolution of which is considered an important 
precondition for the consolidation of stable (and democratic) federalism. The objective of 
this chapter is to demonstrate that the way in which the challenges of multinationalism are 
theorised by transitologists and many scholars of Russian federalism give short shrift to the 
difficulties inherent in developing the constitutional consensus which they deem is required.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the challenges inherent in 
multinational federalism and the two kinds of claims made by a federation’s minority 
national components: claims for recognition and jurisdiction. Second, the issue of designing 
federal institutions will be discussed, focusing on the ways in which these claims can be 
taken into account and the debates between symmetrical and asymmetrical federal design. 
Third, I examine the concept of ‘stateness’ in order to demonstrate transitologists’ emphasis 
on the need for constitutional and institutional consensus occults other facets of successful 
accommodation.
The Challenges o f Multinational Federalism
When Stepan questions whether federalism, multinationalism and democracy can 
coexist, he reframes the terms of an ongoing debate (Stepan, 2001: 189). J.S. Mill believed 
“free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities”, and 
that boundaries of government should coincide as far as possible with those of nationalities 
(Mill, 1964 [1861]: 297). For Almond, a state characterised by cultural homogeneity and 
overlapping memberships exhibits stable and effective government while one characterised 
by increased heterogeneity and segmented memberships results in ineffective governance 
(Almond, 1956; Barry, 1989: 104). Dahl was doubtful that a functioning democratic system 
could be maintained in a polity characterised by subcultural pluralism since it exerts a 
“dangerous strain” on the tolerance and mutual security required to consolidate a
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democratic political system (Dahl, 1971: 5). For Linz and Stepan, a state encounters a 
‘stateness dilemma’ “when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries 
of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of 
citizenship in that state” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 16). They too posit that underlying 
diversities may jeopardise the legitimacy of the state’s institutions as well as the outcome of 
regime transition. For them, “agreements about stateness are logically prior to the creation 
of democratic institutions” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 26). In a multinational federation, 
however, reaching such agreements is an elusive prospect.
Baubock identifies the specificity of multinational federations as the “political 
representation of perceived differences of collective identity through the division of federal 
units so that such groups exercise powers of self-government within some or all of the 
units” (Baubock, 2000: 369). A stateness dilemma exists in such a state when a territorialised 
minority perceives itself as collectively different than the majority (of the state overall, or in 
relation to other federal units) and deserving of some kind of different treatment 
(Definition adapted from Amoretti, 2004: 2). Such a definition has the advantage of putting 
the issue of stateness front and centre: the state is called upon to deal with the national 
unit’s demands and interests. Furthermore, politics in such a system are likely to reflect 
differences in perceptions of the political community and of institutions: “ ... both the 
majority and minority collectives are the product of processes of nation-building that to a 
certain extent will have to compete with each other when they try to make collective 
decisions within the same territory (division of powers, use of political symbols, institutions, 
presence in the international arena, languages, national holidays, educational curricula, etc.)” 
(Requejo, 2003: 26). In a multinational federation, managing the stateness dilemma is made 
complex by these competing policy demands and visions of the state and political 
community.
Kymlicka focuses on two “pivotal” issues for the successful management of 
diversity within a multinational federation: 1) how the boundaries of federal subunits are 
drawn and 2) how powers are distributed between different levels of government 
(Kymlicka, 2001: 93). O ’Leary and Lustick formulate these issues in two tasks: right-sizing 
and right-shaping (O'Leary, Lustick et al., 2001: 1-14). Right-sizing is the articulation of 
“preferences of political agents at the centre of existing regimes to have what they regard as 
appropriate external and internal territorial borders” (Ibid.: 2). The choice of a strategy and 
institutional configuration (e.g. federalism, autonomy, consociationalism, control) is made at 
this stage. Once the institutional structure is established, “right-shaping” is the process 
whereby determinations are made on jurisdiction and competencies of territorial units and 
the size, shape, weight, and capacity of central and local governments (O'Leary, Lustick et
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al., 2001: 10). Right-shaping, in other words, concerns more precisely issues of federal 
design.
In the period preceding and following the collapse o f the Soviet Union, the 
boundaries of Russia’s federal system were widely discussed. Tatarstan’s efforts to raise its 
status to Union republic and secure a confederal-type relationship with Russia are examples 
of the right-shaping which occurred. In Canada, discussions about right-shaping occur 
mainly in the context of Quebec’s proposals for secession. For the purposes of this thesis, I 
leave aside consideration of the issue o f boundaries and right-sizing, and concentrate mainly 
on the second task, right-shaping. Within this task, Tatarstan and Quebec issue two sorts of 
claims: for recognition of their specificity (e.g. special status) and for jurisdiction (e.g. 
autonomy, asymmetry, division o f powers). These claims for recognition and jurisdiction 
continually renew the stateness dilemma because many of the concrete demands address 
concerns such as citizenship, electoral systems, official languages and religions, rights of a 
group to special position in the polity (Horowitz, 1985: 187).
Shared sovereignty and shared jurisdictions within federal states creates a potential 
for tension between a conception of democracy as majority rule, and as power-sharing. Is 
the federation predicated on the norm of equal citizenship as the basis of political identity, 
where the central government is the main bearer and guarantor of national unity? Or, does 
it admit the possibility of divided sovereignties and multiple or nested identities and 
approaches to policy? The distribution of powers — right-shaping a multinational federation 
-  is a balancing act between majority and minority, shared- and self-rule and the minority’s 
claims for recognition and jurisdiction. In studies of federalism, the terms of this balancing 
act are those of symmetrical and asymmetrical federalism.
Federal Symmetry and Asymmetry
Federal symmetry is defined as “the extent to which component states share in the 
conditions and thereby the concerns more or less common to the federal system as a 
whole” (Tarlton, 1965: 861). In a symmetrical federation, the component units are miniature 
reflections of the same cleavages and identities of the political whole. In other words, it is 
one where presumably no stateness dilemma exists. Asymmetry, on the other hand, comes 
in different varieties. Political asymmetry characterises the cultural, economic, social and 
political conditions which affect the power and influence of component governments with 
each other and the central government. As Duchacek reminds us, all federations are 
asymmetric in some way or other since power, resources etc. are distributed in different 
ways (Duchacek, 1987 [1970]). For Tarlton, conflict is more likely in situations where the 
relationships between local and central authorities differ: “the degree of harmony or conflict
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within a federal system can be thought of as a function o f the symmetrical pattern 
prevailing within the system” (Tarlton, 1965: 871). Similar to the arguments surveyed above 
about national unity, federations in which asymmetry predominates are predicted to be 
more unstable. While political asymmetry is a naturally-occurring phenomenon, constitutional 
asymmetry characterises a division of powers between federal and regional governments 
(and within federal subunits) which is not uniform (See Watts, 1999: 63-8 for a discussion 
of political and constitutional asymmetries). Also prevalent is de facto asymmetry, arising 
from arrangements which are not entrenched in a constitution but are the result of demands 
and negotiation within specific policy contexts.
The challenge, as Hughes points out, is to determine “ ...whether built-in 
constitutional or institutional asymmetries are an exceptionally destabilising factor” 
(Hughes, 2001b: 38). The theoretical argument for symmetry in federal systems rearticulates 
the bias analysed above for stability over diversity, majority rule over power sharing. Power 
sharing is seen to lead to the institutionalisation of difference, which is seen as inimical to a 
stable federal polity. Stepan analyses federal systems on a demos-constraining to demos- 
enabling continuum, and concludes that constitutional asymmetries tend to be demos- 
constraining and threaten the equality of citizenship (Stepan, 2001: 340-1). In a textbook 
written for the Russian Ministry of Justice, Umnova concludes that “In an asymmetrical 
federation, as a rule, conflicts are inevitable and propagate as the division between subjects 
o f the federation become permanent sources of unhappiness for those whose rights are 
unobjectively restricted” (Umnova, 1998: 40). Asymmetry, whether constitutional or de facto, 
is considered as zero-sum: rights or competence given to one group restrict the rights of 
others. Furthermore, Umnova’s remarks about asymmetry constituting “unobjective” 
restrictions challenge the legitimacy of differentiated rights and political asymmetry, because 
these depart from a norm of equality a constitution is expected to foster. But as Webber 
points out, “constitutional asymmetry is not so much about citizens getting more power as 
about where they exercise it” (Webber, 1994: 229).
Asymmetry is a means of right-shaping and distributing competence in order to 
respond to claims for recognition and jurisdiction. Constitutional asymmetries recognise the 
possibility that one-size-fits-all distributions of competence may not address the needs of 
particular federal units. The state recognises and takes steps to protect (or at least, devolves 
the competences required so the subunit has the powers to protect) its specificity. Linz and 
Stepan argue a regime of universal citizenship rights — a common ‘roof of state-mandated 
and -enforced individual rights — is adequate to promote stability and ensure respect of 
national minorities’ rights and claims (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 33). Such a prescription 
inevitably results in entrenching a degree of asymmetry. But talking asymmetry and
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institutionalising asymmetry are two different processes. Indeed, Stepan believes individual 
rights must trump policies that diverge from the ideal of equality: “individual rights should 
be a property of the federal center”, and “any laws and social policies that violate this state­
wide bill of individual rights must fall outside the constitutionally guaranteed policy scope 
of subunits” (Stepan, 2001: 198). In the end, “ [t]hough formalized asymmetry may be 
defensible from any number of perspectives, it will most often be trumped by the equality 
principle in constitutional politics” (Milne, 1991: 286). As I examine in greater detail in 
Chapters 5 and 7 the tensions between individual rights guaranteed by the centre and 
regional competences to establish and manage minority language policy are an element of 
federal-regional resentment.
Just as civic state identity is posited to lead to more neutral and stable outcomes, 
symmetry and uniformity in rights and governmental competence are considered necessary 
to protect democracy. For Webber, the argument that asymmetry dilutes equality and rights 
is an argument for the nation in disguise: leaders are not really concerned with individual 
liberty, but assume that uniformity of treatment and symmetry is part of what being a 
country means (Webber, 1994: 253). The entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms by Pierre Trudeau’s government is analysed as breaking with federal 
relationships (seen as “diverse, filtered, diluted, subject to mediation, and complicated”) to 
make the state-citizen relationship “systematised, centralised, uniform, constant, unilateral 
and direct” (John Whyte in Cairns, 1992: 79-80). Similar language is found Valentei’s 
criticism of Russia’s asymmetrical federalism: “everyone knows what separating one’s 
children into those who are favourites and those who are not can result in. The effect has 
been analogous, a total lack of respect on the part of the children towards the parents and 
towards one another”(Quoted in Smith, 1998: 1398). For Kymlicka, in the discussions 
about asymmetry creating different classes of citizens it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
opposition to asymmetry is not rooted in latent ethnocentrism (Kymlicka, 2001: 105). 
Hughes goes further, stating that arguments in favour of federal symmetry and equalisation 
of federal units often cloaks outright hostility toward minority rights — driven by claims to 
promoting stability and ‘assimilation’ (Hughes, 2001b: 45). Asymmetrical federalism is 
rejected because it may contribute to perpetuate, rather than solve, a stateness dilemma.
Addressing the Stateness Dilem m a
The grandfather of transition studies, Rustow, names national unity as a background 
condition for successful consolidation of democracy. For him consensus on “national 
unity” is deemed to exist when the “vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be have no 
doubt or mental reservation as to which political community they belong to” (Rustow,
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1970: 350). Thus, it is theorised that “without some prior consensus on overarching 
national identity and boundaries little or nothing can be accomplished to move the system 
out of the protracted uncertainty of transition in to the relative calm [...] of consolidation” 
(Schmitter and Karl, 1994: 184). The more pluri -national, -lingual, -religious or -cultural a 
society is, the more complex these theorists posit politics will be in these regimes, thus 
making it harder to come to an agreement on institutional and constitutional fundamentals. 
Thus, just as Rustow before them, Linz and Stepan state the condition of stable state 
consolidation: the “congruence between the polis and the demos facilitates the creation of a 
democratic nation-state: it also virtually eliminates all problems of ‘stateness’ and should 
thus be considered a supportive condition for democratic consolidation” (Linz and Stepan, 
1997: 24). This assumption, however, is increasingly challenged as unable to fully grasp the 
challenge of multinationalism. As Stephen May suggests: “the principal difficulty with the 
formulation of nation-state congruence [...] is its inability to accommodate and/or 
recognise the legitimate claims of nations without states, or national minorities” (May, 2001: 
75).
In multinational states, what solutions do transition theorists suggest for forging 
consensus on national unity? In addition to a regime of universal citizenship rights, Linz 
and Stephan concede that in multinational and multicultural states, a hybrid approach may 
be warranted: “combining collective rights for nationalities or minorities with individual 
rights fully protected by the state is the least conflictual solution” (Linz and Stepan, 1997: 
26). In other words, individual plus group rights may be an appropriate solution to stateness 
problems. For his part, Offe sees the politics of difference and identity conflict as 
intractable and suggests group rights are a possible antidote, useful particular in situations 
where a minority is territorialized (Offe, 1998: 123). However, claims that group rights 
constitute an antidote or least conflictual solutions are dubious because the crucial question 
of how a regime of individual and group rights is established is not addressed. As I examine 
throughout this thesis, political discussions and adoption of such mixed-rights regimes is an 
eminently conflictual affair, constituting the essence of politics in a multinational state. 
Moreover, I deal with two layers of institutional design — one based on territory (where 
claims are made regarding the place of the minority unit within federal design) and the other 
based on a particular minority group (where claims are made regarding specific policies, 
such as language). Group rights do not solve, but perpetuate and reframe the stateness 
dilemma.
As Kymlicka remarks, liberal approaches are wed to the idea “that people’s interest 
in cultural membership is adequately protected by the common rights of citizenship, and 
that any further measures to protect this interest are illegitimate” (Kymlicka, 1995: 107). In
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Stepan and Linz’s own framework, there is considerable tension between group rights 
(which they posit as a less conflictual solution) and individual universal rights. Indeed, they 
contrast democratic politics (which emphasise strong and equal citizenship rights and more 
conducive to democratic consolidation) to nation-state politics (in which policies are aimed at 
increasing cultural homogeneity) (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 25). This tension between “civic” 
and “ethnic” state-building is widespread in studies of the post-communist institutional 
design. Similar tensions exist between asymmetrical and symmetrical federal designs and the 
former promotes stable and democratic outcomes. For instance, it is unclear whether 
theorists such as Linz and Stepan would consider language policies carried out by federal 
subunits such as Quebec or Tatarstan as measures that promote equality or nationalisation. 
Kuzio calls for the need to decouple nation and stateness and suggests civic forms of state 
and identity lead to more stable regimes (Kuzio, 2001: 171-2). Civic, however, does not 
mean neutral or unproblematic. Policies of state-mandated and enforced universal rights 
must be contextualised as part of a deliberate strategy of given political actors, on which 
consensus may or may not have been achieved, and the legitimacy of which may be tainted 
by the processes by which the rights are entrenched. Kymlicka makes clear that the pursuit 
of civic integration nevertheless promotes a form of ‘societal culture’, which is territorially- 
concentrated and centred on a shared language, used in a range of public and private 
societal institutions (Kymlicka, 2001: 25). So-called civic approaches fail to address other 
facets of the stateness dilemma, namely claims for the recognition of difference, and for the 
legitimacy of difference. Leaders in Tatarstan and Quebec greeted their respective federal 
constitutions, which laid down a regime of individual rights (along with some collective 
rights) with scepticism, contending precisely that the basic law did not take account of their 
particular cultural, linguistic or historical interests. Furthermore, the state’s constitution- 
building was not perceived as neutral, but as competing state-building strategies which 
sought to subordinate national identity to an overarching ideal of national identity and unity.
For stateness “fixers”, the primary task is “to get the initial constitutional rules 
right” (Hanson, 2001: 133). Just as national unity is the background condition for stability, 
“the founding constitutional arrangements of any regime must surely be considered as one 
of the most important factors determining the future trajectory of the state” (Ross, 2000: 
405). In other words, federalism, democracy, stability, and justice result from the 
constitutional order put in place. But little detail is given on the processes whereby 
consensus is achieved on the constitutional rules. To say the foundations are important is 
not to say how they are established and how they are implemented, especially in a 
multinational context where consensus on the very form and content of the state is 
challenged. Furthermore, a fixation on the importance of institutional design alone hinders
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the consideration of other factors which may create conditions for consensus. The apolitical 
nature of the transitologists’ approaches to stateness constitutes a significant lacuna of their 
theorisations. The fact that solving the stateness dilemma is placed prior to politics gives us 
little insight into the kind of institutional arrangement or political behaviour which may 
contribute to accommodating multinationalism. Hughes and Sasse emphasise the variety of 
factors which come into play — role of institutions, elites, regime type, and international 
context (Hughes and Sasse, 2001: 223-37).
Needed is better insight into the ways in which the stateness dilemma is expressed 
and addressed by governments within federal states. While the stateness concept arises in 
the context of transition studies, the argument that national unity — the congruence between 
polis and demos — is required to promote state stability and democracy is neither new nor 
unique to that discipline. Moreover, the theoretical assumptions do not correspond to a 
number real-world cases, such as Canada, Switzedand, Spain or Belgium, sill governed 
democratically against a backdrop of unresolved stateness dilemmas. A stateness dilemma is 
more than the existence diversity. In a multinational federal state, the very structure of the 
state territorialises and perpetuates the existence of difference. The stateness dilemma is 
then expressed in the interplay between different levels of government and their different 
conceptions of the constitution and federal design. The institutional framework is the object 
of political struggle between elites at different levels of government. This thesis seeks to 
delve deeper into these questions by examining the role of federal design, asymmetrical 
federalism and federal practice in two precise cases, Tatarstan and Quebec.
The Myths o f Statism and Constitutionalism
Asymmetry is an important factor in multinational federations because it uncovers 
debates on the form and content of the institutional structure, and reveals tensions between 
various governments’ perceptions of the political community and identity within the state. 
Indeed, in the constitutional politics of Russia and Canada, the extent to which asymmetry 
is a factor which prevents or provokes instability and complaints of unequal treatment in 
favour of Tatarstan and Quebec is a key debate. Increased asymmetry for Quebec (whether 
in the form of constitutional recognition of the province as a distinct society, or the 
devolution of competence) is politically charged because of the unsettled consensus on 
whether Canada should be more or less centralised, more or less symmetrical, and indeed 
because of the ongoing debates regarding the consequences of asymmetry for unity and 
political community. Resistance to the constitutionalisation of asymmetry has led to the 
development de facto power sharing and asymmetry.
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Similar conflicts of vision in Russia led to the signing between 1994 and 1996 of an 
unprecedented series of bilateral intergovernmental agreements between federal and 
regional governments. Hughes argues the treaties, while increasing the complexity of 
Russia’s federal system, served a strategic purpose of defusing potential ethnic conflicts and 
regulating federal-regional conflict (Hughes, 1996: 43). For him, the treaties do not weaken 
federal institutions. Rather, in the context of the 1990s, negotiated asymmetrical federalism 
institutionalised a means of regulating the division of powers and managing elite differences 
(Hughes, 2001b: 54-61). Similarly, Zverev views Tatarstan’s treaty as fixing a status quo in its 
relations with Russia, helping to institutionalise a degree of predictability in federal relations 
(Zverev, 1998: 143).
However, the scholarly consensus on asymmetry and bilateralism in Russia is 
overwhelmingly negative. The bilateral treaties are seen as “dangerous precedents” (Stoner- 
Weiss, 1997: 239) for the future stability of Russia’s constitutional regime or as power-grabs 
by ethnic entrepreneurs (Solnick, 1995: 57; Treisman, 1996: 327). Stepan considers the 
bilateral treaties undemocratic (he calls them “a-constitutional”), mainly because they 
enshrine a norm of asymmetry and are not democratically sanctioned by parliament (Stepan, 
2001). (But he ignores the difficulties and paradoxes involved in obtaining majority consent 
for measures aimed at a minority). The view which the Putin administration and Russian 
courts adopted after 2000 is that the treaties drained Russia’s sovereignty and weakened the 
state. Sakwa concludes that the treaties and the asymmetric federalism they enshrine “not 
only granted differential rights to regional leaderships, but effectively established different 
gradations of democratic citizenship to those living in different parts of the country” 
(Sakwa, 2002: 2). Kahn concludes that the treaty practice hamstrung Russia’s institutional 
development: ‘W  hoc bilateral negotiations that circumvent federal institutions weaken 
structures that already suffer from low levels of respect or even compliance” (Kahn, 2002:
4).
It is virtually impossible to discern these scholars’ real intent: do they challenge 
asymmetry per se or seek to criticise the abuses which emerged in practice? In practice, 
Russia’s model of negotiated federal-regional relations did indeed result in a system of 
“segmented regionalism”, the characteristics of which are not conducive to the 
consolidation of federalism or democracy (Sakwa, 2002: 2). But judgement of the means 
and ends of asymmetry are commonly misconstrued in analyses of Russian federalism. For 
instance, when Ross contends bilateralism led to the rise of regional authoritarianism, he 
provides little detail on the nature of his presumed causal link between asymmetry and its 
consequences (Ross, 2002: 31). It is too easy to place responsibility for the 
institutionalisation of “regional fiefdoms”, the under-implementation or infringement of
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court rulings and constitutional norms in Russia to the existence of asymmetrical federalism 
alone. Rare are analyses of the way in which asymmetry contributes to accommodate 
stateness claims in a given context, and what alternatives were available at the time. This 
thesis seeks to provide a better contextualisation of the locus of asymmetry in Russia -  why 
and how it emerged as a practice, which purpose it played to respond to Tatarstan’s 
demands for recognition and jurisdiction as well as its claims for autonomy in the field of 
language policy, and what the consequences of such asymmetrical federalism have been.
Two normative assumptions are prevalent in the discussion of asymmetry and 
bilateralism: emphasis on the central state as guarantor of order and on the constitution as 
main problem-solving mechanism. Transitologists and many scholars of Russian federalism 
adopt the perspective of the central governments in their quest to design stable institutions. 
Przeworksi argues that it is institutional failure at the centre which provides a context for 
regionally-based nationalists to mobilise and promote an autonomy movement (Quoted in 
Dowley, 1998). Transitologists seek mechanisms that will engender centripetal processes, 
identification of component governments to the state as a whole, and also loyalty and 
allegiance to the central government. Kahn illustrates this objective well: “The component 
governments of a federation should consider the interests of the whole federal system, not 
just the singular pursuit of that component’s interests” (Kahn, 2002: 24). The assumption 
here is that an overarching sense of loyalty is necessary and that the right institutional 
framework can help manufacture it. It overlooks the fact that federalism is simultaneously a 
system of shared- and self-rule in which sovereignty is diffused and that loyalty may be bi­
directional. In addition, it overlooks the fact that in a multinational federation, characterised 
by the existence of ethnic difference, the interests of the majority will likely conflict with 
those of the minority. Indeed, within the minority unit, the interests of the “whole federal 
system” are unlikely to be viewed as neutral but as an expression of the will of the state’s 
majority population or ethnic group.
The second assumption is about the role of a constitution to promote unity and 
stability. Bilateralism and asymmetry are considered to create “exceptions” to constitutional 
rules, or to what a constitution should be. As Filippov et al. note in their recent work on 
designing federalism, their primordial concern is to make so-called first order components 
of a constitutional order non-negotiable and irreversible (Filippov, Ordeshook et al., 2004: 
71-5). This echoes Stepan’s prescription that a constitutional system must be self-enforcing, 
and that the rules of the game become the only ones in town (Stepan, 2000: 145-6). In the 
Russian context, the inability to get consensus on the ground rules is seen as jeopardising 
the entire enterprise:
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Unfortunately, during a period o f  time when the rules o f  the political game were very much 
in flux, vagueness for whatever reason could and often did lead to serious problems with 
lasting legacies. The result is that many fundamental questions have been left unanswered, 
only deferred. And as questions mount, they have a tendency to turn into problems. Issues 
o f  the supremacy o f  laws, judicial review, nullification, and sovereignty have all remained 
unresolved problems in Russia (Kahn, 2002: 61).
The bilateral treaty process, in other words, only delayed problems and did not ‘solve’ the
constitutional fundamentals. Stoner-Weiss suggests Russia must establish these
fundamentals by implementing a working court system to implement law, a national party
system to integrate centre and periphery and more democracy (Stoner-Weiss, 2004: 322-4).
Although valid, such prescriptions are issued with the objective of reducing administrative
complexity and eliminating asymmetry. Most prescriptions (Kahn’s in particular) have
tended to reaffirm the importance of protecting the federal constitution and reasserting the
importance of law to foster allegiance and loyalty on the part of regional government, seeing
treaties and asymmetry as obstacles to the development of such ‘feelings’, rather than the
underlying condition of multinationalism. Many of these analyses throw the baby out with
the bathwater. Arguing that asymmetry and differentiated rights weaken unity requires these
scholars to explain why symmetry and equality are better at creating stability.
These diagnoses and policy prescriptions are based on the assumption that some
sort of foundational agreement is required, and that a constitution must establish
unchanging rules of the game. “A modern constitution, Tully reminds us, thus appears as
the precondition of democracy, rather than a part of democracy” (Tully, 1995: 69).
Divergences from the norm — in the form of bilateral negotiations, disagreements on the
division o f competences and efforts to revise the ground-rules — are seen as strikes against a
constitutional consensus, and are thus reduced to harbingers of instability. “Stateness
fixers” place too much emphasis on constitutionalism and legalism as a way out of stateness
dilemmas. But in so doing, they reduce the usefulness of their theorisations in making sense
of situations where constitutional consensus is elusive, why it is lost or gained. Legalism, as
Gray writes, promotes an illusion that we can dispense with politics: “Whereas the
adjudication of rights is — or at least imagines itself to be — unconditional and final, a
political settlement can strike a balance among contending ideals and interests” (Gray, 2000:
117).
The arguments that symmetry and national unity lead to stable outcomes are strong 
from a liberal normative perspective. But they lack sufficient empirical or contextual 
foundation. Little effort has been made to see how asymmetry [de jure or de facto) turns 
vicious circles into virtuous ones. This is the purpose of the empirical analysis provided in 
this thesis. Hanson remarks that to say democracy is unconsolidated does not give us 
insight into what is good in the existing system and what if any sources of future stability
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and development emerge from existing arrangement (Hanson, 2001: 137). The same can be 
said about Russia’s and Canada’s practice of asymmetrical federalism, and the way in which 
the politics of federalism create capacity for ongoing accommodation of multinationalism.
Paradoxes o f Multinational Federalism
Measures to accommodate minority demands (asymmetry, differentiated rights) are
often analysed as a “slippery slope”: The institutionalisation of minorities and granting of
protective rights makes it easier and likelier to mobilise for more power and more rights
(Offe, 1998: 133). Diversity is seen as a challenge to unity, and policies which institutionalise
diversity are seen as worsening rather than solving the problem, a conundrum Kymlicka
calls the ‘paradox of multinational federalism’:
The very success o f  federalism in accommodating self-government may simply encourage 
national minorities to seek secession. The more that federalism succeeds in meeting the 
desire for self-government, the more it recognizes and affirms the sense o f  national identity 
amongst the minority group, and strengthens their political confidence (Kymlicka, 2001:
113).
In recent years, a number of works, mainly in political theory, have emerged which analyse 
the governance of multinational federations (Kymlicka, 1998; Kymlicka, 2001; Requejo, 
2001), and multinational democracies (Tully, 1995; Gagnon and Tully, 2001). The 
accommodation of multinationalism in these works is seen as unfinished business: 
successful accommodation requires the development of mechanisms that provide a basis 
for ongoing constitutional dialogue, an ongoing politics of recognition. These theorists have 
generally steered clear of the sort of prescriptions provided by transitologists, but seek to 
demonstrate that democratic accommodation rests on mutual understanding, consent and 
shared sovereignty. For Erk and Gagnon, mechanisms and behaviours which foster federal 
trust may be more effective than attempting to reach agreement on a common purpose. 
Federal trust expresses the confidence which exists between the members of a federation 
on each other’s integrity and commitment to finding a way to maintain the federal union. 
This is contrasted to federal comity (Bundestreue), a principle which like transitologists’ 
solution to the stateness dilemma, requires allegiance to a common purpose: 'bundestreue 
requires loyalty to trump autonomy (Erk and Gagnon, 2000: 94). In states where unity of 
purpose is elusive or contentious, we need to develop better capacity at identifying the 
institutions, practices and attitudes which foster federal trust, and engage governments in 
politics of accommodation. “Federalism does not provide a magic formula for the 
resolution of national differences. It provides at best a framework for negotiating these 
differences, and to make it work requires an enormous degree of ingenuity, goodwill, and 
indeed good luck” (Kymlicka, 2001: 118). Thus, the focus must be broader than on
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institutional design alone, but must include behaviours and mechanisms which create 
capacity for the governance of difference and multinationalism.
Do federal institutions lay down the groundwork for federalfiw? In her thesis on the 
development of fiscal federalism in Russia, Pascal concludes that this ism — the process — 
matters a great deal in creating expectations of stability and consistency: “The development 
of federalism is not simply a matter of implementing an efficient and clear institutional 
design to delineate authority and jurisdictions. It is a process in which actors actively bargain 
over the definition and shape of the institutional environment” (Pascal, 2000: 193). 
Przeworski, looking at democracy in the context of transition, names three crucial aspects: 
democracy is a form of institutionalisation of continual conflicts; the capacity of particular 
groups to realise their interests is shaped by the specific institutional arrangements of a 
given system; and although this capacity is given a priori, the outcomes of conflicts are not 
determined uniquely through the institutional arrangements or elites within the system 
(Przeworski, 1986: 58). In other words, “democratic compromise cannot be a substantive 
compromise; it can only be a contingent institutional compromise” (Przeworski, 1986: 59). 
Over-reliance on constitutionalism occults the contingent nature of the political relations 
and processes which occur in a polity, especially if we look to the constitution as a 
foundational ideal: “Too often constitutions are seen as the rational, unified expression of a 
people rather than the products of an accidental history often seized upon in politically 
hazardous times. The ritualistic exercise o f declaring and entrenching fundamental values in 
a constitution is often mistaken for an historical shortcut, an easy way to leap over the 
existential difficulties of actually securing or living out these principles in practice” (Milne, 
1986: 58).
Conclusion
I use the word “accommodate” purposely. The existence per se of a stateness 
dilemma does not mean that state stability is impossible. Perhaps one difficulty is the fact 
that discussion of stateness has largely occurred within the paradigm of transition studies, 
for which transition leads to consolidation once “abnormality” leads to “normality”. 
Normality, here, designates accoutumance, acceptance of institutions and predictability and 
consistent elite behaviour within institutions (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). We need to 
question what ‘normality’ signifies within the context of a multinational federation where a 
degree of consensus on structural or institutional issues may exist but questions of identity, 
rights, jurisdiction and recognition are unresolved or are in evolution. Tully suggests the 
sort o f shift required:
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“We should focus on the field o f  interaction in which the conflict arises and needs to be 
resolved. [...] [A] conflict is not a struggle o f one minority for recognition in relation to 
other actors who are independent of, unaffected by and neutral with respect to the form o f  
recognition that the minority seeks. Rather, a struggle for recognition o f  a ‘minority’ always 
calls into question and (if successful) modifies, often in complex ways, the existing forms o f  
reciprocal recognition o f  the other members o f the larger system o f  government o f  which 
the minority is a member (Tully, 2005: 86).
For Kahn, the lack of consensus on sovereignty, autonomy, rule of law results in a 
lack of consensus on the merits and design of federal government (Kahn, 2002: 5). But lack 
of consensus does not imply a hopeless situation. Within a federal system, component 
governments may not be arguing against the system as a whole, but arguing for a 
reconfiguration of the institutional framework. The challenge during regime transition and 
the resulting de-institutionalisation is to identify and strengthen the mechanisms 
implemented to re-institutionalise multinationality (Hughes and Sasse, 2001: 229-33). Lack 
of consensus denotes continuing debate over the form and content of institutions, over the 
meaning of sovereignty and the extent to which it can be shared. Political elites in Quebec 
and Tatarstan have consistently been in favour of federalism, just a different kind of federal 
design, and different constellation of powers etc. Thus, the disagreement may endure but 
stability becomes a function of politics rather than only a function of the institutional 
ground rules. Especially if these ground rules are the subject of debate. Stateness, rather as 
being seen as an obstacle to state stability, can be seen as a modus vivendi (Gray, 2000: 25) of 
politics in multinational polities and as Keating writes, “nationality [is] a form of politics to 
be negotiated continually, rather than as a problem to be resolved once and for all, after 
which ‘normal’ politics can resume” (Keating, 2001: 3). As I turn to examine the cases of 
Tatarstan and Quebec in more detail, accommodation rather than resolution of constitutional 
disagreements is a better lens to examine and assess the capacity of federal design in 
addressing these disagreements and the stateness dilemma in the multinational federations 
of Russia and Canada.
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Chapter 3. Accommodating Tatarstan’s Status Claims
Tatarstan took as much power as it could. The 
rest is left to the federal bodies, and we are 
satisfied with this (Boris Yeltsin, June 1994).
Democratic Russia is a federal state. Alternatives 
to federalism do not exist. Our approach 
proceeds from the universally recognised 
conception that federations are based on divided 
sovereignty. The treaty is the act by which the 
federal centre recognised and recognises the 
republic’s sovereignty (Mintimer Shaimiev, 
Annual Address, 26 March 2004).
The stateness dilemma in Tatarstan puts two different conceptions of federal design 
at odds. First, starting with the late perestroika period, Tatarstan’s leaders issued claims for 
raising the republic’s status to that of full-fledged and ‘sovereign’ federal unit within the 
Soviet Union. They continued to claim recognition of this status within the institutional and 
constitutional framework of the Russian Federation. As a ‘sovereign’ state, Tatarstan’s 
leadership argued that powers must be delegated from the bottom up, and devised a 
confederal federal design in its 1992 constitution. Second, the federal design established by 
Russia’s constitution conflicted with Tatarstan’s concept of the state and federation. It 
ignored Tatarstan’s sovereign status and moreover, established a hierarchical, if  not 
hegemonic, division of competences. The 1994 bilateral treaty on delimitation of powers 
served to bridge the gap between these conflicting visions.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the constitutional and status ambiguities 
between Tatarstan’s and Russia’s constitutional and institutional frameworks and the 
solutions implemented to address them. I argue that the treaty did not solve the underlying 
constitutional disagreement nor did it attenuate the ambiguities of the federal design or 
delegation of competences. Instead, the treaty provides recognition of Tatarstan’s claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction in the Russian federal system. By institutionalising a process of 
federal bargaining, the treaty provides leaders in Moscow and Kazan a powerful symbolic 
and political tool to overcome, or at least overlook, the constitutional impasse. The chapter 
is organised as follows. First, I examine the nature of Tatarstan’s Soviet-era claims for status 
and jurisdiction. Then I turn to the way in which Tatarstan’s leadership defined its status 
and its competences within Russia, contrasting this to the way in which Russia’s 
constitution defines the place of Tatarstan within its federal design. I examine these 
conflicting views of constitutional status and federal design and the role played by the 1994 
bilateral treaty to help bridge these constitutional divides.
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D ebates over Status and Structure during Perestroika
The issue of Tatarstan’s place within the Soviet federal structure was raised several 
times during the twentieth century (e.g. during the re-drafting of the Soviet constitutions in 
1936 and 1977) (Khakimov, 1997: 62). But the context and openness of perestroika provided 
impetus for a more widespread internal debate of Tatarstan’s status and a more responsive 
central elite. In fact, conferences, petitions, press articles and demonstrations in the Tatar 
Autonomous Republic (TASSR)1 occurred with increasing frequency on the republic’s 
status within the RSFSR (of which it was an autonomous republic) and the Soviet Union 
(Graney, 1999: 89). Not unlike developments in other Soviet republics, public organisations 
appeared in the TASSR, such as the Tatar Public Centre (TPC), created in 1988. The TPC, 
while moderately nationalist, had a programme which was in line with similar organisations’ 
positions during perestroika, advocating the advancement of democratisation and securing 
greater rights for the TASSR. Delegates at the founding TPC Congress in February 1989 
were overwhelmingly Tatar (97 per cent), and gathered wide sections of the republic’s 
academic, literary and political elite. In fact, one of the Centre’s co-founders, Rafael 
Khakimov, worked at the time within the apparatus of the TASSR Communist Party and 
went on to become political advisor to Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev. It is 
important to note the movement did not advocate secession from the Union, but advocated 
raising the status of the TASSR to that of Union republic (ST, 10.10.1989). Increasingly 
prevalent were public meetings and academic conferences on the need for upgrading the 
republic’s position (Iskhakov, 1998b provides a chronology and analysis of these various 
events).
Two series of arguments are evoked in arguments in support of status change for 
the republic: economic and cultural. The TASSR was a donor region in the RSFSR and 
Soviet Union, which provoked resentment. Demonstrations in Kazan’s Freedom Square in 
February 1990 attracted 8,000 and featured slogans “Tatarstan is not a milk cow [doinaya 
korova)” and “Union republic status for Tatarstan” (Iskhakov, 1998b). This argument is 
fuelled by the type of comparisons published in the press at the time. The TASSR and 
Lithuanian SSR had roughly the same area and population, but where the former had a per 
capita national income of 212 roubles, Lithuania’s was 1,500 roubles (Pravda, 1.9.1990).
1 The Tatar Autonomous Socialist Republic (TASSR) was synonymous with Tataria at the time. After it 
declared sovereignty, the republic changed its name to the Tatar SSR, or Tatarstan. The distinction is not 
territorial but historical and political. In a letter to the Chairman o f  the Committee on the Press o f  the Russian 
Federation in 1994, the speaker o f  Tatarstan’s Supreme Soviet, Farid Mukhametshin, protested the continued 
use o f  Tataria in the Russian press. For him, “the name ‘Tataria’ goes along with the traditions o f  the bygone 
era o f  Soviet Tataria when the significance o f  the distinctive national and historical features o f  entire peoples 
and republics was minimised” (Segodvya, 18.5.1994). I use Tatarstan throughout the thesis for the sake o f  
clarity.
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Tatarstan, with an economic output of 25 billion roubles a year, did not have an industrial 
ministry and controlled only two percent of its enterprises while the Union controlled 80 
per cent and the RSFSR eighteen percent (Tagirov, 2000). ‘Economic nationalism’ and the 
desire to free the republic from the exploitation of the centre is one facet of the economic 
argument (Walker, 1996).
A second facet of the argument for increased power over the economy is the 
context of Gorbachev’s policies of kho^raschet (regional budgetary self-sufficiency). 
Khosraschet increased the level of the regional leadership’s accountability for its failures. This 
provided the impetus for republican elites to acquire more responsibility and competence 
over economic developments in order to minimise the risk of failures and jeopardising their 
positions.2 Within Tatarstan, increased economic autonomy is linked with democratisation 
and federalism, as Kurchakov and Khakimov write: “The possibility of transition to 
democratic socialism is connected with the assertion of real economic independence and 
responsibility of union republics and autonomous formations for the comprehensive social 
and economic development of their territories and peoples...” (Kurchakov and Khakimov, 
1989: 11). Thus, more power over economic matters provides the levers to make better use 
of resources and protect citizens from too dramatic a transition to the market economy 
(which would evolve into Tatarstan’s policy of soft entry into the market during the 1990s).
The second series of arguments in favour of raising the TASSR’s status is based on 
culture and language. Mainly confined to folklore, music and theatre until perestroika, the 
question of the utility of the Tatar language began to appear in the republican press in 
October 1987 (Iskhakov, 1998a: 15-6). Discussions about raising the status of the Tatar 
language to a state or official language started in earnest after 1987. A workshop in 1989 on 
the place of the Tatar language and the equality of nations was held and attended by 
prominent figures including M.Z. Zakiev, director of the Academy of Science’s Institute of 
Language, Literature and History (IYaLI), and Rafael Khakimov (ST, 1.20.1989). The fact 
that a large proportion of membership of TPC and nationalist organisation members hailed 
from the cultural and academic intelligentsia ensured a prominent place for the language 
issue on the political agenda.
Just as the TASSR’s economic weakness was linked to its political status, the 
endemic lack of utility of Tatar was raised in the context of its autonomous status within the 
RSFSR: “the peoples who lived within autonomous units were worse off in terms of 
cultural and socioeconomic development as those peoples who had Union republic status” 
(Zakiev and Sharypova, 1991: 18). In the RSFSR’s autonomous republics, language
2 Thanks to Jim Hughes for drawing my attention on this point.
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education was not as widespread as in Union republics, but as Connor points out, children 
in the TASSR and Bashkir ASSR could expect ten years of primary education in their native 
languages (Connor, 1984: 257). In fact, in 1987-88, 995 Tatar schools (mostly concentrated 
in rural areas) operated in the republic. While Tatar was offered in preschool middle and 
professional-technical schools, it was not taught in specialised schools or in institutions of 
higher education. Tatar was hardly used in state structures, except in Komsomol and labour 
{profsoyus^  organisations. As a language of science and scientific research, Tatar was used 
only in the humanities. In mass communications, information, advertising and transport, 
Tatar occupied a second rate position, when it was used at all. Tatar-language programming 
was broadcast on television three hours a day and on the radio four hours a day (Iskhakova, 
2001: 1-29). In 1989, although 95 per cent of urban Tatars claimed Tatar as their native 
language, only 36 per cent said they actually used it on a daily basis (Graney, 1999: 310). 
Among Russians in the republic the rate of Russian-Tatar bilingualism was placed at 1.1 per 
cent (Bairamova, 2001: 167). The lack of prestige and utility for Tatar was raised by 
Shaimiev, then First Secretary of the TASSR Obkom, in September 1989, who argued that 
language status was intimately linked to cultural survival (national’naya samobytnost) (ST, 
8.12.1989). Khakimov confirms the leadership’s intention: “We wanted to be sure that the 
Tatar language would have state status, it would develop, and that Tatars would not 
disappear” (Interview published in Ovrutskii, 2000: 38). Thus, cultural and linguistic 
survival was another factor in Tatarstan’s status claims.
In April 1990, the Soviet government introduced a package of laws to address the 
dissatisfaction of Union republics. This package included laws on secession, economic self- 
sufficiency, state languages and importantly, on the political status of union and 
autonomous republics. Tatarstan’s leadership was quick to grasp the significance of the 26 
April 1990 Law on the Demarcation of powers of the USSR and Members of the 
Federation (USSR, 1990a). This law equalised Union and autonomous republics, thus 
providing Tatarstan with the status it had been requesting. The law provides power over 
economic levers, granting autonomous regions the power to “independently resolve 
questions of production and economic facilities”, and “ensure comprehensive economic, 
social, and cultural development on their territory, taking into account the interests of all 
peoples living therein” (art.4). More importantly, the law establishes the basis for a 
confederal relationship between the TASSR, Soviet state and Russian Federation: “The 
relation between the autonomous formations and the Union republics of which they are a 
part are determined by agreements and treaties concluded within the framework of the 
USSR constitution, the constitutions of the Union and autonomous-republics and the law” 
(art.l). In addition, the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR was adopted on
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24 April 1990, granting the right to use both titular and the state language (Russian) as 
official. Through these laws, the TASSR obtained de jure equality of status and the 
competences over economic and cultural and linguistic issues it had claimed. The status 
conferred by these Soviet laws would indeed become the baseline for Tatarstan’s 
subsequent demands vis-a-vis Russia. It is the very relationship with Russia, however, that 
remained the biggest unknown variable at the time.
The laws enacted by the Soviet government profoundly affected Russia’s internal 
structure and its relationships with its component autonomous republics. Consequently, 
Russia issued its Declaration on State Sovereignty on 12 June 1990 in an attempt to 
consolidate its federal structure and stall its disintegration (RSFSR, 1990). Compared to the 
status conferred upon the TASSR in the 1990 Soviet laws, Russia’s declaration was 
ambiguous on the place and status of autonomous republics within its constitutional 
structure. The declaration promised to “substantially broaden” the rights of autonomous 
republics but provided little detail on how powers would be distributed. In its declaration, 
Russia claimed full competence over its state structure (art.5), and affirmed the supremacy 
of RSFSR laws and disallowed Soviet laws which contradicted RSFSR sovereignty. Russia 
recognised the sovereignty of Union republics and of the Soviet Union and established that 
relations between it and Union republics would be determined by bilateral agreements 
(art.6). But the declaration was silent on a crucial point for Tatarstan’s leadership — whether 
the Russia recognised Tatarstan’s status as a Union republic as conferred by the 1990 law. 
In fact, nothing indicated that Russia would stop considering the TASSR as an autonomous 
republic within its federal structure, since by virtue of the declaration Russia’s leaders 
disavowed any Soviet legislation which contradicted the RSFSR’s ‘sovereign rights’.
Since Russia seceded from the Soviet Union, the rights of its constituent units in the 
context of Soviet law were mooted. The ambiguities of the republic’s place within the 
Soviet and Russian states prompted Tatar leaders to consider their own declaration of 
sovereignty. Nationalist groups and parties were particularly active in these discussions. The 
TPC held a plenum in June 1990 to discuss the content of an eventual declaration of 
sovereignty, as did the more radical Ittifak movement. These were accompanied by 
demonstrations in Kazan and other cities (Iskhakov, 1998b). Various drafts of the 
declaration as well as the debates of the Tatarstan State Soviet were reported in the 
republican press (e.g. numerous articles in ST during July and August 1990). In what is 
considered to be a move to constrain extreme nationalism and consolidate the Tatarstan’s 
loyalty to the Russian federation (Kahn, 2002: 118-9), Yeltsin issued his fateful call to 
Tatarstan to take all the sovereignty it could swallow. Yeltsin explained to Shaimiev that he
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did not seek conflict, and that “if you want to govern completely on your own -  just go 
ahead” (Quoted in Kondrashov, 2000: 142).
Boris Zheleznov, a constitutional law professor at Kazan State University and co­
author of Tatarstan’s Declaration of sovereignty, relates that Yeltsin considered his August 
exhortation to sovereignty to be a political tool, and that the Russian president asked him to 
convey to Tatarstan’s leaders they should not take his call too far (Interview with 
Zheleznov, 2004b). Consequently, if the republic acted on Yeltsin’s call to go ahead and 
take sovereignty, any unilateral declaration would rest on ambiguous political and legal 
foundations: the TASSR’s 1978 constitution allowed the republic only the right to 
participate in decisions about its state status (art.67) but forbade it from making changes to 
the state structure, a power which, constitutionally, belongs to the RSFSR alone 
(Zheleznov, 1996: 42). Yeltsin’s exhortation is an example of how Russia’s president tended 
to think not in institutional terms but in terms of the consolidation of political power and 
relationships. Russia’s secession from the Soviet Union and Yeltsin’s decision in 1993 to 
suspend the Constitutional Court and parliament illustrate how the centre did not consider 
itself particular constrained by the existing constitutional framework. The instability of such 
a context is one factor behind the decision by Tatarstan’s elites to secure their own 
institutional space.
Tatarstan declared sovereignty on 30 August 1990 (TSSR, 1990), signalling its 
intention to stick to the state structure established by the Soviet government in its April 
laws (Zverev, 1999: 97). As Shaimiev relates, the political context of these laws and Russia’s 
Declaration of sovereignty forced Tatarstan to formulate its political and legal status and the 
basis for its participation in the Russian and Soviet states (ST, 30.8.1990). By its declaration, 
Tatarstan claimed Union republic status, exclusive possession of all its natural resources 
(art.2) and the supremacy of republican laws (art.5 and 6). On the basis of its status, the 
declaration affirmed its leadership’s intention to conclude bilateral treaties with the USSR 
and RSFSR, and also sign the Union Treaty as a full-fledged constituent member of the 
Soviet federation (art. 5). The notion of sovereignty conveyed in Tatarstan’s declaration 
departs from the conventional definition of the concept. Khakimov sought to reassure that 
Tatarstan did not share the Baltic States’ more extreme view of sovereignty: in Lithuania 
sovereignty meant secession from the USSR whereas Tatarstan sought to “strengthen not 
abandon the Soviet state” (ST, 14.2.1991). Sovereignty, tiierefore, constituted an expression 
of a political programme: the republic claimed it constituted a state on par with, not 
subordinated to, the RSFSR and build its relationship with the Union and Russian 
governments on a bottom-up, treaty basis. The fundamentals of this political programme 
remained intact following the August 1991 putsch, failure of the Union Treaty negotiations
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and collapse of the Soviet Union. Now, it would seek to have its status claims heeded by 
Russia and integrate the Federation as a founding and equal member, rather than a federal 
subject
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the articulation of Tatarstan’s status 
claims occurred in the context of increased nationalist mobilisation on the content and form 
of the Tatarstan state and its link with Russia. Indeed, nationalist groups were most active in 
Tatarstan in the period leading to the 1992 referendum on state status and the drafting of its 
constitution (Graney, 1999: 66; Kondrashov, 2000: Chap. 6 and 7). Radical groups criticised 
Shaimiev’s and the TPC’s policies as being too centrist and not doing enough to protect the 
interests of the Tatar nation. Consequently, Ittifak organised the first All-Tatar Congress 
(Kurultai), attended by Tatars from across the former Soviet Union. The Congress called for 
Tatarstan’s complete independence from Russia, and adoption of Tatar as the republic’s 
sole official language (Iskhakov, 1998c: 177-8). During the Congress, a Tatar National 
Assembly (Milli Mejlis) was elected to defend the interests of the Tatar nation. The powers 
which the Congress delegated to the Milli Mejlis included: confirmation of Tatarstan’s 
government; Tatar language and cultural policy; appointing a Tatar national guard; the right 
to ban the activities of political parties and media opposed to Tatarstan’s sovereignty 
(Resolutions and charters of the Congress in Iskhakov, 1998c: 164-71).
The republican elite quickly dismissed the legitimacy of these parallel institutions. 
For Vladimir Morokin, Russian People’s Deputy from Tatarstan, by electing a Milli Mejlis, 
the Congress “created parallel power structures in an unconstitutional way” (RG, 7.2.1992). 
Khakimov welcomed the creation of the organisation, as long as it toned down its demands: 
a party which competed for power democratically and militated for official status for Tatar 
was fine, but to insist on the creation of a Tatar national guard was a step he feared would 
precipitate a crisis (ST, 1.2.1992). Shaimiev repudiated the ethnic nationalism and 
ethnocentrism of the Congress’s proposals and sought to reassure Tatarstan’s citizens — as 
well as Moscow — that he would continue to pursue autonomy in a “civilized and 
constitutional” manner. The path chosen by the “multinational people of Tatarstan” was 
the creation of “sovereign state based on the primacy of individual rights and the 
preservation of rights of its peoples” (ST, 25.12.1990). “Sovereignty”, as Khakimov 
explains, is interpreted by the leadership “as an ideology for all o f Tatarstan society” 
(Interview in Ovrutskii, 2000: 19). The concept of national and ethnic harmony in Tatarstan 
has been a constant theme in Shaimiev’s rhetoric. In public speeches, he promotes a 
“republican identity”, speaking of the rights of Tatarstantsy, residents of Tatarstan and not 
only the rights of Russians or the rights of Tatars (Drobizheva, 2003; Interview with 
Khakimov, 2004). He was careful to reassure ethnic Russians in Tatarstan and leaders in
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Moscow that sovereignty and the elevation of the Tatar language would not deprive 
Russians of their rights. Shaimiev played an important role in maintaining stability within 
the republic and Russian Federation in the early 1990s. He walked a thin line but 
successfully harnessed the claims of moderate Tatar nationalists by acceding to demands for 
language policies (which I examine in chapter 5), and also taking steps to promote and 
protect special status for Tatarstan within Russia.
The March 1992 referendum on Tatarstan’s status represents an attempt by the 
leadership to harness nationalism and provide popular legitimacy of the leadership’s 
strategy. The question put to the citizens of Tatarstan was the following: “Do you agree that 
the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law that builds its 
relations with the Russian Federation and with other republics and states on the basis of a 
treaty under which all parties are equal?” Walker notes the ambiguous wording of the 
question, e.g. “subject of international law” and “sovereign state” (Walker, 1996). The fact 
that these terms were retained instead of “self-determination” or “autonomy” is a signal 
that Tatarstan was committed to pursuing the political programme established in its 
declaration of sovereignty: not “secession”, but special status and a confederal relationship 
with Moscow. This was a strong signal that republican elites sought a re-institutionalisation 
of a form of autonomous state, not separatism. A referendum on secession would likely 
have had a different outcome. Wording is a controversial issue in Quebec as well, where the 
terms “separation” and “secession” poll lower than “association” and “partnership”. /The 
Government of Canada enacted its Clarity Law (2000) in an effort to constrain Quebec to 
pose a “clear” question on secession during any future referendum.
Russia’s leaders seized upon the ambiguities in the wording of the question to 
discredit the referendum. Vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi urged the people of Tatarstan 
not to allow themselves to be swept way by the wave of nationalism, warning against “near­
sighted politicians” seeking to gain “cheap popularity” by playing the nationalities card. 
Rutskoi, paradoxically emphasised the commonalities in Russia’s and Tatarstan’s histories — 
the common struggle against invasions of Napoleon and Nazi Germany — and the fact that 
both Russian and Tatars suffered during the Soviet era to plead Tatarstan’s leaders and 
citizens to rethink the need for a referendum (RG, 13.3.1992). A group of Russian Peoples’ 
Deputies challenged the clarity of the question before the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation (RG, 6.3.1992). Deputies argued the referendum should be blocked on a 
procedural basis (three questions were asked to which only one yes or no answer was 
possible) and on a constitutional basis (deciding republican sovereignty is ultra vires 
Tatarstan’s State Council).
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The Constitutional Court handed down its ruling on 13 March 1992. It upheld 
Tatarstan’s right to hold a referendum but limited it to issues which fell within the republic’s 
exclusive sphere of competence. Insofar as the question proposes a change to Tatarstan’s 
state structure and its position within Russia, the Court concluded it was unconstitutional. 
Similarly, the Court annulled provisions of Tatarstan’s Declaration of sovereignty on the 
basis that the power to amend the state status of subjects of the federation is not within its 
jurisdiction. The ruling ignores the 1990 Soviet laws on which Tatarstan based its 
declaration, and places Tatarstan firmly within the constitutional framework of Russia: “The 
Court cannot ignore the fact that [...] Tatarstan’s declaration of sovereignty fails to mention 
the republic is a component of the Russian Federation” (KSRF, 1992: par.l). The Court 
makes it clear that federal-regional relations in Russia must be based on the constitution and 
not on the basis of treaties. Moreover, treaties must respect Russia’s constitution, which 
precludes any special status for the republic (KSRF, 1992: par.l). In the sole dissent, Justice 
Ametistov, the only court member appointed by Yeltsin, argued the RSFSR constitution 
allows for treaty-based relations and that moreover, he considered a Protocol signed by 
Russia and Tatarstan on 15 August 1991 established a precedent that Russia agreed with 
Tatarstan to base their relations on a negotiated treaty (KSRF, 1992).
The ruling is remarkable for two reasons. First, it is based on rather selective reading 
of the legal developments of the late Soviet period. Furthermore, it completely occludes the 
fact that in issuing its own declaration of sovereignty in 1990, Russia too violated the Soviet 
constitution. Second, the ruling is remarkable for the fact that it was practically ignored in 
Tatarstan and was not enforced by Moscow.3 The ruling prompted the Tatarstan State 
Council to clarify the purpose of the referendum: it was organised to elicit popular approval 
of the 1990 Declaration of sovereignty (art.l), not to approve secession from Russia or the 
unilateral modification of Tatarstan’s boundaries (art. 2) (VSRT, 1992). The Constitutional 
Court’s Chairman, Valerii Zorkin, called on the federal government to take steps to enforce 
his court’s ruling. In an interview, he blamed the conflict in Tatarstan partly on “incorrect 
actions by the central authorities” that did not nip Tatarstan’s sovereignty in the bud in 
1990 (RG, 19.3.1992). For Sergei Shakhrai, Tatarstan’s decision to ignore the court and 
proceed with the referendum was tantamount to a “coup d’etat” (IZV, 17.3.1992). Yeltsin 
himself intervened with an appeal to the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet threatening the 
referendum would endanger the future of bilateral negotiations (RG, 20.3.1992). This was 
an empty threat, since bilateral negotiations on power-sharing agreements continued
3 It remained un-enforced until 2000, when two rulings by the Constitutional Court in June 2000 on 
republican sovereignty started the process o f  bringing republics’ constitutions and statuses in line with the 
federal constitution. I examine this in greater detail in the next chapter.
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unabated. Notwithstanding the legal ruling and political objections, the referendum took 
place peacefully: with 81.6 percent of Tatarstan electors turning out, 61.4 percent voted in 
favour and 37.2 percent against. While a breakdown of the vote by ethnicity is unavailable, 
the relatively high turnout and favourable votes indicate that a number of ethnic Russians in 
Tatarstan supported the referendum.
Entrenching Status: Tatarstan’s 1992 Constitution
Having secured popular legitimacy of its status, Tatarstan’s leaders sought to 
entrench it in a constitution. Zila Valeeva, vice-chair of the Tatar State Soviet, remarks that 
Moscow was thoroughly dissatisfied that the republic would adopt a constitution before the 
federal constitution-making process was complete. Mukhametshin sought to reassure 
Russian leaders by claiming the constitution was needed to address domestic concerns and 
block the spread of extremism and nationalism and promote interethnic and civic harmony, 
namely by declaring Russian and Tatar as equal official languages and protecting individual 
rights (Pravda, 21.11.1992). Since I trace the development of the language issue in a 
subsequent chapter, I proceed here with an examination of the entrenchment of Tatarstan’s 
status and federal design.
In early 1992, the republican press featured articles on how Tatarstan’s future 
constitution should reflect the republic’s status in Russia. Does it belong, or not, in the 
Federation? (ST, 28.1.1992) Midkhat Faroukshin, Kazan State University political scientist 
and participant in the drafting process, expressed doubts (echoed by Tatarstan’s leaders to 
this day) about the capacity of Russian federalism to accommodate Tatarstan’s status: “As it 
is configured, [Russia] has always been and remains a federation on paper but unitary state 
de facto (na dele)” (ST, 19.1.1992). Consequently, Tatarstan leaders believed it was important 
to entrench the republic’s sovereignty and the basis of its relations with Russia. During the 
State Soviet’s debates over the constitution, Shaimiev intervened to define “associated 
status” to mean that Russia and Tatarstan would base their relations on a bilateral treaty, 
handle their problems jointly, and that Tatarstan’s borders were inviolable (RG, 11.11.1992).
The 167-article constitution approved in 1992 expanded on the vision of Tatarstan 
as a “sovereign democratic state” which was established by the 1990 declaration of 
sovereignty (art.l). It reads more as the constitution of a sovereign state than of a federated 
unit: sovereignty is said to emanate from the people of Tatarstan, and only the people of the 
republic are empowered to change the republic’s status (art.l and 2). Article 59 established 
the supremacy of Tatarstan’s laws and constitution.4 As Graney points out, Russia is
4 The supremacy o f  Tatarstan law is reaffirmed throughout the constitution: Tatar citi2enship is pre-eminent 
(art.l9); military service is set by Tatar, not Russian, law (art.58); Tatarstan Constitutional Court judges are
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mentioned only twice in the constitution (Graney, 1999). First, in provisions on republican 
citizenship (art.19), which states that citizens of Tatarstan also possess Russian citizenship. 
Second, in article 61 and the key status provisions defining Tatarstan as a “subject of 
international law associated with Russia on the basis of a treaty on mutual delegation of 
authority”.
The document completely disregards the Constitutional Court’s 1992 ruling that 
prohibited the republic from adopting provisions on its state status. This state status is the 
key element of its constitution, providing for a confederal federal design in which powers 
and competences are delegated from the bottom-up (sni^ u-vverkh). This position is wholly 
consistent with the status Tatarstan contends it obtained in 1990, and which its citizens 
approved in the March 1992 referendum. Like the 1990 Declaration of sovereignty, 
Tatarstan’s 1992 constitution is a programmatic document, setting out the agenda for future 
federal-regional relations and development, and basing the bilateral relationship on a treaty 
which did not yet exist. In so doing, Tatarstan’s leaders made a bet that Russia would 
conform to this agenda.
Counter-designs: Constitution and Federal D esign  in Russia
Russia too conducted discussions and negotiations on the content of a new 
constitution. Following Tatarstan’s referendum on its status, the federal authorities signed 
the Federal Treaty5 with all but two federal subjects (Chechnya and Tatarstan). Tatarstan 
refused to sign the treaty, arguing it conceded less in terms of status and power than it 
would have received in the Union Treaty of 1991 (ST, 1.4.1992). Simultaneously, however, 
Tatar and Russian delegations met (30 March to 2 April 1992) to continue negotiations on a 
separate bilateral accord. The Federal Treaty maintained the existing three-tier federal 
structure (republics (ethno-territorial subjects), oblasts (territorial subjects) and autonomous 
okrugs) and consecrated strong constitutional asymmetries. Republics gained autonomous 
status while regions were treated as administrative units. The treaty acknowledges the 
“sovereignty” of republics, their right to self-determination and to the exercise “full state 
power” (art.3). Kahn notes the ambiguities and overlap in provisions on federal exclusive 
powers and joint powers. For instance, while the federal government has jurisdiction over 
federal taxation and tax collection, the power to establish principles of taxation is defined as 
a joint competence (Kahn, 2002: 124-32). The Federal Treaty, in sum, created a murky, if 
not unworkable, division of powers.
subject only to the norms established by the republican Constitution (Art 139) and no reference is made to 
Russian courts in Chapter 14 on the judicial system.
5 The Federal Treaty consists o f  three separate treaties, for republics, administrative bodies (oblasts and federal 
cities) and autonomous okrugs.
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The Federal Treaty did not stem the tide of discontent. Regional leaders contested 
their second rate status while federal leaders objected to the confederal model of federalism 
which the Federal Treaty embodied. During the process of drafting the federal constitution, 
the ethno-territorial dimension was a key line of contention. Parliamentarians objected to 
the fact that no mechanism was in place to ensure the supremacy of Russia’s constitution. 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet’s Council of Nationalities, 
framed the Federal Treaty as a political compromise but that it would not create a stable 
base for federal-regional policy (NG, 23.2.1993). Indeed, several regions declared 
themselves republics (e.g. Sverdlovsk in July 1993) to better profit from the economic 
advantages of republican status, notably ownership of natural resources. In his memoirs, 
Yeltsin admits that at the time it was not clear how to solve the problem of Russia’s regions, 
but that work on the new constitution would help to clarify it (Yeltsin, 1994: 215).
Successive drafts of the federal constitution were published and even Yeltsin’s 
“presidential draft”6 omitted differentiated status for republics. While the leaders of the 
republics sought to ensure their asymmetrical status was entrenched in the constitution, 
their claim to such status was strongly criticised. Republics based their differentiated status 
on the fact that they constituted a homeland to a titular nationality. Leonid Smirnyagin 
contested republics’ claims for special status based on the fact they constitute homelands 
for national minorities by arguing that in many republics, the titular nationality was 
outnumbered by ethnic Russians, and in other cases the titular nationality was spread out 
throughout the country. Commenting on the Tatarstan case in particular, he writes “Its 
politicians are taking the lead in the struggle with the Federation for the regalia of statehood 
and miss no chance to emphasise their independence. However, in fact this independence 
expresses itself merely in a reluctance to pay federal taxes” (Segodnya, 22.6.1993). Republican 
status is viewed as a ruse to secure economic and other benefits. Leaders of predominantly 
ethnically Russian regions were unhappy that regions received fewer economic privileges by 
virtue of ‘arbitrary’ status and evoked the spectre of separatism (the chairman of 
Krasnoyarsk’s Soviet, Vyacheslav Novikov called republican status a “bomb under Russia’s 
future”) to discredit differentiated status for republics (IZV, 24.6.1993). Governor Eduard 
Rossel justified the decision to raise Sverdlovsk’s status to that of the Urals Republic on an 
argument of equality: “We are firmly convinced that all members of the Federation should 
be equal in terms of political, economic and legislative rights [...] and that the principle for 
dividing the country should be territorial” (IZV, 3.7.1993).
6 The President’s draft was one o f  many circulating, including the ‘Rumyantsev’ or ‘parliamentary’ draft, which 
in contrast with Yeltsin’s version, gave more powers to parliament (McFaul, 2001: 168-9).
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For ethnologist Valerii Tishkov, “to say that power belongs only to the titular group 
is to embark on a disastrous path” (NG, 24.10.1992). Fear that titular status would lead to 
the disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians in republics was a key factor in these discussions, 
inspired particularly by the examples of the Baltic republics. Peoples’ Deputy Vladimir 
Morokin (a Russian from Tatarstan) argued Tatarstan’s constitution establishes “the 
preference for one nation over another—mild apartheid, so to speak” (RG, 7.2.1992). Oleg 
Rumyantsev, the secretary of Russia’s Constitutional Commission, evoked the situation in 
Yugoslavia to illustrate how the interests of Russian in Tatarstan are ignored, like those of 
Serbians in Bosnia (NG, 30.10.1992).
Fear of ethnic conflict, however, was not the sole motive in discussions about 
republics. Russia’s ethnofederalism was seen as contradicting democratic principles, and 
thus mortgaging the future stability of Russia’s nascent democracy: “In the long term, 
[asymmetrical ethno-federalism is] not sustainable, especially when it makes the creation of 
a common Russian (rossiiskaya) identity more problematic” (Oracheva, 1998). Consequently, 
proposals were made for the implementation of a civic identity (a pre-eminent Russian 
identity in Tishkov’s parlance) (Tishkov, 1997; Tolz, 1998: 104-6; Opalski, 2001: 306-7). 
However, in a state as ethnically homogeneous as Russia7, there is little doubt that a policy 
of civic Rj)ssian-ness (with Russian as the state language) would quickly create the conditions 
for increased assimilation of minorities. The argument in favour of diversity was articulated 
mostly by republican leaders during the constitutional negotiations. Sakha president Mikhail 
Nikolaev argued the preservation of differentiated status is desirable because it is a system 
which can “most fully reflect the diversity of the Russian Federation” because “What is 
characteristic of Tatarstan is not characteristic of Dagestan, and vice versa” (NG,
17.8.1993).
The constitutional conference which was formed to consider Yeltsin’s ‘presidential
draft’ in June 1993 consisted of 762 members, including four representatives of each subject
of the federation (RV, 8.6.1993) Khakimov criticised the composition as ignoring the rights
and interests of Russia’s national units:
The triumph o f  a mechanical majority at the conference is causing profound disappointment 
in the forms o f  democracy that are taking shape. [...] Apparendy the organisers o f  the 
conference decided to ensure a numerical superiority o f  votes so that the republics wouldn't 
even think o f  defending their interests (NG, 24.6.1993).
Tatarstan withdrew from the conference since the draft did not provide special status for
the republic and as Shaimiev and Mukhametshin made clear, they believed the
constitutional conference ignored the interests of republics and especially their right to self­
7 Russians account for over 80 per cent o f  the population; Tatars are the largest minority with 3.8 per cent 
(one-third o f  whom live in Tatarstan).
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determination. Shaimiev repeatedly stated Tatarstan would not agree to a constitution which 
did not recognise the bottom-up, bilateral nature of its relationship with Russia (NG, 
25.6.1992). In the meantime, the deadlock between the president and Supreme Soviet and 
inability to secure approval of the constitution provoked Yeltsin to issue his Decree no. 
1400, which disbanded the parliament and gave him the power to rule by decree until a new 
constitution was approved and a new parliament elected (McFaul, 2001: 191-204). While 
federal leaders claimed that a majority of citizens approved the constitution in the 
December 1993 referendum, it was rejected by the populations of seven republics (NG, 
18.12.1993). The vote was invalid in Tatarstan due to low turnout.
The federal design which emerged at the end of 1993 broke considerably with the 
asymmetrical federalism embodied in the Federal Treaty and in previous drafts. Article 5 
established the basic principles of Russia’s federal structure. While various types of federal 
subjects are maintained (republics, regions, autonomous regions, etc.), all subjects are equal 
(§1). §2 introduced a slight constitutional asymmetry by providing republics the right to 
establish constitutions while other federal subjects are allowed to implement charters. §3 
states that the state structure of the Russian Federation is based on its state unity, the unity 
of executive power, the division of powers and competences between federal and regional 
bodies of state power and the equality and self-determination of the peoples of the Russian 
Federation. This section was interpreted in very different ways in the years after 1993 by 
regional and federal governments and the courts. Tatarstan’s leaders argue this clause 
enshrines the principle of divided sovereignty, and thus empowered it to maintain its status 
of ‘sovereign state’. Russia’s courts, on the other hand, interpret the clause as precluding any 
joint sovereignty. I examine these conflicting interpretations in greater length in the next 
chapter. Another constitutional asymmetry is introduced by article 68 in favour of republics: 
they can adopt a state language in parallel with Russian (§2). For all intents and purposes, 
this is the extent to the constitutional asymmetries established by the 1993 constitution.
Although the Federal Treaty was incorporated into the constitution, the 
constitution’s provisions on regional competence are supreme. Thus many of the powers 
acquired by republics (e.g. ownership of natural resources, the power to determine their 
state structures) were mooted. On the division of powers, article 71 lists exclusive federal 
powers while article 72 outlines areas of joint jurisdiction. Subjects of the federation are 
given all residual powers (art.73). However, a specificity of Russia’s system of joint 
competences is established by article 76: subjects of the federation can legislate in areas of 
joint jurisdiction to the extent that they do not contradict federal law in the same area (§5). 
In other words, in all areas of joint jurisdiction, federal legislation is paramount.
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The Russian Constitutional Court has upheld this division of competences in several 
rulings. In a 1997 ruling on the taxation system — a joint competence under the constitution 
(art.72§l(i)) — the Court found that:
even in the absence o f  a federal law on the general principles o f  taxation and charges, 
recognition o f  the right o f  subjects o f  the Russian Federation to regulate matters o f  joint 
jurisdiction ahead [of the federal lawmaker] would not automatically grant them the 
competence to resolve ail issues relating to said principles to the extent to which they have 
universal importance both for the lawmakers o f  subjects o f the Russian Federation and the 
federal lawmaker and, therefore, [the competence] must be regulated by federal law (KSRF,
1997: par.2).
In a similar case, the republic of Karelia challenged the federal Forestry Code on the basis 
that the Federal Treaty and its own bilateral treaty with Russia prevented the federal 
government from legislating on the use and protection of the forestry. The Court rebuffed 
Karelia, arguing that in case of divergences between provisions of the Federal Treaty, 
bilateral agreements and the federal constitution, only the latter is valid. Moreover, since the 
regulation of natural resources is a joint competence (art.72§l(v)), it is within the federal 
government’s prerogative to legislate as it sees fit (KSRF, 1998a: pars.4-6).
The 1993 constitution provides the federal government with important powers of 
monitoring and control over the subjects of the federation. Article 77§2 establishes that in 
the exercise of joint competences, federal and regional bodies of executive power consist of 
a “unified system of executive power”. Moreover, the president is empowered to resolve 
differences between federal and regional bodies (art.85§l). The constitution allows the 
president to suspend normative acts of subjects of the federation which contradict the 
federal constitution, but does not define the concrete mechanism by which this is to be 
accomplished (art.85§2).8 The power of disallowance is controversial, since a key tenet of 
federalism is that federal and regional components of a federation are independent within 
the sphere of their competences. Similar provisions in Canada’s 1867 constitution (s.90) led 
Wheare to classify Canada as a quasi-federation (Wheare, 1946: 15). Graham Smith 
interprets these clauses in Russia’s constitution as a clear affront to the federal principle 
(Smith, 1998: 1395-6). In Canada, a total of 112 provincial laws were disallowed. The last 
case of disallowance occurred in 1943 (Belanger, 2001). In Canada, this power is regarded as 
having fallen into disuse, and for all intents and purposes is archaic. In Russia, while the 
Yeltsin or Putin have not suspended a regional leader or legislature for failing to respect the 
federal constitution, regional laws and constitutions are regularly challenged by federal 
prosecutors and courts, as I examine in greater detail in the next chapter.
Although Russia’s constitution establishes a centralised federal design and creates 
the basis for virtual federal hegemony in joint competences, several provisions add
8 The mechanisms by which the president could use his powers o f  disallowance were spelled out in federal 
laws passed in 1999 and 2003, examined in the next chapter.
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flexibility. Thus, even if the basis for federal control is strong, the use of these powers is 
contingent on federal leader’s decision to implement them. The constitution establishes the 
possibility of federal-regional coordination of policy and competences: article 78 (§2-3) 
permits the delegation of competences between levels of government, as long as this 
delegation “does not contradict the constitution or federal law”. Article 11 §3 allows the use 
of bilateral treaties and agreements as the means to delegate competences. Although article 
11 does not specify the limits of bilateral delegation, the provisions in article 78 tend to limit 
the use of treaties to the existing division of competences, that is, an exclusive federal 
power cannot be turned into a joint power or given exclusively to a regional government.9 
In 1993-94 these provisions on power-sharing provided crucial flexibility to Russia’s federal 
design to accommodate Tatarstan’s claims.
Bridging the Constitutional Divides: The 1994 Bilateral Treaty
Following the referendum in December 1993, Yeltsin issued an order which 
resulted in a round-the-clock effort to formalise a bilateral agreement with Tatarstan (NG,
16.2.1994). Scholars describe the treaties as ad /W accommodations (Kahn, 2002: 4). In the 
case of Tatarstan, the treaty process was far from ad hoc, and as Hughes argues, ad hoc is 
often mistaken for ambiguous in the literature about the treaty (Hughes, 1996: 43). Indeed, 
delegations were in place for years (e.g. Sergei Shakhrai, Gennadii Burbulis negotiated for 
Moscow, Farid Mukhametshin, Rafael Khakimov, Marat Galeev for Tatarstan). Moreover, 
bilateral negotiations were ongoing and had already produced a number of 
intergovernmental agreements, the content of which remained secret for years. During 1992 
and 1993, twelve intergovernmental agreements were signed.10
For Stoner-Weiss the treaty subverted Russia’s constitution: “Tatarstan’s 
stubbornness in particular led to the establishment of a dangerous precedent in centre-
9 In several rulings by the Russian Constitutional Court in June 2000 which I examine in the next chapter, the 
court stated that treaty provisions cannot overstep the division o f  powers established by articles 71-3 o f  the 
constitution.
10 In chronological order, the intergovernmental agreements and key points are the following: On economic 
cooperation (22 January 1992, grants ownership o f  natural resources within RT to its people); On oil transport 
and production (calls for cooperation); On cooperation on environmental protection (reaffirms that 
jurisdiction over issue is shared); On higher education (5 June 1993, reaffirms that education is area o f  joint 
jurisdiction, agreement to recognise diplomas issued by Tatar institutions and commitment to reach agreement 
on funding); On state Property (22 June 1993, property in RT belongs to the republic apart from list o f  
exceptions stipulated in agreement); On defence industry and production; On the coordination o f  fight against 
crime; On division o f  competences in foreign economic relations (restates constitutional division o f  powers, 
and calls for coordination within areas o f joint jurisdiction); On the military (reaffirms the existing 
constitutional division o f  powers and Russia’s exclusive competences); On bank affairs, monetary, credit and 
currency policy (restates Russia’s exclusive powers); On Customs (states the division o f  fees, taxes and 
revenues to both RT and Russia per agreement on budget cooperation); On budgetary cooperation (most 
substantial accord, setting RT’s payments to federal budget (proportion o f  VAT to be transferred to federal 
budget to be determined in yearly agreements) and revenues which RT could keep (including accise taxes on 
alcohol, oil and gas, etc.).
51
Chapter 3. Accommodating Tatarstan’s Status Claims
periphery relations” (Stoner-Weiss, 1997: 239). Solnick qualifies Russia as an already very 
asymmetrical federation in 1994 (Solnick, 1998). Yet, as I have examined above, the 1993 
constitution created very few constitutional asymmetries. The bilateral treaties created a 
number of political asymmetries which perpetuated the ambiguities and contradictions in 
Russia’s and Tatarstan’s constitutions and conceptions of federal design. But these scholars’ 
assessments ignore (just as the Russian leadership in 1993 ignored) the precedents of the 
late Soviet period and the status quo which Tatarstan claimed deserved to be recognised. I 
argue that the ‘dangerous precedent’ in Russia-Tatarstan relations is not the bilateral treaty 
per se, but the lack of correspondence between their constitutions. Thus, it is not treaty 
relations which are inimical to federal stability, but the contradictions and asymmetries 
which resulted in practice and in political behaviours during the 1990s. The fact that 
Tatarstan shielded its laws from federal court rulings and from federal laws on the basis of 
its bilateral treaty is criticised (Kahn, 2002 provides an in depth assessment of the 
contradictions which emerged). But studies of legal contradictions and ambiguities have not 
addressed the question of why legal dissonance mattered and overlook the crucial 
significance of the treaty and treaty process as a tool for accommodating Tatarstan’s claims 
and constitutional disagreements.
The lack of correspondence between Tatarstan’s and Russia’s constitutions, and 
indeed the different visions of federal design and political community they embodied, is 
striking. Russia’s 1993 constitution, as I examined above, laid the groundwork for a 
centralised federation, and placed Tatarstan firmly within Russia’s constitutional and federal 
order. Under its terms, Tatarstan is a republic within the Russian Federation (art.65), the 
status of which is determined by the federal constitution (art.66§l) and subject to the 
provisions analysed above on the division of competences. Tatarstan’s constitution, on the 
other hand, hardly acknowledged Russia at all, defining it as a sovereign unit associated with 
Russia on the basis of an as of yet inexistent confederal treaty. In its constitution Tatarstan 
views itself as the source of authority and the delegation of competences as proceeding 
from the bottom-up. (Powers which were never really Tatarstan’s to begin with -  for 
instance, defence, state security and communications -were ‘delegated’ to Moscow in 1993 
(NG, 15.1.1993)). For Tatarstan’s leadership, the basis of this confederal relationship was 
laid in 1990, and confirmed by referendum and in its constitution.
While the 1994 treaty “On the Delimitation of powers and competences between 
the state bodies of Russia and Tatarstan” does not eliminate the contradictions between 
Tatarstan’s and Russia’s constitution, it provided a means to look beyond the conflict and 
bridge the constitutional disagreements. Negotiations on the 1994 treaty enshrined a 
process of intergovernmental accommodation. The accompanying intergovernmental
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power-sharing agreement allowed for a regulation of shared competences, even though 
some of their provisions contradicted the federal constitution. The treaty’s preamble defines 
Tatarstan as a “state united with Russia on the basis of the federal constitution, Tatarstan 
constitution and the treaty” (The text is published in Guboglo, 1997: 247-52). For 
Tatarstan’s leaders, this is by far the treaty’s most significant clause since it formalises the 
status which it claimed since 1990. The remainder of the document establishes the division 
of competences between both levels of government. Apart from a limited number of 
exceptions, competences which the constitution assigns to the federal government are 
identical to those in the treaty.11. Significant contradictions between the treaty and federal 
constitution appear in the sections on Tatarstan’s exclusive competences and joint powers; 
on issues which the constitution lists as joint but which the treaty delegates Tatarstan (art.2). 
These powers are mosdy on economic issues, many of which were the subject of separate 
intergovernmental agreements (ownership and use of natural resources and state property; 
independent foreign economic activity; conversion of state enterprises; and the creation of a 
national bank).
The treaty establishes a norm of interpretation of shared competences which differs 
substantially from the federal constitution. Whereas the constitution’s article 76 establishes 
a hierarchy between federal and regional law in areas of joint jurisdiction, the treaty 
prohibits either level of government of legislating in the other’s sphere of powers and that 
conflicting laws on joint powers are to be resolved by joint agreement (art.6). By making 
bilateral political negotiation the main dispute setdement mechanism, the treaty sought to 
insulate Tatarstan’s laws in areas of joint jurisdiction from judicial review. (But as I 
examined above, the Russian Constitutional Court did not consider itself bound by treaty 
provisions which contradicted the division of powers established by the federal 
constitution.) The treaty was signed by both presidents Yeltsin and Shaimiev, in Russian 
and Tatar. The intergovernmental agreements were signed for a five-year period and 
renewed in 1999 with the caveat they could be modified anytime on mutual agreement. No 
termination date was specified for the treaty, except that it cannot be amended or cancelled 
unilaterally. This notwithstanding, the treaty is subject to the requirements stipulated in the 
2003 Law on the division of powers (examined in the next chapter) which rendered all 
treaties null and void unless approved by both federal and regional assemblies by July 2005.
The 1994 treaty bridged the gap, at least politically, between Tatarstan’s and Russia’s 
constitutions. For Shaimiev, the treaty and intergovernmental agreements “lent legitimacy to 
the relations of Russia and Tatarstan” and recognised “Tatarstan’s sovereignty over the
11 The exceptions concern federal powers which the treaty lists a joint, including citizenship, fiscal policy and 
regional development, the management o f  federal property and production and sale o f  arms.
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decision to determine the powers which [it] leaves to [itself] and those powers which are 
delegated to Russia” (ST 15.2.1995). The Chairman of the World Congress of Tatars, Indus 
Tagirov frames the treaty’s importance as legitimating and recognising Russia’s and 
Tatarstan’s sovereignty (ST, 30.3.1994). Indeed, for political advisor Khakimov, Russia’s 
1993 constitution is illegitimate since it was adopted without Tatarstan’s consent but it “is 
recognised thanks to the treaty” (Interview in Ovrutskii, 2000: 37). The treaty responded to 
Tatarstan’s claims for recognition and jurisdiction, as Mukhametshin makes clear on the 
occasion of its fifth anniversary: “Gradually Tatarstan obtained a new status within the 
Russian Federation, and has developed its own economic and political systems” (TBDR, 
12.2.1999).
For his part, Yeltsin explained his rationale for signing the treaty in a national 
address on federal-regional relations in 1997:
In order to solve some very difficult and divisive problems with Tatarstan, in 1994 we used 
an entirely new kind o f  constitutional tool for the very first time. I’m referring to the 
bilateral agreement on the demarcation o f  powers between federal and regional government 
bodies. At the time, this tool served as a kind o f  emergency political first aid. It forestalled 
the danger o f  a split in the Federation (Yeltsin, 1997: 3).
In the same address, Yeltsin justified the extension of treaty practice to other subjects as 
providing regions with powers to address specific regional needs and problems: “We are 
going to live in a stable and prosperous state [...] whose might will grow from year to year 
through the riches and true independence of all its constituent regions” (Yeltsin, 1997: 3). 
Although the treaty violated the federal constitution (containing at least nineteen violations, 
according to Lysenko (1997: 184-6)), it was hailed by Russia’s leaders as heralding the value 
of cooperation. For former Yeltsin advisor Mikhail Krasnov, “Formally [the treaty] 
contradicted several provisions of the constitution, but politically it was useful in that it 
initiated the search for compromises” (NG, 27.7.2001). The deputy representative of 
Tatarstan in Moscow, Mikhail Stoliarov concurs, adding the treaty helped “consolidate the 
country” (Stoliarov, 2003: 95). The treaty is deemed a valuable transitional tool since it 
“fixed the status quo between Russia and Tatarstan, thus ushering in a period of political 
predictability in Russo-Tatarstan relations” (Zverev, 1998: 143). Russian negotiator Sergei 
Shakhrai imputes the success in the negotiations to the unpoliticised and technical manner 
in which the negotiations were conducted (Shakhrai, 1997: 153). Khakimov, a member of 
Tatarstan’s negotiating team, attributes success to the fact that intergovernmental 
coordination and negotiation occurred on three levels simultaneously (political, 
governmental and ministerial), each reinforcing the other (Khakimov, 1996: 75-6).
But as I have examined, the treaty did not ‘solve’ any of the underlying 
contradictions in both Russia’s and Tatarstan’s constitutions. It addressed Tatarstan’s claims
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for recognition. But on questions of jurisdiction, the treaty added confusion to Russia’s 
federal design (Hughes, 1996: 43). Throughout the 1990s, Tatarstan’s leaders used the treaty 
as a foil to legitimise laws which contradicted the federal constitution. Indeed, the treaty was 
interpreted in Tatarstan as allowing “treaty-constitutional federalism”, argued as more 
responsive to regional differences than the “constitutional federalism” embodied in Russia’s 
1993 constitution (Khakimov, 1996: 70). The treaty-constitutional federalism of the 1994 
treaty “means that Moscow does not demand that Tatarstan bring its Constitution into line 
with the Constitution of Russia” (Khakimov, 1996: 76).
Accom m odating Conflicting Claims
Although the treaty responded to Tatarstan’s demand for recognition, the 
persistence of constitutional disagreements on federal design, and particularly on the 
division of competences, led to a practice of a ‘treaty-constitutional federalism’. This gave 
rise to contradictions in laws and policies, arising from ongoing conflicting interpretations 
of the federal and Tatarstan constitutions, as well as court rulings. I examine two examples 
below. The first example, regarding a constitutional requirement for candidates to the post 
of president of Tatarstan speak both state languages, illustrates the tenacity of Tatarstan’s 
demands for jurisdiction. These provisions have been maintained in the face of political 
pressure and judicial challenge. The second case, on inter-budgetary relations, illustrates the 
way in which bilateralism created a basis for a stabilisation of Russia and Tatarstan’s 
relationship. Tatarstan’s agreement on inter-budgetary matters was a significant 
achievement in the 1990s granting the republic significant fiscal and financial advantages. In 
2000, republican leadership decided to abandon the agreement and adhere to Russia’s 
system of fiscal federalism. In this case, treaty-constitutional federalism provided a basis for 
a transition to more constitutional federalism.
Under article 108 of the 1992 constitution, only citizens of Tatarstan who speak its 
state languages can stand for election to the presidency. The law On the Election of the 
President of Tatarstan stipulated that the president must speak both languages (1995 
version).12 Neither document defines the precise standard of language knowledge required. 
Tatarstan insisted its status of republic allows it to keep these provisions intact even though 
the courts have deemed them unconstitutional. The law, however, was never enforced 
during the election campaigns, which Shaimiev handily won. Midkhat Faroukshin believes 
the government was reticent to apply to language requirement for it could have provided 
prosecutors grounds to overturn the elections’ results or dismiss the republican government 
(Interview with Faroukshin, 2004).
12 The provision was dropped from the 2004 version o f  the law.
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Although it remained un-enforced, Tatarstan’s leaders refused to follow a 2001 
decision by the Russian Constitutional Court and have kept the language requirement in 
their constitution (art.91 in the 2002 version). The constitution of the Republic of Adygeia 
has a similar language requirement to Tatarstan’s — stipulating candidates speak (vladet) both 
state languages. Adygeia argued that it is within republic’s sphere of competence to manage 
their state languages, following article 68 of the federal constitution. As such, bilingualism 
for presidential candidates is a prerequisite for the “successful execution of the president’s 
duties” and not a basis for discriminating against potential candidates (KSRF, 2001b: par.l). 
The Court, however, viewed the issue as a violation of citizens’ “passive electoral rights” — 
the right to stand in elections -  and thus struck down the provision (Ibid.: par.l).13 Since 
the protection of electoral rights is a shared competence, federal subjects’ legislation cannot 
reduce the level of protection that is offered by federal law and the federal constitution 
(KSRF, 2002). The Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities also criticised such provisions as 
limiting the objectives of the Framework Convention’s article 15 to promote the 
participation of minorities other than the titular group in the political and electoral process 
(CoE, 2002: 26).
On the basis of these rulings, Tatarstan’s Supreme Court struck down the language 
requirement in both Tatarstan’s law on presidential elections and its constitution (in 
February 2001 and April 2004 respectively). In both cases, the courts refused to take 
account of the State Council’s argument that it was within its power to legislate on matters 
pertaining to the republic’s state languages (RT, 6.2.2003). Khakimov believes the language 
requirement will not be removed from the republic’s constitution because it constitutes 
“not only a symbol but an important question of state, promoting balance in the republic” 
(Interview with Khakimov, 2004). For his part, Shaimiev argues the issue is a question of 
minority rights: he contrasts Tatarstan’s provision, presented as fostering bilingualism and 
protecting multinationalism with Russia’s constitution and electoral law seen as promoting 
assimilation.
“The Russian law on electoral rights does not establish norms regarding the knowledge o f  
state languages in the subjects o f  the federation. In Tatar law there is a norm which states 
that only an individual who speaks two state languages — Tatar and Russian — regardless o f  
nationality, may be elected president. I am told that Tatarstan’s law limits the electoral rights 
o f those candidates who do not speak Tatar. On the other hand, however, isn’t it a 
limitation o f  the rights o f  1.5 million Tatars, half o f  our electorate, if  they cannot address 
their president in their native, and what is more, state language? Indeed in Russia a non- 
Russian speaker cannot be elected President” (Shaimiev, Interview in N G , 2.12.2000).
13 In a 1998 ruling on the constitutionality o f  Bashkortostan’s law on the presidency, the court reserved 
judgement on a similar issue because while the law established a language requirement, the republic had not 
yet enacted any legislation on its state languages (KSRF, 1998b).
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There are two dimensions to this statement: the federal government’s attitudes to 
multilingualism and the tension between group and individual rights. On the first 
dimension, Shaimiev contends that even if multilingualism is not a concern for the federal 
government, this is not a compelling reason to prohibit a language requirement in Tatarstan. 
There is a concern that the centre is not sufficiendy sensitive to the multilingual character of 
its subjects. The language requirement is a powerful political symbol. However, the fact the 
provision lacked precision and it was never implemented reveal the existence of a degree of 
ambivalence within Tatarstan on the effectiveness and utility of such a norm. Second, the 
statement reveals tension between conceptions of group and individual rights. The 
chairman of the Tatarstan State Council Committee on Science, Education, Culture and 
National Issues, Razil’ Valeev, evokes this tension direcdy: “What is higher: one person’s 
rights or those of a few million Tatar-speakers?” (Interview with Valeev, 2004) The right to 
stand for election is contrasted with the right of all citizens to receive information from and 
communicate with their president in Tatarstan’s state languages. Tatarstan’s Constitutional 
Court (whose role is examined in more detail in the following chapter) issued a 
contradictory ruling on these provisions and upheld the language requirement as it protects 
the right guaranteed by Tatarstan’s constitution to communicate with and receive 
information from the state in both state languages (KSRT, 2003a). According to Valeev, the 
republic will not budge on the position and amend its constitution, since the language 
requirement is no different than any other job requirement (Interview with Valeev, 2004). 
The provisions remain in place, even though since 2004 Tatarstan’s president is no longer 
elected but appointed by the federal president. While this has mooted the issue of the 
language requirement for the foreseeable future, a situation in which the Russian president 
appointed a candidate who does not speak Tatar to the Tatarstan presidency would almost 
certainly revive the polemic. This example serves to demonstrate how Tatarstan uses its 
claim to special status in Russia as a basis for maintaining legislation and constitutional 
provisions which federal courts reject as unconstitutional.
The second example addresses the intergovernmental agreement on budgetary 
cooperation signed in 1992. This agreement is undoubtedly the most significant of the 
bilateral accords from the perspective of the distribution of powers since it provided 
Tatarstan the right to withdraw from Russia’s system o f fiscal federalism and gave it 
independent sources of revenue to carry out “voluntarily delegated competences of the 
Russian Federation” (art.l, published in Guboglo, 1997: 416-18). The agreement mandated 
both parties to determine on a yearly basis the amount of VAT revenues which would be 
retained by the republic and how much would be forwarded to the federal treasury. The 
agreement’s provisions were the subject of intense negotiations in March 1999, when all
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intergovernmental agreements needed to be reviewed (TBDR, 16.2.1999). Negotiations 
were blocked on the percentage of tax revenue that Tatarstan would be allowed to keep. 
While all Tatarstan’s bilateral agreements were renewed for a further five years, the protocol 
stipulates that the inter-budgetary agreement would be revised on a yearly basis (RF, 1999b).
The agreement was dropped in December 2000, when Tatarstan announced it 
“joined” Russia’s inter-budgetary system and would open a branch of the federal treasury in 
the republic. Although the issue was reported to have been the subject of intense 
negotiations during 2000, little justification for the change appeared in the press. Tatarstan’s 
Prime Minister Minnikhanov claimed the republic would loose 30-40 per cent of its 
revenues by joining the federal budget system (TBDR, 18.8.2000). Tatarstan, however, was 
amply compensated for the change with the Federal Programme on Social-Economic Development 
of Tatarstan 2001-2006 promising transfers of 160 billion roubles over five years (RF, 2001b). 
This amount nearly matched the revenue which Tatarstan claimed it would lose by 
abandoning its bilateral agreement.14 The Federal Programme is winding down, the end of 
which is expected by Tatarstan’s Finance Minister to create a budget shortfall of $300 
million in the next years (V&D, 9.12.2004). Federal Finance Minister, Alexei Kudrin, 
indicates that after the end of the special programme, Tatarstan will be eligible for federal 
funds through existing government investment programmes on equal terms with other 
federal subjects (TBDR, 8.8.2005).
For the purpose of comparison, Tatarstan’s current position in Russia’s fiscal 
federalism conforms closer to the practice in other federal systems, such as Canada’s. 
Canada’s constitution guarantees provinces the right to raise funds by direct taxation (s.92). 
But in addition to this, the Government of Canada uses two mechanisms to transfer funds 
to provinces. These are not ad hoc transfers, but established and recurring programmes. 
First, federal transfer payment are made to assist in the provision of programmes and 
services in healthcare, post-secondary education, and social services. Transfers are 
conditional: they must be used to fund policies in these areas. In 2004-05, federal transfers 
accounted for about 26 per cent of provinces’ revenues. Transfers to Quebec for 2005-06 
are estimated at nearly $15.6 billion (Canada, 2005b; Canada, 2005c). Second, equalisation 
payments are made to provinces in order to reduce disparities between provinces. Payments 
are unconditional and based on an established formula. Quebec receives nearly half of the
14 Under the terms o f  its 1992 bilateral agreement (as revised in 1999), Tatarstan retained 75 per cent o f  
income tax receipts as well as VAT and tax revenues (IZV, 25.11.2000). In 2001, Tatarstan fell in line with 
other federal subjects: it would keep only 40 per cent o f  income tax receipts and transfer all VAT and duties 
on oil and alcohol sales to Moscow (IZV, 25.11.2000; TBDR, 19.3.2001; 5.9.2001). Effects o f  the change were 
immediately visible: in 2002, Tatarstan transferred 160 per cent more to M oscow than in 2001 (RT, 18.3.2003): 
49 per cent o f  taxes collected went to Moscow, 25 to the republican budget and 26 divided among 
municipalities (TBDR, 13.11.2002). In 2004, the republic was the largest contributor to the federal budget 
among federal subjects in the Volga Federal District (TBDR, 28.12.2004).
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total of equalisation payments (Canada, 2005a). Although the issue of federal transfers are 
eminendy political, as a matter of policy they are routine and not the object of ad hoc 
manipulations or bilateral exceptions. The 1992 intergovernmental agreement on inter- 
budgetary relations introduced significant political asymmetries in Tatarstan’s favour. The 
agreement provided a basis for a long-term ‘routinisation’ of fiscal relations, and helped 
facilitate the republic’s integration into Russia’s fiscal space nearly a decade later.
Conclusion
As I have examined in this chapter, the treaty and agreements accomplished two
things. First, they engaged Tatarstan and Russia’s leaders in a process of intergovernmental
negotiation, providing a degree of continuity and fluidity to their relations. The treaty, in
sum, institutionalised a process of bargaining and political compromise (Hughes, 2001b: 62-
63). Second, the accommodation of Tatarstan’s claims for recognition, mainly through the
1994 treaty, bridged the contradictions which existed between the federal and republican
constitutions by creating an alternative institutional channel, as well as*a basis for political or
patrimonial ties between Shaimiev and Yeltsin. Both sides agreed to close their eyes on the
contradictions inherent in their constitutions and in the treaty itself. Meanwhile, the leaders
of Russia and Tatarstan each infused their own meaning in the significance and role of the
treaty and model of federal-regional relations it establishes. It appears we are in the presence
of what Foley terms a constitutional abeyance:
“the element o f  dormant suspension implicit in what appear to be explicit constitutional 
arrangements, and the attitudinal habits o f  wilful neglect, protective obfuscation, and 
complicity in non-exposure, require to preserve the effectiveness o f  abeyance in deferring 
conflict and containing unresolved points o f  issue” (Foley, 1989: xi).
Shaimiev and Yeltsin concentrated not so much on the contradictions inherent in the 
constitutions and the unconstitutionality of some of the treaty’s provisions, but on the 
importance of the process and of the symbol; the importance of the abeyance mechanism. 
Thomas would characterise the 1994 bilateral treaty as an example of an “unsettled 
settlement” (Thomas, 1997: xii). By not defining institutional arrangements in too much 
detail, the treaty built in a degree of flexibility, and simultaneously provides recognition and 
vindication of both parties’ contradictory positions and federal visions. The political 
exigencies of the context led leaders to accept to live perhaps more in the spirit of federal 
accommodation than by the letter of the law.
For Walker the treaty forced Russia “to grow into federalism by negotiation” 
(Walker, 1996). I think it is appropriate to expand on this and add that the treaty forced 
Tatarstan to also grow into constitutional federalism. The treaty does not solve constitutional 
contradictions or establish a basis for a clearer division of powers. As Khakimov explains,
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“It’s political, above all” (Interview in Ovrutskii, 2000: 36). It provided a basis for the meta­
stability of Russia’s federalism, a view that Shakhrai holds: “the contradictory and unique 
experience of the “Tatarstan model” serves as a reminder” of the value of federalism in 
Russia (Shakhrai, 2001: 9).
In this chapter, I examined the nature of the constitutional disagreement — of the 
stateness dilemma -  between Russia and Tatarstan, and the republic’s claims for recognition 
as a “sovereign state united with Russia” and for jurisdiction. The confederal model of 
federal design advocated by Tatarstan’s political elites was not reflected in the constitution 
adopted by the Russian federal government in 1993. The federal constitution, by contrast, 
implemented a federal design with a penchant for strong central control, which denied 
Tatarstan the status and powers it sought. The bilateral treaty signed in 1994 bridged these 
competing visions, and provided for recognition of Tatarstan’s status as a state “united” 
with Russia and for a confederal division of competences between the two states. But the 
treaty’s advantage — and the ambiguities and contradictions on which it rested — also 
constitute its greatest weakness. Tatarstan’s treaty lacks firm grounding within the federal 
constitution, and is predicated on leaders’ willingness to compromise on a number of 
contradictions and ambiguities. Because the stability of this system depends on a narrow 
institutional consensus and non-transparent executive relations, it is not insulated from a 
change in circumstances or leadership (Hughes, 2001b: 58). Putin’s accession to the Russian 
presidency in 2000 signalled the ascendancy of greater centralisation over bilateralism and 
the ‘unsettled settlement’. Putin’s federalism emphasises the importance of increased 
symmetry in federal-regional relations as a means of consolidating a power vertical under 
his control. This was the impetus for his speedy reforms of the federal system to eliminate 
the contradictions in Russia’s and Tatarstan’s constitutions.
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Chapter 4. Collaborative or Hegemonic? Conflicting Visions of
Federalism in Putin’s Russia
As long as there is federalism in Russia, we are 
alive (Rafael Khakimov, April 2004).
Our county’s internal diversities constitute its 
competitive advantage in the world arena. 
Therefore the contradictory and unique
experience o f  the “Tatarstan model” must be put
into the service o f  Russia (Sergei Shakhrai in
Ne^avisimaya Ga^eta, 27 February 2001).
In this chapter, I examine the developments in federalism in Vladimir Putin’s
Russia. Putin’s federal reforms represent a move away from the practice of asymmetrical
negotiated federalism in favour of a centralising interpretation of the 1993 constitution. In 
other words, the objective was to settle many of the “unsettlements” — for instance, 
asymmetries and contradictions between federal and regional laws and constitutions — and 
reassert the primacy of the constitution and federal control. A. priori, therefore, these
reforms appear to target Tatarstan’s differentiated status. Analysis of the nature of Putin’s
reforms and their implementation in Tatarstan provide a window on how Tatarstan’s claims 
for recognition and jurisdiction have fared. Although republican elites continue to advocate 
a different model of federalism based less on federal control or hegemony and more on 
regional autonomy, they complied with many of Putin’s reforms. Constitutional changes in 
Tatarstan acknowledge the republic’s place within Russia, and increasingly, its leaders argue 
that Russia needs more, not less, federalism. The shift is significant — although Tatarstan 
continues to advocate a different model of federalism, it does so within the context of 
Russia’s changing presidential politics and how this impacts on federal design. That is not to 
say that Tatarstan has abandoned its claims for recognition and jurisdiction. The 1994 
bilateral treaty, although stripped of many of its operative and power-sharing provisions, 
continues to perform important political functions. The importance which Tatarstan’s elites 
continue to attach to the treaty and to the model of cooperative federalism it embodies is 
intact: the treaty serves as a reminder of what federalism was and could be in the Russian 
Federation.
The chapter is organised as follows. First, I examine Putin’s institutional changes to 
Russia’s federal design, the federal government’s conception of the division of 
competences, and key Constitutional Court rulings on the status of republics. Second, I 
analyse the counterview proposed by Shaimiev of the division of powers and federal design 
and turn to the way in which Putin’s reforms were implemented in Tatarstan. Finally, I 
assess the role of Tatarstan’s bilateral treaty in the current context.
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Putin’s Federal Reforms1
Putin shows a keen awareness of the abuses of power that resulted from negotiated 
federalism and the lack of federal control over Russia’s regions. For Kahn, Putin’s reforms 
.. were, more than anything else, a reaction to Yeltsin’s federal legacy of weak institutions 
and lack of consensus on basic questions of sovereignty and inter-governmental relations in 
a federal state” (Kahn, 2002: 277). Upon acquiring power in 2000, Putin set out to re­
establish a ‘power vertical’ in the federal system, roll back the asymmetry which had come 
to characterise the system and restore federal-regional relations on the basis of the 1993 
constitution. O f particular concern was the legislative and constitutional dissonance which 
existence between federal and regional governments. In 2000, Russia’s Prosecutor General 
reported that 70 per cent of regional legislative acts deviated from federal legislation, and 34 
per cent contradicted the federal constitution (Hyde, 2001: 731). According to the Russian 
Ministry of Justice, eighteen of twenty-one republican constitutions, and a third of 16,000 
laws it examined contradicted federal law (Kahn, 2002: 173).
The reforms Putin carried out were not new but had been discussed since 1996. 
Whereas Yeltsin’s attempts at federal reform had been ignored,2 Putin followed up on his 
promises for change and implemented concrete reforms from the very start of his term. 
Putin’s annual address to the Federal Assembly in July 2000 unveiled the strategic direction 
as well as the famous formula, ‘dictatorship of the law’. Putin voiced much concern on the 
question of the effectiveness of the state: indecision and weakness of state structures 
reduced policy and governance capacity. The time had come to bridge the regional “islets of 
power” and reassert central power (Putin, 2000). Regional autonomy was seen to have taken 
the upper hand and created situations in which “ ... centrifugal forces had gained such 
momentum that they were threatening [to destroy] the state itself’ (Putin, quoted in 
R F E /R L  'Newsline, 8.10.2002). Putin criticised the lack of transparency of bilateral treaties, 
arguing under Yeltsin: they were concluded “behind the backs of constituent units of the 
Federation” and “without any preliminary discussion and the securing of a public 
consensus” (Putin, 2002). Putin does not condemn the principle of treaty-making, 
conceding it was a way of responding to the political exigencies of the 1990s, and could be a 
means to accommodate regional specificities. But he stressed the need to “precisely 
determine where the powers of the federal bodies should be and where the powers of the
1 See Cashaback (2003) for a more detailed analysis o f  the federal reforms undertaken during Putin’s first term.
2 A  1996 presidential decree and 1998 government resolution were issued in an attempt to circumscribe the 
use o f  bilateral treaties, so that they were used only to regulate issues o f joint control, or accommodate a 
federal subject’s “geographical, economic, social, national or other specificity” (RF, 1996b: art.4; RF, 1998). In 
addition, the federal government enacted a law on the bodies o f  state power o f  the subjects o f  the federation 
which re-established the supremacy o f  the federal constitution and o f  its articles 71 and 72, on the division o f  
competences (RF, 1999a). Under Yeltsin, these initiatives were never fully implemented.
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subjects of the Federation [should be]” (Putin, 2001). In sum, Putin’s objective was to 
consolidate the central government’s power, strengthen its capacity to control the 
implementation of law and policy throughout the country and re-impose the authority of 
the federal constitution.
The most sustained push for reforms occurred between 2000 and 2002, a time when 
most of the institutional changes were implemented. Between 2002 and 2004, federal 
reform as a topic of discussion “all but disappeared from the centre’s rhetoric”, which was 
increasingly focused on administrative reform (Interview with Faroukshin, 2004). A 
renewed interest in federal reforms was sparked in late 2004 when the president abolished 
direct elections for regional leaders and again in 2005 with an announcement of the 
government’s intention to rollback some of its earlier reforms and amend the division of 
competences.
Institutional Changes to Russian Federalism
Putin adopted a number of reforms to increase the federal government’s monitoring 
and control capacity. The first reform restructured the presidential administration by 
reorganising the federation into seven umbrella administrative regions (federal districts) 
headed by an appointed plenipotentiary representative (PR) subordinate to the head of the 
Presidential Administration (Decree no.849, 2000; Decree no.97, 2001). The move 
aggregated the monitoring function, which existed under Yeltsin. Indeed, before 2000, a PR 
was appointed in each federal subject and the system was seen as unwieldy because of the 
large number of representatives and their lack of resources: the federal envoy often 
depended on the regional government for resources, thus compromising his authority 
(Clark, 1998: 37). Putin removed the influence of regional leaders on the activities of the 
representatives. He explained the territorial aggregation of this monitoring function was not 
a federal or constitutional but “managerial reform” to accomplish three tasks: 1) monitor 
the regions’ conformity to federal law and the constitution, 2) coordinate the activities of 
federal-level officials in the regions and 3) analyse and report on the effectiveness of local 
law enforcement agencies (ITAR/TASS, 22.5.2000). The envoys’ tasks were expanded in 
2003 when Putin directed them to monitor the implementation of federal electoral law, land 
reform, and federal transfers to the regions (NG, 24.4.2003).
The creation of federal districts and representatives were designed to increase the 
centre’s monitoring capacity and facilitate the implementation of a unified legal space. In 
practice, an envoy’s effectiveness has depended on his particular personality, interests, 
ability and relationships (Mikheev, 2002, RRR, 27.9.2002). Reddaway and Orttung conclude 
the reform has successfully depersonalised the relations between the president and most
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governors, except for relations with the leaders of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and St- 
Petersburg (Reddaway and Orttung, 2004). For instance, within the Volga Federal District 
Tatarstan continues to take political issues up direcdy with Moscow, circumventing the 
office of the PR (Sharafutdinova and Magomedov, 2004). As I examine below, inter-elite 
relations continue to be the norm in the management of the Russia-Tatarstan relationship.
In a further effort to remove regional leaders from direct access to the levers of 
power in Moscow, a July 2000 law modified the composition of the Federation Council 
(FC) (RF, 2000a). Since 1995, leaders of regional executive and legislative branches sat in 
the upper chamber on an ex officio basis, providing regional leaders significant presence and 
influence at the centre. The law directs regional legislative and executive branches to select 
one representative each to sit in the FC. Unsurprisingly, regional leaders reacted strongly to 
the proposal and vetoed it. To secure passage of the bill, amendments were proposed to 
allow governors to keep their seats until their own terms expired, and ensure that the terms 
of incoming representatives were identical to the terms of the bodies which appointed them 
(Huskey, 2001: 114; Hyde, 2001: 729). Federation Council reform is considered to have 
produced dubious results. According to Gel’man, in many cases regional governments 
appointed Moscow-based lobbyists and business elites who maintain informal relationships 
with the Kremlin and who can wield their influence behind the scenes. A significant 
proportion of regional representatives have little or no connection to the region they 
represent. In some cases, governors appoint potential rivals to the FC to minimise their 
influence on decision-making within their region and strengthen their grip on the domestic 
political scenes (Gel'man, 2001: 2).
To compensate them for their removal from the Federation Council, Putin created 
the State Council, an intergovernmental forum where leaders of all 89 subjects meet on a 
quarterly basis. The body’s presidium comprises the president and seven regional leaders, 
one per district, appointed for a six-month term (RF, 2000d). Although the body is 
consultative, its aim is to promote the participation of regional leaders in the “preparation 
and passing of important national decisions” (Putin, 2000). In its first five years, the State 
Council convened fifteen times, its presidium held forty-five meetings. Speaking on the 
occasion of the Council’s fifth anniversary in Kazan, Putin concluded it evolved into “one 
of the most influential political institutions in the country” and constitutes an “extended 
government, able to find national solutions and approaches to complex problems” (Intertat,
26.8.2005). At the same session, regional leaders echoed Putin’s positive appraisal, even 
though the institution had been greeted with scepticism in 2000. For Shaimiev, it plays “a 
useful and productive role”. Luzhkov suggests the Council is the perfect forum to give 
regional leaders a more substantial role in the consideration of the federal budget (Intertat,
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26.8.2005). The Council has become a key institution for discussion of federal-regional 
concerns (sessions on tropics as diverse as housing, federal design, education policy and 
national security have been held). Although it is only a consultative body, it nevertheless 
performs a function of intergovernmental representation of regional interests.
Following the terrorist attack in Beslan in September 2004, Putin acted quickly to 
abolish elections for leaders of regional governments. The rationale for the change was a 
need for stronger executive control: “The bodies of executive authority in the centre and in 
the subjects of the Russian Federation [...] must work as a single integrated organism with a 
clear structure of subordination. Until now, such a system has not been put in place” (Putin 
quoted in RG, 13.9.2004). Shaimiev backed the reform guardedly, conceding Putin’s 
rationale: “In many regions the people who come to power do so as proteges of capital or 
on the basis of populism”, which hinders the ability of “the people at the helm [to] actually 
steer” (ITAR/TASS, 14.9.2004). Putin convened the State Council for closed-door sessions 
on the proposed reforms. Unsurprisingly, little dissent was voiced publicly by leaders for 
whom loyalty to the Russian president would become a job requirement. Thus, many 
approved the proposals, including Moscow mayor Luzhkov and St-Petersburg mayor 
Valentina Matvienko and argued the reform would provide the federal government the 
ability to instil discipline at the regional level and provide regional leaders with levers with 
which to govern (ITAR/TASS, 18.10.2004). Amendments were brought to the 1999 law on 
the bodies of state power to give the President the power to appoint regional leaders (RF, 
1999a: art.5§3a), and a decree was issued to refine the administrative procedure: presidential 
representatives select a candidate “in consultation” with regional leaders, civil society groups 
and public organisations for the president’s approval (RF, 2004).3 Once nominated, the 
regional assembly must confirm the choice. If the nominee is refused twice, the president is 
empowered to dissolve the assembly (RF, 1999a: art.9).
Although Tatarstan’s State Council approved Putin’s proposals by fifty-seven to 
nineteen votes (NG, 27.10.2004), at the United Russia party conference in November 2004 
members from Tatarstan were outspoken in their criticism of Putin’s proposals and 
suggested that the dissolution of regional assemblies be prohibited and a sunset clause be 
included in the law (NG, 11.11.2004). Shaimiev was supportive of the decision to appoint 
regional leaders but strongly criticised the power Putin gained to dissolve regional 
assemblies that vetoed his choice: “Under no circumstances can we agree with [those 
provisions]. The people elect Parliament, thus it is the voice of the people” (RT,
3 The original decree called on the presidential representative to establish a short-list o f  two candidates, to be 
submitted to the Head o f  the Presidential Administration. Putin’s changes to the procedure, made in June 
2005, increased representatives’ powers: no longer needing to coordinate their choice with the presidential 
administration, they are free to nominate only one candidate for approval (RF, 2005b).
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26.10.2004). In the meantime, many regional leaders including Shaimiev circumvented the 
procedures established by Putin’s December 2004 decree by appealing directly to the 
Russian president to re-nominate them. Shaimiev reported that Putin asked him to accept a 
fourth term as president because the “price of stability in a republic like Tatarstan is too 
high” (RT, 12.03.2005). Consequendy, Shaimiev submitted his pre-term resignation, was 
nominated by Putin and confirmed by the Tatarstan State Council on 25 March 2005. 
Simultaneously, Tatarstan’s constitution was amended to suspend (not annul) the clauses on 
the election of Tatarstan’s president. Both Shaimiev and Mukhametshin justified the move 
to suspend rather than rescind the clauses by saying they believed the suspension of 
elections is only temporary and the reinstatement of direct elections is “merely a question of 
time” (TBDR, 31.03.2005). Many incumbent governors have been reappointed and so far 
no nominations have been blocked by regional assemblies. While early to assess the 
consequences of this reform, analysts fear the anti-federal tendencies of the change, and the 
potential for conflict it creates should regional assemblies start to reject presidential 
nominees (see articles in NG, 14.9.2001 and 5.11.2004). By increasing Moscow’s control 
over regional leadership, it will likely make it difficult to isolate the centre from future policy 
failures. Consequently, the reform could focus future discontent on the federal government, 
rather than diffuse it between it and the regions.
In addition to the changes affecting the place of regional leaders, Putin strengthened 
the federal government’s ability to combat contradictions in legislation, dubbed the 
‘separatism in the legal sphere’. The 1993 constitution designates the president as guarantor 
of the federal constitution (art.80§2) and grants him the right to suspend legislative acts 
which contradict federal law or the constitution (art.85§2). The 1999 law on the bodies of 
state power was amended to give the president the power to dismiss regional leaders or 
parliaments who enact or fail to rescind contradictory legislation. However, this power is 
not discretionary as the courts have ruled that courts of three jurisdictions must concur that 
regional legislation is delinquent before the president can invoke the procedure. In 2000, a 
key tool was created in the struggle against legislative dissonance: the Federal Registry of 
Legal Normative Acts. All subjects of the federation are required to forward their normative 
legal acts to the federal Ministry of Justice for assessment (RF, 2000c, art.2). The purpose of 
the Registry is further defined in a government resolution: it “controls the correspondence 
of normative legal acts of subjects of the federation with the constitution of Russia and 
federal laws” and creates the “means to obtain information about the normative legal acts 
of subjects of the federation” (RF, 2000b, art.2). Thus, in addition to fostering more
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transparency, the registry creates a material and institutional basis for the systematic analysis 
of the correspondence of regional and federal laws.4
R e-im posing Federal Supremacy in the Division of Powers
Following his 2001 Annual Address, Putin appointed a Presidential Commission for the 
Demarcation of Powers Between the Federal, Regional and Municipal Levels of Government, naming a 
former colleague from the administration of St Petersburg and trusted deputy, Dmitrii 
Kozak (then the deputy head of the Presidential Administration, now the Presidential 
Representative to the Southern Federal District), to direct its work. Kozak’s Commission 
would eventually regroup the State Council working group headed by Shaimiev and 
Luzhkov’s working group on state system reforms. The Commission’s report, Concept of 
Federal Reforms, was presented to the State Council and regional leaders in early 2002. The 
Concept calls for a better division of powers in areas of joint competences to ensure tasks are 
executed and financed properly, and an increase in the centre’s capacity to assess and 
control regional policy implementation. Kozak’s model makes the federal government 
responsible for setting national standards, while regional governments are held responsible 
for the execution of policy. In such a system, bilateral power-sharing would be used only in 
exceptional circumstances to take into account “geographic or other particularities” 
(Concept, 2002). In the wake of the report, two laws were enacted. Approved in July 2003, 
the law Amendments to the Federal haw On General Principles of the Organisation of legislative and 
Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation proposes a clear 
delimitation of federal-regional competencies and circumscribes the use of treaties. On 
General Principles of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation was adopted in October in 
order to promote the economic and policy capacities of municipal government. Although 
both laws were the subject of intense scrutiny by Duma committees, the fundamental 
principles of Kozak’s vision emerged unscathed.
Whereas issues of jurisdiction and accountability were left unanswered in Putin’s 
previous reform initiatives, these laws establish a balance of interests and powers between 
orders of government and resolve ambiguities and unfunded mandates so “power becomes 
accountable to its citizens” (Kozak quoted in Tsvetkova, 2003). A key element in both laws 
is the reassertion of the supremacy of federal law and the federal constitution. In areas of 
joint jurisdiction, the laws enumerate the tasks which will be controlled by Moscow and 
those to be funded and executed by the subjects of the federation and by municipal
4 The Registry is a fascinating resource that lists normative acts o f Russia’s federal subjects, challenges made 
(by federal or regional prosecutors, or courts) and what action was taken by the regional government (whether 
the protest was acknowledged or challenged). It is available online: http://www.registr.bcpi.ru.
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governments. A higher-level government is empowered to set policy objectives and charge 
lower-level governments with their implementation. In an attempt to eliminate the problem 
of unfunded mandates, the law forbids the delegation of powers to another level of 
government without an accompanying budgetary envelope, and empowers the delegating 
body to sanction or suspend leaders who misuse funds earmarked for a specific purpose 
(RRR, 7:28, 2002). The law on the state bodies of the subjects of the federation contains 
provisions which allow the federal government to assume financial control of regional 
governments whose deficits rise above thirty per cent (art.269§lb and §3). If  an arbitrage 
court approves its petition, the federal government can retain this control for up to a year.
Article 267 of the law on the bodies of state power addresses bilateral 
intergovernmental agreements. Bilateral treaties can be pursued in exceptional 
circumstances, to accommodate the “economic, geographic or other peculiarities” of 
subjects of the federation. Ethnicity appears to have been downgraded as a reason to pursue 
bilateral power-sharing since the earlier (1999) version of the law listed ethnicity as a 
motive. In addition, the law adds several requirements, purportedly to increase the 
transparency of the process, the consequences of which would make concluding treaties 
increasingly difficult. First, all subjects of the federation have a right to consult and 
comment on draft treaties (art.267§5). Second, a treaty must be approved by both the 
federal and regional parliaments (art.267§4 and §8). Efforts to make the process more 
transparent and institutionalised may reduce its effectiveness. Since the law foresee treaties 
to be used to address regional particularities and entrench some degree of asymmetry, by 
requiring the approval of parliament, the law creates the potential for increased federal- 
regional conflict. The effectiveness of bilateral agreements is potentially reduced as a coping 
mechanism. Since all remaining treaties needed to be ratified by the federal assembly before 
July 2005, the law has effectively rendered them moot as operative documents.
Two years after the Kozak reforms effectively withdrew policy-making capacity in 
areas of joint jurisdiction, Putin announced during a State Council session in Kaliningrad on 
2 July 2005 that powers would be handed back to regions. 114 competences will be handed 
back “to change the quality of the work of regional bodies and raise their role and 
accountability in the socio-economic sphere” (Putin, 2005). “The delegation of additional 
powers to regions [...] is not the result of some administrative itch {%ud)” but designed to 
promote more effective economic policy (Putin, 2005). The president did not specify which 
powers would be transferred to the regions at this meeting, although it has been reported 
they include forestry management, veterinary services, the protection of historical 
monuments, science, education, housing, etc. (RG, 24.8.2005). When the State Council 
reconvened in Kazan on 26 August 2005, Putin confirmed a law was being drafted to ratify
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the changes announced in Kaliningrad (RT, 27.8.2005). One competence he immediately 
handed over to regional leaders was the power to select the directors of federal agencies (of 
the Ministry of Justice, civil affairs, internal affairs, etc.) in the regions (The decree was 
presented at the State Council session in Kaliningrad: RF, 2005b).
Rostislav Turovsky believes the announcements reflect a realisation by Moscow that 
the strict power vertical does not sufficiently insulate it from unpopular decisions. For 
instance, the protests which occurred in many regions in response to changes in social 
benefits and housing policies demonstrated the centre’s vulnerability ([Novaya Ga^eta,
7.7.2005). Now that regional leaders are federal appointees, Moscow is more comfortable 
delegating power back to regions knowing it possesses greater control over those exercising 
it. Moreover, although the law is forthcoming, Putin has made clear his conception of how 
the powers are to be exercised: “ ... competence, in the first instance, means responsibility. 
The federal centre will carefully observe how it is used” (Putin, 2005). It is not a reform 
aimed at increasing regional policy autonomy, since it is not ‘competences’ but ‘duties’ or 
‘obligations’ (obya^annost) that are to be delegated. Indeed, these reforms appear to be more 
about presidential power than about federalism.
Court Interpretations o f Republican Status
At the same time as Putin adopted measures aimed at strengthening the centre’s 
hand in its relations with regional governments, the Russian Constitutional Court (KSRF) 
handed down landmark rulings in June 2000 which asserted the supremacy of the federal 
constitution and provided the impetus for bringing republics’ constitutions in line with it. 
While the Court issued rulings in the 1990s which already confirmed the supremacy of 
federal legislation in matters of joint competence (see Chapter 3, and especially the rulings 
on the fundamentals of the tax system (1997) and on the Forestry Code (1998)), the June 
2000 rulings took aim at the most fundamental of republics’ claims: that they constitute 
sovereign entities within Russia.
The 7 June 2000 ruling annulled provisions of Altai’s constitution which defined the 
republic as sovereign, possessor of its natural resources and subject of international law. In 
addition, the Court rejected the republic’s claims that its status was based on a bilateral 
treaty with Russia. Sovereignty, the Court ruled, is an attribute of the Russian people as a 
whole, and indivisible: “The Russian constitution does not allow any other bearer of 
sovereignty or source of power besides the multinational people of Russia” (KSRF, 2000b, 
Par.2.1). Moreover, the Court reasserted the equality of all subjects of the federation, and 
the supremacy of the federal constitution and laws: neither the 1992 Federal Treaty nor any 
bilateral treaty trump the provisions of the 1993 constitution.
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On request from a group of State Duma deputies who challenged the constitutions 
of several republics, including Tatarstan’s, the Court issued a Determination on 27 June 
2000. Based on the 7 June ruling as well as its 1992 opinion on Tatarstan’s referendum on 
state sovereignty, the Court concluded that “Sovereignty [...], the supremacy and 
independence of state power, the entirety of legislative, executive and judicial power on its 
territory and independence in international relations constitute essential characteristics of 
the Russian Federation as a state” (KSRF, 2000a: par.2.1). Sovereignty is indivisible: only 
Russia may sign international treaties and republics cannot claim to be subjects of 
international law or sovereign states. Tatarstan’s claim to be “united” with Russia 
constitutes an “unconstitutional modification o f its constitutional status” (KSRF, 2000a: 
par.3.2). Moreover, the republic cannot claim possession of natural resources or any other 
competences which contradicts the division of competences established by the federal 
constitution. In April 2001, Volga District presidential representative Sergei Kirienko 
complained that republics had not amended their constitutions to reflect the Court’s rulings. 
The Constitutional Court answered with a clarification, stating any constitutional provision 
deemed to be unconstitutional is inoperative (KSRF, 2001a: par.3) and that its rulings apply 
to all federal subjects.
The June 2000 rulings did not break ground. The Court had already ruled in its 1992 
decision on Tatarstan’s referendum that republics could not make changes to their 
constitutional status. The rulings did, however, remove any remaining ambiguities regarding 
republics’ claims to be sovereign entities: only Russia can claim sovereignty. Moreover, 
claims that republics possess special status, or in the case of Tatarstan, that it is “united with 
Russia” are unconstitutional. One major difference with the Court’s previous rulings on the 
federal structure was the impetus they provided to bring regional legislation, and especially 
republics’ laws and constitutions, in line with federal law. While previous rulings had been 
ignored, in the context of Putin’s Russia, they signalled the beginning of campaigns by 
federal prosecutors to rid regional law books of contradictory provisions in their effort to 
establish legislative and constitutional coherence.
Visions o f Federalism in Putin’s Russia
Putin’s institutional reforms, taken with the Constitutional Court’s rulings, provide 
an impression of the centre’s vision of federal design and federalism. Foremost, federalism 
is about symmetry in the federal government’s relations with the subjects of the federation, 
and between the subjects themselves. The Constitutional Court rejected an interpretation of 
the constitution that allowed subjects of the federation to possess sovereignty, even in areas 
of exclusive regional competence. Effectiveness and political stability are conceived as
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emanating from a strong and unified system of executive governance, and I would add, 
dominance. Indeed, the Kozak reforms reflect a view of the division of competences as 
hegemonic, aiming less at protecting regional autonomy than providing measures for federal 
control over implementation of policy in Russia’s regions. “The division of powers”, Putin 
explained, “is not like a Chinese wall between centre and regions” (IZV, 19.7.2001). 
Similarly, Putin’s federal reforms minimise the role of power-sharing or shared sovereignty 
because this “aggravates the problem of inequality” among subjects of the federation and 
between them and the federal government (IZV, 19.7.2001). Reforms of federal design 
under Putin question the extent to which Russia still constitutes a federal political system. 
Presidential control over the appointment of regional leaders further cements Moscow’s 
control and the view that regions are executors rather than initiators of policy. Federal 
reforms consolidate a model of hegemonic federalism -  with tendencies toward centralised 
authoritarianism -  which emphasises central control over regional autonomy or self-rule.
To get a better idea of the way in which this vision of federalism has been 
implemented in Russia, I turn to examine how these reforms were received and acted upon 
in Tatarstan. Tatarstan’s political elite, while complying with many of these reforms, 
continue to articulate a different vision of federalism. The areas of continued disagreement 
— Tatarstan’s persistent claim to sovereignty and its call for jurisdictional autonomy — are a 
useful foil to grasp the extent to which consensus has been achieved over federal design.
Tatarstan’s Com peting Vision o f Federalism: Collaborative versus H egem onic
The reaction in Tatarstan to Putin’s various initiatives was a mixture of public 
opposition and agreement. It was clear that the balance of power shifted in favour of the 
centre once Putin gained power. Shaimiev welcomed Putin’s efforts to create a single legal 
space in Russia and supported, if sometimes only tacidy, the Russian president’s reform 
programme. For Shaimiev, legal dissonance and contradictions which emerged during the 
1990s needed to be clarified, but in a different way than Kozak would eventually suggest:
“We adopted a lot o f  different laws to reach some definite political and economic goals in a 
short period. We’ve done a lot, now it’s time to fix this mess. It’s necessary to make a clear 
division o f  [competences], what belongs to the center and what to the subjects o f  the 
federation, without interfering with each other’s exclusive powers” (TBDR, 16.10.2000).
In 2001, Putin appointed Shaimiev to direct a State Council working group on the division
of powers, which was subsequently folded into Kozak’s working group on federal reforms.
Regional leaders and republics were not shut out of the reform process, even if the resulting
laws did not please all participants. As Lankina notes, regional support for the law on the
division of powers was secured by giving them a voice in the process. Moreover, in
exchange for their support of the law on municipal government, governors obtained powers
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to select or remove municipal leaders and control over municipal spending (Lankina, 2003). 
Although Shaimiev criticised provisions of the Kozak report and of the laws which emerged 
from it, in the end he complied while underlining that Tatarstan possessed a different 
conception of federalism. This has become Tatarstan’s principal reaction to Putin’s federal 
reforms: they are criticised but endorsed with the leadership making it clear it remains 
committed to an alternate conception of federalism.
One of the main objectives of Shaimiev’s working group was to correct the 
imbalance in the distribution of competences in the federal constitution. For Tatarstan’s 
president, the division of competences in the 1993 constitution permits federal control by 
stealth: since federal law in areas of shared jurisdiction is supreme, subjects of the federation 
are reduced to execution rather than elaboration of policy (Interview in Goble, 2000). As I 
examined above, this is the view entrenched in Kozak’s reform bills, and it is the way in 
which Russia’s courts interpret regional laws which diverge from federal legislation on 
matters of joint jurisdiction.
What Putin called “separatism in the legal sphere” Shaimiev sees as a sign that the 
federal principle needs to be better implemented in Russia. The working group’s report, the 
Draft Concept oft State Policy on the Division of Competences and Powers between Federal, Regional and 
Municipal Bodies (hereafter Concept, cited as GSRF) proposes a model of federal design in 
which the centre would legislate to establish strategic orientations while giving regional 
government more latitude to implement the law according to local needs and particularities. 
The Concept outlines the lacunae in Russia’s federalism: there are too many shared 
competences, each level of government’s respective rights and obligations are not well 
demarcated, and Moscow interferes too much in regional and shared jurisdictions (GSRF, 
2002: 101-3). Furthermore, the constitution does not define the terms it uses to denote each 
government’s powers and obligations. The report objects to the wide interpretation which 
the centre has given of its right to establish “general principles” in areas of joint jurisdiction 
in order to shut out regional governments from legislating in these areas (GSRF, 2002: 105). 
In their rulings on issues of joint competence, Russia’s courts have tended to adopt similarly 
broad interpretations.
The Concept outlines a number of reforms to Russia’s federal design, which I 
summarise as falling into three categories: the need for a model of cooperative federalism; a 
clearer division of powers; and the use of treaty relations. First, it establishes a wholly 
different normative vision of federalism. It argues federalism must be viewed as both an 
institutional structure (ustroistvo) and principle of political behaviour; as providing the means 
for self- and shared-rule (GSRF, 2002: 103-4). In this sense, cooperative federalism is 
contrasted to the existing model and practice of hegemonic federalism in Russia. Under a
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model of cooperative federalism, shared sovereignty is possible as is increased cooperation 
in fields of joint jurisdiction. The purpose of such a change of vision is to “promote better 
relations between the central and regional governments” and “increased respect for and 
support of the political, cultural and national diversities of Russian society” (GSRF, 2002: 
104). Regional autonomy, therefore, is a key component of this vision.
Second, the implementation of a model of cooperative federalism must begin with a 
reform of the division of competences. Constitutional competence implies a right to make 
policy and obligation to carry it out. This is the same principle which guided the work of 
Kozak’s working group and the State Council’s sessions in July and August 2005 on the 
division of powers. However, the Kozak reforms did not reorganise the constitutional 
division of powers but provided detailed lists of which level of government was responsible 
for financing and implementing given tasks. As I discussed above, these reforms emphasise 
compliance over autonomy. Mukhametshin indicates that 300 federal laws exist in areas of 
joint jurisdiction, and few provide clear direction on the rights and obligations of each level 
of government (TBDR, 1.7.2002). Tatarstan’s leaders argued federal laws in areas of joint 
and regional jurisdiction should also be subject to review and that harmonisation of 
conflicting legislation should not only be a top-down phenomenon. Shaimiev’s Concept calls 
for federal law-makers to be more attuned to regional legislative and policy approaches and 
create more room for regional and municipal governments to tailor legislative initiatives to 
their specific needs and goals (GSRF, 2002: 114). Three levels of competence are 
envisioned: strategic (federal), territorial (regional) and local (municipal). Russia would keep 
its power to set national objectives, but the other levels of government would gain more 
latitude to determine how these objectives should be implemented (GSRF, 2002: 104). In 
this Concept, “subsidiarity”, defined as giving competence to the level of government most 
suited to carry it out, should trump hierarchy and verticality (GSRF, 2002: 116). It provides 
no detail on how such a system would be implemented or how it would operate. While 
subsidiarity is advanced as being more dynamic and cooperative, in a federation of 89 
members one wonders how workable it would be. The report argues that Russia’s 
constitution already contains many of the mechanisms that could facilitate a transition to 
cooperative federalism, such as article 11 which foresees the use of bilateral agreements 
(GSRF, 2002:108-9).
Third, bilateral treaties are given an important role in this model of cooperative 
federalism. The Concept rejects the way in which treaties were used under Yeltsin. Treaties in 
the 1990s often contained unconstitutional provisions and delegated exclusive federal or 
joint powers to regional governments. Shaimiev’s report makes it clear that treaties should 
not establish “treaty-constitutional” relations or contravene the constitution. They should
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be used as tools to determine priorities in the regulation of joint competences, take regional 
concerns into account or help resolve conflicts between central and regional governments 
(GSRF, 2002:120-2).
Shaimiev’s Concept was presented to the State Council Presidium on 26 December 
2000. Although its contents were controversial, the Presidium approved and recommended 
it be brought to the attention of the full State Council (RF, 2001c). But the report was never 
scheduled for consideration (GSRF, 2002: 106nl). It received minimal coverage in the 
republican press, apart for Zve^da Povol^h’ja  which published an excerpt and the journal 
Ka^an Federalist which published the report verbatim. Shaimiev defended his vision, arguing 
that “Russia’s power and strength reside in the strength and independence of its regions” 
and that stability “can only be ensured by diversity and not blind unification” (IZV,
19.2.2001). For Dmitrii Kozak, the implementation of the report’s provisions “would lead 
to the destruction of the unity of the country’s legal system [...] and to separatism among 
Russia’s well-off regions” (Quoted in East European Constitutional Review, Fall 2001). 
This assessment was echoed by State Duma members whom the Kremlin appointed to 
consider the report (TBDR, 19.2.2001). The Kremlin’s dissatisfaction with Shaimiev’s 
Concept prompted Putin to appoint Kozak to head a separate working group on the division 
of powers, into which Shaimiev’s working group was incorporated.
Although little came of Shaimiev’s report, I focus on it because of the alternate 
vision of federalism it articulates. Two features are remarkable. First, it does not call for 
outright constitutional reform. Although its implementation would significantly change the 
way federalism is practiced in Russia, Shaimiev illustrates that on paper the 1993 
constitution already provides a basis for cooperative federalism. Second, the Concept does 
not challenge the federal government’s role to legislate on matters of state importance or to 
set state-wide approaches. Instead it argues that in areas of joint jurisdiction, more attention 
needs to be paid to regional specificities. Thus, although the report itself reads like a series 
of idealistic proposals, its principles inform many of Tatarstan’s arguments on the changes 
required to Russia’s federal design. This belief in the value of a more cooperative federalism 
sheds light on the way in which Tatarstan implemented Putin’s federal reforms, and on the 
nature of its persistent claims for recognition and jurisdiction.
Reacting to Putin’s Federalism: Legislative Harmonisation
At the same time as Shaimiev’s working group drafted its concept of federal design, 
Tatarstan’s leadership began implementing Putin’s federal reforms. A Commission was 
created under the aegis of the Volga district presidential representative, Sergei Kirienko, to
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bring Tatarstan’s legislation in line with the Russian constitution.5 Kirienko sought to clarify 
that the law, not personalities, was to guide legislative the process: “It is not the personal 
relations of Sergei Kirienko and Mintimer Shaimiev that count in this case, it is the necessity 
of the unification process... Conciliation commissions must not rely on any other 
documents than the two constitutions” (Quoted in TBDR, 30.10.2000). The Commission’s 
inaugural meeting classified forty-five laws as constituting “political conflicts”, linked to 
competences which Tatarstan claimed had been delegated by the 1994 treaty, including 
property and natural resource rights (ZP, 14-20.9.2000). Mukhametshin argued that since 
Tatarstan had assented to neither the Federal Treaty nor the 1993 constitution, the bilateral 
treaty was the only link between Moscow and Kazan and its provisions needed to be 
respected. Since the contradictions were “political, not juridical” they needed to be 
discussed by Putin and Shaimiev instead of the conciliation committees (VE, 28.9.2001, 
Sharafutdinova and Magomedov, 2004: 160). Shaimiev reported that he had taken up these 
“political conflicts” with Putin and that the Russian president agreed the harmonisation 
committees needed to take the treaty’s provisions into account (RT, 14.11.2000). Thus, 
contrary to Kirienko’s wishes, non-transparent executive negotiations appear to have 
informed the harmonisation process. Notwithstanding Putin’s attempts to depersonalise 
federal-regional relations, it is clear that inter-elite negotiation and mediation have retained 
their importance as mechanisms of accommodation.
Federal prosecutors, however, were indifferent to the nuance between political and 
juridical contradictions. Soon after the Constitutional Court’s June 2000 rulings, Russian 
Deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Zvyagintsev challenged twenty republican laws 
including the constitution because they placed “[Tatarstan’s] legal system outside the federal 
legal system” (Interview in Interfax, 26.6.2000). On orders from Russian’s Prosecutor 
General, Tatarstan’s own prosecutor also issued challenges. The Tatarstan State Council’s 
Permanent Commission on Legislation began considering prosecutors’ protests in late 2000. 
Results were immediately apparent. Chief Federal Inspector in Tatarstan, Marsel 
Galimardanov, reported that as of January 2001, 89 of 115 documents challenged had been 
harmonised with federal law (TBDR 11.01.2001). In his year-end summary of the State 
Council’s activities, Mukhametshin calculated that the parliament spent a majority of its 
2001 session dealing with harmonisation (Interview published in RT, 28.12.2001). In 2001, 
prosecutors challenged seventy-three laws, thirty-one of which were amended and 
seventeen rescinded. O f thirty-seven protests that went to court, Tatarstan won only three
5 Several bodies were established to work on legislative and constitutional harmonisation in addition to the 
Kirienko commission: a joint Tatar-Russian commission on the constitution, committees o f  the Tatarstan 
State Council and a republican Constitutional Committee.
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cases (RT, 28.12.2001). The Federal Registry of normative acts still lists Tatarstan as the 
biggest offender among Russia’s federal subjects: as of 31 December 2004, nineteen acts (or 
20 per cent of total state-wide) were found to contradict federal law. Ninety-two laws 
contain provisions which violate federal law.6 What explains the persistence of legal 
dissonance?
During the harmonisation process, Tatarstan’s Prosecutor, Kafil Amirov, reported 
that twelve republican laws were “more progressive” than Moscow’s (TBDR 30.1.2001).7 
But the Federal Registry does not include federal laws and these are not subject to similar 
assessment by the Ministry of Justice. Consequently, State Council deputies protested the 
double-standard and claimed federal laws should be held to the same standard. In fact, 
deputies found at least twenty federal laws that violated the federal constitution but were 
told federal prosecutors are not empowered to protest federal laws (RT, 28.12.2001). In a 
speech given in Kazan, Yurii Chaika, Russia’s Minister of Justice, stated that “federal laws 
need to be respected since Russia is a federal state”, but better regional legislation could be 
used to replace outdated federal laws (RT, 14.11.2000). This is a possibility Shaimiev also 
raised in his Concept. However, in the absence of a mechanism to implement such a 
procedure, prosecutors and judges have no basis to dismiss federal challenges. This has 
prompted Shaimiev to complain about the asymmetries of the harmonisation process: 
“while Moscow needs efficient vertical power, it should be concerned about what might 
happen if central officials, including prosecutors, act too vigorously”. “Federal ministries”, 
he continued, have “begun to trespass on Tatarstan’s power” (Interview published on 
Ga^eta.ru, 7.3.2001).
Constitutional Harmonisation and Tatarstan’s 2002 Constitution
Tatarstan’s constitution was also the subject of intense scrutiny: between 1999 and 
2001, 103 complaints were filed (RT, 28.12.2001). In May 2000, a federal-regional expert 
group was created to harmonise Tatarstan’s constitution with the federal constitution.8 The 
group, which included jurists from Tatarstan and the federal Presidential Administration, 
undertook a detailed analysis of every article of Tatarstan’s 1992 constitution. In response, 
Tatarstan’s State Council formed a Constitutional Committee in September 2000 to 
implement the expert group’s findings. The main obstacle to harmonisation was
6 Summary posted on http:/7www.bcpi.ru/svodka/svodka.html. accessed 11 February 2005.
7 He listed these laws: on a tax to eliminate housing slums; on private detectives and security activities; on 
illegal drug trade and usage; on violations to the land code; on the minimum wage; on land resources; on 
farms; on the restoration o f  the Latin script; as well as the Tatarstan’s water, land, and forestry codes (TBDR, 
6.9.2000).
8 The Expert group on harmonisation o f  the Russian and Tatarstan constitutions: Gruppa ekspertov po 
soglasovaniyu K RT s KRF i federal’nymi 3akonamt.
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disagreements about Tatarstan’s status: Moscow’s negotiators pressed Tatarstan to drop 
provisions that it is ‘united with Russia’ and clearly specify its place within Russia (VE,
28.9.2001). Tatarstan’s leaders explained the persistence of constitutional contradictions by 
the fact that the republic had adopted its law before Russia and the treaty bridged the 
differences. Like the ‘political issues’ which arose during the work on legislative 
harmonisation, disagreements on Tatarstan’s constitution were reserved for further 
discussion by presidents Shaimiev and Putin. Bilateral, closed-door meetings between both 
presidents were held in the Fall o f 2002, which Shaimiev qualified as “very detailed” on the 
issue of Tatarstan’s state structures (TBDR 24.10.2001), and that consensus was reached 
between the heads of state on the changes that were required to Tatarstan’s constitution 
(Tatar-Inform, 12.11.2001). The secretive nature of these discussions and their outcomes 
makes it difficult to assess the basis of their agreement, or whether there was any consensus 
at all.
Nonetheless, the Tatarstan State Council’s Constitutional Commission worked on 
amendments from 2000 to 2002. The drafting process received wide coverage in republican 
press and media (particularly in RT, ZP, and VK in January-April 2002). 1242 amendment 
proposals were received, including 273 from State Council deputies, 319 from municipal 
bodies, 404 from public organisations and citizens (including 73 from the Tatarstan New 
Century movement, 32 from the Tatar Public Centre, 8 from Ittifak), and 149 from media 
organisations. O f these proposals, the Commission considered 514 amendments, refused 
286, passed 126 and 102 were withdrawn (RT, 2.4.2002). The draft constitution was 
approved in first reading on 28 February by a margin of 116 to 1 (TBDR, 28.2.2002) amid 
intense debate on the wording of the provisions on Tatarstan’s sovereignty and citizenship. 
Federal prosecutors indicated the draft constitution was unsatisfactory and did not resolve 
contradictions. Parliamentary committees deliberated another month before the State 
Council resumed debate on second reading on 29 March 2002. On the eve of the debate, 
Mukhametshin stated that although federal authorities were urgently pushing for 
harmonisation, contradictions would remain in the final document (TBDR, 28.3.2002). 
During the State Council’s debates, Shaimiev argued that unless article 61 (on Tatarstan’s 
status) was amended there was no point in amending the constitution at all since it was the 
biggest point of friction with Moscow (TBDR, 1.4.2002). Perhaps the insistence on the 
need to review the expression of Tatarstan’s status provides a clue on the agreement 
reported to have been reached by Shaimiev and Putin. The State Council approved the draft 
in second and third readings on 19 April and the constitution was signed into law by 
Shaimiev a week later. Three-quarters of the constitution’s articles were reworked, and it 
was shortened to 124 articles (from 167 in the 1992 version). Conscious that the document
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still contained provisions which contradicted federal law, Shaimiev was stoic: “We should 
be able to formulate our principles and have enough courage to defend them for the benefit 
of the future federation” (TBDR, 29.4.2002).
Whereas the 1992 constitution placed Russia at arms’ length, the 2002 version 
acknowledges Tatarstan is a subject of the federation and recognises the constitutional 
division of powers (All references to Tatarstan, 2002). Article 1 contains the most 
significant provisions, both in terms of recognition of Tatarstan’s status in Russia and 
preservation of its ambiguities. The provision defining Tatarstan as “united with Russia on 
the basis of the Russian and Tatar constitutions and the bilateral treaty” was maintained 
(art.l§l). But no claim to sovereignty in areas of exclusive federal or joint jurisdiction is 
made: Tatarstan exercises its sovereignty only within the spheres of competence which 
belong to it exclusively. The constitution drops Tatarstan’s claim to being a “subject of 
international law” but asserts its right to engage in international relations and trade on 
matter within its jurisdiction (art.l§4). The provision on the existence of republican 
citizenship is maintained, but contrary to the 1992 version, Tatarstan citizenship is 
automatically granted to Russian citizens living in the republic, and citizens of Tatarstan are 
simultaneously citizens of Russia (art.21). Compared to the 1992 constitution, the latest 
version represents a remarkable change in Tatarstan’s stance. Whereas the claim for 
recognition (its status as “united with Russia”) is maintained, Tatarstan positions itself more 
as a federated unit of Russia than as confederal partner.
The constitution maintains provisions on the inviolability of Tatarstan’s territory 
(art.5) and that its status cannot be changed without its consent (art.l§3). To further 
entrench its status and democratic legitimacy, article 1 of Tatarstan’s constitution can be 
changed or rescinded only by referendum (art. 123). By evoking the 1992 referendum, the 
leadership seeks to insulate Tatarstan’s status claims from further challenges and court 
rulings. Notwithstanding previous Constitutional Court rulings which found that Russia’s 
federal subjects cannot unilaterally amend their status, this article places Tatarstan’s citizens 
as bearers of sovereignty and source of authority (art.3). Consequently, the status of 
Tatarstan as ‘united’ with Russia is framed as the expression of popular will and not the 
leadership’s whim.
As Mukhametshin makes clear, the ambiguities which remain in the amended 
version are not accidental: “In many provisions of the new constitution there are 
contradictions. But we consciously maintained our course because Tatarstan has its own 
position, especially on the question of sovereignty over the competences which are 
determined [by the 1994 treaty]” (RT, 30.4.2002). The constitution maintains ambiguous 
provisions on republican competences, including citizenship, the place of the treaty and
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most significantly, its claim to sovereignty. Although the document clearly circumscribes the 
norm of sovereignty to those powers over which Tatarstan has exclusive jurisdiction, its 
lawmakers deliberately ignored the Constitutional Court’s June 2000 rulings by maintaining 
a claim to sovereignty. Compared to the 1992 version, the current constitution does not 
advocate a confederal state structure. The centre’s prerogatives are recognised, a big 
difference with the 1992 constitution in which Russia is mentioned only twice. The 
underlying constitutional disagreement, about status and the way in which republican 
jurisdiction should be protected in federal practice, remain.
Indeed, federal challenges of these remaining ambiguities have not abated. Russian 
Deputy General Prosecutor Zvyagintsev issued protests against the 2002 constitution, 
arguing the State Council ignored court rulings by maintaining provisions on republican 
sovereignty (articles 1, 11, 23, 121), citizenship and on the bilateral Tatar-Russian 
relationship (TBDR 15.3.2002). Almost as soon as the State Council had passed the 
constitution, it created another commission to consider the latest challenges. Mukhametshin 
refused to concede that the norm of republican sovereignty in the new constitution was 
unconstitutional, accusing prosecutors of interpreting the federal constitution in “in their 
own way” (TBDR, 9.9.2002). For him, the new constitution addressed Russia’s concerns 
and the rulings of the Constitutional Court: limited sovereignty, “expressed by the 
possession of full state power outside Russia’s field of competence”, is both lawful and 
adheres to article 73 of the federal constitution (Interview published in RT, 6.2.2003). The 
Tatarstan Supreme Court began hearings to consider the prosecutor’s challenges in January 
2003 (TBDR, 27.1.2003).
However, the proceedings ground to a halt while the Russian Constitutional Court 
considered a case brought by Bashkortostan and Tatarstan challenging prosecutors’ power 
to challenge their constitutions in courts of general jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court 
ruled that even if the basic law of a subject of the federation was found to violate federal 
law, it was not sufficient grounds to declare the document unconstitutional Before, a 
prosecutor would ask an administrative or civil court to ascertain the constitutionality of a 
regional constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled that constitutions of subjects of the 
federation are not ‘ordinary legal acts’ and have a special relationship with the constitution 
of the Russian Federation. Consequently, only the Constitutional Court is empowered to 
ascertain constitutionality (KSRF, 2003: par.4.3). This unexpected ruling added several 
hurdles to the centre’s ability to challenge federal subjects’ basic laws. Yet, it does not 
appear the ruling signalled a more region-friendly attitude but was a way for the 
Constitutional Court to secure its own authority vis-a-vis the Russian Supreme Court and 
other courts which were usurping its competence in this area.
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Following this ruling, in December 2003 the Tatarstan Supreme Court resumed 
Zvyagintsev’s case against the Tatarstan constitution (TBDR, 24.3.2004). After years of 
procedural and legal wrangling, the Court ruled in March 2004 that provisions of Tatarstan’s 
constitution (on sovereignty, state status, republican citizenship) contradicted federal law 
(and not the federal constitution) (Tatarlnform, 31.3.2004). In June 2004, the Tatarstan 
Supreme Court invalidated Tatarstan’s 1990 Declaration of state sovereignty and its claims 
to sovereignty and ownership of natural resources. Marat Galeev, who represented the State 
Council during the hearings, argued that the Court should not consider the declaration a 
legal act, but a political document endowed with symbolic importance (Tatar-Inform,
17.6.2004).
All the provisions adopted to express Tatarstan’s differentiated status have been 
invalidated. The 1990 Declaration of sovereignty and constitutional provisions on its 
sovereignty and status are inoperative. But Tatarstan’s leadership has refused to officially 
rescind the provisions. Galeev’s argument about the symbolic value of the provisions is part 
of the explanation. Two additional reasons are used to justify their refusal to rewrite these 
articles of the republican constitution. First, Tatarstan’s leaders argue that sovereignty in a 
federal system is divisible. Shaimiev states this position clearly:
“[Article 1 o f  the Tatar constitution expresses] our view regarding federalism [and] our 
principal position.... Can anyone show me any academic works proving that a state can exist 
without sovereignty? [In our constitution], we speak o f  limited sovereignty within the 
framework o f  our powers... This doesn't violate the Russian constitution. Moreover, it 
seems to me that not everybody has read the Russian constitution to the very end. In its last 
part, there is a section about sovereign republics within the Russian Federation (Quoted in 
RT, 24.4.2002).
Second, the Tatarstan Constitutional Court (which is separate from the Russian 
Constitutional Court) issued a ruling which vindicates Tatarstan’s position and is used to 
counter federal claims. Twenty-nine State Council deputies asked the Tatarstan 
Constitutional Court (KSRT) provide an interpretation of the first article of Tatarstan’s 
2002 constitution and its relationship to the federal constitution. Since Article 5 of the 
federal constitution defines republics as states, the appellants maintained Tatarstan’s 
constitutional claim to sovereignty was not out of line since it only included “full command 
and independence in resolving questions emanating from its exclusive sphere of 
competences” (KSRT, 2003b: Par. 2). The KSRT agreed that sovereignty is an attribute of 
states, and that Tatarstan can claim sovereignty (samostoyatel’nost) over the power which 
belongs exclusively to the republic (KSRT, 2003b: Par. 7). In its determination, it provides a 
detailed analysis of the historical context of Tatarstan’s political-legal status, from the 1978 
constitution to the 1990 Declaration of sovereignty and 1992 ruling by the Russian 
Constitutional Court. Tatarstan’s Court found that the republic is entitled to claim the status
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of subject of international law {pravosub”ektnost) in areas where it has international and 
economic contacts, and reaffirms the republic’s state-legal status as defined by both the 
Tatar and Russian constitutions and the 1994 treaty.9
The Tatarstan Constitutional Court has issued rulings which directly contradict prior 
rulings of Russia’s Constitutional Court. How and why are such competing court rulings 
significant? First, the conflicting rulings point to a gap in Russia’s constitution on the place 
and competence of republican constitutional courts. The chairman of Tatarstan’s 
Constitutional Court explains his court is independent from Russia’s: each court has its own 
competences determined by the division of powers in the federal and republican 
constitutions, and their decisions are final and cannot be appealed (Nafiev, 2001: 94). 
Zheleznov points out that no mechanism is in place to determine which ruling must be 
enforced (Conference presentation by Zheleznov, 2004a). This is a novel situation which 
has not yet been addressed (Author's conversation with Zheleznov, 2004b). Second, in the 
absence of a conciliation procedure (and Zheleznov contends constitutional amendment 
may be required to rectify the situation), the colliding rulings become the object of political 
struggle. Each level of government can claim “its” court vindicates its position. Most of my 
interlocutors in Tatarstan were critical of Russia’s Constitutional Court and the motives it 
uses in its rulings (Author’s interviews with Faroukshin, Galeev, Khakimov, Valeev, 2004). 
They see federal judges as being politically biased in their rulings on sovereignty since in 
many of their academic publications, judges including former Court chairman Marat Baglai 
have admitted the existence of partial sovereignty for components of a federation. As a 
result, the Russian Constitutional Court continues to be seen as responding to political 
rather than only legal criteria in their rulings (Conference presentation by Nafiev, 2004, 
Faroukshin in TBDR 12.11.2002). Conversely, it is hard to conceive that the Tatarstan 
Constitutional Court would rule against republican interests. Although Putin’s federal 
reforms and court rulings have eliminated the legal basis of Tatarstan’s claims to special 
status and jurisdiction, they remain politically sensitive and salient issues.
The Fate o f the 1994 Bilateral Treaty
Since it was signed in February 1994, the treaty is considered to be the cornerstone 
of Tatarstan’s relationship with Russia: it recognised Tatarstan’s differentiated status, its 
special relationship with the Moscow with respect to the delegation of powers, and it 
provided a bridge between Russia’s and Tatarstan’s constitutions. But the treaty did not
9 In a separate ruling, the KSRT provided an interpretation o f  the constitutional provisions on republican 
citizenship (articles 5 and 21). The court upheld the powers delegated to the republic in the 1994 treaty 
(art.3§13), namely Tatarstan’s competence to establish its own citizenship, but adds that Russian citizenship is 
primary: one must be a citizen o f  Russia to become a citizen o f  Tatarstan (KSRT, 2003a: par.5).
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insulate the republic from Putin’s federal reforms even if it was invoked to justify the 
persistence of legal and constitutional contradictions. One of Putin’s priorities in 2000 was 
to review the treaty practice. He charged the Kozak working group to revise all treaties and 
identify those which should be rescinded. As a result, twenty-eight of forty-two treaties 
were abolished.
Seeking to pre-empt a challenge of Tatarstan’s treaty, Shaimiev reiterated on the 
sixth anniversary of its signing in 2000 that the treaty had “become an ideology for 
Tatarstan” and its people would “not accept attempts to infringe in any way on the relations 
it establishes” (RRR, 1.3.2000). During a visit to Kazan, Putin emphasised that the relations 
between Russia and Tatarstan should be based on the constitution. “Experience has shown 
that at the time, that treaty was the right solution, and maybe even the only viable one” but 
“the constitution stipulates that all Federation members are equal” and “Tatarstan [...] 
understands that” (RRR, 19.4.2000, IZV, 7.19.2001). Kozak signalled his working group 
would not target Tatarstan’s treaty, stating that disagreements between Tatarstan and Russia 
had been solved thanks to the “constructive and wise position of Mintimer Shaimiev, 
President Putin, and the federal government” (Transcript of ORT interview quoted in 
TBDR, 23.4.2002), in other words, non-transparent negotiations.
It is unclear, however, how these disagreements were solved. The future of the 
treaty and uncertainties over whether it would be renewed were the subject of political 
discussions. Although it is difficult to track the outcome of these closed-door discussions, 
what is clear is that parties have been involved in negotiations over a new version of the 
agreement. A republican commission was formed on 3 June 2002 to begin drafting 
amendments to the 1994 treaty. Mukhametshin who chaired the commission stated “there 
would be no talk of renouncing the treaty”, but that they would seek to amend the treaty so 
that the republic’s interests, especially its “national-territorial” interests, were protected (RT, 
8.6.2002). Mukhametshin subsequently announced the creation of a Russia-Tatarstan 
working group on the examination of the bilateral treaty, co-chaired by himself and Sergei 
Kirienko. Since 2002, announcements have been made regularly that the treaty is almost 
ready for presidential approval.10 Khakimov indicated that the persistent stumbling blocks 
in the negotiations are Tatarstan’s claim to be “united with Russia”, and its powers in 
foreign economic relations (Interview with Khakimov, 2004). Mukhametshin downplays 
expectations regarding the contents of a revised bilateral agreement: “I do not think we will 
be successful in obtaining additional financial preferences, but we will try and preserve 
some competences” (RT, 23.11.2004). For Faroukshin the treaty is merely a shell. He is
10 For instance, the working group announced in late 2004 that a treaty would be ready in June 2005, in time 
for the celebrations o f  Kazan’s millennium. Meanwhile, the deadline has come and gone.
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pessimistic about the ongoing negotiations estimating that a revised agreement will be 
“empty” since Tatarstan possesses little power to constrain Moscow to make significant 
concessions (Interview with Faroukshin, 2004).
The 2003 law on the bodies of state power set July 2005 as the deadline for bringing 
existing treaties in line with federal law. Consequendy, for all intents and purposes 
Tatarstan’s treaty is invalid and irrelevant as a legal/constitutional document (Interview with 
Faroukshin, 2004). Nevertheless, Tatarstan leaders continued to profess their confidence in 
the model of federal-regional relations which the bilateral treaty represents. The treaty 
provides recognition of Tatarstan’s place in Russia’s federal order, which is of utmost 
symbolic importance. For Shaimiev, the treaty is important because it “gave Tatarstan a 
voice, something we really value” (TBDR, 17.7.2001). Tatarstan’s political elites have shifted 
their emphasis when speaking of the document’s importance and role. In a 2004 roundtable 
about the treaty’s significance, Khakimov — an architect of the original agreement — implied 
it was a transitory tool: “In the period of transition from a unitary to federal country, a 
concrete mechanism was needed to found the relations between subjects and centre on 
democratic principles. The 1994 treaty fulfilled that role, and constituted a guarantee of 
stability in that volatile period” (RT, 14.2.2004). In the wake of constitutional rulings which 
have annulled republican sovereignty, Galeev believes while the “ ...treaty is not operative 
but its constructive inertia continues to work” (RT, 14.2.2004).
Conclusion
Putin’s federal reforms sought to restore the federal constitution as the basis of 
relations between Russia’s federal and regional governments. “The aim”, Sakwa writes, “was 
to achieve constitutional federalism rather than the ad hoc asymmetrical federalism that had 
emerged under Yeltsin” (Sakwa, 2004: 137). In many respects, Putin has achieved in 
reasserting the central place of the constitution in Russia’s federal design. His reforms have 
been successful in eliminating legal and constitutional dissonance. But the reforms to the 
division of powers, the appointment of regional leaders point to the implementation of a 
model of hegemonic federalism in Russia based less on regional autonomy but on control 
by and from Moscow. Recent announcements of plans to delegate powers back to regions 
are evidence, however, that a process federal-regional accommodation still exists. Moscow 
is inclined to respond to regional demands for increased authority, especially if, as is the 
case, it is clearly in the centre’s interests. However, in many respects, “personalism” still 
outweighs “proceduralism” in Russia’s federative relations (Reddaway, 2002). By controlling 
the appointment of regional governors, Putin has acquired even more power to influence 
regional politics.
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Tatarstan’s reactions to Putin’s reforms and the extent to which they were
implemented in the republic provide a window on whether the reformed system constitutes
a basis for future stability, and for stable accommodation of Tatarstan’s specificities and
claims. Although the use of “sovereignty” by Tatarstan was always somewhat ambiguous, in
the current context, claims for sovereignty can be interpreted as claims for autonomy. In
the 2002 constitution, Tatarstan no longer defines itself at arms’ length from Russia but as a
subject of the Russian Federation. A degree of consensus on federal design has emerged.
Yet, the persistence of Tatarstan’s claims for recognition, and the continued importance —
even if it is only symbolic — on concluding a new bilateral treaty demonstrates that
Tatarstan’s elite cling to a different model of federalism. Tatarstan’s leadership emphasises
Russia’s need for ‘real’ federalism and the protection of federal subjects’ autonomy.
Shaimiev repeated his vision during meeting of the State Council in Kazan:
“The division o f  competences between the subjects and federal centre in any state is one o f  
the key questions. There must be an overall legal space, uniform rules o f  state policy, and an 
understanding o f  the general values o f society. We cannot consider democracy as anarchy or 
the “power vertical” as a negation o f  federalism. Democracy is based on law, and federalism 
on a clear differentiation o f  powers, where each level o f  government knows its rights and 
responsibilities (Intertat, 26.8.2005).
Shaimiev, in essence, continues to argue that the constitutional disagreement must be 
addressed: he seeks a consensus on the place and autonomy of Russia’s constituent units 
within Russia’s federal design. Yet it appears that such a balance has not yet been achieved. 
For Marat Galeev, Putin’s federal reforms have not reassured Tatarstan that its autonomy is 
something the centre considers worthy of protection: “Current legislation looks more and 
more like that of a unitary state... While Tatarstan argues that having autonomy and 
regulatory [rather than only executory] power is important and should belong to the 
subjects of the federation, it does not have the administrative resources to remedy the 
situation within current conditions” (Interview with Galeev, 2004).
In Tatarstan, there appears to be a sense that for the time being, the pendulum has 
shifted toward central control, and that the republic must bide its time. The processes of 
intergovernmental mediation, prominent during the 1990s, continue to function. 
Negotiations on a bilateral treaty are ongoing. Similarly, although the courts have struck 
down provisions on republican status from Tatarstan’s constitution, federal authorities have 
not sought to force the republic to rescind the provisions altogether. While the federal 
government does not share Tatarstan’s concerns, it has not sought to directly oppose them 
either. Constitutional ambiguities and intergovernmental negotiation continue to operate as 
coping mechanisms. However, it is clear that for the republican elite the balance of power 
has shifted toward the centre. Shaimiev, who sees in Putin’s power to dissolve regional 
assemblies that refuse to ratify his choice of governor a violation of democratic principles,
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ultimately backed down, stating that “confrontation in the actual political situation would 
[lead to] crisis” (RT, 26.02.2005). In many interviews and discussions I conducted in 
Tatarstan, the phrases “within current conditions, within the current situation” often came 
up, reflecting ambivalence about the current state of federalism, but also a degree of 
hopefulness that ‘real’ federalism is still possible. As Khakimov remarks, “Only Tatarstan 
continues to speak for federalism, and as long democracy lives in Tatarstan, we will not veer 
from that” (Interview with Khakimov, 2004). Even in the context of Putin’s centralising 
reforms, the persistence of political discussions and legal interpretations of the extent to 
which Russia’s constitution can and should foster a truly federal separation of powers and 
way to exercise power in Russia is evidence of the value of the federal idea in Tatarstan, and 
the Russian Federation.
85
Chapter 5. Language Policy in Tatarstan: Status and Jurisdiction in Practice
Chapter 5. Language Policy in Tatarstan: Status and Jurisdiction in 
Practice
The choice o f  sovereign statehood entailed from 
the very beginning the development o f  a new 
national linguistic setting (Minnullin, 2002).
In the era o f  globalisation, Tatars need above all 
to protect their republic, statehood and 
constitution since these are the structures 
necessary for the development o f  language and 
culture. The preservation o f  statehood ensures 
the survival o f  our people and our language 
(Mintimer Shaimiev’s address to delegates at 
World Tatar Congress, 29 August 2002).
In this chapter, I examine the way in which Tatarstan’s claims for recognition and 
jurisdiction are contextualised and implemented in the specific policy area of language. It is 
a field in which both Tatarstan and Russian governments enact policy, and constitutes a 
place where one can measure the effectiveness of federal design at providing recognition 
and the jurisdiction required to devise and manage language policies. Language in Tatarstan 
has been a consistent theme of nationalist discourse and state activity, across the spectrum 
from radicals to moderates. Scholars have tended to examine Tatarstan’s language policies 
in the context of its claims to sovereignty: “The most striking feature of the Tatar identity 
debate in the last seven years has been the growing importance attached to language, not 
only in identity construction and preservation, but in the fulfilment of statehood as well” 
(Rorlich, 1999: 390). Gorenburg analyses language as part of the nationalist mobilisation in 
the republic (Gorenburg, 2003). For her part, Graney views language as one way in which 
republican leadership endowed its “sovereignty project” with concrete policy content 
(Graney, 1999; 2001: 265). The objective of this chapter is to identify the legislative and 
constitutional frameworks which determine issues of jurisdiction over language, and provide 
an assessment of policies which have been implemented.
As a rejoinder to the previous chapters, I address the relationship between 
Tatarstan’s status and jurisdictional claims and its policy-making capacity in language. Since 
group rights are proposed as solutions to the stateness dilemmas identified in Chapter 2, 
this chapter examines Tatarstan’s competences in language and the extent to which its 
policies correspond with policy-makers’ objectives. Does the republic possess enough 
power to implement its policies? Are they policies hampered by lack of jurisdiction? I find 
the language situation is generally stable in the republic. In the area of language policy, 
Tatarstan possesses a lot of leeway in order to implement desired language policy and 
practices. Policy failures are not due to a constraining centre but to lack of political will
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within the republic to carry out and enforce policy. Consequently, language policy is an 
example of successful federalism in Tatarstan and Russia. The constitutional asymmetry 
created in the 1993 federal constitution provides Tatarstan with the de jure power to 
establish Tatar as a state language and implement measures to protect Tatar. It is federal 
design itself, rather than the intergovernmental and bilateral processes examined in previous 
chapters, which creates governance capacity in this sphere. Although points of friction exist 
between Moscow and Kazan, they are based more on issues of overall federal design and 
the status of Tatarstan as a republic than on strictly linguistic issues.
The chapter is organised as follows. I examine why and how language was on the 
political agenda during perestroika and how competence over language policy was 
institutionalised in Tatarstan’s and Russia’s constitutional and legal frameworks. I then turn 
to trace the implementation of Tatarstan’s language law, concentrating on four issues: the 
institutional structure created to support language policy-making; developments in media 
and publishing; education; and finally, an assessment of the policy’s overall results. I address 
the federal-regional dimension of language policy and focus on the case o f script reform 
before concluding the chapter with an examination of the Russian Constitutional Court’s 
November 2004 ruling on the constitutionality of Tatarstan’s language regime.
Perestroika and O pening o f the Language Question in Tatarstan
The political context of perestroika provides insight into the nature of the language 
demands articulated by Tatarstan’s leaders. Ethnic mobilisation in Union republics 
(especially the Baltic republics) was closely followed in Moscow and Kazan. The package of 
laws adopted by Soviet authorities in April 1990 was an attempt to control the unravelling 
of the Union. In addition to the Law on the Demarcation of the powers between members 
of the federation (examined in Chapter 3), the Law on the Languages of the Peoples of the 
USSR was adopted on 24 April 1990 to give Union and autonomous republics the right to 
determine the legal status of languages within their territories and raise titular or national 
languages to state language status (USSR, 1990b: art.4). This law provided dejure recognition 
of a practice which was widely prevalent de facto among Union republics in 1989. The 
Estonian SSR’s law “On Language” declared Estonian to be the sole state language. The 
language laws adopted by most other Union republics (the Belarus, Moldovan, Kazakh, 
Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs) in that time provided official or state status for 
the titular language and preserved a role for Russian (as an official language, or a language 
of “interethnic communication”). Just as the Soviet law on the Demarcation of powers 
elevated the status of autonomous republics such as Tatarstan, the language law innovates
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by recognising their power to establish “state languages” and engage in “linguistic state- 
building” (lingvoetati^ m) (Neroznak, 2002: 8).
‘Linguistic state-building’ is one reason language reform was on the agenda in 
Tatarstan. As Graney shows, establishing state status for Tatar bolstered Tatarstan’s overall 
‘sovereignty project’ and status claims. By establishing its titular language as state language 
and devising its own language policy, Tatarstan’s leaders engaged in the institutional 
practices associated with their newfound ‘sovereign’ status (Graney, 1999: 244). Concern 
over the poor state of Tatar within Tatarstan was another reason language reform figured 
prominently on the political agenda. In almost every interview I conducted, my 
interlocutors were quick to point out the dismal state of Tatar in 1989-90. During the 
perestroika period, Tatar was taught for two hours a week in 9091 Tatar-language groups in 
Russian and mixed schools. In the TASSR, there were 995 Tatar schools in 1987-88 and 
1059 schools in 1988-89 (Iskhakova, 2001). But these schools were more prevalent in rural 
areas. In Kazan only one Tatar school existed in 1990, a fact repeated to me in several 
interviews (with Iskhakov, Minnullin and Valeev, 2004). The republican press reported at 
the time on the lack of qualified personnel in Tatar and bilingual schools (ST, 10.2.1989). 
For Khakimov, political action was necessary because “We wanted to be sure that the Tatar 
language would have state status, it would develop and Tatars would not disappear” 
(Interview in Ovrutskii, 2000: 38).
As Damir Iskhakov, an ethnologist in the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan and 
currently deputy leader of the World Tatar Congress remarks, raising the status and use of 
the Tatar language was not a new phenomenon, but a return to the situation prevalent 
earlier in the twentieth century (Interview with Iskhakov, 2004). During the early Soviet 
period, Tatar had the status of a state language and was widely used within state structures 
and education (Khairullin, Gorokhova et al., 1998: 17 infra). Script reform was also 
implemented: a Latin-based alphabet replaced Arabic as the basis for the written language. 
Stalin’s policy of assimilation (sliyanie) adopted after the fifteenth Congress of the VKP(B) 
led to the contraction of Tatar in the public sphere and education, and the script was 
changed to Cyrillic in 1939 (Khairullin, Gorokhova et al., 1998: 200-02). Subsequent policies 
of the Soviet regime (on education, for instance) are regarded as having contributed to the 
weakening of Tatar (Bairamova, 2001: 154-75). Today’s policy-makers underline the 
importance of the policies of the 1920s and 1930s. A collection of laws, decrees and policies 
from that era published by the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences is exemplary of the 
continuity which leaders want to impart to current policies and the model for future 
thinking on language policy in the republic (Khairullin, Gorokhova et al., 1998).
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Responding to concerns about the state of Tatar, Shaimiev stressed the need to 
teach both national languages to republican children (ST, 8.12.1989). In a shrewdly-titled 
article N ot Privileges, but Protection Khakimov wrote that a language law is necessary to 
guarantee a right to education in both Tatar and Russian and create the basis for the use of 
Tatar in official and professional activities (Khakimov, 1990). Both Shaimiev and Khakimov 
were quick to stress the importance of tolerance and bilingualism and reassure Tatarstan’s 
Russians that raising the status of Tatar would not come at the expense of the rights of 
Russian speakers. The Presidium of the TASSR Supreme Soviet created a committee 
headed by the director of the Academy of Sciences’ Institute on Language, Literature and 
Art (IYaLI), Mifratikh Zakiev, to draft a language law (ST, 7.12.1989). In addition, Tatar 
lessons were broadcast on state television from 1988 onwards, and from 1989 to 1991 the 
state Russian-language newspaper published a weekly column Net's Speak Tatar (Pogovorimpo- 
tatarski) (ST, 27.9.1989).1
Language was also on the agenda of Tatarstan’s nationalist parties. At its founding 
congress, the Tatar Public Centre (TPC) resolved “The optimal solution for the cultural 
development of the republic is complete bilingualism...” (Iskhakov, 1998d: 118-9). The 
TPC was committed to developing the sovereignty of Tatarstan and protecting the state 
status of Tatar in order to “restore balance” between Tatar and Russian (ST 14.2.1991) but 
did not repudiate the status of Russian as language of “interethnic communication” in the 
republic. This also happened to be the same approach adopted by the Committee drafting 
the language law (Iskhakov, 1998b). Many nationalist movements and groups issued 
demands for state status for the Tatar language, the development of schools and transition 
to the Latin script (Iskhakov, 1998d; 1998c reproduces the programmes of nationalist 
parties and organisations). One key difference between moderates and radicals, however, 
concerned the place of the Russian language. Ittifak resolved that all state officials be 
required to be bilingual (Ittifak, 1991: 15-25). Such a move would have eliminated the 
overwhelming majority of Russians from official and state positions, but also, ironically, 
many ethnic Tatars more competent in Russian than Tatar.
Although the status of the Tatar language was a key element of nationalist 
programmes and was mentioned in the declaration of sovereignty and 1992 constitution, 
the implementation of concrete language policies lagged behind. What these documents did 
is raise the juridical status of the Tatar language, declaring Russian and Tatar to be the 
republic’s state languages (TSSR, 1990: art.3; Tatarstan, 1992: art.4). While Shaimiev 
characterised language as a “central issue” in 1990, language policies and measures “required
’A sign o f  the times, the first column was devoted to providing Russian-Tatar translations o f  expressions such 
as perestroika, glasnost, interethnic (meyhnatsional’nye) relations, language, nation, democratisation, etc.
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a separate decision” to be addressed in a law rather than in the declaration of sovereignty 
(ST, 30.8.1990). Two years later, during debates on the constitution Shaimiev intervened to 
ensure a clause on language status was inserted in the constitution but again deferred 
discussion of concrete mechanisms and policies until after it was adopted (ST, 25.1.1992;
27.2.1992).
Although work on a language law proceeded throughout this period, little discussion 
of the committee’s work filtered into the press.2 From the reports that exist, the committee 
appears to have struggled with two major issues. First, members wanted the law to 
implement measures that would “protect the language for real”, and raise the level of 
effective legislative protection of Tatar (ST, 6.2.1992). The concern here surrounded the 
actual policy tools which would be put in place to raise not only the status but utility of the 
language. Second, there was significant debate on whether the linguistic model should be 
based on constraint or voluntary use of Tatar. For instance, in plenary debates of article 15, 
State Council members disagreed whether the provision should read “proceedings are 
conducted in “Tatar and Russian” or “in Tatar or Russian””. A compromise was reached on 
a more ambiguous wording: “proceedings are conducted in the state languages of 
Tatarstan” (ST, 8.7.1992). Aleksandr Salagaev, who heads Tatarstan’s Russian Cultural 
Society, expressed concern that draft provisions in the law requiring all teachers to learn 
both state language provided too short a deadline (1997 was the date suggested) and “will 
lead to the exclusion of Russian-language candidates” (IZVT, 5.14.1992). Andrei Beliaev 
expressed consternation at the fact that Tatarstan’s language policies were not the subject of 
wider public consultations but tended to be presented as a fait accompli in the press (VK, 
26.8.1994). Indeed, after the draft language law was published in the republican press (ST,
5.30.1992), little reaction or comments were published in the weeks before the final version 
of the law was approved in July 1992 (ST, 25.7.1992).
Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks o f Tatarstan and Russia
The 1992 Law on Languages of Peoples of Tatarstan (all references to the amended 
version (Tatarstan, 2004b) establishes both Tatar and Russian as equal state languages (art.3) 
and enshrines the principle of non-discrimination and of freedom of choice (art.2). 
Although the law also regulates the use of Russian and other languages, particular attention 
is given to the needs of Tatar speakers, and the specific tasks of Tatar-language renewal
2 I was unable to obtain stenographic records o f  the proceedings o f  the committee drafting the language law. 
An official at the Central State Archive informed me it was too early to access documents pertaining to the 
period 1990-94.
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(opening schools and creating a native-language education system, training specialists).3 In 
education, the law establishes a policy of free choice of the language of instruction (art.7 
and 8). Although parents are free to choose the language of instruction, the law prescribes 
the study of Russian and Tatar as a subject in preschools, general, middle and specialised 
middle schools (art.9). Moreover, Russian and Tatar must be taught “in equal amounts”, a 
requirement maintained in the republic’s Law on Education (Tatarstan, 1997: art.6§l and 
ch.2). In the public sector, the law creates a regime of official bilingualism in public 
administration and state affairs, permitting the use of Tatar and Russian in the proceedings 
of state bodies and materials published by the state (art.10-17). Both languages are used on 
state signs and street signs (art. 20 and 23). I provide a discussion of how these legislative 
provisions work in practice in the section on implementation, below.
On the federal side, the 1993 constitution creates a constitutional asymmetry for 
republics to name a state language in addition to Russian. Russia’s Law on Language of the 
Peoples of the Russian Federation (RF, 1991, references to the version as amended in 2002) 
establishes Russian as the state language, and reasserts the constitutional guarantee of 
republics’ right to establish state languages (art.3). The law allows for the use of other 
minority languages in areas where their speakers are concentrated. Russian is the language 
of state proceedings (parliament, courts). The law does not prohibit the use of other 
languages and allows citizens to use a translator in the event they do not speak the state 
language (art. 18). The 2005 Law on Russian as the State Language o f the Russian 
Federation, enacted to protect the status and role of Russian, preserves republics’ 
constitutional asymmetry. Although the law stipulates that the use of Russian is mandatory 
in a number of fields, such as the proceedings of federal state bodies, elections, court 
proceedings including court of the subjects of the federation, communication with the 
subjects of the federation (RF, 2005a: art.3), it adds that such obligations “must not be 
interpreted as a negation or depreciation of the right to use the state languages of republics” 
(art.l§7). Thus, conscious efforts have been made to preserve the autonomy of republics 
with regard to language policy.
Russia’s law on language describes the competences of the federal government and 
republics. The federal government regulates Russian as a state language and funds the
3 The law was rewritten in 2004 to provide better recognition o f the status and rights o f  the speakers o f  other 
languages: “On the State Languages o f  Tatarstan and other languages in Tatarstan”. Exchanges between the 
Russian government and the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection o f  
National Minorities shows the Committee was concerned that Tatarstan’s legislation did not provide sufficient 
support o f  the rights o f  non-titular groups within the republic (CoE, 2002: 13). Tatarstan’s language law allows 
the use o f other languages in state services: citizens unable to address state bodies or courts in the republic’s 
state languages can do so in their native tongue, or use a translator. Moreover, the law protects the right to 
education in the “native language o f  the people o f  Tatarstan”. For instance, a number o f  Chuvash and Udmurt 
schools operate in the republic.
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teaching of Russian as a state language in the country’s schools (art.10), and cooperates with 
republics to develop their state languages (art.6). The law grants republics the power to 
publish laws and conduct the proceedings of state bodies in their state language and Russian 
(art. 13 and 16). In education, republics have the competence to provide and fund education 
in their state language (art.29§8). According to Russia’s Law on Education, the federal 
government is responsible for setting the state-wide educational curriculum (uchebnyi plan) 
and subjects of the federation devise and deliver the regional component of the federal 
curriculum. Approximately one-third of the federal curriculum is devoted to the regional 
component, which includes courses on national languages (not Russian), local and regional 
history, culture and geography (RF, 1996a: art.29§8).
While officials in Tatarstan do not criticise the division of competences in the field 
of education, they decry Moscow’s lack of responsiveness to the challenge of teaching more 
than one state language. An official within the Cabinet of Ministers’ Department on 
Languages, Faria Shaikhieva, mentions that the federal curriculum “does not foresee 
Tatarstan’s needs as a bilingual republic, in which two state languages are mandatory 
subjects and in many cases one additional national language is taught” (Interview with 
Shaikhieva 2004). The problem is that the federal curriculum foresees that republics will 
teach only one other state language and is not clear on the place of other national languages 
(such as Chuvash, Udmurt, etc.) within the regional component of a republic in which these 
national languages are not titular. Since all languages other than Russian fall within the 
regional component, there is pressure on the time allocated for other subjects within the 
regional curriculum. As Valeev point out, “Moscow is concerned with the quality of Russian 
taught in schools but does not show the same level of concern for other languages” 
(Interview with Valeev, 2004). Whereas the federal government implemented its Federal 
programme on the Russian language to “reinforce the role of the Russian language in 
education” (RF, 2001a), Kim Minnullin deplores the fact that the federal government has 
not implemented a similar programme for any other language (Minnullin, 2004a). In 
addition, since the federal government is responsible for establishing educational curricula, 
it has the power to increase or decrease the time allocated to the regional component. A 
compression of the regional component would potentially limit Tatarstan’s ability to deliver 
Tatar-language education and region-specific content (Interviews with Galiakhmetov, 2004; 
Minnullin, 2004b; Shaikhieva, 2004). Nevertheless, as things currently stand, although the 
federal government is not perceived to be as responsive as officials would like, the federal 
constitutional and legislative framework has enabled Tatarstan’s leaders to enact an 
ambitious language programme.
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Implem entation o f Tatarstan’s Language Policy
Tatarstan adopted its language law in 1992 but concrete policy initiatives and bodies 
to oversee their implementation were not put in place until 1994. Having the law on the 
books did not guarantee it realisation, however. As McAuley notes, the absence of a 
commitment by Tatarstan’s leadership to implement concrete policy goals jeopardised the 
stated goal to preserve the republic’s Tatar heritage (McAuley, 1997: 85). As I examine in 
this section, political commitment is a key factor in the implementation of language policy 
in Tatarstan. I focus on a number policy goals which were implemented (institutional 
structures, media and publishing activities, education) and conclude with an assessment of 
overall results of Tatarstan’s language policy.
The State Programme on the Preservation, Study and Development of the 
Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan (State Programme) was enacted in 1994 to execute 
the 1992 language law and, more importantly, set concrete policy objectives (Tatarstan, 
1994a). The programme includes 126 measures, 67 of which are devoted explicitly to Tatar. 
None address Russian exclusively (Gorenburg, 2005: 12). For the Chairman of the 
Tatarstan State Council Committee on Culture, Science and National Affairs, Razil’ Valeev, 
“more attention was given to Tatar than Russian on purpose because Tatar was in a worse 
situation. It is only natural to give more assistance to the weakest of both languages” 
(Interview with Valeev, 2004).4 While much has been published by way of assessment of 
Tatarstan’s language policy in Russian, it is mainly quantitative in character and analyses the 
evolution of the number of schools, classes, media outlets etc. opened in the republic. Little 
material is available in English. Furthermore, there is comparatively less critical assessment 
of the policies’ strengths and weaknesses and how the existing approaches, institutions and 
political context affect language policy capacity.
Institutional Structures
As part of the State Programme, a Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers on the 'Realisation 
of the Law on Languages was created as a permanent body to coordinate the activities of 
government bodies, scientific and educational institutions in order to promote a unified 
approach to the implementation of language policy (Tatarstan, 1994b: art.l). The committee 
is headed by Tatarstan’s Prime Minister, with the Vice Premier and head of the IYaLI as co- 
chairmen. There are another thirty members, including the heads of ministries and state 
bodies, parliamentarians, academics and linguists, and representatives of local government.
4 Just as Tatarstan’s Law on languages was redrafted in 2004 to provide better recognition o f  the rights o f  non­
titular groups in the republic, the recent version o f  the State Programme (entided the Slate Programme on the 
Preservation, Study and Development of the State Languages of Tatarstan and other languages in Tatarstan, 2004-2014) 
includes measures that specifically address Russian and other languages.
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The IYaLI provides organisational and technical support. This Committee is tasked with 
overall control of the implementation of the law and State Programme and preparation of 
concrete proposals to attain the legislative objectives. Several sub-committees are in place to 
develop policy on specific issues (on legislative amendments, place names, or to draft a law 
to police violations of the language law). The Programme designates a cornucopia of bodies 
to execute the programme’s measures such as ministries, local governments, the IYaLI, 
Tatarstan’s Academy of Sciences, institutions of higher education, publishing houses, etc. In 
1996, in an effort to bolster the institutional presence of language policy within the state 
apparatus, a Department on the Realisation of the Law on Languages (DL) was created 
within the Cabinet of Ministers. As its manager Kim Minnullin relates, “When I started in 
1996, all I had to work with was a copy of the 1992 law and 1994 State Programme” 
(Interview with Minnullin, 2004b). Thus, four years after the adoption of the law, and 
almost two years after the State Programme came into existence, Tatarstan was still at the 
beginning of the implementation process.
The Cabinet issued periodic decrees following 1994 in an attempt to spur progress 
on some concrete measures. But according to Valeev, the execution of language policy was 
seriously hampered by a “lack of motivation” (dejitsit yhelaniyd) on the part of republican 
leadership (Interview with Valeev, 2004). Many of the policy tasks enumerated in the State 
Programme were ignored or postponed. For instance, the Cabinet was expected to draw up 
a list of posts in the bureaucracy which would be designated bilingual before the end 1994, a 
task which was never carried out even after additional resolutions were issued. Similarly, 
progress toward the creation of a Tatar National University was much slower than the 
deadlines set by the Programme. Three reasons appear to explain the lack of motivation to 
fully implement language policy in Tatarstan: financial obstacles, organisational
insufficiencies, and institutional incapacity.
First, republican budgetary constraints and under-funding of language policy 
prevented the full execution of measures included in the State Programme. The budget 
contained appropriations for the realisation of the programme, but as Table 5.1 
demonstrates, in the mid 1990s the level of financing fluctuated from year to year (See 
Vedomosti Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan for the yearly data, 1994-2004).
Table 5.1. Buc getary Appropriations for Im Cementation of Law on Languages
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Appropriation 
(thousands of 
roubles)
4000 4898 5660 6000 6000 7200 33758
Financing 3275 2455 5500 4485 6000 7200 28915
Financing as 
percentage of 
appropriation
82 50 97 75 100 100 85
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State-wide budget constraints had repercussions for other bodies, such as media and 
publishing companies, libraries and cultural organisations which were unable to execute 
their policy commitments (RT, 22.05.1997). In addition, municipal governments, 
responsible for the delivery of language education, faced significant shortages. Irek 
Arslanov, manager of the Department on Nationality Affairs of the City of Kazan, notes 
that only 30-50 per cent of the sums budgeted for the implementation of language policy at 
the municipal level were actually dispensed for that purpose (KV, 1.7.1999).
Second, the “declaratory nature” of the law and many policy obligations in the 
Programme did not lead to the creation of adequate mechanisms for their implementation 
(Ganiev, 1997: 114; Iskhakova, 2003). Damir Iskhakov argues the “law is like air since no 
mechanism is in place to realise language policy” (Interview with Iskhakov, 2004). For 
example, although bilingual street signs were put up during the 1990s, Iskhakov signals 
there is nowhere to go to complain about the quality of the Tatar language and have 
grammatical or typological errors corrected (Interview with Iskhakov, 2004). A further 
example is provided by Kim Minnullin. The State Programme did not lead to the 
implementation of procedures to sanction the violation of the language law. A sub-group of 
the Cabinet Committee worked on such a law, it was never finalised. Finally, a provision on 
the violation of the language law was included in the Administrative Code of Tatarstan 
(Tatarstan, 2002: art.3.5), but sets only penalties not the means of enforcement. As 
Minnullin points out “we have not reached the moment when we can say how this 
provision should work, how we know when the law is violated and how violations are 
punished”(Interview with Minnullin, 2004b).
Institutional incapacity is the third factor. Even though the Cabinet Committee was 
created to oversee the implementation of the language law, Ganiev and Tatarstan’s Cabinet 
called for the creation of an overarching power structure for the execution of language 
policy (Ganiev, 1997: 115). The current body, the Department of Languages, consists of 
three people. And although it has been successful in many o f its activities (outreach, 
conferences, the publication of dictionaries, pedagogical material and studies of language 
policy and language law in Tatarstan), “the difficulty is that the Department does not have 
its own ministry or structure to defend its interests or coordinate activities” (Interview with 
Minnullin, 2004b). The preamble of the 2004 State Programme describes the institutional 
lacunae: there is an absence of an infrastructure to provide research support and 
coordination, there is no centre responsible for setting language standards, attest 
professional qualifications, test language, or provide translation services to government 
(Tatarstan, 2004a). This has resulted in a diffusion of language policy within the state. 
Consequently, since language does not present a common front within the apparatus of
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government, it has been easier to push language issues to the backburner and harder to 
promote coordination of the various dimension of language policy. Minnullin says that his 
proposals for the creation of such a body fall on deaf ears, because political leaders refer 
language either to the Cabinet Committee or the IYaLI. As Minnullin points out, IYaLI 
regroups language specialists but “they are not specialists of the politics of language” 
(Interview with Minnullin, 2004b).
It is unclear to which extent the creation of a more centralised body within 
government would advance the implementation of language policy. Indeed, there is no 
guarantee that a more hierarchical coordination mechanism would foster additional political 
motivation. As the manager of the Department of Education of the City of Kazan relates, 
municipal governments are rarely consulted in policy-making and expected only to execute 
the policy. There is no outlet or mechanism to share information about experiences and 
innovations of policy delivery at the municipal level which could prove beneficial (Interview 
with Galiakhmetov, 2004). Perhaps better horizontal coordination of language across 
government would be more beneficial than adding another level of hierarchical control. The 
2004 State Programme provides for the creation of an institutional structure to optimise the 
realisation of the language law, which would be responsible for developing research and 
analysis, related not only to linguistic issues but also to the relations between Tatarstan’s 
national groups and languages (Tatarstan, 2004a: part 3).
Media and Publishing
The 1994 State Programme set objectives to increase the Tatar content of 
information media (print, TV, radio), including the creation of new Tatar-language 
programming. In the area of media and publishing, significant quantitative progress was 
accomplished. In terms of written materials, as of April 2004, 517 newspapers and 
magazines were in circulation in Tatarstan: 421 in Russian, ninety in Tatar, five in Chuvash 
and one in Udmurt (Pozner, 2004). In 1998, the Tatar Ministry of Information reported that 
the republican publishing house Magarif had edited 526 books, 89 per cent in Tatar, with a 
circulation of 10.8 million copies (Khairullin, Minnullin et al., 1999). While funding for 
many publications is provided from the republican budget,5 the demand for Tatar-language 
newspapers comes exclusively from Tatar-speakers (See Table 5.2).
Progress has also been made regarding the amount of Tatar-language programming 
on republican television and radio. At the end of the 1980s, three hours of Tatar
5 The media market in Tatarstan has undergone significant centralisation since 1992. The state holding 
Tatmedia was created in 2003 and comprises over 100 media oudets including state-funded newspapers and 
other media. In the private sector, 2 holdings dominate: Efir (which controls several radio stations, as well as 
the newspapers Vostochnyi Ekspress and M K  v Tatarstane) and STS (which is part o f  the Russia-wide holdings o f  
the American-owned StoryFirst Communications group) (Shaforostov, 2004).
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programming were available on television and four hours on the radio (Iskhakova, 2001: 
51). By the mid-1990s, 70 per cent of radio broadcasts and 54 per cent of republic-produced 
television aired on the State television and radio company (GTRK) (which represents 45 per 
cent of total output) was in Tatar (Davis, Hammond et al., 2000: 204). In May 2001, a new 
republican network, T N V  (Tatarstan Novyi Vek, or Tatarstan New Century), was created to 
counterbalance Moscow’s increasing control over the Tatarstan GTRK (Coalson, 2004).6 
Ilshat Aminov, the head of the new network, explained that since the GTRK allots only 2.5 
hours a day for Tatar-language programming, TNV would broadcast in both state languages 
of Tatarstan, in equal amounts (TBDR, 9.8.2001). TNV is available to 99.5 per cent 
republican residents, to residents of Bashkortostan and some programming is rebroadcast 
on networks throughout Russia. In August 2002, TNV launched a radio station (BulgarFM) 
which is billed as the Tatar Mayak: it broadcasts round-the-clock in Tatar and Russian, 
alternating from one language to the other every three hours (RT, 23.08.2002). In addition 
to TNV, another twenty radio and TV stations operate in Tatarstan, of which three 
broadcast in Tatar, seven in Russian, and the balance in both languages (Pozner, 2004). 
During the evening, channels such as TNV, GTRK (Rossiya) and the private EJir offer both 
Tatar and Russian news programming. As with written media, demand for Tatar-language 
programming is driven mainly by Tatars: 75.6 per cent of Tatars claimed to tune in to Tatar 
broadcasts while 90.7 per cent of Russians follow programming in Russian only (Table 5.3). 
Paradoxically, although the overwhelming majority of Russians do not follow Tatar- 
language programming, 55.3 per cent believe that enough Tatar material is broadcast. A 
majority of Tatars believe, for their part, that the quantity is insufficient (Table 5.4).
Table 5.2: Newspaper Readership, by Language and National Group (in %) 
(Iskhakova, 2001: 51)____________________ __________________ ______________
Tatars Russians
Publications in Tatar 14.1 —
Publications in Russian 49.6 99.2
Publications in both languages 36.3 0.8
6 The federal government assumed control over the Tatarstan branch o f  the State Radio-Television Company 
in 2003. The decision to create TNV  will likely protect Tatar-language broadcasts from the recent 
reorganisation by the federal government o f  regional branches o f  the federal GTRK. Before, regional 
branches o f  the GTRK received funding from M oscow but were managed by Russia’s regions. Under the 
change, the federal government cut the financial support and airtime reserved for regional programming by 
half (to 360 hours), and stipulates this time can be used only for news programming. Thematic programming 
or programming about regional social or political issues must be cut or financed exclusively by the regions 
(NG, 24.1.2005). The issue garnered little reaction in Tatarstan and Shaimiev issued a decree liquidating the 
holdings o f  the Tatarstan branch o f  the GTRK in February 2005. Goble fears the change will strengthen the 
“information vertical” in Russian broadcasting and lead to a dramatic drop in the amount o f  programming 
available in Chuvash, Marii and Karelian, which do not benefit from the same level o f  republican support as 
Tatar in Tatarstan (Goble, 2005).
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Table 5.3: Radio and Television Audience, by Language o f Programming and
N ational Group (in %) (Iskhakova, 2001: 51)
Language o f programming Tatars Russians
Tatar 9.8 0.1
Russian 14.6 90.7
Both 75.6 9.2
Table 5.4: Opinions on the Quantity o f Tatar-language Programming, by National
Group (in %) (Iskhakova, 2001: 51)
Tatars Russian
Entirely sufficient, perhaps too much 4.0 22.9
Entirely sufficient 28.6 32.4
Often insufficient 30.6 5.8
Completely insufficient 24.2 2.7
N o  answer 12.5 36.1
Education
The State Programme’s objectives in the field of education were ambitious, aimed at 
establishing a system of Tatar-language education and instruction; devising educational 
curricula; training teachers; and publishing pedagogical material, dictionaries and support 
materials. In the field of higher education, the Programme called for the creation of a 
Faculty of Tatar language and literature at Ka2an State University and the creation of a 
Tatar National University. Indicators show that progress in this area have been very visible. 
As Valeev points out, policy-makers were concerned foremost with increasing the quantity 
of schools and availability of Tatar in order to redress the endemic weakness of Tatar- 
language education (Interview with Valeev, 2004). In 1990, only one Tatar school existed in 
Kazan. Thirty-five schools were subsequendy opened in the capital during the 1990s 
(Interview with Galiakhmetov, 2004). In the republic, 1132 Tatar schools and eighty-one 
Tatar lyceums and gymnasia existed in 2003. Within Russian-language schools, 2814 Tatar- 
language streams were in place (n.a., 2003). In 1999, 70 per cent of Tatar children attended 
Tatar-language preschools and kindergartens, up from 23.5 per cent in 1992 (Khadiullin, 
1999: 62). The key education provision of the 1992 language law, requiring Russian and 
Tatar to be taught in equal amounts, has been respected. Tatar and Russian as state 
languages are studied in all general schools and institutions of professional education, and 
consequendy 99.7 per cent of Tatarstan’s pupils study Tatar. While all Tatars study Tatar as 
a state language , it is the language of instruction of only 51.9 per cent of them (Tatarstan, 
2005). Table 5.5 illustrates the evolution of Tatar-language education between 1990 and 
2004.
The lack of teachers qualified to teach in Tatar schools was a significant problem in 
the early 1990s: there was a deficit of 1070 teachers in ninety-five republican cities in 1993- 
94 (Iskhakova, 2001). This deficit has dropped as measures were implemented to train
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teachers and cadres. Current, teachers and cadres receive training within the Kazan State 
Pedagogical Institute, the Kazan State University and Tatar National Humanities Institute. 
Similarly, there was a deficit o f quality textbooks and pedagogical materials. Through the 
financial support of the State Programme, Magarif and Kheter publish forty textbooks and 
more than thirty methodology texts a year, with a combined print run of one million copies 
(n.a., 2003). Since 1992, 1000 books (14.5 million copies), eighty dictionaries (550,000 
copies) have been published by the republic’s Tatar-language publishers (Minnullin, 2002).
Table 5.5: Dynam ics o f Developm ent o f Tatar-Language Education in Tatarstan
1991 2004
Total schools with Tatar as language o f  instruction 1069 1210
Percentage o f  pupils taught in native Tatar language 29.8% 51.9%
Total pupils studying Tatar language (as percentage o f  
all pupils)
28.5% 99.7%
Source: RT 22.02.2001, Tatarstan 2005
While the quantitative indicators are positive for primary and general schools, Tatar 
has not fared as well within institutions of higher education. “The lack of a unified system 
of Tatar-language education”, explains the manager of the Department of Education of the 
City of Kazan, “hampers the effectiveness of the law” (Interview with Galiakhmetov, 2004). 
According to a study by Garipov and Faller, no more than 10 per cent of students within 
higher education receive instruction in Tatar throughout the duration of their studies, and 
about 20 per cent have regular lectures or courses in Tatar (Garipov and Faller, 2003: 179). 
The 1994 State programme does not stipulate mechanisms for the implementation of the 
language law in higher education, which Razil’ Valeev concedes was a significant lacuna 
(Interview with Valeev, 2004). Although the offer of Tatar language instruction is restricted 
at this level, demand for Tatar-language instruction may itself be limited: the lack of utility 
of Tatar within higher education and then on the job market may help explain why only half 
of Tatars attend Tatar-language primary and high schools.
Middle-specialised institutions of education and higher education fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, and are not directly affected by Tatarstan’s language 
legislation. The federal government provides financing for higher education, and in 2001 
the Ministry of Education ordered Tatarstan’s institutions of higher education to cease 
using federal funds to provide teaching in Tatar (Yusupov, 1997: 16-7, TBDR 26.07.2001). 
Just as in primary and secondary education, the federal educational curriculum provides 15- 
20 per cent of time for the delivery of a regional component, financed by Tatarstan.7
7 Textbooks are published from republic funds, but according to Mukharyamova et al., these books are either 
translations o f  Russian Ministry o f  Education-approved texts (to encourage a “unified standard”), or are 
commissioned without tender, which has produced results o f  varying quality (Mukharyamova, Morenko et al., 
2004: 16).
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Therefore, the problem of integrating Tatar in higher education is not necessarily due to a 
lack of opportunity, but of political will. At a session of the State Committee on Culture, 
Science, Education and National Questions in June 2004, participants learned that it is up to 
individual institutions to decide how, if at all, to integrate Tatar into their curricula. The 
Council of Rectors of Tatarstan never finalised a joint approach on the delivery of the 
national-regional component of the curriculum within their institutions. Consequently, 
Tatar instruction is organised on an ad hoc basis. Tatar is offered in fifteen of Tatarstan’s 
twenty-two institutions (Mukharyamova, Morenko et al., 2004: 14). Overall, only five 
percent of students in institutions of professional education receive instruction in Tatar, and 
32 per cent within institutions of higher education (VE, 25.06.2004).
In institutions like Kazan State University (KGU) of the Kazan State Pedagogical 
University, parallel Tatar groups have been established. Students reading political science or 
sociology at KGU, for instance, may have a Tatar language requirement, but instruction in 
core topics will be provided in Russian. The possibility to write term papers or exams in the 
subjects in Tatar depends on individual instructors’ abilities and openness (Interview with 
Nizamova, 2004). Recent research finds between 55 and 70 per cent students attending 
Tatar-language schools who apply to university find it “advantageous” to write their 
entrance exams in Russian. The number is even higher for more “prestigious” schools like 
the Kazan State Medical University (Mukharyamova, Morenko et al., 2004: 11). The authors 
explain their findings by the lack of Tatar-language preparatory courses and the fact that 
Tatars use Russian-speaking tutors to prepare their exams. More pernicious, however, is the 
lack of established procedures regulating the use of Tatar in entrance exams. Although a 
right to write entrance exams in either language exists, uncertainty as to how this is 
conducted in individual institutions had led many applicants to use Russian rather than 
jeopardise their chances (Mukharyamova, Morenko et al., 2004: 13).
In his annual address to the State Council, Tatarstan president Shaimiev rebuked the 
Minister of Education for proceeding too slowly on the question of development of Tatar 
language education (Shaimiev, 2004). Consequently, the second State Programme for 2004- 
14 includes measures to increase coordination in the field of higher education and develop a 
unified system of Tatar-language education (Tatarstan, 2004a: par 3.4). Significantly, during 
his presentation to the State Council’s hearings on higher education in June 2004, 
Mukhametshin refused to lay the blame on the federal government, but stressed that 
national language education within Tatarstan’s institutions of higher education is a 
republican issue (RT, 24.06.2004). Long-standing (and long-postponed) plans to create a 
Tatar National University have resulted not in the establishment o f a wholly new institution, 
but in the consolidation of three existing institutions (Kazan State Pedagogical University,
100
Chapter 5. Language Policy in Tatarstan: Status and Jurisdiction in Practice
the Tatar American Regional Institute and Tatar State Humanities Institute) to create the 
Tatar State Humanities and Pedagogical University (TGGPU). The decision, announced in 
July 2005 seeks to respond to the need for a unified Tatar-language education system 
(Intertat, 4.7.2005). The federal government approved its registration (VE, 11.8.2005). For 
Razil’ Valeev, the objective of a Tatar university is to train specialists and cadres to take up 
positions in the bilingual republic. The plan is to provide teaching in three languages — 
Tatar, Russian and English — and prepare lawyers, administrators, diplomats and teachers, 
which traditional universities have been unable to provide in sufficient quantities (Interview 
with Valeev, 2004). One concern about the role of a dedicated university is the effect it will 
have on Tatar-language education in the republic’s other institutions. Although it promotes 
a unified system of Tatar education, Kim Minnullin fears that by creating a parallel system, 
‘traditional’ universities will disengage from the task of providing Tatar-language instruction 
(RT, 24.06.2004). If  the republic’s other institutions were to revert to a provision of Tatar- 
language services and education which is perceived as only optional, the result would be 
self-defeating.
Language Utility
As the previous sections illustrate, Tatarstan’s language policy has been successful in 
increasing the supply of education, media and publishing. For Valeev, the reforms of the 
1990s needed to address the quantity o f Tatar (schools, publications, reviving the Tatar 
language), but “the next step needs to address the quality of the Tatar language” (Interview 
with Valeev, 2004). This concerns chiefly the issue of language utility and functionality. In 
his study of minority languages in Russia, Neroznak concludes that “the lack of 
correspondence between the legal status and utility level of language” poses serious 
problems for titular languages (Neroznak, 2002: 16). Thus, even in Tatarstan, where 
considerable efforts have gone into language planning, strong contradictions exist between 
the status and the functions of the Tatar language (Interview with Minnullin, 2004b).
One problem is the linguistic asymmetry prevalent in Tatarstan. The legislation 
creates a model of Tatar-Russian bilingualism in the republic. However, the demographic 
situation (Tatars account for just over half o f the republic’s population, Russians for 43 per 
cent) and the asymmetry in Tatars’ and Russians’ competence in the other language are 
obstacles to the establishment of Tatar as functionality equal to Russian (Interview with 
Bairamova, 2004). Whereas only 0.5 per cent of Tatar respondents in the study in Table 5.6 
respond they have no knowledge of Russian, 81.6 per cent of Russians state they possess no 
competence whatsoever in Tatar. The 2002 Russian census revealed a slight rise in Russians’
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level of competence in Tatar: ten percent of Russians respond they understand it; another 
ten per cent say they can speak it (Musina, 2005).
Table 5.6: Levels o f Com petence in Tatar and Russian Languages, by National 
Group (in %) (Iskhakova, 2001: 35)_________________________ __________________
Competence in 
Tatar
Competence in 
Russian
Tatars Russians Tatars Russians
Fluent 65.1 1.2 84.9 97.9
Speak, read but not write 11.2 1.0 3.6 1.1
Speak, but not read nor write 12.1 1.5 1.8 0.7
Speak with difficulty 7.8 2.5 8.4 0.1
Understand, but not speak 2.7 12.1 6.8 0.2
N ot at all 1.1 81.6 0.5 —
Russian continues to service a majority of spheres (education, professional activities, 
and communication) and remains the main language of inter-ethnic communication. 
Russians are unlikely to use Tatar to communicate, read, or in a work setting (Bairamova, 
1997: 8-12; Bairamova, 2001). Tatar, on the other hand, does not service all spheres of 
activity. In education, Tatar is not as prominent as Russian as a language of work or 
scientific research and publication. Even for many Tatars, Tatar is a functional second 
language (Bairamova, 1993). Gorenburg shows that language policies have not resulted in 
changes to overall speaking patterns and has not proved successful “in reversing the trend 
toward a decrease in Tatar language knowledge and use among ethnic Tatars” (Gorenburg, 
2005: 18). In the academic field, candidates prefer to write dissertations in Russian because 
there are more Russian-speaking specialists and a larger readership (Interview with 
Bairamova, 2004). Thus, although many of the policy measures implemented by the 
government since 1994 have tackled supply-side problems, demand for Tatar policies has 
not risen as quickly.
Among Russian-speakers, nine years o f mandatory study of Tatar is not considered 
sufficient to develop fluency. In my informal interviews and discussions with Russian- 
speakers and parents of Russian pupils, while some criticised the fact that Tatar-language 
education was a requirement, they were more critical of the quality of the textbooks and 
pedagogical materials available for Tatar as a second language. Moreover, they deplore the 
fact that compulsory study leads only to a limited knowledge of the Tatar language (350-400 
words and expressions) (Interviews with Ovrutskii, 2004; Salagaev, 2004). This has led 
Bairamova to question whether bilingualism should be the policy objective. Policy-makers 
“measure success in a different way as a linguist” (Interview with Bairamova, 2004). For 
her, the policies implemented since 1992 have led to “significant” achievements in terms of 
raising the status of Tatar and raising Russians’ and Tatars’ exposure to the language (Ibid.).
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Since the road to full bilingualism is likely to be long, fluency in both languages may remain 
too high a standard for the time being.
Although the official policy of linguistic equality has not led to full-fledged equality 
of use and utility of both languages, language policy in Tatarstan is not a factor of political 
instability. In that sense, Tatarstan’s approach — official bilingualism and a policy of free 
choice of the language of instruction — has been successful to develop what Iskhakov 
(1998a: 25) calls parity of esteem (paritetnyi natsionaliym) between Russians and Tatars 
(Interviews with Bairamova, 2004; Minnullin, 2004b). The policy has led to greater respect 
of the place of Tatar and Russian within the republic. As Sagitova remarks, the rise in status 
and respect for Tatar has contributed to curtail the everyday resentment and discrimination 
to which Tatar-speakers were subjected in the late Soviet period (Interviews with Sagitova, 
2004; Valeev, 2004). The linguistic front is characterised by tolerance. This is in line with the 
republican leadership’s attempts to fashion a sense of Tatarstani (tatarstanskii) identification 
among the republic’s residents, as I examined in Chapter 3. Thus, bilingualism becomes a 
characteristic of being a resident of Tatarstan, a Tatarstanets (Drobizheva, 2004). Recent 
polling data appears to confirm the acceptance by Tatars and Russians of the bilingual 
nature of the republic: in 2002, 90 per cent of Tatars and 70 per cent of Russian agree with 
the view that both languages should be state languages (Conference presentation by Musina, 
2005). Among Russians, positive opinion of Tatar as a mandatory topic in school rose from 
13 percent in 1990 to 61 per cent in 1993 and has stayed at that level (Iskhakova, 2001: 51). 
Among both Russians and Tatars, there is an overwhelming consensus the president of the 
republic should speak both languages (Bairamova, 2001: 181; Iskhakova, 2003).
Although the law and State Programmes have raised the status and official presence 
of Tatar, the development of functional bilingualism must be seen as a long term objective 
(Garaev, 2002). The 2004 State Programme deplored the fact that language issues have 
become, during the 1990s, a second-order concern (Tatarstan, 2004a: preamble). Language 
policy has been treated as a one-off affair, especially after the law and policy were first put 
in place. The policies were developed, enacted and achievements measured (the quantitative 
assessments surveyed in this chapter point to a significant recrudescence of the presence of 
the Tatar language in the republic), but the need for continued efforts and innovative policy, 
especially a context of budgetary constraint and more pressing social and economic issues, 
is overlooked. By mentioning that language policy must raise the quality of the language, 
Valeev signals he is aware of the challenge (Interview with Valeev, 2004). For Minnullin, 
this challenge requires increased policy and monitoring capacity of language issues and 
language policy within the government apparatus in order to promote language priorities in 
a more sustained and professional way (Interview with Minnullin, 2004b). While it is too
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early to know whether the State Programme for 2004-14 will respond to these needs, 
political resolve will be a crucial factor in its implementation. Before it was implemented, 
twenty-five per cent of the funds budgeted by the 2004 State Programme were cut prior to 
receiving presidential approval in Fall 2004. One main difference between the draft and 
final versions of the Programme was the sources of financing. Whereas the draft 
Programme directly earmarked resources from the republican budget, the final version 
states that funding of many tasks will come from the operating budgets of the organisations 
responsible for their implementation. Language policy commitments may subsequently be 
squeezed by competing priorities. Thus, the inadequacies of Tatarstan’s language policies 
are likely to remain a consequence of endogenous factors and a lack of resources and 
political commitment.
Status and Jurisdiction in Language: The Federal-Regional D im ension
Although Tatarstan’s language policy makers evoke the lack of support they receive 
from Moscow, none of my interlocutors characterised federal policy as a hindrance to the 
exercise of the republic’s prerogatives. While they are critical of the general direction of 
Putin’s federal reforms and of recent developments in federal-regional relations, a 
consensus exists that republican policy-makers possess the competences required to 
implement their objectives. That is not to say that the federal constitutional and legal 
framework has no influence. Indeed, federal law has forced several changes in Tatarstan’s 
language policies. For example, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a resolution in June 1996 
which required bilingual labels and documentation in the sale of products such as 
pharmaceuticals and food products (Khairullin, Minnullin et al., 1999: 53-7). Because such a 
requirement contradicted federal legislation, the resolution was amended to require labelling 
of good produced in Tatarstan only. This limited requirements was also found to contradict 
federal legislation, and the labelling requirement dropped altogether (Interview with 
Minnullin, 2004b). As I examine in Chapter 7, federal law in Canada requires all packaging 
to be bilingual. Quebec’s language legislation added more stringent requirements, requiring 
instruction booklets, guarantees and other information provided with consumer goods be 
made available in French. In Tatarstan, the few producers providing bilingual packaging do 
so on a voluntary basis.
Script reform
Script reform has been one of the significant and persistent areas of federal-regional 
conflict. This issue has been the object of legislation, counter-legislation and competing 
court rulings by Tatarstan’s and Russia’s Constitutional Courts. Script reform was a topic of
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academic and political discussion throughout the 1990s. Impetus for implementing the 
change was provided by Tatar deputy (and later Russian State Duma member) Fandas 
Safiullin, who brought the issue for discussion at the Second All-World Tatar Congress in 
1996. Congress delegates voted unanimously in favour of script reform.8 Consequently, the 
Cabinet Committee on the Realisation of the Tatar language law studied the experiences 
with the Latin-based alphabet of the 1930s (called Yanalif, the Tatar acronym for new 
alphabet) and involved seventeen republican organisations (including the Tatar Academy of 
Sciences, the Ministries of Culture and Education, the unions of Writers and Journalists) in 
the decision-making process on script reform (Minnullin, 1999, RT, 9.22.2001). The 1999 
“Law on the Restoration (Vosstanovlenie) of the Tatar Alphabet on the Basis of the Latin 
Script” established the 34-letter Latin-based alphabet to be used and set a ten-year 
implementation period (from 2001 to 2011, projected to cost $4.7M), during which both 
Latin and Cyrillic scripts would coexist (art.3). The law required a State Programme on 
Implementation be put in place to manage the transition (art.4). As part of this transition, 
the Ministry of Education implemented pilot programmes in two to three schools in each 
region of Tatarstan to teach Tatar in the Latin script. The Minister reported the experiment 
was successful: pupils demonstrate fast progress in using the Latin script (Kharisov, 2002).
Dozens of articles for and against the reform appeared in republican print media, 
and arguments ensued over the linguistic and political justifications for the reform. Most 
arguments in favour were of a linguistic or philological nature. Republican elites sought to 
emphasise the continuity of the reform. Its very name, Law on the Restoration (Vosstanovlenie) 
was meant to link Tatarstan’s 1999 law with the period from 1927 to 1939 when Tatar was 
based on a Latin script (KV, 12.10.1999). The multilateral process by which the law was 
adopted tends to support Tatar policy-makers’ claims that the reform was intended to be a 
linguistic rather than explicitly political project. Although LDPR leader Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky insinuated a Latin alphabet was chosen over Arabic because “Turkey paid 
Tatarstan more than Saudi Arabia” (TBDR, 12.1.2001), Minnullin justified the decision as a 
means to further the development of the Tatar language and because the Latin-based 
alphabet more faithfully renders the sounds of Tatar (Minnullin, 1999). It is this linguistic 
argument which was most prominent in the republican press. The Cyrillic script is 
considered deficient as it does not render Tatar sounds properly, and includes letters, the 
sound of which do not exist in Tatar (including E, Yo, Ts, Shch, Yu, Ya, Zh). Furthermore, 
the change was said to be a means to reduce linguistic interference — Tatar learned in
8 Tatarstan’s leaders have legitimised their approach to script reform as being the result o f  a unanimous 
decision o f  the world’s Tatars and argue it is a decision in the best interest o f  the Tatar nation. Opponents, on 
the other hand, criticise that many delegates came from Tatar communities in other countries where Latin 
scripts are already commonly used and do not understand the situation o f  Russia’s Tatars.
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Cyrillic was often spoken with Russian sounds (Wertheim, 2003: chap. 2). By separating the 
scripts, for philologists, each language could better develop (Minnullin, 1999; Interview with 
Minnullin, 2004b).
The promotion of Tatarstan’s participation in the Internet and high-tech was 
another prominent argument in favour of script reform. Khakimov argued that a Latin- 
based Tatar is easier to use on the Internet than Cyrillic, thus contributing to “make Tatar 
more useful in IT” (Interview with Khakimov, 2004, V&D, 5.4.2001 and 27.7.2001). 
Tatarstan’s government has signed agreements with Microsoft to develop a Tatar operating 
system and software (TBDR, 22.4.2005). This is conjugated with a desire to make it easier 
for Tatars from Tatarstan to communicate with the outside world, with Tatars in other 
countries, and facilitate a rapprochement with the Turkic world. For Rafael Mukhammetdinov, 
one of the leaders of the nationalist Ittifak organisation, script reform is as an opportunity to 
differentiate Tatarstan from Russia and pose an act of national self-determination, “whereby 
Tatarstan removes the eyeglasses made in Moscow to keep the republic focused on that 
city, and puts on normal eyeglasses to see the world in another way, straight and clearly” 
(ZP, 28.12.2002).
Tatarstan’s script reform, although adopted unanimously at the World Tatar 
Congress was the object of increasing opposition within Russia. The Latin script is a huge 
symbolic issue, demonstrating a potential disconnect between Tatarstan and Russia. 
Consequently, Shaimiev’s 2001 Annual Address sought to reassure observers that 
Tatarstan’s adoption of the Latin script did not represent a step away from Russia but was a 
purely linguistic decision, over which Tatarstan possessed the requisite constitutional 
competence (NG, 1.3.2001). Russia’s Supreme Mufti and groups of Tatars from outside 
Tatarstan evoked concern that script reform would cut them off from Tatarstan (V&D, 
12.10.2001, RG, 22.9.2001). In an open letter published in Rossiiskaya Ga^eta in September 
2001, prominent Tatars from outside Tatarstan called for the transition to be cancelled, 
arguing script reform would separate the majority of Russia’s Tatars from cultural and 
linguistic developments in Tatarstan (NG, 20.10.2001). Reactions to this letter were swift 
and personal. Valeev disqualified the letter by insinuating that ninety percent of the 
signatories did not speak Tatar fluendy (RG, 22.9.2001) and Rafael Khakimov alleges the 
letter was either faked or instigated by Moscow (Interview with Khakimov, 2004).
However, Shaimiev’s support for script reform weakened in 2002. While he called 
for the experiments in Tatarstan’s schools to continue, he stated there was “no rush” to 
complete the transition to the Latin alphabet. At the 2002 All-Tatar Congress, he openly 
backed off the idea:
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“At the last Congress we decided on a transition to the Latin script for the Tatar language.
The law on the restoration o f  the Latin script has not been abolished. Nevertheless I have 
doubts about the timing o f  the transition, and these are tied to the unity o f  our people. [...]
It could be that Tatarstan changes to Latin, but that in the rest o f  Russian regions Tatars will 
use Cyrillic. Does this not weaken our nation? I think you [the Congress] must thoroughly 
discuss this question” (RT, 30.8.2002).
Moreover, it appears that political motivation for carrying out the script transition was also 
lacking, since the state programme which was supposed to specify the timetable and 
provide resources for the transition was adopted late. In addition, once the law was 
adopted, script reform never seemed to rally wider social and public support, and appeared 
motivated by bureaucratic interests. Sagitova relates that the relatively difficult socio­
economic context of the republic makes it difficult to create support for script reform 
(Interview with Sagitova, 2004). For Faroukshin, left on its own script reform would 
probably have fizzled out due to a lack of political impetus and public interest (Interview 
with Faroukshin, 2004). However, the federal government’s intervention and decision to 
directly forbid Tatarstan’s reform gave the issue a new lease of life. Furthermore, it raised 
the issue from a linguistic problem to a constitutional one (Discussion with Drobizheva, 
2004). The federal government’s intervention provoked resentment and a belief that it was 
unjustly interfering within Tatarstan’s competences (Interview with Sagitova, 2004), 
represented Moscow’s “imperial mentality” (Interview with Valeev in VE, 8.2.2002) and 
was representative of the “crisis of federalism” in Russia (Interview with Iskhakov, 2004).
An amendment to Russia’s language law was put forward by a group of Russian 
State Duma deputies, who sought to forbid the script change on the basis it threatened 
national security. Deputy Head of the Duma Committee on Nationalities Affairs and one of 
the bill’s co-sponsors, Kaadyr-ool Bicheldei, from Tyva, argued that script reform posed a 
threat to Russia’s integrity and consequently the federal government needed to act to 
prevent republics from falling into the sphere o f influence of foreign states (Itogi, 11.6.2002). 
Sergei Shashurin, a deputy from Tatarstan, stated script reform opened the door to Turkish 
expansion and threatened Russia’s integrity (TBDR, 13.3.2002). A second line of arguments 
in favour of the amendments, perhaps more serious and harder to dismiss as Tatar-bashing, 
concerned Russia’s responsibility to preserve the unity of the country’s educational space 
and the unity of its peoples (TBDR, 20.9.2002, 21.09.2002). Anatolii Nikitin, member of the 
Duma’s Committee on Nationalities Affairs, explained during debates on the amendment 
that his committee was motivated by two concerns. First, since territorial boundaries do not 
coincide with the actual distribution of Tatars in Russia, “it is very difficult to determine 
whether it is the will of the entire people to adopt the proposed script.” Second, the right to 
choose an alphabet must be balanced with “the right of citizens to live in a united
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educational and cultural field and the right to equal access to information” (Stenogramme of 
Duma Proceedings, 5.6.2002).
The federal amendments were widely supported by Russia’s Federal Assembly and 
signed into law by Putin in December 2002. The provision added to Russia’s Law on 
languages stipulates that the state languages of Russia and its republics must be written in 
Cyrillic, unless prescribed otherwise by federal law (RF, 1991: art.3§5). Tatarstan’s State 
Council urged Putin to veto the law, arguing it was ultra vires the federal government. 
Although Putin signed the law, he suggested that “further development of Russia’s 
legislation on the languages of its peoples must be carried out through a dialogue between 
the two chambers of the Russian State Council and the legislative bodies of the federation” 
(IZV, 13.12.2002). A committee dialogue would likely take years, and considering the 
margin of victory (336 deputies approved the law in final reading) it is rather doubtful the 
Federal Assembly will grant Tatarstan an exemption in the near future.
Shaimiev, who had cooled on script reform as a linguistic issue, seized on Russia’s 
legislative initiative as an issue of national self-determination: “The development of 
language is the exclusive right of a nation, as affirmed in a number of international 
documents which by the way Russia has signed. Unfortunately, this is not the first instance 
of federal interference in the republic’s exclusive powers” (Shaimiev, 2004). The issue was 
transformed, as Valeev put it, from “philological question to a political [one]” (RT, 
9.22.2001). This led the State Council to ask the Tatarstan Constitutional Court to provide 
an interpretation of the constitutionality of the republic’s Law on the Restoration o f the 
Latin script. The State Council argued that since Tatar is the state language of Tatarstan, 
competence over script reform belongs to the republic. In the ruling handed down on 23 
December 2003, the Court found that the power granted by the federal constitution to 
establish a state language “necessarily assumes a right to determine its alphabet” (KSRT, 
2003c: par.3). Furthermore, since script was not a competence which was included in the 
federal constitution’s provisions on the division of powers (articles 71 and 72), the Court 
concluded it was a residual power and therefore belonged exclusively to subjects of the 
federation (Ibid.: par.5). The Tatarstan Constitutional Court’s ruling, based on the federal 
division of powers and constitution, was the argument used by the government in its 
subsequent appeal to the federal constitutional court.
But the political leadership was not unanimous on the course of action following its 
‘victory’ in Tatarstan’s Constitutional Court. State Council Chairman Mukhametshin did not 
want to take a confrontational approach and appeal to the Russian Constitutional Court. 
Consequently, the Council took the legislative route (as Putin suggested in 2002) and 
petitioned the Federal Assembly to annul its law (RT, 22.01.2004, 30.01.2004). Moreover,
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many leaders were not confident the Russian Constitutional Court would find in Tatarstan’s 
favour. Valeev explains that getting a “fair decision from the Russian Constitutional Court” 
would be difficult “because in recent times it makes not legal but political rulings” (IZV,
25.12.2003). Notwithstanding its reticence, the State Council reversed its course and 
appealed the constitutionality of Russia’s law to federal constitutional court. When asked to 
explain this change of strategy, Valeev responded that it was a response to federal 
prosecutors’ challenge of the legality of Tatarstan’s law. Since “they raised the stakes, we 
decided to appeal” (Interview with Valeev, 2004).
Constitutional Court Ruling on Tatarstan’s hanguage ham
The Russian Constitutional Court heard the appeal at the beginning of October 
2004. It considered two issues simultaneously: Tatarstan’s appeal on the constitutionality of 
Russia’s move to prohibit script reform and a challenge of Tatarstan’s policy of mandatory 
bilingual education. I return to the latter below. Elena Mizulina, the Federal Assembly’s 
representative to the Court argued “the change of script within one of Russia’s republics 
represents a limitation of citizen’s rights and freedoms. The transition to the Latin script 
separates citizens of Tatarstan from the rest of Russia” (NG, 6.10.2004). This argument 
echoes Nikitin’s, quoted above, framing Tatarstan’s script reform as a question of individual 
rights. Since script reform affects Tatars everywhere in Russia (a majority of which live 
outside Tatarstan) a change of alphabet is an issue of national importance and falls under 
the heading of the protection of citizens’ rights, a joint competence in the federal 
constitution. Whereas Tatarstan’s Constitutional Court ruled that power over script reform 
was a residual power, the federal Constitutional Court placed it within a wider context.
In its ruling, the Court did not accept Tatarstan’s claim that the regulation of 
republican state languages was its exclusive competence: “since the status of state languages 
of republics affects [...] the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Russian Federation in 
the spheres of education and culture, it cannot be an area of exclusive republican 
competence” (KSRF, 2004: par.2). The Court found Tatarstan’s script reform was carried 
out “without considering the requirements and guarantees of the Russian constitution in the 
area of language”, and “could lead to the limitations of the rights of citizens who live 
outside the republics to use their native language or freely choose their language of 
communication” (Ibid.: par.4§2). In addition, contra Tatarstan’s argument that its law was 
only a “linguistic reform”, the Court ruled that the “establishment of one or another script 
of a state language [...] depends not only on the special features of a language’s phonetics” 
but “must take into account historical and political factors, national and cultural traditions” 
(Ibid.: par.4§l). The Court identifies some of these factors: the “historical realities of the
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Russian Federation”, where languages of the peoples of Russia have traditionally and 
historically based on Cyrillic (Ibid.). As with the 1992 ruling on the constitutionality of 
Tatarstan’s referendum, the Court does not consider Soviet-era precedents and specifically 
the fact that until 1939 Tatar had never actually been written in a Cyrillic script.
The Court did not retain Tatarstan’s jurisdictional argument. Instead it approved the 
purpose of the federal amendments as strengthening “the principles of state integrity and 
the constitutional guarantees of the right to cultural and national development” (Ibid.: par. 
4§3). For the Court’s Chairman, Valerii Zorkin, Russia’s legislation “promotes, in the 
interests of state unity, the harmonisation and balanced functioning of a pan-federal 
language and the languages of republics and seeks to maximise their interaction within 
Russia’s linguistic space without preventing the realisation of the rights of citizens in the 
linguistic sphere including the right to use one’s mother tongue” (RJa novosti, 16.11.2004). 
Khakimov criticised the ruling as a “political-legal” decision (NG, 17.12.2004), precisely the 
sort of ruling he expected from the Russian Constitutional Court (Interview with 
Khakimov, 2004). Shaimiev gave the ruling a positive spin: it “does not limit Tatarstan’s 
right to keep working on the Latin problem” (TBDR, 19.11.2004). In fact Tatarstan’s 
Ministry of Education announced that the experiment on teaching Tatar with a Latin script 
will continue unabated in sixty-two republican schools (IZV, 17.11.2004). For Shaimiev, the 
republic will pursue this experiment for five years in order to build a better case to petition 
the federal government to grant it permission to adopt script reform (NG, 17.12.2004). 
Mukhametshin stated that Tatarstan would not appeal the Court’s ruling (TBDR,
22.11.2004).
Although republican leadership stated they would not challenge the ruling, Fandas 
Safiullin founded the Latin Front, an umbrella organisation reuniting 63 civic groups from 
four regions in addition to the World Tatar Congress, Institute of History and IYaLI. The 
Front calls for the right to use the Latin script, and seeks to force Russia to respect 
international law and its “commitments to protect the rights of people and nations” 
(Safiullin, 2004). Valeev stated that if the government would not appeal the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling to the European Court of Human Rights, then residents or civic groups 
could do so since Russian legislation prevents Tatars from asserting their rights to self- 
determination (TBDR, 22.11.2004). Meanwhile, the Latin Front has issued a call to 
UNESCO to take measures to “defend the linguistic rights of the Tatar people” and the 
“violation of the linguistic rights of the Tatar people” (Safiullin, 2005, Tatarinform, 
13.1.2005). Pending any further resolution by international bodies, the issue remains 
unsettled.
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Another justification for the leadership’s muted reactions to the ruling on script 
reform is the fact Court simultaneously upheld Tatarstan’s education regime. Tatarstan 
resident Sergei Khapugin seized the Court to rule on the constitutionality of the provisions 
of Tatarstan’s language and education laws which require both state languages be taught in 
equal amounts. In 2001, the Russian-language daily Vechemyaya Kazan’ organised a public 
meeting at which parents and Tatarstan Ministry of Education officials discussed the issue 
of compulsory Tatar-language education. Parents echoed Khapugin’s claims that mandatory 
lessons in Tatar take time away from learning Russian, and consequently diminishes 
competence in Russian speaking and writing. Khapugin argued that Tatarstan’s requirement 
violates the equality of Russian pupils, compared to pupils of other subjects of the 
federation (RG 6.10.2004). Furthermore, he challenged Tatarstan’s power to impose 
requirements in education policy on the basis it is not a sovereign state (VK 18.12.2001, 
TBDR 18.12.2001). Although the federal Constitutional Court accepted his appeal in 2002, 
it did not hear the case until two years later.
The Constitutional Court found that the study of both Russian and Tatar as state 
languages in the republic does not contradict the federal constitution or pose a limit to the 
constitutional right to receive an education. The language requirement, on the contrary, is in 
line with the principles enounced in federal education legislation which seek to protect “a 
system of national education and regional cultural traditions within a multinational state” 
(KSRF, 2004: par.3.1). “The Tatarstan legislator is entitled, following Article 68 in 
conjunction with article 43 as well as federal legislation, to require the study of Tatar as a 
state language as a condition of completing general education” (Ibid.). Furthermore, as long 
as the Tatar component complies with the federal educational curriculum (Ibid.: par.3.2), it 
does not contradict federal legislation on education. As for Khapugin’s claims that 
Tatarstan violated the equality of pupils, the Court found that as long “as measures 
designed to protect and development teaching of Tatar as a state language of Tatarstan [...] 
do not impede on the functioning or study of Russian as a state language of the Russian 
Federation”, they do not violate equality rights (Ibid., par.3.1). Therefore, republican 
requirements conform to the norm of equality established in the federal constitution to the 
extent they do not allow differential treatment of Tatar or Russian. The Court did not 
consider international standards in its ruling, even though Russia is subject to the norms of 
the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on National Minorities which require the 
Russian government to take steps to protect and develop the right to minority language 
education. The ruling is based solely on the rights and norms contained within the federal 
and republican constitutions and legislation.
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For Shaimiev, the Court’s opinion on Tatarstan’s language law and requirements 
was “more important” than its findings on the issue of script reform (NG, 17.11.2004). It 
was a significant ruling since it was the first case in which Tatarstan’s jurisdiction over 
language policy and language education was confirmed by the court (RT, 18.11.2004). It 
confirmed the legitimacy of the constitutional asymmetry in Russia’s 1993 constitution, 
which provides republics the right to establish and manage their state language. Although 
republican leaders were unhappy with the court’s ruling on script reform, their reaction 
would no doubt have been far less restrained had its right to carry out bilingual education 
been quashed.
Conclusion: Federal D esign and Language Policy
Republican status and constitutional asymmetry have provided both recognition of 
Tatarstan’s status and competence over language. The bilateralism and intergovernmental 
agreements which characterised other aspects of Tatarstan’s relationship with Russia has 
not been a feature of its interactions in the area of language. Russia’s existing federal design 
is recognised as providing the autonomy required for Tatarstan’s policy-makers to 
implement their objectives in this field. Policy failures are largely due to republican 
constraints, such as the lack of financing, or of organisation and political support.
Nevertheless, as Kim Minnullin explains, republican policy-makers are critical o f the 
lack of support received by Moscow. He has no counterpart or interlocutor in Moscow with 
whom it is possible to coordinate policies, or share experiences (Interview with Minnullin, 
2004b). He considers the federal government has not shown enough awareness of the 
challenges inherent in implementing bilingualism and language policy in the republic. 
Similarly, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities also points to the absence of mechanisms to coordinate and implement 
Russia’s language legislation, such as the absence of a ministry for nationalities affairs, as a 
limit of the effectiveness of the centre’s support for national minorities (CoE, 2002: 12).9 
For Shaimiev, this lack of federal support shifts the burden on Russia’s federal subjects:
Republics are necessary to preserve and develop national cultures in Russia. The centre does 
not play an active role in these issues. For example, neither Tatars nor any o f  the other 
various peoples in Russia have radio or television stations on the federal level even though 
they conscientiously pay their taxes. The republics are dealing with this alone (RRR, 
24.1.2001).
Republican status is the key to Tatarstan’s ability to implement its language policies. In the 
context of Putin’s federal reforms and the rise of concerns about increasing unitarism in the
9 Putin abolished the Ministry for Federation Affairs, Nationality, and Migration Policy in 2001 and replaced it 
with a minister without portfolio, charged with the implementation o f  nationalities policy within federal 
agencies. This post was abolished in February 2004. Following the Beslan attacks, Putin announced the 
creation o f  a Ministry for regional and nationalities policy.
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federation, the link between state status and language is made more directly. Razil’ Valeev 
contends: “for a language to be a state language, we need to have a state. Russia must create 
the conditions for its various components and nationalities to have access to education, 
culture, and status. It has no other option than accommodate the nations within it” 
(Interview with Valeev, 2004). This highlights the political dimension of language. The 
republican leadership is conscious that language is a marker of identity and difference with 
Russia. The importance of the issue has steadily grown during the 1990s.
The 2004 ruling by Russia’s Constitutional Court framed the issue as one of 
constitutional competence. Tatarstan’s jurisdiction over language is linked to its 
constitutional status of republic and the asymmetry created in article 68 of the federal 
constitution which grants republics the right to establish state languages. Policy capacity 
thus rests on this competence to name a state language, in addition to the provisions of the 
federal law on education, which allows the republic to require and deliver education in Tatar 
and other languages as part of the regional curriculum. Thus, while constitutional status has 
facilitated the protection of Tatar, language issues remain politically charged, demonstrated 
by discussions over the constitutional requirement for bilingual presidential candidates and 
the Latin script reform. While the balance between state status, jurisdiction and language 
policy is stable at present, the balance is contingent on the stability of federal design — 
particularly the role and place of republics — and the extent to which elites use language as 
an issue to mobilise popular support or nationalism.
113
Chapter 6. Federal Design in Canada and Accommodating Quebec
Chapter 6. Federal Design in Canada and Accommodating Quebec
By forcing a centralism perhaps acceptable to 
some provinces but not to Quebec, and by 
insisting that Quebec must be like the others, we 
could destroy Canada. This became my doctrine 
o f federalism. I wanted to decentralize up to a 
point as the way to strengthen, indeed to establish 
and maintain, unity (Lester B. Pearson, 1975).
Constitutional difficulty is simply the price o f  
being Canadian. Canada just happens to be one o f  
those countries that is committed, as a condition 
o f  its survival, to engage in a constant act o f  self­
justification and self-invention. Constitutional 
dialogue among regions and languages is the very 
condition o f  our collective survival (Michael 
Ignatieff, 2005).
This chapter examines the nature of Quebec’s ‘stateness dilemma’ -  the 
constitutional conflict — which is a persistent feature of federal-provincial relations. 
Although many of Tatarstan’s claims were first voiced during a time of regime change and 
transition, its demands for recognition and jurisdiction have endured. Quebec’s demands 
were not the result of regime change. Its challenges to federal design emerged partly as a 
result o f domestic political changes, including a rise in nationalism, and partly in response to 
the federal government’s own strategies. The comparative interest of this chapter is to show 
that the absence of agreement on the constitutional fundamentals and persistence of 
Quebec’s claims have not led to federal paralysis. Negotiation and accommodation persists, 
notwithstanding the existence of a salient stateness dilemma. Intergovernmental 
negotiations and ad hoc agreements are prominent in the accommodation of Quebec’s claims 
for recognition and jurisdiction.
Multitudes of analyses and works already exist on the Quebec-Canada constitutional 
conundrum. My purpose here is to examine the nature of the stateness dilemma in Quebec, 
what attempts are made to accommodate Quebec’s claims in order to identify the 
mechanisms, practices and actors at work in this process and to establish a basis for the 
comparative analysis with Tatarstan in Chapter 8. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I 
examine the contested visions of Canada’s constitution and of Quebec’s place within the 
federal order. These visions, particularly whether confederation is a pact between two 
founding peoples or ten equal provinces, has played a key role in Quebec’s demands for 
constitutional recognition since the 1960s. Second, I survey various attempts at 
constitutional change in Canada throughout the 1970s and 1980s and the failures to reach 
constitutional consensus on Quebec’s demands. To finish, I turn to the processes of 
intergovernmental negotiation which exist between Quebec and Canada to show that failure
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to agree on the constitutional fundamentals has not been an impediment to the 
accommodation of Quebec’s demands.
Contested Narratives: Constitution-M aking and the Federative Pact
Contrary to Russia, where Tatarstan’s claims and constitutional disagreements were 
articulated during the actual constitution-making process between 1990 and 1993, Quebec’s 
claims appeared over a longer period of time, and are articulated in relation to long-standing 
perceptions and interpretations of Canada’s federal design. This section surveys some of the 
main factors in the evolution of Canadian federalism and the competing notions of the 
purpose and content of the 1867 constitution. I examine two main constitutional 
disagreements: the issue of provincial autonomy in Canada’s division of competences and 
the status of Quebec within the federation.
The division of competences established by the British North America Act, 1867 
embodies the ambivalence which existed at the time between federal and unitary 
government. As Houle remarks, “the choice to federate was not based on a deep reflection: 
it did not seek to increase democratic rights or weaken state power by dividing it among 
two levels of government. It is essentially pragmatic reasons which led to its adoption; it 
was adopted as a necessary evil, out of inability to negotiate a legislative union” (Houle, 
1999: 242). Indeed, since many of Canada’s founding fathers favoured a legislative union 
over federalism, the compromise reached in 1867 provides for a fairly centralised federal 
design, at least on paper (LaSelva, 1996: 173). Wheare classifies Canada’s constitution as 
quasi-federal based on the powers of the central government (residuary powers, as well as 
powers of reservation and disallowance, effectively giving the centre a veto over provincial 
legislation) (Wheare, 1946: 21). In addition to the usual competences reserved for the 
centre, Canada’s federal government enjoys the power to appoint judges of provincial 
courts, lieutenant governors and to raise revenue by any means of taxation (s.91) and 
through customs and excise taxes (s. 122). Provincial governments, for their part, obtained 
competences considered to be of local interest—education, social services, municipal 
government (s.92)— and can raise funds through direct taxation only. Contrary to Russia’s 
constitution, there are much fewer joint competences in Canada. The areas of shared 
(concurrent) jurisdiction are old age pensions (s.94A), with agriculture and immigration 
(s.95) defined as joint powers where federal law is paramount (like Russia, federal law 
trumps provincial law in these two areas).
In the decades following confederation, Prime Minister John A. Macdonald did not 
recoil from using the centre’s powers to strike down provincial legislation. Provincial 
leaders, particularly Ontario Premier Oliver Mowat challenged the use of the powers or
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reservation and disallowance on the basis that federal overreaching overrode provincial 
jurisdiction. The UK Joint Commission of the Privy Council, Canada’s court of last resort at 
the time, handed down several rulings during the late 1800s which recognised the equality 
of federal and provincial governments and their sovereignty within their respective 
jurisdictions (LaSelva, 1996: ch.2; Romney, 1999: part 2).
Notwithstanding the existence of a fairly clear-cut division of competences, federal 
practice in Canada did not adhere to the conception of constitutional competences as “water­
tight compartments”. Many of the competences which were of local interest at the time, 
such as education, health, labour and social assistance came to matter more in the twentieth 
century. Moreover, for provincial governments, whose revenue-raising capacity was limited, 
the rise in demand for these services entailed additional costs. Concerned that the existing 
federal design and its compartmentalised jurisdictions impeded national unity and national 
needs, the federal government struck the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations (Rowell-Sirois Commission) to consider modifications to the distribution of 
powers and means to reach a better balance between jurisdictional responsibility and 
funding capacity (Canada, 1940). The Commission proposed provinces rely more fully on 
federal financial transfers for the realisation of their policy commitments. In other words, 
provinces would forego their constitutional autonomy in areas of exclusive jurisdiction to 
facilitate the organisation of national programmes. The Commission also proposed that an 
equalisation programme be implemented in order to reduce the fiscal disparities between 
the more and less prosperous provinces and to permit the latter to provide public services 
comparable to those of their wealthier counterparts. This has become a mainstay of 
Canada’s system of fiscal federalism.
Unable to change the federal division of powers, the federal government began 
instead to implement shared-cost programmes with provincial governments. In exchange 
for federal financial transfers, provinces adhered to national standards and programmes. 
Referred to as the federal spending power, this practices arises from “the power of 
parliament to make payments to people or institutions or governments for purposes on 
which it does not necessarily have the power to legislate” (Trudeau, 1969: 4). As 
constitutionalist Peter Hogg notes, the spending power is not explicitly mentioned in the 
constitution but has been inferred from federal government’s powers to levy taxes, legislate 
in relation to public property and appropriate federal funds (Hogg, 1985: 124). Provincial 
governments, of course, are free to refuse to enter a shared-cost programme but in so doing 
renounce federal funds.
The spending power has been a persistent irritant in the Quebec-Canada 
relationship. Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis subscribed to a more literal reading of the
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1867 constitution, claiming that federalism must be based on the principle o f provincial 
autonomy, which the spending power clearly disregards (Duplessis, 1946: 455; 1950: 17). In 
Tatarstan too, leaders argue for a strict interpretation of the federal principle and for a 
‘watertight’ interpretation of constitutional jurisdictions. However, contrary to the Russian 
constitution, which explicitly foresees the supremacy of federal law in joint competences, 
the spending power in Canada has evolved largely outside the federal design and led to a de 
facto circumvention of the division of powers. Rejecting federal interference in provincial 
jurisdictions, the Duplessis government refused to participate in a shared-cost programme 
on university finance. In addition, the government struck a Royal Commission on 
Constitutional Problems (the Tremblay Commission) which concluded in 1956 that the 
spending power had resulted in a distortion of the division of powers and was evidence of 
the “fundamental divergences” that had appeared between Quebec’s and Ottawa’s 
interpretations of federal design (Quebec, 1956: 286). The blurring of jurisdictional 
boundaries and provincial autonomy constitutes the first aspect of Quebec’s claims.
Recognition of Quebec’s status within Canada is the second area of contention, 
where long-standing interpretations of Canada’s ‘constitutional moment’ clash. In 1867, 
federation for French Canadians was considered the best means to facilitate the coexistence 
of both national groups and the protection of French Canadian culture. Indeed, the word 
Confederation was retained chiefly because the term would be more acceptable in Quebec and 
would ensure the proposal was approved (McRoberts, 1997: 12-3). A long-standing belief in 
Quebec is that Confederation constituted a pact between Canada’s two founding peoples. 
For French-Canadian nationalist Henri Bourassa, the Canadian constitution represents a 
double contract: “One was concluded between the French and English of the old province 
of Canada, while the aim of the other was to bring together the scattered colonies of British 
North America. We are thus party to two contracts — one national and one political” 
(Quoted in McRoberts, 1997: 20).
Romney and McRoberts argue this interpretation of Canada as a compact has been 
forgotten or deliberately occluded in political debate (McRoberts, 1997; Romney, 1999). 
Romney in particular argues that what has become the dominant interpretation of 1867 — 
that it was an act of nation-building — misconstrues the motivations and beliefs of the 
founders, for whom constitution was foremost a way to obtain provincial self-government 
and divided sovereignty. With the passage of time, the compact theory of confederation has 
increasingly been disqualified as myth, construed as a theory by francophones to legitimate 
Quebec’s specificity (Romney, 1999: 242). For my purposes, the historical veracity of the 
compact theory matters less than its political relevance to the debates of the last fifty years. 
As Fernand Dumont writes “It is of little importance if the Confederation was at the outset
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really a compact between two nations that explicit texts established. What is important is
that the French Canadians saw it as such an agreement and based their behaviour in the
common house upon this belief’ (Quoted in Erk and Gagnon, 2000: 98). The same is true
in Tatarstan, where claims for a confederal relationship with Russia are based on Soviet-era
equalisation of autonomous and Union republics. Following Russia’s Declaration of
sovereignty and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s Constitutional Court denied
Tatarstan’s claim to special status and ignored the Soviet legislative foundation of this
status. In both these cases, claims for special status and recognition have come to be based
more on political rather than strict legal precedent.
In an attempt to come to terms with the rise of Quebec nationalism, Prime Minister
Lester B. Pearson formed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&B
Commission) in 1963 with a mandate “to inquire into and report upon the existing state of
bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to
develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two
founding races...” (Canada, 1967: xxi). The Commission’s Preliminary Report noted that one
of the fundamental divergences in Canada concerned the nature of the constitutional
agreement. Although many Quebecois accept the concept of two founding peoples and the
need for equality between them, anglophones in the rest of the country do not consider
dualism to be a legitimate interpretation o f the constitution, seeing 1867 as a bargain
between provinces, not two cultural groups (Canada, 1965: 162). One of the co-chairs and
most ardent defenders of the dualist vision of federation, Andre Laurendeau, articulated his
vision most clearly in the so-called blue pages of the B&B report. For him, dualism required
recognition and the devolution of competences to Quebec in order to protect and promote
its linguistic and cultural difference. Laurendeau argued that failure to recognise Canada’s
dualism would only stoke resentment:
As soon as ... [a] ... minority [such as Canada's francophones] is aware o f  its collective life as 
a whole, it may very well aspire to the mastery o f  its own existence and begin to look 
beyond cultural liberties. It raises the question o f  its political status. It feels that its future 
and the progress o f  its culture are not entirely secure, dominated by a majority composed o f  
the other group. Consequently, it moves in the direction o f greater constitutional autonomy.
Ideally, the minority desires the same autonomy for the whole o f  the community to which it 
belongs; but where it cannot attain this objective, it may decide to concentrate on the more 
limited political unit in which it is incontestably the majority group (Canada, 1967: xlvii-iii).
The logical extension of this argument was that Quebec required greater autonomy, if not
constitutional asymmetry, to protect its place within Canada. For Michael Oliver, the
Commission’s Director of research “ [t]he crucial insight [...] was that a stable base for
French-English cooperation cannot be achieved just by increasing French minority rights in
Canada as a whole (seen as a single community) but must also involve the exercise of a set
of powers, adequate for community development, by a community jurisdiction (Quebec) in
118
Chapter 6. Federal Design in Canada and Accommodating Quebec
which the country-wide minority (Francophones) is a majority” (Oliver, 1993: 326). 
National unity, in other words, depended not only on measures adopted by the federal 
government, but would be strengthened by providing additional powers of self-rule to 
Quebec.
The electoral victory of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) in 1976 provoked a similar exercise
in constitutional problem-solving. Federal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau created the Task
Force on Canadian Unity (Pepin-Robarts Commission) to advise the government on
strategies to foster national unity. The Task Force concluded that a thorough restructuring
of Canada’s federal design was needed in order to accommodate Canada’s dualism (two
cultures) and its regionalism (provinces). The report advocated radical decentralisation and
the adoption of an almost confederal division of powers (Canada, 1978: ch.7,
recommendations 47-64). Most importantly, the Commissioners believed that Quebec’s
claims for recognition needed to be explicitly entrenched in the constitution.
The essential condition in recognizing duality within Canada at the present time is to come 
to terms with modern Quebec. Quebec will continue to be the pillar o f  the French fact in all 
o f  North America; it will perform this function inside the Canadian federal system or 
outside it. So the challenge is not to try to confer on Quebec a role that it has in any case 
played for centuries, but to demonstrate that it is a role which can be played more effectively 
within a restructured federal system which is expressly cognizant o f  Quebec's distinctiveness 
and its sources (Canada, 1978: ch.3).
The Task Force argued the best way to preserve national unity and counter separatism in
Quebec was to devolve all powers regarding the preservation of its heritage, such as
language, culture, civil law, research and communications, as well as taxation and relations
with foreign countries. These powers would be made concurrent, thus preserving the
federal government’s ability to implement national programmes unless a province chose to
exercise its prerogative to withdraw. In addition, the report suggested the constitution be
amended to include a procedure to manage intergovernmental delegation of powers
(Canada, 1978: ch.4.4). Its radical recommendations were squarely rejected by Trudeau and
were shelved. As a recent book concludes, the Pepin-Robarts report is a debate that never
took place (Wallot, 2002).
In this section I surveyed some of the long-standing interpretations of Canada’s
federal design and constitution. I turn now to examine how these conceptions of the
political community, and particularly Quebec’s claims for jurisdiction and recognition were
received, accommodated or rejected. It is useful to keep in mind the recommendations of
the B&B and Pepin-Robarts commissions as they have influenced the responses of political
leaders at both provincial and federal levels throughout the process. In these reports,
addressing Canada’s constitutional dilemma depended on accepting, if not entrenching, the
country’s inherent dualism. It meant acceding to a firmly federal, if not confederal, view of
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the country. It is worthwhile to retain two points. First, the commissions surveyed above, as 
well as many of the constitutional reforms I turn to below, have the objective of “solving” 
Quebec’s constitutional dilemma. Second, elites matter a great deal in Canadian federalism. 
As Cairns (1985: 135) notes, “the constitutional struggle [...] in Canada cannot be 
understood without reference to the clashing wills, ambitions, and visions of that small 
group of political leaders who happened to be on the stage when the time came for 
Canadians to have that constitutional rendezvous with destiny which they had so long 
avoided”. The competition between leaders and governments, proposals and 
counterproposals, is a key dynamic in the events examined in the remainder of this chapter.
The Quiet Revolution and O pting-Out
Quebec’s challenges to Canada’s federal design began in earnest in the 1960s. This 
period, dubbed the Quiet Revolution, witnessed growth in the structures and functions of 
the Quebec state, with the nationalisation of public utilities and creation of Hydro Quebec and 
Caisse de depot, the establishment of ministries of Education and Culture. For Jean Lesage, 
the liberal Premier, a more activist provincial government would endeavour to make 
Quebecois ‘masters of their destiny’ (maitres che^  nous). Thus, the historical claims of 
provincial autonomy are given a nationalist impetus: “Quebec does not defend provincial 
autonomy as principle alone, but because autonomy is the concrete condition not only of its 
survival which is now assured but also of its assertion as a people” (Lesage, 1964: 42). 
Lesage considered that to become maitres che% nous, a reorganisation of the federal system 
was necessary and should be based on the following principles. Quebec is the political 
embodiment of French Canada possessing particular traits it has a right to value and duty to 
protect. The constitutional framework must provide opportunities for the francophone 
national community to set objectives and the means to attain them. To do so, Quebec must 
control the economic, social, administrative and political levers in order to realise the 
aspiration of its people while acting within the context and confines of Canada’s federalism 
(As related in PLQ, 1980). In the context of the time, Lesage believed these demands could 
be addressed within Canada’s existing federal design.
At the time, Quebec’s claims for jurisdiction fell on the ears of a receptive Ottawa. 
Indeed, this epoch is referred to as the heyday of cooperative federalism, characterised by 
pragmatic power-sharing between the Quebec and federal governments. Jean Lesage 
presented his “theory of provincial needs” in 1960 in which he reiterated many of the 
Tremblay Commission’s conclusions on the need for provincial autonomy. His theory 
called for the federal government to cede taxation powers to provincial governments to give 
them the resources to fulfil their constitutional responsibilities (Morin, 1994: 156-7).
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Although the federal government did not entertain this demand for constitutional change, 
the federal Liberal party campaigned in 1963 in favour of “opting out”, or “contracting 
out”. These were arrangements whereby a province that withdrew from shared-cost 
programmes would be provided financial or fiscal compensation in order to establish a 
comparable programme of its own (Smiley, 1970: 72-3).
Once the Pearson government was in power, opting-out was a major topic of 
discussion at the federal-provincial conference in March 1964. The opportunity to opt-out 
was made available to all provinces. But in 1965 only Quebec availed itself of the 
opportunity to withdraw from four shared-cost programmes in exchange for tax 
abatements. The Established Programmes (Interim Arrangements) Act of 1965 transferred 
twenty tax points to Quebec for a trial period of five years, after which the arrangement was 
supposed to be made permanent. In exchange, the provincial programmes were subject to 
verification by Ottawa (Vaillancourt, 1992). Similar agreements were concluded over 
student loans and youth allowance programmes. Pensions are another policy area in which 
opting out was permitted. The constitution defines pensions as a joint competence. When 
the federal government announced its plan to create a national pension scheme in 1964, 
Quebec countered with its own plan. Since Quebec threatened to veto the constitutional 
amendment which was required to implement the federal programme, bilateral negotiations 
were held to broker a compromise. The compromise — the right to opt-out of the federal 
programme — was again made available to all provinces but only Quebec went ahead and 
created its own pension regime. The agreement was hailed as a success for both parties: 
Lesage claimed he was able to obtain recognition of Quebec’s special status while Pearson 
was congratulated for brokering a successful resolution to the confrontation with Quebec 
(McRoberts, 1997: 42).
Opting-out creates de facto asymmetry in the delivery of policy but not necessarily in 
its elaboration. This contrasts with the experience in Russia, where the intergovernmental 
treaties and agreements tended to devolve full competence over policy-making and 
implementation to federal subjects and negate a priority-setting or monitoring role for the 
federal authorities. Moreover, since many of the treaties and agreements were secret and 
signed with an exclusive group of regions, the practice appeared to subvert rather than 
stabilise Russia’s division of powers. Indeed, Putin’s federal reforms, and especially the 
Kozak reform bills sought to restore the federal government’s control capacity. Even in 
competences which the Russian centre devolved to the regions, it retains the power to 
sanction leaders for failing to carry out policy or using the funds for other purposes. In 
Canada, Pearson did not consider the asymmetries created by opting-out to be destabilising. 
The power was available to all provinces, thus did not consecrate any de jure constitutional
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asymmetries. Moreover, the practice was deemed an appropriate response to Quebec’s
claims for jurisdiction:
“We might make provision for Quebec to develop de facto jurisdiction in certain areas where 
she desired it most. Although the federal government had to retain intact certain essential 
powers, there were many other functions o f  government exercised by Ottawa which could 
be left to the provinces. By forcing a centralism perhaps acceptable to some provinces but 
not to Quebec, and by insisting that Quebec must be like the others, we could destroy 
Canada. This became my doctrine o f  federalism. I wanted to decentralize up to a point as 
the way to strengthen, indeed to establish and maintain, unity” (Pearson, 1975: 239).
For Lesage, opting-out was a pragmatic solution to jurisdictional disputes: “Quebec wishes
to point out that particular status is not necessarily an objective in itself. Initially, it may very
well be the result of an administrative development and, subsequently, a constitutional one
that, while applicable in principle to the other provinces, in practice would be of interest
only to Quebec for reasons of its own” (Lesage, 1965: 4). For Claude Morin, a minister in
the Lesage government who would later join the PQ, the cooperative federalism of the
1960s was win-win for both Quebec and Ottawa. Although Quebec did not conquer new
constitutional territory it halted the federal government from occupying provincial
competences (Morin, 1976 [1972]: 9). While bilateral treaties in Russia played a similar role
and were hailed as means by which Russia’s federal subjects could implement policy which
was more closely tailored to their regional needs, opting-out as a practice more closely
resembles the proposals made by Shaimiev in his 2002 Concept o f federal reforms. Rather
than view federal legislation in areas of joint jurisdiction as automatically supreme, Shaimiev
calls for a greater regional role in implementing policy, the general principles of which
would still be established by Moscow. Similar to opting-out, the arrangement would be
available to regions that desired increased autonomy, and probably lead to a degree of de
facto asymmetry in the delivery of policy.
Com peting Claims, Com peting Federal D esign
Opting-out went a long way to address Lesage’s and Quebec Liberals’ demands. His 
successor, Daniel Johnson, sought to entrench Quebec’s specificity and Canada’s linguistic 
and cultural dualism in the constitution. In other words, in addition to the powers Lesage 
claimed, Johnson wanted Quebec’s distinctiveness reflected in the constitution. Power plus 
recognition became the leitmotiv of the province’s demands vis-a-vis the central 
government: “ ... if in a ten-partner Canada Quebec is a province like the others, the 
situation is different in a two-partner Canada. As the homeland and mainstay of French 
Canada, Quebec must assume responsibilities which are peculiar to her; and it goes without 
saying that her powers must be proportionate to her responsibilities” (Johnson, 1968: 53- 
71). Johnson shows a keen understanding of the challenges of multinationalism: “What is
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possible and desirable in a bi-national country is not national unity [...] but national union, 
national harmony, based on the respect of legitimate particularisms” (Johnson, 1990 [1965]: 
92).
Pearson was conscious that the underlying constitutional questions, particularly 
regarding the recognition of Quebec, would need to be addressed eventually. “I believe that 
particular provisions for Quebec, as well as for other provinces where required to ensure 
the fulfilment of particular needs, can be recognized and secured in the constitution without 
destroying the essential unity of our Confederation” (Speech quoted in McRoberts, 1997: 
45). However, a change of leadership in Ottawa in 1968 as well successive changes of 
leadership in Quebec modified the status quo and brought the Pearsonian practice of 
negotiated federalism to and end. Many of Pearson’s colleagues within the federal Cabinet 
opposed his approach to Quebec and use of opting-out as an accommodation mechanism. 
The Minister of Finance, Mitchell Sharpe and Pierre Trudeau, who succeeded Pearson as 
Prime Minister in 1968 had objected to opting-out since 1963. For Trudeau, too much 
decentralisation led down the slippery slope to separation. Opting-out placed certain 
provinces on a different foot in relation to Ottawa. Trudeau felt, in contrast, that federalism 
could not work unless the provinces “are in basically the same relation toward the central 
government” (Quoted in Simeon, 1972: 68). Moreover, he believed that by giving additional 
powers and resources to Quebec only bolstered its administrative capacity and legitimacy to 
demand even more power. In other words, Pearson’s practice of de facto asymmetrical 
federalism perpetuated the paradox of multinational federalism evoked in Chapter 2, which 
led the possibility of increased conflict and a dilution of the bond of citizenship: “ ... when a 
tightly-knit minority within a state begins to define itself forcefully and consistently as a 
nation, it is triggering a mechanism which will tend to propel it towards full statehood” 
(Trudeau, 1968: 188). Consequently, the interim arrangements which were agreed upon in 
1965 were never made permanent. Instead, they were renewed on a yearly basis until 1977, 
when the federal government abolished some of the programmes from which Quebec had 
opted out. To this day, however, Quebec has retained five tax points which were devolved 
by the 1965 arrangement (Vaillancourt, 1992: 350-1).
For Trudeau, ensuring a strong and united federal state and maintaining the 
essential link of Canadian citizenship throughout the country were seen as means to counter 
the rise of nationalism and separatism in Quebec. The contrast between Trudeau’s vision of 
the way to foster Quebec’s belonging is diametrically opposed to those that emerged from 
the B&B and Pepin-Robarts Commissions.
One way o f  offsetting the appeal o f  separatism is by investing tremendous amounts o f  time,
energy, and money in nationalism, at the federal level. A national image must be created that
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will have such an appeal as to make any image o f  a separatist group unattractive. Resources 
must be diverted into such things as national flags, anthems, education, arts councils, 
broadcasting corporations, film boards; the territory must be bound together by a network 
o f  railways, highways, airlines; the national culture and the national economy must be 
protected by taxes and tariffs; ownership o f resources and industry by nationals must be 
made a matter o f  policy. In short, the whole o f  the citizenry must be made to feel that it is 
only within the framework o f  the federal state that their language, culture, institutions, 
sacred traditions, and standard o f  living can be protected from external attack and internal 
strife. (Trudeau, 1968: 193)
In Quebec, where the federal spending power was already a source of resentment, 
Trudeau’s proposals to use the powers and competences of the federal government to instil 
a strong sense of national unity could not but provoke resentment among nationalists. 
Trudeau’s concern with restoring the primacy of the federal state and of a strong state-wide 
identity resonates with some of the decisions taken by Putin since 2000. Many of Putin’s 
federal reforms stem from the belief that Yeltsin’s practice of asymmetrical federalism had 
weakened the integrity of the state and reduced the visibility and importance of state-wide 
institutions. In addition to the reforms I examined in Chapter 4, Putin made symbolic 
gestures, such as reviving the Soviet-era anthem, and ensuring the Russian flag was flown 
on federal buildings and visible in Tatarstan’s court rooms. Reforms that reasserted the 
central place of the federal constitution were aimed at restoring “country’s unity de jure and 
de facto” (Putin, 2003).
In Canada, Trudeau’s vision of a strong and united Canada emphasised the 
differences between the federal and provincial governments. Increasingly, both tiers of 
government would represent competing conceptions of federal design. These competing 
visions were particularly prominent in negotiations on constitutional reform. From 1968 to 
1971, multilateral federal-provincial negotiations were held on constitutional reform. 
Gordon Robertson, Clerk of the Privy Council at the time, emphasises the importance of 
Trudeau’s role. “From the time he accepted the inevitability of pursuing the problem 
[constitutional reform], Trudeau realized that if he was to succeed, it could only be with an 
agenda laid down by the federal government and relentlessly pressed by him personally” 
(Robertson, 2000: 269). Provincial elections in Quebec in 1970 brought Robert Bourassa, 
leader of the Quebec Liberal Party and federalist, to the negotiating table. He was, a priori, 
amenable to constitutional reform. Bourassa was convinced “Federalism constitutes the 
best means for Quebecois to meet their economic, social and cultural objectives. [...] The 
government endeavours to reinforce Canadian federalism” (Bourassa, 1971: 2738-9).
The negotiations on the constitutional amendment package, also called Victoria 
Charter, produced consensus on an amendment formula which would have conferred a de
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facto constitutional veto to Quebec over future constitutional change.1 However, Quebec’s 
inability to secure a provision to constitutionalise the practice of opting-out was one factor 
which led to its refusal to approve the Victoria Charter. Quebec proposed that a new article 
be included in the constitution (94A) to make provincial law in social policy paramount. In 
other words, the federal government would have to consult provincial governments before 
it created a shared-cost programme. Moreover, the provision guaranteed a right to 
withdrawal from any federal programme in an area of provincial jurisdiction with a right to 
fiscal compensation in order to carry out its own programme. Robertson relates that 
Quebec’s demands, coming at the end years of multilateral and bilateral discussions shocked 
the other participants (Robertson, 2000: 283). Although the accord failed, it established one 
element of Quebec’s long-standing constitutional claims for jurisdiction, namely a 
constitutional right to withdraw with compensation from federal programmes.
The failure of the Victoria Charter put Trudeau’s plans for constitutional reform on 
hold. Meanwhile in Quebec, the rise of the popularity of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) and the 
evolution of nationalist sentiment, among federalists as well, led to a hardening of the 
constitutional claims. Bourassa demanded that any future attempts at constitutional change 
take account of Quebec’s distinctiveness: “Quebec will seek to obtain recognition by the 
rest of Canada of its particular responsibility with regard to ensuring the permanence and 
development of the French culture. Quebec cannot abandon this responsibility to others 
and must obtain the constitutional guarantees which it requires” (Bourassa, 1975: 1).
Constitutional Change in Canada
The election of the PQ in 1976 introduced a new dimension to the accommodation 
of Quebec’s demands. For the PQ, Ottawa’s promise of “renewed federalism” was illusory. 
Instead, Quebec must act on its own to propose a new arrangement with Canada: 
sovereignty-association. Its manifesto, The New Quebec-Canada Agreement: the Government of 
Quebec's Proposal for an Agreement as Equals: Sovereignty-Association (Quebec, 1980), consists of 
both a description of Quebec’s place in the Canadian federation and an assessment of 
Canada’s failure to recognise Quebec’s specificity and grant it the policy competences it 
desired.
Although certain federal laws attempted rather late to develop bilingualism within central 
institutions, it shows that francophones were never considered, in Canada, as forming a 
society with a history, culture and its own aspirations. They constituted at most an 
important linguistic minority, without collective rights or particular powers necessarily 
called, as it was long believed in English Canada, to blend into the Canadian whole (Quebec,
1980: 12).
1 The amendment formula in the Victoria Charter required the consent o f  Ontario, Quebec, and at least two 
Atlantic and two Western provinces in order to make any subsequent changes to the constitution.
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Besides its failure to recognise Quebec as constituting a people worthy of constitutional 
recognition, the federal government jeopardised Quebec’s autonomy: “the central 
government is increasingly able to play a role which should normally belong to the 
Government of Quebec, the only which truly belongs to the Quebecois nation” (Quebec, 
1980: 24). Just as Tatarstan sought in its 1992 referendum to entrench the basis of its 
confederal relationship with Russia and the legitimacy of bottom-up delegation of 
competences, sovereignty-association in Quebec was proposed as a means for Quebec to 
secure exclusive competence in taxation, international relations, etc. and delegate other 
competences to the federal level. Having set out its vision of Quebec and Canada, the PQ 
asked the electorate to give it a mandate to negotiate an agreement of sovereignty- 
association with Canada.2
The Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ) countered the PQ ’s project with its own 
manifesto: A. New Canadian Federation (PLQ, 1980). The Liberals offered a more positive 
vision which did not reduce the Canadian federal experience to a series of “failures, retreats, 
defeats, threats and dangers” but remained optimistic that “the Canadian federal framework 
offers Quebec two chief assets: the possibility to flourish freely [...] within the Quebec 
territory and also to participate, without renouncing its identity, to the advantages and 
challenges of a larger and richer society” (PLQ, 1980: 10). PLQ Leader Claude Ryan argued 
that a reformed federal framework could recognise Quebec’s specificity and provide the 
means necessary to ensure Quebec’s protection and development. While he agreed with 
Trudeau on the need for a charter of rights, he claimed decentralisation of power and 
constitutional affirmation of dualism were required (PLQ, 1980: 22). Both Quebec parties 
advocated the need for constitutional change in Canada, and for recognition of the 
province’s status. In Quebec, sovereignty-association was rejected by the same margin as 
Tatarstan’s electorate approved sovereignty in 1992: 60/40.
Tatarstan’s referendum campaign was accompanied by federal threats, the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling which pre-emptively struck down its status claims, and 
ongoing back-room negotiations with Moscow on intergovernmental agreements. During 
Quebec’s referendum, Trudeau committed that he would undertake substantive reforms of 
the Canadian constitution in the event of a No vote but remained coy as to the concrete 
measures he had in mind (McRoberts, 1997: 158-9). Following the referendum, increasingly
2 The 1980 referendum question: “The Government o f  Quebec has made public its proposals to negotiate a 
new agreement with the rest o f  Canada, based on the equality o f  nations; this agreement would enable Quebec 
to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad — in other words, 
sovereignty — and at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common 
currency; no change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be effected without approval by 
the people through another referendum; on these terms do you give the Government o f  Quebec the mandate 
to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?”
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dismayed at the lack of progress in multilateral negotiations with the provinces, Trudeau
proposed the federal government would undertake unilateral reforms to the constitution.
Dubbed the People’s package, the proposal “was deliberately designed to appeal to Canadians
from all regions of the country directly over the heads of recalcitrant premiers who had
vetoed constitutional renewal [...]” (Behiels, 2004: 64).
Since the 1867 constitution contained no amendment procedure, several provinces
including Quebec challenged the federal government’s proposals to amend it unilaterally.
The provinces argued a constitutional convention existed that required provincial consent
for constitutional change. The Supreme Court of Canada found that a constitutional
convention did indeed exist:
A  substantial degree o f  provincial consent — to be determined by the politicians and not the 
courts — was conventionally required for the amendment o f  the Canadian Constitution. The 
convention existed because the federal principle could not be reconciled with a state o f  
affairs where the federal authorities could unilaterally modify provincial legislative powers 
(SCC, 1981).
In line with its view of Confederation as a compact, Quebec argued that unanimous 
provincial consent was required to amend the constitution. The Court refused to recognise 
that the convention required unanimous consent, leaving it up to political actors to best 
determine what degree of consensus was required: “Conventions by their nature develop in 
the political field and it will be for the political actors, not this Court, to determine the 
degree of provincial consent required” (SCC, 1981). The ruling illustrates that there was no 
existing institutional or constitutional constraint on the ethnic or linguistic majority’s ability 
to overrule the minority in Canada. Moreover, the Supreme Court buried any legal basis for 
Quebec’s interpretation of constitution as a compact. Similarly, Russia’s Constitutional 
Court 1992 ruling struck down Tatarstan’s status claims adopted on the basis on Soviet-era 
laws. These rulings provided confirmation that Quebec’s and Tatarstan’s claims for special 
status rely not on legal but political justifications.
Following the Court’s ruling, Trudeau and all ten premiers met in Ottawa in 
November 1981 to negotiate a constitutional amendment package. A coalition of eight 
provinces including Quebec issued two demands. First, they sought an amendment 
procedure requiring consent of two-thirds of provinces representing 50 per cent of the total 
population (the “7/50 rule”). Second, the bloc of eight wanted to entrench the right to opt- 
out of shared-cost programmes with compensation. Moreover, the coalition opposed 
Trudeau’s idea of submitting the final package to a state-wide referendum. During the 
negotiations, Levesque reneged on his commitment to other provincial leaders that a 
referendum should not be held and abandoned his province’s longstanding claim for a 
constitutional veto (McRoberts, 1997: 165). This led to the dissolution of the coalition, and
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an all-night negotiation session during which Trudeau and all premiers except Levesque 
approved the deal which became the Constitution Act, 1982.
The Constitution Act patriated the constitution and made Canada (rather than 
Westminster) responsible for any future amendments. The document’s main innovations 
with regard to Canada’s constitutional framework are: the entrenchment of an amendment 
procedure (s.38§l) and of equalisation payments (part III), recognition of Canada’s 
multicultural heritage (s.27) and Aboriginal treaty rights (part II). By far the most significant 
change to the constitution is the inclusion of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
Charter establishes a series of guarantees of individual rights, mobility rights, and 
entrenches pan-Canadian bilingualism and individual official minority language education 
rights (ss.16-23, see next chapter). A provision included at the last minute at the premiers’ 
insistence is the notwithstanding clause, which empowers provincial legislatures to suspend 
the application of sections 2 and 7-15 of the Charter. For observers, the constitutional 
changes implanted “a new conception of the Canadian political community and of the role 
the federal government should play as a ‘national government’, the government of all 
Canadians” (McRoberts quoted in Cairns, 1992: 54). Indeed, the 1982 constitution 
embodies two competing conceptions of Canada as a political community: Canada as a 
federal state emphasising the importance of shared but separate jurisdictions and provincial 
identities, and the Charter which defines Canadians as a united community of equal rights- 
bearers (Cairns, 1992: 197-9). Kymlicka considers that through the Charter English- 
Canadians “adopted a form of pan-Canadian nationalism which emphasises the role of the 
federal government as the embodiment and defender of their national identity” (Kymlicka, 
1998: 166). The Charter’s emphasis on individual rights further challenges the standing of 
Quebec’s government as the legitimate representative of the interests of Quebecois.
The Government of Quebec refused to assent to the constitutional changes. It 
appealed to the Supreme Court that the changes were unconstitutional since they had been 
made over Quebec’s express objections. However, the Court rebuffed its claim, maintaining 
constitutional convention required only “substantial provincial consent” (SCC, 1982). 
Quebec was thus subjected to a constitution which its government had not approved. 
Political leaders of all parties considered the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982 without 
Quebec’s approval as a betrayal of the federal pact. For Oliver, in choosing to stick to the 
minimal ‘substantial consent’ instead of securing Quebec’s approval, the federal government 
chose “legality over legitimacy” (Oliver, 1999: 66). As a result, Laforest contends the 1982 
setdement marred the legitimacy of Canada’s institutions, something periodically 
emphasised by the National Assembly and Quebec Government (Laforest, 1995: 44). For 
instance, on the Charter’s twentieth anniversary, the National Assembly resolved on 17
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April 2002 “that it never adhered to the Constitution Act, 1982 the consequence of which 
was to diminish the powers and rights of Quebec without [its] consent [...] and remains 
unacceptable for Quebec” (Quebec, 2002).
In Tatarstan, the 1993 constitution, and importantly the failure to secure Tatarstan’s 
demands and consent, was similarly criticised. The “illegitimacy” of the federal constitution 
became a basis for republican elites’ decision to adopt unconstitutional legislation. In 
Quebec, although leaders did not flout the new rules, the National Assembly invoked the 
notwithstanding clause in all provincial legislation until 1986 to signal its discontent. While 
in Russia the 1994 bilateral treaty was quickly adopted to bridge the constitutional conflict, a 
solution was not so forthcoming in the case of Quebec, although another change of 
leadership in Ottawa and Quebec City created the context for an attempt at bridging the 
constitutional divide.
Attempts to Bridge the Constitutional Divide
In 1984, Brian Mulroney’s federal Progressive Conservatives campaigned on a 
platform to mend the constitutional rift, and consequently swept 80 per cent of seats in 
Quebec. Levesque and Mulroney opened a dialogue on the means to secure Quebec’s 
adherence to the 1982 constitution based on a number of provincial demands including a 
constitutional veto, modification of the division of competences, and importantly, the 
entrenchment in the constitution of Quebec’s national specificity (Quebec, 1985). When the 
PQ was defeated at the polls in 1985, Robert Bourassa’s PLQ continued the dialogue but 
with one major caveat: “recognition of Quebec’s specificity is a prerequisite to any 
negotiation on Quebec’s adherence to the Constitution Act, 1982” (Remillard, 1986: 8). The 
federal government’s caveat was for Quebec to cease invoking the notwithstanding clause in 
provincial legislation. At a conference on renewed partnership between Quebec and 
Canada, Quebec’s Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Gil Remillard enumerated five 
conditions for securing Quebec’s assent to the 1982 constitution: explicit recognition of 
Quebec as a distinct society; enhanced powers in immigration; a limit on the federal 
spending power; a constitutional veto; and participation of Quebec in the nomination of 
Supreme Court judges (Remillard, 1986; 1987). These demands, made by a federalist PLQ 
government, were less radical than the conditions proposed earlier by the PQ. Indeed, 
Levesque had asked for a fundamental reorganisation of the division of powers and that 
Quebec receive exclusive power over language policy, which would have required amending 
s.23 of the Charter and effectively taking aim at one of the key achievements of the 1982 
reforms (Quebec, 1985: 17-20, 26-30). Bourassa’s Liberals, instead, reasserted Quebec’s 
traditional demands. First, a commitment by the federal government that it would restrain
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its use of the spending power, or provide the means for Quebec to opt-out of national 
programmes. Second, Quebec sought to supplement the 1982 constitution with a clause 
recognising the dualism of the Canadian federation and Quebec’s distinct status.
These demands constituted the basis of a constitutional amendment package 
negotiated and agreed upon by federal and provincial leaders in a closed-door multilateral 
process. Dubbed the Meech Lake Accord, its architects believed it would remedy the 
‘betrayal’ of 1982. As constitutionalist Peter Hogg writes, “The Constitution A.ct, 1982 failed 
to accomplish one of the goals of the constitutional discussions that had followed the 
Quebec referendum, and that was the better accommodation of Quebec within the 
Canadian federation” (Hogg, 1988: 3). The Meech Lake Accord addressed Quebec’s five 
conditions. The constitution would be augmented by an interpretive clause, whereby the 
“Constitution of Canada [would] be interpreted in a manner consistent with the recognition 
that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society”. On immigration, the federal 
government committed to incorporate the principles of the Quebec-Canada Cullen-Couture 
Agreement (which I examine below), and extend a right to all provinces to conclude 
bilateral agreements on immigration with Ottawa. Regarding the nomination of the 
Supreme Court, under the Accord the federal government would nominate candidates 
based on provincial recommendations. On the spending power, Meech contained a 
guarantee that “reasonable compensation” would be available to any province that opted 
out of national shared-cost programmes within areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction as 
long it implemented a similar programme.
Although the premiers agreed to the Meech Lake Accord, it required unanimous 
ratification by all legislatures by June 1990. In the meantime, several signatories had been 
replaced, and many groups, notably Aboriginal and women’s groups, protesting the lack of 
public participation in the process, mobilised against the Accord. Meech, although drafted 
with Quebec’s demands in mind, was careful to offer all provinces the right to exercise the 
same powers. However, the asymmetry inherent in the distinct society clause was 
vehemently criticised. Constitutional experts were adamant that the clause would have no 
impact on the division of powers, and since it did not provide concrete definition of the 
term “distinct society”, it would “be relevant only where other constitutional provisions are 
unclear or ambiguous and where reference to the ideas of linguistic duality or distinct 
society would help to clarify the meaning” (Hogg, 1988: 12). Pierre Trudeau emerged from 
retirement to criticise the provision: “No one is special. All Canadians are equal, and that 
equality flows from the Charter” (Trudeau, 1988a: 34). For him, enshrining dualism was 
tantamount to dividing the Canadian people (Trudeau, 1988b: 45-6). But most important 
for Trudeau was the vision the Meech Lake Accord enshrined:
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.. .when we talk about a distinct society, and particularly when we enshrine that into the 
Constitution as an operative clause, we are, by definition, by the actual meaning o f  the 
terms, working towards or promoting a provincialist view o f  Canada. N ot national 
patriotism [...]. I think that if  we have a federal and not a confederal country, we have to 
have a national government, a national parliament that will speak out for all Canadians 
(Trudeau, 1988a: 32).
Trudeau’s interventions, coupled with the mobilisation of many groups who feared the
recognition of Quebec’s duality might unduly affect equality rights and multiculturalism, had
made the Accord unpopular by 1990. The failure of the Manitoba and Newfoundland
legislatures to ratify the Accord before the deadline consecrated its demise. The failure of
Meech, on the eve of Saint-Jean Baptiste Day in 1990, was greeted as yet another failure to
respond to Quebec’s aspirations and the perpetuation of 1982’s betrayal. This failure
prompted several federal Tory MPs to defect and found a nationalist political party, the Bloc
Quebecois, within the federal parliament.
Failure notwithstanding, the constitutional front continued to be characterised by
frenetic activity between 1990 and 1992. Four commissions — two in Quebec, two on the
federal level — worked to find a way to solve Canada’s constitutional imbroglio. In Quebec,
the Constitutional Committee of the PLQ published A  Quebec Free to Choose (the Allaire
report) in January 1991 which reiterated the view of Confederation as a “solemn pact” and
the persistent importance of recognising Canada’s dualism. Thus, notwithstanding the legal
rejection of Confederation as a pact, its symbolic and political value remained intact. The
Belanger-Campeau Commission, whose recommendations were endorsed by the Bourassa
government, laid the blame for the crisis squarely on the 1982 constitution.
The Constitution Act, 1982 and the principles it enshrines have indeed engendered a hitherto 
unknown political cohesiveness in Canada. It helped bolster certain political visions o f  the 
federation and the perception o f  a national Canadian identity which are hard to reconcile 
with the effective recognition and expression o f Quebec’s distinct identity (Quebec, 1991:
33).
The fact the Charter enshrines the principle of equality — of individual rights and of 
provinces — makes it increasingly difficult to conceive how Quebec will be able to obtain 
constitutional recognition of its claims for status and jurisdiction without offending the 
values of symmetry and equality. Indeed, “the vision of an exclusive national Canadian 
identity emphasises the centralisation of powers and the existence of a strong “national” 
government. This vision [...] based on the equality of individuals limits Quebec’s ability to 
be a different society” (Quebec, 1991: 36). The Commission recommended the government 
call a referendum on Quebec’s constitutional future following an eighteen months-long 
period of reflection to consider the available options.
Faced with a potential Quebec referendum, the federal government engaged in its 
own attempts to find solutions to the constitutional crisis. Contrary to past constitutional 
conferences which were mainly intergovernmental affairs, the Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s
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Future cast a wider net and solicited input from public organisations and individuals. The
testimony received by the Forum confirmed the resistance outside Quebec to entrenching
any mention of Quebec’s specificity, as witnesses feared it would thus obtain privileges
unavailable to other provinces (Canada, 1991: Part II, §4). Based on these findings, the
government formed the Beaudoin-Dobbie Commission to make proposals for
constitutional changes, which formed the basis of the Charlottetown Accord (Canada,
1992). The Charlottetown Accord proposed changes to Canada’s federal institutions
(moving toward an elected upper chamber and more provincial input on the selection of
Supreme Court justices). Its key provision, however, was the so-called Canada clause. The
Canada clause was an interpretative section which distilled the essence of the Canadian
character, including recognition of Quebec as a distinct society within Canada, as well as the
values of diversity, egalitarianism, etc. Contrary to the clause on distinct society in the
Meech Lake Accord, the Canada clause was not aimed exclusively at recognising Quebec’s
dualism, but defined Quebec’s distinctiveness as a characteristic, among others, of Canada.
All government leaders, including Quebec’s, approved the Charlottetown Accord. But 54
per cent of the electorate rejected it in a state-wide referendum. The failure of
Charlottetown also brought an end to multilateral attempts to amend the constitution.
After its electoral victory in 1995, the Parti Quebecois implemented its key
platform, a referendum on the sovereignty of Quebec. The PQ ’s and Premier Jacques
Parizeau’s vision was embodied in Bill 1, A d  Respecting the Future of Quebec, or Sovereignty Bill.
The preamble clearly expresses the level of discontent:
We entered the federation on the faith o f  a promise o f equality in a shared undertaking and 
o f  respect for our authority in certain matters that to us are vital. But what was to follow did 
not live up to those early hopes. The Canadian State contravened the federative pact by 
invading in a thousand ways areas in which we are autonomous, and by serving notice that 
our secular belief in the equality o f  the partners was an illusion.
The Bill authorises the National Assembly to proclaim Quebec’s sovereignty, after an offer
of “economic and political partnership” was made to Canada (s.l). The bill provided a one-
year timeframe to negotiate such a partnership. The PQ secured the agreement of the
federal Bloc Quebecois and Quebec’s third party Action democratique du Quebec (ADQ) to
campaign jointly in favour of the project.3 The campaign was waged on the practical
consequences of the vote. While proponents of Bill 1 argued that under a new partnership,
Quebec could keep the Canadian currency and access to the Canadian economic space,
Ottawa countered that secession was the real issue. In a televised address, federal Prime
Minister Jean Chretien sought to clarify the stakes of the vote: “Hidden behind a murky
3 The question put to the electorate: “D o you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a 
formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope o f  the bill respecting the 
future o f  Quebec and o f  the agreement signed on June 12, 1995, Yes or No?” The bill is the Sovereignty Bill 
and the agreement mentioned is the one between PQ, BQ and ADQ.
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question is a very clear option. It is the separation of Quebec. A Quebec that would no 
longer be part of Canada” (25 October 1995). On October 30, the referendum failed by the 
slimmest of margins: 50.58 per cent voted no, a margin of 1.16 per cent, or 54,288 votes. 
The PQ remained in government until 2002. It is Quebec’s main opposition party and 
remains committed to promoting and acceding to sovereignty once it is returned to power 
(PQ, 2001).
In these preceding sections, I have illustrated the failures of securing constitutional
consensus. What lessons can be drawn from these various attempts? As Smiley writes, “The
stability of political systems is overwhelmingly a matter of the relation between internal
conflicts of these systems and their institutional capacity to give authoritative resolution to
such conflicts” (Smiley, 1971: 328). The nature of Canada’s constitutional disagreement is
twofold. First it concerns the nature of the federal bargain and Quebec’s place in the
Canadian federation. Second, Quebec challenges the constitutional division of powers, the
federal government’s increased fiscal capacities and what it perceives as federal interferences
within provincial prerogatives.
Although the underlying constitutional conflict remains unaddressed, one important
characteristic of the constitutional politics in Canada is that elites have continued to engage
each other. It constitutes an ongoing process of negotiation and mediation. During the early
1990s, constitutional conflict in Tatarstan led to political crisis, including unilateral
declarations of sovereignty, the seizures of constitutional jurisdiction and competence and
refusals to heed court rulings. Constitutional disagreement in Quebec has not created the
same degree of institutional disruption. Constitutional disagreement and ongoing
discussions on means to bridge the disagreement have become one among many
characteristics of the politics of Quebec and Canada, as Banting and Simeon illustrate:
Lack o f  consensus makes constitutional change necessary. The same lack o f  consensus 
makes constitutional change particularly difficult... Because the constitution lacked 
consensus, it had to be debated. But the same lack o f  consensus made it impossible to agree 
on a new one (Banting and Simeon, 1985: 25).
Canada’s constitutional politics are marked, as I have examined, by elites and leaders,
electoral and political uncertainty and the competitive relationships between governments
that advocate different, sometimes contradictory visions of the political community and
federal design. The failure to address Quebec’s demands in the constitutions builds a degree
of instability and uneasiness into politics. The threat of Quebec sovereignty remains present
but unrealised. In Tatarstan, by contrast, although the bilateral treaty did not solve the
underlying constitutional conflict, it infused a comparatively more important degree of
constitutional stability. By confirming the republic’s status of “united with Russia”, the
treaty provided symbolic recognition, and importantly, minimised the persistence of the
133
Chapter 6. Federal Design in Canada and Accommodating Quebec
disagreement regarding Tatarstan’s status. A significant difference in Tatarstan, however, is 
the absence of a persistent sovereignty movement. The continuity of elites and absence of 
political competition, factors which I examine in more detail in Chapter 8, increase the 
stability of the bilateral relationship.
In Russia, as I examined in Chapter 4, there is more uncertainty regarding the 
federal division of competences and Tatarstan’s autonomy. As I outlined, Tatarstan’s 
bilateral power-sharing agreements have faded into the background, with Tatarstan 
increasingly subject to the division of powers of the 1993 constitution. In Quebec, although 
demands for constitutional protection of provincial jurisdiction have failed, Canada’s federal 
design has proven flexible to provide the basis and means for ongoing intergovernmental 
negotiation to address the province’s claims.
Intergovernmental Negotiations and Accommodation
One recurrent characteristic of federal-provincial politics in Canada is the 
importance of intergovernmental relations. The government of Quebec, especially after the 
Quiet Revolution, assumed a role as catalyst of social and political change, but also as 
protector of Quebec’s cultural and linguistic specificity. Provincial governments are the 
main representative of provincial interests in Canada’s federal system, and the federal 
government’s primary interlocutors. The governmentalisation of federal-regional 
interactions has led to an increase of what Simeon calls “political federalism” and to the 
appearance of an array of institutions and practices to support these processes (Simeon, 
1972: 38; 2002: 15). Intergovernmentalism is the hallmark feature of Canadian federalism, 
and the principal way in which policy is made and delivered in the system.
The existence of various forums of intergovernmental mediation ensures a 
modicum of intergovernmental communication and cooperation even during period of 
acute political tension. In the second section of this chapter, I examined the practice of 
opting-out which was implemented in the 1960s. Although Pierre Trudeau was critical of 
the effects of opting-out, intergovernmental agreements have remained a key mechanism 
for the accommodation of Quebec’s demands. Power over immigration is one such case, 
where agreements were reached at several moments (in 1971, 1975, 1978 and 1991). Each 
subsequent accord reinforced the dynamic of cooperation and granted Quebec more 
competences and resources. Immigration is defined as a joint power where federal law is 
paramount (s.95). It is similar to the powers which Russia’s constitution defines as joint. 
The manner in which Quebec’s immigration accords have been concluded provide an 
interesting parallel with the kind of power-sharing agreement Tatarstan claims is possible
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under Russia’s constitution, and the kind of approach Shaimiev has repeatedly stated is 
required in Russia.
The initial agreement was signed in 1971. The luing-Cloutier Agreement authorised 
Quebec to station an immigration officer within Canadian immigration offices overseas to 
provide information to prospective immigrants about working and living conditions in 
Quebec. The agreement clearly states, however, that Quebec would have no power over the 
recruitment of immigrants bound for Quebec (Canada-Quebec, 1971). The Minister of 
Manpower and Immigration, Otto Lang, pointed out that the powers obtained by Quebec 
were available to any other province who requested them (House of Commons Debates, 
19.5.1971: 5960). The 1975 Agreement broadened the scope of bilateral cooperation, 
particularly to secure the immigration to Canada of a greater number of French-speakers. It 
is the federal minister of Immigration, Robert Andras, who wrote to his Quebec 
counterpart to express concern about the downward trends of francophone immigration to 
Canada (LD, 5.28.1974). Signed in 1975, the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement sought to 
“encourage immigration to Quebec of French-speaking or potentially French-speaking 
immigrants who have the ability to integrate rapidly and successfully into both Quebec 
society and Canadian society” (Canada-Quebec, 1975: preamble). The Accord required that 
Quebec immigration officials be consulted on applications for immigration to Quebec 
(art.6). The accord was criticised not so much for the de facto asymmetry in created in favour 
of Quebec, but for the possibility it provided Quebec to “discriminate” against non­
francophone immigrants (G&M, 20.10.1975; Gazette, 24.10.1975).
As I examined above, the period following the PQ ’s election in 1976 was 
characterised by increased federal-provincial tension. This notwithstanding, the 
governments of Quebec and Canada signed the Cullen-Couture Agreement in 1978 which 
established an unprecedented degree of power-sharing on immigration. This agreement 
enlarged Quebec’s prerogatives: not only was it consulted regarding immigration to Quebec, 
but it obtained the right to establish its own selection criteria based on the province’s 
demographic, socio-cultural and labour market needs and conditions. The accord sought to 
give power to Quebec to select immigrants that “contribute to [its] social and cultural 
enrichment, taking into account its specifically French character” (Canada-Quebec, 1978: 
preamble). Cullen-Couture instituted a federal-provincial committee responsible for joint 
setting of immigration levels in accordance with Quebec’s needs. Again in 1978, Ottawa was 
careful to underline that the asymmetry created was de facto only and not limited to Quebec: 
“ .. .every concession and every agreement we have reached with the province of Quebec is 
available to each of the provinces of Canada. [...] Some are not interested in getting into the 
selection criteria at this time” (House of Commons Debates, 21.2.1978: 3061). For
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McWhinney, the agreement is a testament of the resilience of Canada’s federal design and to 
the effectiveness of the negotiating teams: the “agreement was no doubt facilitated by the 
relative low public profiles and low-key personalities of the two ministers concerned, who 
concentrated on their technical responsibilities” (McWhinney, 1979: 109). Quebec’s 
minister of Immigration reported at the time that the agreement was the best Quebec could 
achieve: only sovereignty would give the province more power in this field (G&M, 
21.2.1978).
The failed Meech Lake Accord would have entrenched the provisions of the Cullen- 
Couture agreement in the constitution. Ottawa and Quebec agreed in 1991 to sign a new 
agreement “in order to provide Quebec with new means to preserve its demographic 
importance in Canada, and to ensure the integration of immigrants in Quebec in a manner 
that respects the distinct identity of Quebec” (Canada-Quebec, 1991: preamble). The 
Canada-Quebec Accord provides Quebec with exclusive competence over the selection, 
reception and integration of independent immigrants (Canada retains competence over 
refugees and other categories). Under the accord, Canada withdraws from the provision of 
linguistic and cultural integration services and instead compensates the Government of 
Quebec for providing them. In line with previous agreements, a joint committee was 
created to oversee the implementation of the accord and, importantly, discuss and set 
immigration levels. Although an amendment procedure was included, the agreement has no 
termination clause. Contrary to the Cullen-Couture agreement, the 1991 intergovernmental 
agreement remains in force until both parties consent to change or rescind it.
For federal Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall, greater autonomy for Quebec 
was a way to respond to Quebec’s cultural specificity: “both governments are convinced 
about the indisputable contribution that immigrants make to Canada’s French-language 
culture which is centered in Quebec. Their integration is fundamental, and we are aware of 
how vitally important it is to assuring the broader objectives” (McDougall, 1991: 1). The 
agreement is a win-win for Ottawa and Quebec, as it addresses Quebec’s “legitimate needs” 
while protecting the overall coherence of federal immigration policy (McDougall, 1991: 2). 
For Quebec’s Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, the accord was in line with Quebec’s 
view of federalism (G&M, 6.2.1991). Quebec’s new jurisdiction over language training and 
settlement for immigrants (and the 32 per cent of federal funding consented to Quebec to 
carry out these programmes) are a “recognition of Quebec’s distinct society and Quebec 
reality” (Gazette, 9.2.1991) and evidence that Canada’s federal system can and does succeed 
in recognising Quebec’s interests (McRoberts, 1993: 295). The agreement on immigration 
was designated as an example of constructive federalism:
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The current system is not perfect, but it is full o f  possibilities. We have only to take a close 
look at those possibilities to discover that there are ways o f adapting, updating and renewing 
our policies. Through administrative agreements o f  various kinds, like the one we are 
signing today, our current federal system can continue to serve Canadians well, in all regions 
o f  this country, and help them fulfil their fair and just aspirations (McDougall, 1991: 4).
However, other provincial leaders resented even these de facto asymmetries. Alberta Premier
Ralph Klein stated clearly “We feel, and have felt for a long time, that it’s inherendy unfair
that Quebec is the only province that has control over immigration” (CP, 5.9.1995).
Whereas Quebec received twelve per cent of Canada’s immigrants, it received 37 per cent of
federal funds for resetdement (G&M, 10.11.1995). In response to the claims Quebec’s
agreement was unfair, bilateral accords on immigration have been reached with all
provinces, on matters such as selection, setdement, etc.4
The intergovernmental agreements on immigration are important for two reasons.
First, they confer a degree de facto recognition of Quebec’s specificity. Although it is
insufficient to bridge the constitutional conflict, it is an example of the flexibility inherent in
Canada’s federal design to take the province’s needs into account. Second, they point to
ongoing processes of accommodation, illustrating the role of elites and the importance of
their willingness to negotiate. There is no constitutional obligation for the federal
government to accommodate Quebec’s demands for greater influence on the immigration
process. Since federal law is supreme in immigration, the federal government could just as
well legislate on its own. In Russia, in all areas of joint control federal law is supreme, yet
the constitution provides similar means and mechanisms to allow for joint approaches the
policy, such as the agreements in Quebec on immigration.
Immigration is only one example. Hundreds of administrative accords and
agreements were signed between Ottawa and Quebec during the 1990s. Many of these
agreements are the result of inter-departmental and inter-ministerial negotiations and
discussions (many of these on routine matters: information sharing, agriculture, minority-
language education) (List obtained by author of intergovernmental accords, 1990-2003).
The structures and institutions of federalism broker cooperation on ongoing policy
initiatives. A deal on healthcare reached between the federal and provincial governments in
September 2004 included a special side-deal for Quebec. A first in this kind of multilateral
agreement, Quebec Premier Jean Charest welcomed the deal as a victory for Quebec and
turning a new page in history (LD, 18.9.2004). For Prime Minister Paul Martin, the
protection of Quebec’s jurisdiction in healthcare is “very important to Quebec [...] and that
was reflected in [the] agreement” (G&M, 17.9.2004). Significant in this deal is the fact that
all federal party leaders supported asymmetry for Quebec, and provincial premiers, although
4 All the federal-provincial agreements are available on Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s website: 
http://w w w .cic.gc.ca/english/policy/fedprov.html
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they expressed some concern, did not object to the special provisions afforded to that 
province (LD, 18.9.2004). The significance was not lost on federal Minister Pierre 
Pettigrew: “I am pleased that the term asymmetric federalism, which has worried so many 
people for so long, can be implemented after many years of work, and that we can talk 
about a reality which is necessary for Quebec” (LD, 17.9.2004).
An additional example of policy cooperation is a recent accord on parental leave, 
reached in March 2005. The accord comes at the end of an eight-year long struggle, 
negotiations and court rulings. Quebec’s National Assembly unanimously adopted Law 140 
in 2001 creating a parental leave programme which is more generous than its federal 
counterpart. The Quebec Court of Appeals issued a reference in January 2004 which found 
that the sections of Canada’s Employment Insurance Act that establish benefits for parental 
leave are beyond the federal government’s jurisdiction (Quebec (A-G) v Canada (A-G), 
2004). But as it was a Reference, the Quebec Court did not invalidate the federal law. 
Although the federal government appealed the ruling, which was heard by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in January 2005, Ottawa and Quebec reached an agreement which allows 
both programmes to coexist. The federal government liberated fiscal space (worth $750M) 
to allow Quebec to manage part of the employment insurance contributions of Quebec 
citi2ens in order to establish its parental leave programme (LD, 1.3.2005). For federal 
Minister Jean Lapierre, this asymmetric agreement underlines “the flexibility of federalism 
[...] and is an example of federalism at work” (LD, 2.3.2005). BQ leader Gilles Duceppe 
countered, however, by discrediting such a claim: “We cannot pretend there is asymmetry in 
a field of competence which belongs to Quebec” (LD, 2.3.2005). Although it will be 
interesting to see how the Supreme Court interprets the jurisdictional issue, the delegation 
of powers demonstrates the ability and commitment of political leaders to reach 
compromise and agree on differentiated approaches to shared policy objectives.
However, as Duceppe’s statement illustrates, the limits of intergovernmentalism are 
clear. Since they only address Quebec’s demands de facto, the underlying constitutional 
conflicts are not resolved. It appears unlikely, however, that political leaders in Canada will 
agree to entrench asymmetries or recognition for Quebec de jure. The Calgary Declaration, 
signed by all provincial premiers except Quebec in 1997 recognised the “unique character of 
Quebec society” (s.5), but stressed that all citizens and all provinces of Canada were equal 
however diverse in their characteristics (ss.1-2). The declaration establishes what will most 
likely govern provinces’ approach to any changes to the constitutional division of powers 
for the foreseeable future: “If any future constitutional amendment confers powers on one 
province, these powers must be available to all provinces” (s.6). Moreover, asymmetry for 
Quebec, even if only de facto and available to all provinces, remains a controversial
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mechanism. Former Saskatchewan Premier Roy Romanow argues that the asymmetry 
institutionalised in the healthcare accords “breaks the country” (LP, 17.9.2004). Public 
opinion remains critical of asymmetry for Quebec, even when it is clear that special 
provisions are available to all provinces (Seidle and Bishop, 2005: 2).
The process which led to the adoption of the Social Union Framework Agreement 
(SUFA) illustrates another limit of intergovernmentalism. As a means to accommodate 
multinationalism, de facto processes depend on leaders’ ability and willingness to continue to 
respond to Quebec’s demands. When it was signed in 1999, federal and provincial leaders 
hailed SUFA as the advent of an era of “cooperative federalism”. Indeed, the Agreement 
provides for increased consultation and coordination of social policy. Regarding the federal 
spending power, under SUFA the federal government agrees to consult provincial 
governments on new Canada-wide programmes or initiatives within provincial jurisdiction, 
and obtain the consent of a majority of provincial governments before the programme is 
implemented (s.5). Quebec refused to sign the Agreement, arguing it further muddied the 
constitutional division of powers and would have further institutionalised the central 
government’s spending power. The inability to guarantee Quebec’s autonomy in areas of 
social policy creates what Noel calls “federalism with a footnote”: federal-provincial 
protocols and agreements are signed but with a footnote indicating that Quebec “shares the 
same policy concerns” but “does not intend to adhere to the federal-provincial” approach 
(Noel, 2000: 4). Quebec’s withdrawal creates a form of de facto asymmetry, but as Noel 
points out, “it is not a form of asymmetry that responds to Quebec’s demands for 
recognition and autonomy. On the contrary, this new brand of federalism changes the rules 
of the game without the consent of the Quebec government, it reinforces the federal 
spending power, and it contributes to advance a new pan-Canadian vision of social policy 
that will affect Quebec, with or without its approval” (Noel, 2000: 17). Although Quebec’s 
refusal is unlikely to lead to its exclusion of future initiatives or funding, it is an indication of 
the persistence of the underlying constitutional conflict: “It is obvious that a Social Union 
which does not take account of Quebec’s vision of Canadian federalism will aggravate the 
problem. There is a parallel with the entrenchment in 1982 of a Charter of individual rights, 
based on values which are shared between Quebecois and other Canadians but which 
separated them because Quebec’s specificity and consent were ignored” (Dufour, 1998: 10).
Conclusion
In Quebec, not only nationalist parties push for increased recognition and 
jurisdiction. Indeed, such demands have been voice by governments of all stripes. In its 
2001 policy platform, Quebec Liberals offered electors a vision of Quebec within Canada.
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Although the PLQ is ready to continue to pursue ad hoc and intergovernmental negotiations, 
considering it “fruitful avenue of accommodation”, it calls for constitutional recognition of 
Quebec’s specificity and the need to address these long-standing issues (Pelletier, 2001: 63). 
Quebec’s leaders continue to call for two things: constitutional recognition and better 
respect of the federal principle and of provincial jurisdictions. Stability of the constitutional 
conflict is a function of which parties are in power in Quebec and Ottawa, the nature of the 
political and issues under consideration at any given time, and importantly, on each side’s 
general willingness to accommodate each other’s demands. McWhinney considered the 
Cullen-Couture Agreement as heralding perhaps an effective model of federal-regional relations:
This mode o f  federal problem-solving through administrative arrangement between the two 
levels o f  government through direct negotiation remains, however, one o f  the m ost hopeful 
approaches to constitutional change. [...] Pending some break in the longstanding impasse 
over amendment machinery to the federal constitution, this is the best solution possible.
Any fundamental constitutional changes depend on the existence o f  a prior national 
consensus. In the meantime, we have a pragmatic, gradualist approach to constitutional 
change through the development o f  special administrative glosses upon the original 
constitutional charter — an imaginative and constructive arrangement, building ultimately on  
the idea o f  federal comity (McWhinney, 1979: 109).
The persistence and unsetded nature of the constitutional issue has led, in effect to the
development of intergovernmental modes of accommodation. As I have shown the
effectiveness of these forms of accommodation rests on actors’ ability to continue to
engage with one another. For Webber, this demonstrates that “constitutions are not meant
to resolve all our conflicts” but “merely suggest a framework through which we can wrestle
with them through time” (Webber, 1994: 29). The ongoing constitutional disagreement, and
the fact that political actors and parties in Quebec and Canada have an interest in
continuing to raise these issues ensures that Quebec’s claims, and the constitutional conflict,
remains at the forefront of politics. One point of difference with Tatarstan is the
democratic backdrop against which Quebec’s demands are articulated and responded to.
Political competition is a process whereby the claims of Quebec’s leaders are debated,
aggregated and represented in the provincial and federal political arenas. This remains
underdeveloped in Russia, where negotiation o f Tatarstan’s claims has further undermined
the development of a similar democratic backdrop, due to the executive focus of elite
relations and the consolidation of the federal and republican leadership.
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Some people look upon language conflicts with 
cynicism, if  not indifference, as if  these were yet 
another episode o f  the great Canadian drama 
(Coulombe, 1995).
The French language needs Quebec 
independence as much as a fish needs a bicycle 
(Jacques Henripin, 2000).
The centrality of language as a political and national concern makes it interesting in
the context of the present study. It provides a good case to examine the proposal that
implementing a regime of collective rights is a means of solving a stateness dilemma.
Language was an important element o f Tatarstan’s nationalist revival and of its claims for
differentiated status. It is a crucial component of national identity in Quebec. A key
difference between the cases is the extent to which language, territory and community are
linked in the province, as former Premier Rene Levesque explains:
Essentially, language makes Quebec the only Canadian province [...] which is radically (in 
the proper sense o f  the word) different from the rest o f  Canada. It makes Quebec the centre 
and homeland o f  a compact cultural group, deeply rooted and rapidly evolving [...] which 
sees itself as a national group. Democratic control over provincial institutions in Quebec 
provide the Quebecois people a powerful platform for its collective affirmation and self- 
determination (Quoted in Chevrier, 1997: 18).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent of Quebec’s legislative autonomy over
language policy in the context of its ongoing claims for recognition and jurisdiction. Similar
to my examination of Tatarstan, this chapter focuses on the extent to which federal design
in Canada provides autonomy to implement and manage language policy. Both federal and
provincial governments pursue separate language policies. Quebec seeks to protect and
foster the existence of a French-language society whereas Canada’s approach is based on its
objective to create a bilingual state and the protection of the country’s language minority
communities. This provides a glimpse into the nature of federal-provincial relations in this
area and the means to gauge whether language is an area of federal-provincial conflict or
accommodation.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I provide a brief historical overview before 
examining Quebec’s language laws and policies in greater detail. I then consider the federal 
government’s language legislation and court rulings on Quebec language law. These provide 
a particularly useful glimpse of the limits of Quebec’s legislative autonomy in the field of 
language policy. I conclude with an assessment of Quebec’s language claims and the extent 
to which the province possesses sufficient autonomy to carry out its policy objectives.
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Historical overview
Language is considered by many commentators, including Supreme Court Justice 
Michel Bastarache to be “a dominant theme in Canadian political history” (Bastarache, 
1986: 32). Until 1867, however, language policy in Canada vacillated between attempts to 
assimilate French speakers and de facto toleration of the language. The 1763 Royal 
Proclamation created the Province of Quebec but limited French civil and criminal law and 
sought to prevent Roman Catholics (mostly francophones) from participating in 
government or the civil service. After Quebec’s British governors urged London to change 
the situation, the Quebec Act, 1774 re-established civil law in Quebec and eliminated the 
Test Oath. Although language was not an explicit provision of the Act, in practice laws 
were enacted in both languages and bilingualism practiced in the courts (Bastarache, 2004b: 
23). When the Constitutional Act of 1791 partitioned the Province of Quebec into Lower 
Canada (today’s Quebec, population 140,000 francophones and 100,000 anglophones) and 
Upper Canada (population 10,000, mostly anglophones), each territory obtained its own 
legislative institutions. Procedural bilingualism was preserved in Lower Canada. In Upper 
Canada, English remained the normal language of proceedings until it was made official in 
1839 (Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972).
Following the 1837 rebellions in the Canadas, the Durham report of 1839 identified 
the existence of linguistic and ethnic differences as a source of enduring conflict in the 
colony and recommended political union of both Canadas and rapid assimilation of French 
Canadians as the solution. The union of both provinces would ensure the demographic 
preponderance of anglophones, and following the wisdom of the time, it was expected “that 
the French, when once placed, by the legitimate course of events and the working of natural 
causes, in a minority, would abandon their vain hopes of nationality” (Lord Durham’s 
Report). The Union Act, 1840 implemented Durham’s recommendation and declared 
English to be the sole language of Canada (article 41). Nevertheless, de facto bilingualism was 
reintroduced in the legislature in 1841, and article 41 was abrogated by Westminster in 1848.
The British North America Act 1867 provides constitutional recognition, albeit of a 
limited nature, of language rights. Section 133 establishes official bilingualism in the 
legislative and judicial institutions of the federal government and Quebec. This is the sole 
reference to language competence in the constitution, as neither sections 92 (division of 
powers) or 93 (education) mention language. Compared to Russia, where a constitutional 
asymmetry was established to allow republics to exercise competence over language, 
language is not formally assigned to a specific order of government in Canada. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court o f Canada has affirmed that either level of government is free to legislate on
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language within their respective jurisdictions (Leckey and Didier, 2004: 525). Within the 
federal government, this minimal official bilingualism would remain largely unchanged until 
the federal government adopted its Official Languages Act in 1969.
In Quebec, language stayed at the margin of politics until the 1960s. Except for two 
laws1, the provincial government did not legislate on language issues. One major reason for 
government’s inaction is that the Church was the main provider of education and health 
services. Language remained intimately linked to religion, with French declared to be 
guardian of faith. In its report on the division of powers and the malaise of Canadian 
federalism, the Tremblay Commission viewed Quebec as a national homeland (foyer national) 
and the political centre of the French Canadian civilisation but did not address the place of 
language or language planning (Quebec, 1956; Bouthillier, 1981). Increasingly, however, the 
endemic weakness of French in the workplace and industry in Quebec called into question 
the reliance on the Clergy as the main protector of the language (Bouthillier and Meynaud, 
1972: 41).
The Quiet Revolution and the rise of Quebec’s demands for increased recognition 
and power within Canada also provoked reflection on the place of language in Quebec 
society. In Tatarstan as well, discussion of political status brought a discussion of the role 
and place of Tatar. As part of Jean Lesage’s project to make Quebecois maitres che% nous, the 
provincial government adopted a more assertive role in the planning and protection of 
culture. One aspect of this project was to orient Quebec as the homeland of Quebecois, 
rather than French Canadian, culture. Consequendy, the government took over many of the 
tasks which had hitherto been accomplished by the Church. A Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
was created in 1961, a Ministry of Education in 1964. The Office de la langue franffise (OLF) 
was founded in 1961 and made responsible for monitoring and enriching the quality of the 
French language in Quebec. While the OLF was initially created to oversee the quality of 
French, it increasingly adopted more assertive stances, calling on government to the adopt 
measures to counter the prominence of English within Quebec’s public service and ensure 
immigrants to Quebec were better integrated into French culture. Guy Cholette, former 
director of the OLF, remarks these demands point to an increasing awareness of the 
linkages between Quebec’s linguistic needs and the political and economic context, and that 
government would need to play a more active role (Cholette, 1993: 25).
The linkage between language and politics, between Quebec’s status and the 
protection of French, is further illustrated in a 1965 White Paper by Cultural Affairs
1 The Lavergne law (1910) required public utilities to provide their customers with information in both 
English and French. The Duplessis government enacted a bill in 1937 (and abrogated it in 1938, following 
public and political pressure) which declared the supremacy o f French versions o f  laws.
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minister Jean Laporte. The policy paper proposed French become the language of thought, 
expression and communication in all activities of the francophone majority (Laporte, 1965; 
Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972). The White Paper saw the government of Quebec as the 
motor of cultural and language policy: “The task of restoration is, in the present, of such 
breadth that it requires the firm and enlightened intervention of the only government in 
which this people [French Canadian] is represented: the Government of Quebec. At stake is 
the preservation [...] of cultural identity, and such a task cannot be undertaken but by the 
government in which the people fully recognises itself — the Government of Quebec” 
(Laporte, 1965: 21-22). Although the White paper was shelved, it illustrates the shift which 
occurred during the Quiet Revolution. In his pamphlet Egalite ou independance, Union nationale 
leader Daniel Johnson proclaimed that Quebec needed to act on the causes of the weakness 
of the French language. “In sum, to make and steer history, economics, politics, all in 
French, that is what I call acting upon the causes; [...] that which can ensure the status of 
the language and give us a Quebec where everyone will speak French” (Johnson, 1990 
[1965]: 11). In the context of nationalist mobilisation and in the midst o f increasing socio­
economic modernisation of the francophone population, a redefinition of Quebec as the 
centre of a national community had occurred. In Tatarstan, language demands figured 
highly in the programmes of nationalist organisations and parties at the end of perestroika, 
when similar pressures to use political power and newfound political status to protect and 
revive the Tatar language.
The newly-created nationalist parties Rassemblementpour I’independance nationale (RIN) 
and Parti Quebecois (PQ) brought the issue of language and political status to the forefront. 
For RIN leader Pierre Bourgault, a transition to radical French unilingualism was the only 
solution to reverse the status quo and remedy the situation in which were “slaves in their 
“own country, forced to learn English to find work (Bourgault, 1966). PQ leader Rene 
Levesque advocated a more moderate path by advocating primacy for French while 
respecting the linguistic rights of Quebec’s anglophones. Most moderate Tatar nationalists, 
such as the TPC, argued in favour of equalising the status of Tatar and Russian, not for the 
primacy of Tatar. In Quebec, a consensus took form at the end of the 1960s on the 
necessity to promote and protect the French language in Quebec, which was intimately 
connected to the expression of a political and societal identity (Bouthillier and Meynaud, 
1972: 42). Language policy would increasingly become the expression and illustration of the 
importance of Quebec as a political and culture centre.
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Im plem enting Language Policy in Quebec
Jean-Jacques Bertrand’s Union nationale government made the first foray into 
language legislation in December 1968. Its hand was forced by a June decision by school 
boards in Saint-Leonard, a Montreal suburb, which forced all immigrants (in this case many 
children of Italian descent) to attend French language schools in order to stem the tendency 
of immigrants to enrol in English-language schools.2 The government overruled the school 
boards with Bill 85 which reinstated parents’ right to choose the language of instruction. 
But the bill was withdrawn in the face of significant opposition by Quebec francophones. 
To mollify increasing opposition, the government created the Commission on the Situation 
of the French Language in Quebec (Gendron Commission) to propose measures to ensure 
the development of French. When riots in Saint-Leonard greeted the beginning of the 1969 
school year, the government responded with Bill 63, the Law to Promote the French Language in 
Quebec. While law did not change the status quo of free choice of the language of instruction, 
it required French be taught in English schools. This, coincidentally, is the approach to 
language education adopted in Tatarstan. In Quebec, however, a regime of bilingualism in 
education was widely condemned as a retrograde measure, stoking the ire of nationalists and 
contributing to the party’s defeat at the polls in 1970 (Gemar, 1983: ch.2).
Gendron Commission
The Gendron Commission’s 15,000-page report concentrated on three issues: the
weakness of French in the workplace, the nature of the constitutional protection of
language rights, and the use of French among Quebec’s minority groups (Quebec, 1972a;
Quebec, 1972b; Quebec, 1972c). A key principle behind the Commission’s
recommendations was the need to affect change on a socio-economic level in order to
redress the place of French. In the workplace, the Commission concluded French was far
from predominant on the Quebec labour market, lacking both status and utility.
French appears useful only to francophones. In Quebec, it is a marginal language since non­
francophones have little need for it and that a good number o f  francophones, in important 
tasks, use English as often and sometimes more than their mother tongue. And this, despite 
the fact that francophones in Quebec, constitute a strong majority o f  workers and o f  the 
population (Quebec, 1972a: 111).
Commissioners assigned the blame directly on the “little enterprise or initiative” shown by
the Quebec government to promote the use of French (Quebec, 1972a: 129).
The second volume, on language rights, considered the options available to the
government should it seek to legislate on the status of the French language. It proposed a
2 The St-Leonard crisis was an example o f some o f  the pressures exerted upon French at time: until the 1960s, 
the population o f  St-Leonard was 99 per cent francophone. In 1967, as a result o f  immigration, francophones 
accounted for 60 per cent o f the population (Plourde, 1988: 11).
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number of options — maintaining the status quo, declaring French the official language, or 
declaring both English and French as national languages. Contrary to Tatarstan, which had 
no legislative authority to even raise the official status of Tatar before the Soviet Union 
passed its language laws in April 1990, the Gendron Commission highlighted that very few 
constitutional limits existed a priori constraining Quebec’s legislative prerogatives. Besides 
the constitutional protection afforded to English within the Quebec legislature and courts 
by s.133 of the federal constitution, the province was otherwise unconstrained. It 
recommended Quebec make French the official language of the province (and grant 
English the status of national language) and establish French as the language of 
communication and of work (Quebec, 1972a: Recommendations 1-10). The report’s third 
volume addressed the need for immigrants to integrate within the French-language 
community, rather than into English-speaking schools and communities. One of the 
measures suggested was the renegotiation of the 1971 federal-provincial treaty on 
immigration to give Quebec greater input into the federal government’s policy-process in 
order to attract greater numbers of francophone immigrants to the province. This was 
achieved with the 1975 and 1978 agreements on immigration. Overall, the Gendron 
Commission provided both the analytical resources and impetus for the government to 
make the next move, and foreshadows the main axes of subsequent language policy: official 
status for French, francisation3 of the workplace, and reforms to language education.
Bill 22
In 1974, Robert Bourassa’s government followed up on many of the Gendron 
Commission’s recommendations by enacting Bill 22, the Law on the Official Language. The law 
proclaimed French as the official language of Quebec (s.l) and the language of public 
administration. Bill 22 responded to the stark assessment of the situation of French in the 
workplace by introducing measures to promote the francisation of businesses. The Regie de 
la langue franpaise was created to oversee the francisation and certification process. Regarding 
the language of instruction, the law required that children demonstrate “sufficient 
knowledge” of English in order to enrol in English-language schools (s.41). It did not, 
however, elaborate on how this criterion should be applied. Instead, the Ministry of 
Education issued a decree a year later to cap the enrolment in English schools (Plourde, 
1988: 17). Bill 22 innovated by raising the status of the French language. However, the law
3 The Grand dictionnaire terminologque defines francisation as the “process which aims at the generalisation o f  
French as language o f  work and o f  communication within public administration and companies”. Online 
source accessed 25 August 2005: http://oqlf.gouv.qc.ca/ressources/gdt.html.
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put an end to the co-equal status of English in the province, which had existed since the 
eighteenth century.4
Nevertheless, the Bill did not satisfy the desires of Quebec nationalists. The 
provisions on francisation were considered too ambiguous: the law did not spell out how 
rigorous the Regie should pursue the process and how to evaluate a firm’s adherence to 
criteria (McRoberts, 1993). As Gemar (1983) points out, Bill 22 is an instrument of language 
promotion, whereas Quebec needed a language policy which would be an instrument of 
social promotion.
The authors o f  Bill 22 did not or were unwilling to understand that is was impossible to 
satisfy both anglophones and francophones... Bill 22 is ambivalent, located between past 
and future, between Bill 63 and Bill 101, between anglophones and francophones. It is at the 
doorstep o f  a societal project, a hope which was not realised (Plourde, 1988: 19).
The PQ criticised the law as not going far enough to raise the status and utility of French. 
For Smith, this meant “the PQ must change its attitude and show real leadership in the 
defence of our linguistic interests” (Smith, 1975: 15).
Bill 101 — Charter of the French Language
Such was the dissatisfaction with bills 22 and 63 that the new PQ government 
mandated Cultural Affairs Minister Camille Laurin in 1976 to undertake a “profound 
revision of the Law on Official languages to give French the place it deserves in Quebec 
society”, and propose policy on the official language, public administration, language of 
work and commerce, advertising and on access to English-language instruction (Quoted in 
Picard, 2003: 241). As a diagnostic of the linguistic situation, Laurin’s White Paper reiterated 
many of the finding of the B&B and Gendron commissions: the number of French- 
speakers was in decline outside Quebec, immigrants to Quebec tended to integrate into 
English-speaking society and the French language lacked utility in the workplace and in 
commerce. “We have let ourselves be convinced that English is the language of the modern 
world, of science and of administration” (Laurin, 1977: 15). Quebec is one province out of 
ten and “French [...] is far from a daily concern in the nine other provinces” (Laurin, 1977: 
12). Within the province, language is a marker of difference which must be protected, and 
consequently its language policy must based on the premise that French in Quebec is not 
only a mode of expression, but a way of life: “It is a matter of protecting the existence of an 
original culture and developing it to its fullness — a mode of being, thinking, writing, 
creating, meeting [...]” (Laurin, 1977: 19). Yet, the White Paper was careful to state that the
4 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau called for a study on the constitutionality o f  Quebec’s law. Eugene Forsey 
challenged Quebec’s decision to grant French a privileged status (LD, 18.7.1974 and 8.9.1874). However the 
government o f  Quebec was wholly within its jurisdiction to adopt these changes.
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promotion of French should not come at the expense of minorities in the province, 
particular its English-language population.
The White Paper proposed the government enact a Charte de la langue franfaise 
{Charter of the French Language, hereafter Charte or CLF) to vigorously assert the place and role 
o f French in Quebec in a less ambiguous manner than existing legislation. Laurin arranged 
for his bill to be the administration’s first, “the first gesture to make since language is the 
very foundation of a people by which it recognises itself and is recognised [...]” (Quoted in 
Plourde, 1988: 23). Once the White Paper was tabled, the draft Bill 1 was ready in six weeks. 
For Laurin, there was no question that language reform was a step toward political 
sovereignty — an act of national self-affirmation and political responsibility. Premier Rene 
Levesque did not share this enthusiasm, considering it a “humiliation” to have to enact a 
language law. He saw it as a prosthesis which only a colonised society needed to adopt 
(Plourde, 1988: 24-5). In contrast, Tatarstan’s language law is far from being seen as a 
humiliation, but rather a confirmation of its status and newfound autonomy to raise the 
status of Tatar and adopt more active measures to protect native language and culture.
There was considerable debate and resistance within the Levesque cabinet on a 
number of Bill l ’s more coercive provisions, particularly concerning the place and rights of 
minorities in the province. The Premier believed French unilingualism in advertising was 
excessive (Laurin, 1999: 93) and rejected the characterisation of French as Quebec’s sole 
official language: “Quebec’s Anglophone minority represents approximately one million 
citizens whom the government must treat in a civilised manner. The government must not 
go to extremes with this bill and must not act as an aggressor vis-a-vis the minority” 
(Quoted in Picard, 2003: 269). The bill limited access to English-language schools to 
children of parents who had received part of their education in English in Quebec. This so- 
called Quebec clause is contrasted to a Canada clause, under which children of parents who 
received part of their education in English in Canada could attend English schools in 
Quebec. Although the final version of the law retained the Quebec clause, Cabinet added a 
provision to authorise reciprocity accords with other provincial governments, which tied the 
right to English-language instruction for citizens of other provinces who moved to Quebec 
to the existence of a similar right to French instruction for that province’s francophone 
minority. For Levesque, this was an acceptable compromise: “I myself would have 
preferred the Canada clause because it respected the flow of internal migrations and 
extended the right to instruction in English to all Canadian children whose parents were 
authentic Anglophones. For want of this, reciprocity, as the word indicates, provides a give- 
and-take approach” (Quoted in Proulx, 1989: 123). The contrast with the Tatarstan’s 
approach to language education is striking since the model adopted in the republic is one of
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free choice, imposing no similar constraints on access to Russian-language instruction for 
either Russians or Tatars.
The Charte was the object of ten Cabinet meetings, province-wide consultations and 
legislative committee hearings. To avoid a drawn-out clause-by-clause approval of all the 
amendments to the original bill, Laurin reintroduced the bill as Bill 101 which was adopted 
in August 1977. F rancis Rocher, one of the Charte’s architects, notes that the law “clearly 
opted for a unilingual French Quebec state” (Rocher, 2002: 22) and constitutes a powerful 
instrument of national self-affirmation (Rocher, 1992b: 166). The preamble states that 
French is a “distinctive language” used by Quebecois to express their identity and should 
therefore become the language of the state, the “normal and usual” language of work, 
instruction, communications, commerce and business in the province. The CLF proclaims 
the official language of Quebec is French (s.l), and that only French is to be used in 
legislative and court proceedings in the province (ss.7-13). The constitutionality of these last 
measures was challenged in Quebec Superior Court.5 Chief Justice Jules Deschenes ruled 
that the constitutional protection afforded to English in Quebec was the result of a joint 
political decision, and to change it required “another decision of the same nature” (QSC, 
1978: 282). The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court o f Canada in 1979 (SCC, 1979), 
and the next day the National Assembly passed Bill 82 to enact English-language versions 
o f laws and reinstate the use of English in the Quebec legislature and courts. As I have 
examined in Chapters 3 and 4, Tatarstan often adopted unconstitutional legislation in order 
to make a wider argument about its status. Camille Laurin stated that the Quebec Cabinet 
was all too aware that these provisions on the use of English were unconstitutional but had 
acted purposefully (Picard, 2003: 265). The measures “protested [...] the injustice of a 
political regime which had imposed this obligation to the province of Quebec only when it 
had provided all other provinces all the means to anglicise its francophone minorities. 
Although invalidated [...], these provisions would find their place in the constitution of a 
sovereign Quebec” (Laurin, 1999: 94).
In education, as mentioned above, the Charte restricted access to English-language 
instruction to children of parents educated in English in Quebec (ch.8). French is a 
mandatory subject in English schools in primary and secondary education.6 The Charte 
creates a right to work in French and prohibits employers from firing employees for
5 The Gendron Commission had considered the constitutionality o f  such a change. While some jurists 
suggested it was within Quebec’s power to modify s.133 as far as it applied to the province, the Commission 
recommended the government respect the constraints o f  s.133 and maintain bilingualism in the legislature and 
courts (Quebec, 1972b).
6 Within French schools, the situation is quite different, and has only recently changed. After 2000, English 
was introduced as a mandatory subject from Grade 5 onwards in French schools. As o f  2005, English is 
taught from Grade 1 (Quebec, 2001a: chap.3, LP 22.3.2005).
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knowing only French (ch.6). Its provisions on francisation are much more coercive than 
those contained in Bill 22. The law requires businesses of more than fifty employees to 
obtain certificates of francisation. Enterprises employing more than 100 employees are 
required to create workplace “francisation committees” of at least six people to devise and 
implement their language plan. This was aimed at increasing workers’ and managers’ 
knowledge of French, ensuring it is used as the main language of communication in the 
workplace. In addition it is a process by which the quality of the terminology employed in 
all manuals, communications etc. can be verified (ch.5). The CLF requires that all 
packaging, instruction manuals, contracts, etc. be published in French. Firms incorporated 
in Quebec are required to have a French name. The law restricts the use of any other 
language in public advertising and signage in the province. Compared to Tatarstan’s law, the 
Charte is far more coercive in its provisions and methods. This is due, partly to the 
constitutional context, which affords Quebec with the jurisdiction to legislate in such 
matters whereas Tatarstan’s legislative competence is more restrained.7
Also different from Tatarstan’s approach are the institutional mechanisms put in 
place by the Charte to oversee its implementation. Although the government decided against 
creating a ministry to manage language policy, a minister is assigned to oversee its 
application, in addition to several additional bodies. The Commission de toponymie, in existence 
since 1911, was retained and is responsible for establishing norms regarding place names 
and geographic terminology. The Office de la langue fran$aise, created in 1961, was made 
responsible for the francisation and certification of Quebec businesses. Bill 101 created the 
Conseil de la langue franfaise to monitor the linguistic situation and advise the minister and the 
Commission de protection de la langue franffise (CPLF) to execute the law. The CPLF, colloquially 
referred to as the ‘language police’, was intended to enforce the law’s provisions on 
advertising and signage and respond to public complaints. The three principal bodies — the 
Office, Conseil and Commission de protection — together play complementary roles: manager, 
counsellor and controller.
The absence of a ministry or overarching coordinating body was considered a 
significant oversight. In a 1986, the government concluded language policy initiatives were 
dispersed and ill-coordinated, increasingly mired in bureaucratic infighting between the 
various bodies. A commission consequently proposed that Quebec’s language bodies be 
consolidated to promote better priority-setting and policy-making (Quebec, 1986: 44). In 
Tatarstan the implementation of the language law was initially overseen by the Cabinet 
Committee on the law on languages, but the myriad of academic, governmental and other
7 Several o f  provisions o f  the Charte, notably on education and advertising were struck down after the 
Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms was adopted. I examine these court cases below.
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bodies responsible for the execution of specific tasks and policies significantly hampered 
coordination. Although the Department on Language was created in 1996, its manager, 
Kim Minnullin, claims the language issues must be given an increased institutional presence, 
similar to the body created in Quebec in 1988 (Interview with Minnullin, 2004b). Indeed, in 
1988 the Secretariat a la politique linguistique (SPL) was created to assist the minister 
responsible for the Charter in her tasks. The Secretariat’s mandate includes overall 
coordination of the implementation of language policy and the coherence of the 
government’s and language bodies’ interventions on language issues, supervision of legal 
challenges and modifications to the law and promotion of Quebec’s language policy abroad 
(SPL, 2001: 9; Interview with Dumas, 2004; SPL, 2004). Jean-Claude Rondeau, appointed to 
head the SPL in 1989, refers to the Secretariat as a “mini-ministry” because of the 
horizontal coordination it accomplishes (LP, 30.3.1989).
The SPL is a small outfit, consisting of the Associate Deputy Minister Guy Dumas, 
Director Jacques Gosselin, four professionals and three support staff. The Secretariat 
establishes the triennial strategic plan, determining the priorities, objectives and 
performance evaluation criteria for all the organisations which implement language policy 
(SPL, 2001; 2005). For Dumas, the fact the Secretariat was maintained by subsequent 
governments demonstrates that leaders, regardless of party affiliation, have reached a 
“common vision of the linguistic question in Quebec” and agree on the benefit of 
coordination (Interview with Dumas, 2004). Further evidence of this consensus was 
provided in August 2004 when Dumas was appointed to the Deputy Ministers’ Forum, a 
coordination body composed of top civil servants which holds biweekly meetings. This 
appointment underlines the need for horizontal coordination of language issues, especially 
since language impacts a large number of Quebec’s laws and vice versa (Interview with 
Dumas, 2004). In addition to these bodies, a permanent inter-ministerial committee on 
language policy convenes on a yearly basis to consider the need for changes to the Charte.
Overall, the law implemented wide-ranging language policy in Quebec. Although 
many provisions were challenged and amended, its objectives remain intact. As I examine in 
the section on assessment, below, it has played an important role in the preservation and 
development of French in the province. Over the years, the Charte has become a powerful 
political symbol and manifestation of Quebec’s identity and distinctiveness. It is, as Rocher 
states, a “sacred cow” (Rocher, 1992b: 106) in Quebec politics, and confirms the 
importance of the government’s role in the preservation and promotion of French. 
Tatarstan’s language law, although it also reflects the importance of the republican 
government’s status and competence over language, has not attracted the same degree of 
public awareness or enthusiasm. In the republic, language policy-making appears to be more
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of a bureaucratic and parliamentary process compared to Quebec, where linguistic issues 
attract wider media attention and public resonance.
Language Law and Policy in Canada
In Russia the federal government’s interventions in language policy are minimal, 
limited essentially to provisions which have established the autonomy of republics to carry 
out their language policies and to measures to protect the status and visibility of Russian 
and enhance the quality of Russian-language education. In Canada, however, the federal 
government has played a more active role in the field of language. It is worthwhile 
remembering that English and French are official languages in Canada. The main axes of 
federal intervention in language are the promotion of official languages and the 
implementation of the language provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The constitution of 1867 created a limited regime of bilingualism within the 
federal parliament and courts. Over the next century, advances in language policy at the 
federal level were piecemeal, confined to increasing the visibility of French on stamps 
(1927), banknotes (1936) and on family allowance cheques (in Quebec in 1945, 1962 in 
other provinces). Simultaneous interpretation was introduced in the House of Commons in 
1957.
As I examined in the last chapter, the rise of concern over the status and utility of 
French in Quebec prompted Pearson’s government create the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The Commission concluded Canada was experiencing a 
profound crisis, especially in relation to the developments in Quebec, where the Quiet 
Revolution was changing views of itself and of its place in the federation. The “equal 
partnership” at the base of the federal system was seen as seriously prejudiced by the lack of 
presence of French within the institutions of the federal government. The commission 
concluded that the endemic weakness of French in the rest of the country and within the 
federal administration prejudiced francophones’ sense of belonging. Thus, raising the status 
and visibility of French within the federal government and in the rest of the country was 
seen as means to address the crisis of federalism and constituted one element of the federal 
government’s strategy to respond to Quebec’s claims for increased recognition (Canada, 
1967).
The federal government responded by adopting the Official Languages Act, 1969 
(OLA). The Act created an obligation for the federal government to provide services and 
communications in both official languages in designated areas. It also created the Office of 
the Commissioner of Official Languages to play the role of ombudsman and linguistic 
auditor of the federal government’s progress and activities in terms of the equality of the
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two official languages (Newman, 2004: 8-9). In addition to increasing the presence of 
French within federal institutions, the B&B Commission recommended that the federal 
government take steps to institute a state-wide system of minority language education. The 
purpose of such a policy was the preservation o f bilingualism, and of minority language 
speakers and communities throughout the country. The Commission suggested a personal 
rather than territorial policy because the former would have served to promote the status 
quo\ providing “recognition of only the majority’s rights and to oppression of the official 
language minorities” and “ [depriving] minority groups en bloc of essential language rights” 
(Canada, 1970: Book 1: 86).
The federal government included this recommendation in its 1969 White Paper on 
the constitution, and sought to include language rights in a proposed Charter of rights. The 
failure of constitutional talks in 1971 meant that the federal government would need to 
secure provincial cooperation in order to implement its minority language programme. 
Since education is a provincial competence, Ottawa reached an agreement with provincial 
leaders in 1970 in order to implement its Bilingualism in Education Programme (BEP). The 
programme was renamed the Official Languages in Education Programme (OLEP) in 1979 
and exists still today (Hayday, 2001). Under this programme, the federal government 
contributes toward the costs of providing official language education (to official language 
minorities) and second-language instruction (for members of the linguistic majority).8 Thus, 
the programme does not affect the provision of French-language instruction in Quebec: in 
Quebec, OLEP assists the government to provide English-language instruction and 
English-language education to francophones. (For more detailed analysis of these 
programmes, see Hayday, 2001; Behiels, 2004; Hayday, Forthcoming 2005). At the time, the 
federal government lacked the specific legislative authority to carry out its policy, relying 
instead on its spending power and the agreement of provincial leaders. The programme was 
not especially controversial in Quebec, however, since it already possessed a well-funded 
system of English-language education (Hayday, Forthcoming 2005). This is a point of 
significant difference with Russia where Tatarstan deplores the lack of assistance by the 
federal government in providing the support, both political and financial, for minority 
language education.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adopted in 1982, significantly 
altered the protection afforded to language rights in Canada. Indeed, its articles 16-23 are a 
departure from the limited language rights regime which existed until then under the 1867 
constitution. The Charter commits the federal government to provide services in both
8 For the period 2003-04, the Department o f  Canadian Heritage disbursed $135.5M and $66.2M respectively 
for these programmes (PCH, 2004a: 28).
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official languages and creates a constitutional obligation to protect minority language 
rights.9 Language rights are conferred the highest degree of constitutional protection since 
they are shielded from recourse to the notwithstanding clause (s.33§l, Bastarache, 2004b: 
7), and modifications to this section of the Charter are subject to unanimous consent of all 
provinces and federal government (s.41). The Charter’s section 23 on minority language 
education rights is probably the most significant provision on language, and a significant 
area of conflict with Quebec. Section 23 requires provincial governments to provide 
minority language education where sufficient demand exists. Access to such minority 
language instruction is guaranteed by the Canada clause — that is, it is available to children 
o f parents educated in the language of the minority anywhere in Canada (s.23§lb). Besides 
establishing a guarantee for provincial language minorities, this section sought to overturn 
the limitation created by Quebec’s language law and the Quebec clause in order to preserve 
freedom of movement in the country. As MacMillan remarks, the framers did not seek to 
completely alienate Quebec since they exempted Quebec from the requirements of s.23§la 
of the Charter, which defines mother tongue as the criterion for access to minority-language 
education (MacMillan, 1998: 80). Presently, the criterion which applies to Quebec is 
Canadian citizenship, which gives Quebec the competence to compel immigrants to attend 
French-language schools (even if these individuals’ mother tongue is English). The 
constitutional asymmetry created in this section has preserved one of the key objectives of 
Quebec’s language policy, namely to ensure that newcomers to the province attend French- 
language schools.
In 1988, the federal government significandy overhauled its Official Languages Act 
to adapt its provisions to this new constitutional framework. Whereas the 1969 version of 
the law was seen as containing mosdy declaratory instruments creating few tangible, 
enforceable obligations, the 1988 version sets out more precise objectives (McRae, 1998: 
79). The OLA carries a much clearer sense of mission — the federal government’s desire to 
protect linguistic duality in Canada, especially its commitment to assisting and developing 
official language minorities (s.2). The law’s operative sections are given quasi-constitutional 
status, trumping any other act of parliament. Furthermore, the law guarantees that 
complaints brought to the attention of the Commissioner on Official Languages obtain 
remedy in federal court.
The 1988 version of the law included two parts which are not subject to court 
remedy, but are statements of government policy. Part VI commits the federal government 
to promote the equitable participation of both language groups in federal institutions. Part
9 Bastarache notes that the courts have yet to rule on the extent to which all these provisions create obligations 
for governments to provide services in the language o f  the minority (Bastarache, 2004b: 26-9).
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VII contains a commitment to enhance the vitality of the English and French minority 
communities, support their development, and foster the full recognition and use of both 
English and French in Canadian society (s.41). As Newman notes, the realisation of these 
commitments depends in large part on securing the cooperation of provincial governments 
(Newman, 2004: 23). The Commissioner of Official Languages has called on Parliament to 
clarify its obligations and the legal scope of Part VII, in essence to make the objective 
legally enforceable (OCOL, 2005: 10-1, Interviews with Tremblay, Boileau et al., 2004). A 
bill tabled by Senator Jean-Robert Gauthier is currendy before the House of Commons’ 
Standing Committee on Official Languages. The proposed amendments to the OLA would 
subject Part VII to court remedy, thus create positive obligations for the federal 
government to promote minority language groups. The issue raises a potentially contentious 
issue for Quebec. Enhancing the role of the federal government in the protection of 
Quebec’s English-language minority — one consequence of the proposed bill — “could be 
seen as interference in Quebec’s competences” (Interview with Sauvageau, 2004). Quebec’s 
objective to develop a French-language society is seen to conflict with the federal 
government’s objective to raise its involvement in the protection of Quebec’s English 
language community. For Benoit Sauvageau, former Bloc Quebecois spokesperson on 
official languages, the Bloc’s desire to preserve the linguistic balance in Quebec has led it, 
paradoxically, to vote against proposals which would strengthen the place and visibility of 
French in the rest of the country. Ideally, the Bloc would like to see a degree of asymmetry 
included in the bill whereby the federal government would play a greater role to protect 
francophones in the rest of Canada but not anglophones in Quebec (Interview with 
Sauvageau, 2004). This is unlikely to happen as it runs counter to thirty years of federal 
language policy. It is an illustration, however, of the type jurisdictional disputes which 
currently exist in the field of language.
The federal government’s activities in language policy are not limited to these 
legislative and constitutional instruments alone. As part of a renewed push to promote the 
vitality of official languages in education, community development and the federal public 
service, the federal government introduced its Action Plan for Official Languages in 2003, with a 
commitment of $751M over five years (Canada, 2003). In addition, the Department of 
Canadian Heritage manages a large number o f programmes and policy initiatives (such as 
the Development of Official-Language Communities Programme, and Enhancement of 
Official Languages Programme) (PCH, 2004a: 28). The federal government provides 
funding to Radio-Canada, the national French-language public broadcaster, supports 
broadcasting and publishing activities in the French language (to develop French-language 
programming and publications, books, magazines, etc) through a variety of different
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departments and agencies (See PCH, 2004b for a breakdown of interdepartmental funding
and programme commitments). In its 2001 constitutional policy, the Liberal Party of
Quebec (PLQ) acknowledges the benefits of the federal government’s activities.
Canadian federalism is also a phenomenal springboard for the French language. We must 
admit that Quebec is not solely responsible for promoting the French Fact in North 
America; federal institutions have played an important role in this area for a long time. 
Organisations such as Radio-Canada, the National Film Board, the Arts Council, Telefilm  
Canada, the national museums and Parks Canada have made an important contribution, in 
their own way, to the preservation and development o f  our collective heritage, and the 
identities o f Canada and Quebec (Pelletier, 2001: 53).
Since Confederation, the federal government’s interventions in the field of language 
policy have grown. From a regime of limited constitutional bilingualism, the adoption of the 
OLA and most importantly the Charter of Rights consecrated a shift toward official 
bilingualism and constitutional protection of Canada’s minority languages. Through these 
constitutional and legislative instruments, the federal government is committed to 
protecting the vitality of Canada’s official languages and their speakers. The measures 
provide a statement of Canada’s vision of itself as a bilingual where both languages are 
worthy of recognition and protection. Through its programming and funding 
commitments, the government promotes French-language culture and make cultural 
products widely available.
Federal and Quebec approaches to language illustrate the competing conceptions of 
the political community they seek to promote. One of the underlying objectives of federal 
language policies is that by facilitating bilingualism and the presence and status of French, it 
may contribute to fostering a greater sense of national unity, perhaps helping to placate 
Quebec’s claims for recognition. In practice, these objectives appear to compete. Quebec’s 
objective to protect its status of a French-language society contrasts with Canada’s objective 
to promote a bilingual state and a sense of national identity which embraces both official 
languages. These competing objectives have led to resistance in Quebec of measures which 
could raise the status of the French language in the rest of the country. Since much of the 
federal government’s activities are centered on the protection of minority language 
communities, its interventions in Quebec are considered as outside interventions and 
demonstrate that “not enough attention is paid to the fact that the federal government can 
intrude on Quebec’s language competences” (Sauvageau, 2003: 73). However, when 
compared to Russia, characterised by far less positive federal support of minority language 
communities, Canada’s actions to promote French outside Quebec increases the availability 
of French-language cultural and information products, of which Quebecois are also 
consumers and beneficiaries. In Russia, support for Tatar language policies, media and 
cultural products are virtually exclusively the responsibility of the republican government.
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Thus, although the legislative approaches of the federal and Quebec governments compete, 
they are nonetheless complimentary in their efforts to protect the French language 
(Interview with Cardinal, 2004).
Court rulings
The courts have played a significant role in mediating Canada’s and Quebec’s 
approaches and interpreting the extent of Quebec’s constitutional autonomy in language 
policy. This role has increased even more since the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was 
enacted. Since then, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has become “the ultimate arbiter 
of the full range of mandated individual and minority rights” (Behiels, 2004: xxvii). The 
legal arena has become the principal forum where Quebec and Canada’s language regimes, 
and by extension their respective visions of community, have collided. In the 1970s, the 
federal government was careful not to attack the Charte directly, preferring instead to 
support groups who challenged its provisions, or by joining actions to argue against (or as 
the case may be, in favour of) Quebec’s language law. I examine several rulings on the law’s 
provisions on education as well as rulings on the provisions on the language of advertising 
and signage.
In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter brought by several Protestant school
boards and citizens of Quebec which challenged the constitutionality o f the “Quebec
clause” in light of s.23 of the Canadian Charter. This case is the clearest example of collision
between federal and provincial language regimes, and between Quebec’s law and a
constitution it did not approve. The Court ruled that
“The framers o f  the Constitution unquestionably intended by s. 23 to establish a general 
regime for the language o f  instruction, not a special regime for Quebec; but in view o f  the 
period when the Charter was enacted, and especially in light o f  the wording o f  s. 23 o f the 
Charter [...], it is apparent that the combined effect o f  the latter two sections [of Quebec’s 
language law] seemed to the framers like an archetype o f  the regimes needing reform [...]”
(SCC, 1984: 79-80).
For the Court, the Charter was intended to place the principles of freedom of movement 
and guarantee of minority language education ahead of Quebec’s desire to integrate 
newcomers to the province into the French-language system of instruction. Although s.23 
created a constitutional asymmetry to permit Quebec to retain a degree of control over 
access to English-language schools, the government protested the imposition by Canada of 
a clause which embodied an ideal of linguistic dualism which Quebec did not recognise. As 
the Minister responsible for the Charte, Claude Ryan, wrote in 1989, “Quebec does not want 
to sacrifice its competence in language to an ideal of Canadian unity which does not 
guarantee the preservation of its own distinct character” (Ryan, 1989: 1-2). Although the 
legitimacy of the constitution was challenged, the Court’s ruling was observed.
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Two rulings were issued in December 1988 on the limits imposed by the Charte on 
advertising and signs. The Government of Quebec argued that the purpose of the CLF — to 
enhance the status of French in Quebec and ensure the province’s French appearance {visage 
linguistique) — compelled it to restrict the use of other languages, and such restrictions were 
justifiable under s.l o f the Canadian Charter’s (LD, 3.12.1988).10 The SCC ruled that the 
provisions of the law were contrary to the guarantee of freedom of expression found in 
both the Quebec and Canadian Charters of rights. However, the Court did not disagree 
with the purpose of Quebec’s legislation, just with the means employed to attain its 
objectives. It ruled there is a “rational connection between protecting the French language 
and assuring that the reality of Quebec society is communicated through the “visage 
linguistique””, but that the limits prescribed were not “necessary for the achievement of the 
legislative purpose or proportionate to it” (SCC, 1988: 718). Since the premise was 
justifiable, the Court suggested that “requiring the predominant display of the French 
language, even its marked predominance, would be proportional to the goal of promoting 
and maintaining a French “visage linguistique” in Quebec and therefore justified under the 
Quebec Charter and the Canadian Charted {Ibid.: 781). Ensuring the predominance of 
French rather than banning other languages was a measure the Court deemed was a 
legitimate means to respect both the legislator’s purpose and citizens’ rights to freedom of 
expression.
The rulings were handed down in an already charged political atmosphere. In April 
1988, 25,000 people marched in support of Bill 101 in the presence of PQ and labour 
leaders and some federal MPs (Gazette, 18.4.1988). Armed with a petition signed by 
101,000 people in support of Quebec’s language law, the president o f the nationalist Societe 
Saint-Jean Baptiste called on the provincial government to protect Bill 101 and invoke the 
notwithstanding clause to exempt the Charte from the Canadian Charter (LD, 18.4.1988). 
Thus, even after the Meech Lake Accord had been signed (although not yet adopted), 
nationalist feeling was high. Quebec nationalists clearly indicated that any decision of the 
Court against the CLF would be seen as illegitimate interference. Consequently, the public 
and political reaction to the ruling was somewhat predictable. Nationalists condemned the 
decision, while Premier Robert Bourassa put on a straight face claiming the ruling 
confirmed the province’s “right to legislate in linguistic matters” (G&M, 16.12.1988). The 
Conseil de la langue fran^aise urged Claude Ryan to take measures to protect the “symbolic 
value” of French-language signage and the message unilingual signs convey, that “only one
10 Section 1 reads: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society”.
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language is official in Quebec— French” (Guy Rivard quoted in LD, 14.12.1988). For Ryan, 
the ruling underlined fundamental differences between Canada’s and Quebec’s language 
policies and that the legitimacy of a ruling by a court on which six justices were not from 
Quebec would not be accepted by the Quebec public (LP, 10.2.2004). This is curious 
language coming from a Quebec federalist, even more curious because the Court had struck 
down the law’s provisions based on articles of Quebec’s own Charter and Rights of 
Freedoms, adopted even before the Charte (Interview with Gosselin, 2004).
Nevertheless, within a week of the ruling, the government enacted Bill 178 to 
suspend its application by invoking the notwithstanding clause regarding the violations of 
freedom of expression. The law, in essence, permitted Quebec to ignore the Court’s ruling. 
Bill 178 maintained the requirement that exterior signs be unilingual. While the law played 
well within Quebec, reaction in the rest of Canada was unanimously negative, largely 
because the use of the notwithstanding clause is viewed as a radical option. Federal Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney condemned the bill and pressed Bourassa to reconsider (LD, 
22.12.1988). Provincial leaders in Western Canada were reported to be relieved: “By passing 
Bill 178, Quebec had rejected bilingualism. In Western Canada, bilingualism is perceived as 
part of a federal effort to placate Quebec, and if Quebec no longer wants it, what point is 
there to it?” (FP, 11.1.1989). In May 1993, the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee 
condemned the bill, finding it contradicted several articles of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Communications nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, 1993). Quebec 
adopted a substantial package of amendments to the Charte in 1993 (Law 86, 1993 LQ 
Ch.40) bringing the law in line with the Court’s 1984 and 1988 rulings. The law incorporates 
the Canada clause and rescinded Bill 178, adopting instead the approach which was 
suggested by the Court: it allowed the use of other languages in public signs and advertising 
as long as French is “clearly predominant”.11
Three long-awaited decisions on provisions regarding access to English-language 
education were handed down in March 2005. Consistent with its 1988 Ford and Devine 
decisions, the Court did not strike down the law but disagreed with the specific mechanisms 
employed to reach its objectives. In Gosselin, the case involved francophone parents’ claims 
to a right to send their children to publicly-funded English language schools. In Quebec, 
this is a right which is guaranteed to the English-language minority. The Court was asked to 
weigh the constitutional right to minority language education (granted in s.23 of the 
Charter) against the right (also guaranteed by the Charter) to equality. The Court disagreed
11 Regulations adopted by the Govemor-in-Council further refine this criterion. French is considered to be 
“clearly predominant” if  the space given to French and the lettering used is at least twice the as large as that o f  
the other languages, and that the sign does not reduce the visual impact o f  the French text (RSQ ch. C -ll ,  
r.10.2).
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with the parents, refusing the argument based on equality and providing a contextual 
reading of the purpose of both s.23 of the Charter and the CLF. “If  adopted, the practical 
effect of the appellants’ equality argument would be to read out of the Constitution the 
carefully crafted compromise contained in s.23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
This is impermissible” (SCC, 2005a: par.2). The constitutional compromise is based on a 
consensus that differentiated treatment is not only legitimate but required in the Canadian 
context:
In the context o f minority language education, equality in substance as opposed to mere 
formal equality may require differential treatment as the Court noted in Arsenault-Cameron v.
Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 31: “Section 23 is premised on the fact that 
substantive equality requires that official language minorities be treated differendy, if  
necessary, according to their particular circumstances and needs, in order to provide them 
with a standard o f  education equivalent to that o f  the official language majority” (SCC,
2005a: par. 15).
Since the appellants were members of the francophone majority in Quebec, the Court ruled 
that their claim to have their children educated in French did not fall within the purpose of 
s.23 of the Charter. The federal government argued in favour of the Charte in this case, as 
the Commissioner for Official Languages, Dyane Adam, explains, “as [members] of the 
majority accede to the schools of the minority, the schools are transformed into immersion 
schools, thus practically cancelling the rights o f the minority to have its own schools” (LD,
1.4.2005). The Court defended Quebec’s legislative authority to impose differentiated 
treatment of its francophone minority, and illustrates another significant difference with 
Tatarstan, where its law does not constrain Tatar-speakers to attend Tatar-language schools. 
Russia’s Constitutional Court has upheld Tatarstan’s requirement to learn both languages, 
but only to the extent it does not discriminate against the use and place of Russian in 
education.
In Solski, the limits on access to English-language schools were challenged not by 
francophones but by immigrants to Quebec and Canadian citizens who had moved to the 
province. The Charte limits access to English schools to children of parents who received 
the “major part” of their education in English in Canada (s.73§2). The Quebec government 
applies a quantitative calculation (time spent in school, for example) to quantify “major 
part”. For instance, Quebec rejected a right to English-language instruction of Anglophone 
children who attended French immersion schools in Ontario on the basis that the “major 
part” of their education had not been in English. The Court found that employing 
quantitative, arithmetic means was too limited and did not accord with the principles 
embodied in s.23 of the Charter (SCC, 2005b: par.33). Although the Court invalidated the 
way in which the language Charter was implemented in practice, it recognised Quebec’s 
jurisdiction in decisions regarding access to English-language schools.
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Since 1988, the Supreme Court’s rulings demonstrate that Quebec is not immune 
from Canada’s constitutional and federal context. Even though the 1982 Charter imposed 
additional requirements, the Court has recognised Quebec’s autonomy and the legitimacy of 
the Charters objectives. Reflecting on the significance of the Ford ruling, Yalden remarks 
“the Court was largely sympathetic to what Bill 101 had set out to achieve, and sought 
simply to refine the means used to achieve its objectives so that they might better conform 
to principles enunciated in its preamble and in Quebec’s Charter” (Yalden, 1989: 983).
A ssessing Q uebec’s Language Policy
Nearly twenty years after the Charte was adopted, the PQ government of Jacques 
Parizeau undertook a major review of the language situation and assessment of the law’s 
successes and failures. Consequendy, an inter-ministerial committee was created by Louise 
Beaudoin, then minister of Culture and responsible for the application of the Charte, in 
September 1995. Its report is the first substantial evaluation of Quebec’s language 
legislation. In Tatarstan, during the discussions on the second State Programme, no similar 
wide-ranging horizontal evaluation of the law’s successes and failures was conducted, due I 
surmise to a lack of administrative and analytical capacity. Indeed, Tatarstan’s State 
Programme for 2004-14 calls for the creation of a research and policy body which would 
more consistently track linguistic developments and the effects of language policy.
Quebec’s inter-ministerial report is unequivocal in its assessment of the effects of 
the Canadian constitutional framework on Quebec’s language policy. Canada’s constitution 
“reduced the latitude available to Quebec to ensure the quality and radiance of the French 
language in Quebec”. The federal OLA and Quebec’s Charte are viewed as dichotomous. 
Their “competing” objectives are “harmful to the realisation of [Quebec’s] objectives”. The 
report, penned under a PQ government in the wake of the 1995 referendum, ties language 
to the province’s status within Canada. “Without constitutional modifications or even 
accession to sovereignty, Quebec will not be master of its language policy” (Quebec, 1996d: 
41-2).
This is a paradoxical statement, since this bleak assessment of Quebec’s legislative 
handicaps does not correspond with the many successes outlined by the inter-ministerial 
report. Many areas identified as problems in the 1972 Gendron Commission report and 
1977 White Paper are viewed as examples of progress (Quebec, 1996d: See section 3). In 
the workplace, francophones occupy the place justified by their demographic proportion. 
The salary disparities between francophones and anglophones have almost completely 
disappeared and there are greater numbers of francophones in management position. Thus, 
the objective of making French the “normal and habitual” language of work was attained,
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with the exception of Montreal where French continues to struggle. The francisation of 
Quebec enterprises and businesses progressed reasonably well. In commerce and service 
industries, services are provided in French (in 95 per cent o f business studied, it was 
possible to obtain service in French) (Quebec, 1996d: 98-100).
In education, almost all immigrants to Quebec attend French-language school, a 
dramatic reversal of the situation prevalent in the 1960s and 70s. Whereas ten percent of 
immigrants to the province attended French schools before the Charte was enacted, 78.5 per 
cent received instructed in French in 2002. 95 per cent of new immigrants enter the French- 
language school system (McAndrew, 2002: 70). It is no surprise, therefore that education is 
considered to be one of the law’s most marked achievements (Bouchard and Bourhis, 2002: 
12-3). Bilingualism has also risen among anglophones and allophones in the province.12 
When compared to the data examined in Chapter 5 regarding the lack of effective 
bilingualism among Tatarstan’s Russians and the virtual absence of Russians (and nearly half 
of the republic’s Tatars) from Tatar-language schools, Quebec’s successes in reversing the 
situation prevalent in the 1960s and 70s appears even more remarkable. The committee 
called for the development of a new indicator to measure language use. Rather than relying 
on categories such as mother tongue or language spoken at home, French as the language 
o f public use {langue d’usage public) is promoted as a better indicator of the use of French in 
the province (Quebec, 1996c: 33, 35). Whereas 83 per cent of Quebecois use French in the 
home, 87 per cent admit to using French as their main language of public use (Oakes, 2004: 
545).13 Such an indicator could provide useful in the case of Tatarstan. The most common 
indicator of language use in the republic is mother tongue/native language, which is 
acknowledged to be a poor indication of actual language competence, let alone language use 
(Gorenburg, 2005: 3).
Finally, the report considers one of the law’s major goals — to provide Quebec and 
Montreal with a predominant French appearance {visage fran$ais) — and concludes it was 
achieved. The desire of francophones to be maitres che% eux and to live their language has 
been most visibly manifested in French-language signage and advertising (Quebec, 1996d: 
93). Many if not most of the Charte’s objectives were attained. The remaining problems and 
obstacles to language policy in Quebec are due less to a constraining Canadian federal 
design than to global and domestic factors. These problems include ensuring the power of 
attraction of French in Montreal and in business, protecting the vitality of French in the
12 In 2001, two-thirds o f  anglophones and almost three-quarters o f  allophones claimed to possess knowledge 
o f  French. Between 1991 and 2001, bilingualism among anglophones rose from 59.4 to 67.2 per cent and 
from 46.6 to 50.5 per cent among allophones (OQLF, 2005: 24-34).
13 Statistician Charles Castonguay argues such an indicator is a red herring. Although it may reveal the use o f  
French, it hides hiding the precariousness o f  the situation o f  the French language, especially in Montreal 
(Castonguay, Dubuc et al., 2002).
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context of globalisation and in Quebec’s increased international and trade interactions as 
well as in information technologies, and ensuring the Government continues to show the 
example as spearhead and motor of language policy in Quebec.
Already in 1985, the president of the Conseil de la langue fran$aise, Michel Plourde, 
warned against relying on the false security provided by the existence of the law (Plourde, 
1985). Although the Charte is the centrepiece of Quebec’s approach, law must be 
complemented by a social and international approach to language policy (Quebec, 1996c: 
11-2). In Tatarstan too, policy-makers have realised the limits of relying too much on a 
legislated approach to promote increased language utility. Effective language policy depends 
on concerted action, the development of more cooperative rather than only coercive 
interventions. The lack of political motivation to carry on with language policy and extend 
its application is a source of ineffectiveness in both Tatarstan and Quebec.
For example, francisation of Quebec businesses is an area in which the inter- 
ministerial committee concluded progress was stalled. Certification is considered overly 
bureaucratic, tending to promote institutional francisation without necessarily reaching the 
rank-and-file. The Committee concluded that it could be re-energised by extending the law 
to include medium-sized businesses (10-49 employees). A tripartite working group 
(including labour, employers and government) was formed to study the proposal but 
concluded that a legal approach was inappropriate. It suggested, instead, that political 
commitment would be more effective than an extension of legal coercion. A clear 
demonstration by government “to show francisation is not a problem, but an asset and 
advantage” was suggested to be a more fruitful approach (Quebec, 1996a: 11). Indeed, the 
cooperative approach appears to have borne fruit. In 2004, the Office quebecois de la langue 
franfaise reported a record certification rate of 76 per cent (OQLF, 2004: 19). Between 1997 
and 2002, the CPLF reported that 92 per cent of violations to the law had been resolved 
without recourse to legal action (of 17,303 complaints handled, 5,277 were withdrawn and 
only 805 handed over to prosecutors) (CPLF, 2002: 13). The majority of public complaints 
received are about the poor quality of written French on or the unavailability of French- 
language versions of consumer products. Therefore, the CPLF adopted a sectoral approach 
and sought to secure the compliance of manufacturers on a cooperative and case-by-case 
basis (CPLF, 2002: 14-5). Thus, although Quebec’s language agencies have at their disposal 
a fairly effective stick, increasingly the carrot of consensus is seen as the preferable means. 
As part of its priority setting exercise for 2005-08, the OQLF intends to resolve 90 per cent 
of violations of the law without recourse to the judicial system (SPL, 2005: 14). Although 
Tatarstan possesses little coercive ability to sanction violations or ensure compliance with its 
law; its policy-makers believe acquiring such coercive capacity would be helpful. In contrast,
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Quebec, where coercive measures and capacity exists, is moving toward concertation and 
cooperation to ensure adherence to the Charte.
The inter-ministerial report was critical of the government’s own language policy: its 
internal policy had not been reviewed since 1977 and the Charte was unevenly applied in 
state bodies. The lack of compliance by the Tatarstan government to its language law and 
programmes is seen as an impediment to the policy’s coherence and credibility. In Quebec, 
the Government Policy on the Use and Quality of French in the A.dministration (Quebec, 1996b), 
adopted in the wake of the inter-ministerial report, subjects state bodies to the same 
requirements as any other large entity in the province. Governmental bodies must ensure 
the laws and regulations which they oversee are in line with the Charte's objectives, undergo 
certification and report on application of language policy in their yearly reports. The Polity 
reiterates that French is the language of administration in Quebec by establishing guidelines 
for the exclusive use of French in the publication of documents and communication with 
the public, governments or corporations in Quebec. (Any correspondence in a language 
other than French is printed on plain paper instead of letterhead, is unsigned and carries the 
mention “Translation”; only the original French document is signed) (Quebec, 1996b: 
s.10).14
Language policy in Quebec possesses the kind of institutional support which
Minnullin has repeatedly stated is needed in Tatarstan (Interview with Minnullin, 2004b).
However, even with a comparatively larger institutional presence and financial support,
Quebec’s inter-ministerial report concluded that government needed to better coordinate its
policy obligations and ensure they are met. Institutional presence and capacity do not
compensate the lack of political commitment or planning.
“All policies adopted by the government must take language policy into account, support 
and confirm it, especially in the areas o f  education [French as mother tongue, second 
language...], o f  immigration and the integration o f  immigrants to a French-language society, 
in social and health services. Similarly, the behaviour the public administration as a whole 
must illustrate, to all citizens, that French is the official language o f  the state” (Quebec,
1996c: 43).
For instance, immigration and integration are areas where the need for coordination is most 
visible. O f the 350,000 residents of Quebec who do not speak French, half are immigrants 
(Quebec, 1998). Forty per cent of immigration to Quebec is a result of criteria established 
by the 1991 Canada-Quebec Accord on immigration. In other words, Quebec has a voice in 
the selection of this category of immigrants. Under the 1991 Accord, integration (including 
French language teaching for new arrivals) is Quebec’s prerogative, providing it the 
opportunity to take steps to ensure immigrants are given opportunities to integrate in
14 Even if  the law mandates French unilingualism in the public service, Gosselin points out that over eighty 
per cent o f  content available on state bodies’ websites is available in English, and in many cases in Spanish 
(Interview with Gosselin, 2004).
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Quebec’s French language culture (Carens, 1995: 27, 29; Symons, 2002: 34-40). However, 
Quebec’s Ministere des Relations avec les citoyens et l\'Immigration noted in 1998 that integration 
programmes and use of funds was not sufficiently-well coordinated, nor did they always 
meet the needs of their clients. Consequendy, the Ministry assumed the coordination o f and 
accountability for integration programmes (Quebec, 1998), many of which have sustained 
budget cuts in recent years. Immigration is an area in which federal-provincial cooperation 
resulted in additional prerogatives for Quebec. Yet, it is not federal intervention which 
handicaps Quebec’s ability to integrate its immigrants, but provincial policy failures and lack 
of integrated approaches and funding.
Four years after the inter-ministerial report, the PQ again launched an assessment of 
the status and future of the French language in Quebec. Whereas the previous effort was 
more policy-based, the Estates-General on the Situation and Future of French in Quebec (also 
known as the Larose Commission), announced in June 2000, adopted a wider approach, 
seeking to place language policy within a political perspective. For Lucien Bouchard, “The 
preservation of French is a victory that took over 300 years, which was hard-won, and 
which is constantly threatened by the ocean that encircles us”, thus conferring a “particular 
duty in Quebec to check and see where we are in terms of the protection o f our language” 
(Gazette, 21.3.2000). PQ militants were critical of the lack of activity of the Parizeau and 
Bouchard governments on language issues. The Larose Commission provided an 
opportunity for public reflection, debate and mobilisation on the law’s successes and 
failures.
The Commission concluded that “enormous progress” has been made in language 
in Quebec but warns nonetheless that progress is not “irreversible” (Quebec, 2001a: 10). 
The socio-economic context in which English is increasingly the lingua franca, stagnation of 
the francisation process and proliferation of bilingual signs are seen to threaten the place of 
French in Quebec. Similar to the findings of the 1996 report, the Commission criticises the 
government of Quebec, among other things, for increasing its offer of bilingual rather than 
unilingual, public services. It concluded the francisation certification process needed to be 
extended to small and medium businesses. Moreover, it required government commit more 
resources to language policy, having found that budget outlays to Quebec’s language bodies 
had fallen (in real terms) from $38M in 1980 to $22M in 2000, and personnel fell from 497 
in 1980-81 to 273 in 2000-01 (Quebec, 2001a: 179). As in the 1996 report, the Larose 
commission argued that the Canadian constitutional context constrains Quebec’s legislative 
prerogatives. Yet many of the obstacles identified — such as the power of attraction of 
English — are related more to the overall context of increased international ties, the
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generalisation of English in processes of economic and cultural globalisation than to 
limitations imposed by the federal constitutional framework.
The Larose Commission issued 149 recommendations, many of which were 
designed to increase governmental coordination, increased teacher training and resources, 
etc. (Quebec, 2001a: 226-49). Regarding the symbolic importance of Quebec’s Charte, the 
commission recommended it be given quasi-constitutional status, to cement the recognition 
of Quebec as a French-language state (chap. 2). In addition, the committee recommended 
the government implement Quebec citizenship to better articulate Quebecois’ attachment 
to common values and institutions in Quebec: citizenship would embody the fact that 
learning French in Quebec is a fundamental right and that for immigrants, arriving in 
Quebec is not the same as arriving in Canada (Chap. 1). More than anything, these measures 
were symbolic.
The Secretariat a la politique linguistique drew up a shortlist of thirty recommendations 
to be considered in greater detail by the government (Interview with Dumas, 2004). The 
more political recommendations, such as Quebec citizenship, were dropped. The changes 
which resulted from the Larose recommendations were institutional in nature. The Conseil de 
protection and Office were amalgamated to increase the coordination and coherence of 
government’s language policy. The body which emerged, Office quebecois de la langue franfaise 
(OQLF), was integrated more closely to the SPL, since the Associate Deputy Minister was 
given permanent representation (LD, 15.5.2002). The OQLF was made responsible for all 
administrative and inspection tasks. Prior to the change, both CPLF and OLF dealt with 
public complaints. While the former responded to complaints (some 3,000 a year) on 
infractions regarding signs, advertising and the quality of French in commercial material, the 
OLF addressed those arising from workplace certification. More importantly, however, the 
reform is an additional sign that the government is committed to cooperative and concerted 
efforts in order to promote compliance with the law. The fact that the CPLF was reviled as 
the “language police” while the OLF accomplished its francisation certification in a more 
consensual and cooperative manner was not lost on policy-makers (Interview with Dumas, 
2004). In Quebec, while many of the law’s coercive aspects are still in place, cooperation 
and consensus are perceived to be more effective to generate compliance, and more 
importantly, maintain consensus on the necessity and legitimacy of the Charters objectives.
In Tatarstan, republican authorities have to resort to cooperation and voluntary 
compliance with its language law because of their lack of legislative and constitutional 
prerogatives to adopt more coercive provisions. However, Quebec possesses comparatively 
more legislative autonomy (over education, for instance) and policy capacity (coercive 
instruments and abilities) than Tatarstan. Paradoxically, while the constraints imposed by
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the Canadian constitution are a persistent complaint in Quebec (in policy reports, and 
academic commentary such as in Gosselin, 2003; Sauvageau, 2003), policy-makers in 
Tatarstan evoke the lack of support of the federal government but rarely complain that its 
legislative autonomy is constrained, even though it possesses comparatively less power in 
the field of language.
Conclusion: Q uebec, Canada and Language Balance
Provincial and federal approaches to language policy embody different conceptions 
of the state and of the political community. But as I have examined in this chapter, the ways 
in which language and language competence have evolved have established certain 
complementarities. The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms has directly collided with 
some provisions of Quebec’s Charte and embody different approaches to language rights — 
Ottawa’s personal language regime versus Quebec’s territorial regime. But overall the 
constitutional framework and judicial rulings tolerate the coexistence of these approaches.
Policy-makers in Quebec, like in Tatarstan, believe that balance over language 
questions has been largely attained in the province. While complaints about constitutional 
constraints are recurrent, Gosselin is more circumspect: “The federal nature of the 
Canadian state imposes certain obligations and limits on Quebec”, but overall the 
constitutional framework is not a hindrance to Quebec’s objectives (Interview with 
Gosselin, 2004). For Supreme Court Justice Michel Bastarache, the Court has affirmed the 
fundamental nature of language rights, and that cases now before the Canadian courts tend 
to seek clarification on the application of language rights rather than challenge the existence 
of the right altogether (Interview with Bastarache, 2004a). The Supreme Court has 
consistently reaffirmed the legitimacy of the Charte's objectives. For Benoit Sauvageau, 
“Quebec does not contest the division of powers over language. We have reached a balance 
on linguistic questions. The Charte is a model which allowed Quebecois to make French 
their official language while protecting linguistic rights of the minority” (Interview with 
Sauvageau, 2004).
PQ militants periodically call for a more coercive application of Quebec’s language 
law (during the hearings of the Estates-General, and most during the PQ’s policy 
convention in June 2005). Yet during the convention, two-thirds of delegates refused to 
approve a more coercive language policy platform. As the PQ MNA Elsie Lefebvre argues, 
“There are other ways of advancing French in Quebec. This is a debate which is ill- 
perceived and our [less coercive] course of action is more positive and more inclusive” (LP,
5.6.2005). Jacques Henripin is convinced Quebec already possesses the competence 
required to successfully carry out its language policy:
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“The French language needs Quebec independence as much as a fish needs a bicycle. This 
well-known slogan applies perfecdy to the linguistic question not only because the pre­
eminence o f  French in Quebec is already assured within the federal framework but because 
the sovereignty project will not increase francophones’ linguistic security” (LP, 19.5.2000).
Indeed, claims that Canada’s constitutional framework is a limit to Quebec’s
language prerogatives do not stand up to the data on the status of the Quebec language. In
its 2004 annual report, the OQLF concludes that the results achieved in language
progression and policy in Quebec, although positive “have not led to the full generalisation
of utilisation of French in Quebec” (OQLF, 2004: xvii). The obstacles to such
generalisation which are commonly offered include: the power of attraction of English,
immigrants (particularly in Montreal) are more likely to use English rather than French,
foreign and economic relations are mainly conducted in English and the language of
information technologies is English. Clearly, the issues related to the general predominance
of English within the context of globalisation are difficult to address by legislative means.
Quebec’s language bodies have concluded as much and their emphasis on sectoral and
cooperative approaches to the enforcement of Quebec’s law demonstrates that the
challenges faced by French require wider, more societal and horizontal approached to
language planning. Success in facing these challenges depends less on Quebec’s status
within Canada than on the way it uses its existing prerogatives to adapt its policy to these
circumstances.
Quebec possesses the constitutional and legislative autonomy required to carry out 
its policy objectives. Like Tatarstan, language policy in the province illustrates the way in 
which federal design, and particularly a regime of collective rights, can assist in the 
accommodation of multinationalism. However, in terms of the theoretical debates 
examined in Chapter 2, the case studies of language policy in Quebec and Tatarstan show 
that devolution or protection of autonomy in a field as central to identity and difference as 
language has not led to the resolution of the stateness dilemma. The paradox is that while 
both Quebec and Tatarstan possess the competence required to put a distinctive stamp on 
their language policies and promote and protect this national specificity, claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction have not abated. Group rights — policy capacity over language — 
though part of a successful strategy for accommodating claims, did not ‘solve’ the stateness 
dilemma in these cases. The persistence of territorial claims highlights the challenges 
inherent in devising means to accommodate the claims of territorialised minorities within 
multinational federations.
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Chapter 8. Comparing Federal Design and the Accommodation of 
Multinationalism
Canada is increasingly becoming an experiment 
in democracy, but is has not ceased to be a federal 
experiment. Federalism is important in Canada 
not only because it accommodates territorial 
particularisms, but also because it protects ways
o f life and expresses a will to live together
(LaSelva, 1996:133).
I have no doubt that unitary tendencies are a 
temporary phenomenon. We must live through 
them. Russia does not have a future without 
federalism (Mintimer Shaimiev during World 
Tatar Congress, 29 August 2002).
The principal assumption made in this thesis is that federal design of an institutional 
framework is only part of an effective political response to multinationalism. Indeed, 
successful accommodation depends on developing a context that is conducive to facilitating 
ongoing adjudication, negotiation and balancing of claims for recognition and jurisdiction.
Looking at the cases of Tatarstan and Quebec, I find that institutional design does indeed
matter in the accommodation of multinationalism. But since disagreement persists on the 
“constitutional rules of the game”, accommodation is facilitated by additional means, 
namely intergovernmental and inter-elite negotiation. Elites play a key role. The stability of 
these mechanisms of intergovernmentalism depends in turn on fostering a degree of 
agreement and trust among elites on the stability of a political system’s institutions such as 
courts, territorial structure and political competition.
The dimensions along which Quebec and Tatarstan are compared in this chapter are 
the following. These cases exhibit similarities in the kind of claims which are advanced. 
Moreover, a common point is the persistence of claims for recognition and jurisdiction. The 
mechanisms employed to accommodate these demands are similar, particularly 
intergovernmental and inter-elite negotiation and a reliance on institutions of inter-state 
federalism. In the field of language, although significant demographic and contextual 
differences exist, Tatarstan and Quebec possess similar degrees of competence and 
autonomy to establish and carry out policy in this area. As I examine below, these cases also 
exhibit several substantial differences, especially regarding the nature of their respective 
political regimes. Quebec is a functioning democracy, where the rules of the political game 
— for instance elections, representation, and the role of the courts — are accepted and 
contribute to structure its relationship with the federal government. Tatarstan’s transition to 
democratic rule is incomplete. Its hybrid regime exhibits characteristics of procedural
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democracy but is marked by a higher degree of constitutional ambivalence illustrated by the
contradictions between the Russian and Tatarstan Constitutional Courts, comparatively less
citizen engagement and involvement in governance and a consolidated political elite.
Simeon (2002: 3) provides a realistic, if contradictory assessment of the capacity of
federalism as a means to providing definitive solutions to managing multinationalism:
[...] there is a profound ambivalence about federalism -  the sense that yes, federalism is an 
effective institutional form for managing territorially based conflicts; but no, it entrenches 
and perpetuates the very conflicts it is designed to alleviate. Yes, in principle federalism 
enhances the quality o f  Canadian democracy — but no, the secrecy o f executive federalism 
produces a democratic deficit. Yes, federalism can contribute to effective, responsive policy­
making, but no, the difficulties o f  divided jurisdiction, and the transaction costs involved in 
coordinating across eleven governments can result in a joint decision trap.
Throughout this chapter, the ambivalence of federalism must be kept in mind, as many 
practices and structures carry both advantages and disadvantages. I begin by contrasting my 
empirical findings and comparing the ways in which Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction have been addressed. I then examine language policy in each 
case to show that, contrary to theoretical expectations, the delegation of collective rights 
and autonomy over language has not solved the constitutional conflict, although it does 
contribute to create a context of trust and stability. I then consider the basis for the ongoing 
accommodation of multinationalism in Canada and Russia. Both cases are characterised by 
a preponderance of intergovernmental regulation as the means to address claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction. Indeed, the failures to entrench claims within Russia and 
Canada’s constitutions have given rise to a complex system of intergovernmental and inter­
elite accommodation. Although intergovernmental relations appear to be a key element of 
the accommodation strategies, their effectiveness relies on two factors which I examine in 
the final section: a commitment by elites to continue to engage each other, and the 
existence of an overall institutional “superstructure” which fosters trust and institutional 
continuity.
Accom m odating Claims for Recognition
Russell defines claims for recognition as affecting the “mega-constitutional” 
dimension of a state, which goes “beyond disputing the merits of specific constitutional 
proposals and addresses the very nature o f the political community on which the 
constitution is based” (Russell, 1994: 30). Both Russia and Canada are characterised by 
failures to provide constitutional resolution of Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s claims for 
recognition. Tatarstan’s insistence it constitutes a sovereignty state “united” with Russia, 
even in the face of court rulings and political reforms which have hollowed out its meaning 
or prohibited it outright, demonstrates that underlying £mega-constitutional’ differences
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persist. In Canada, changes were made to the constitution in 1982 over Quebec’s explicit 
objections. Subsequent attempts (in 1987 and 1992) to address the province’s status claims 
and entrench its status of “distinct society” failed. Consequently, “In Quebec, 
[constitutional] debates cannot ignore the [...] “national question”” (Rocher, 1992a: 21).
Although Russia’s 1993 constitution does grant Tatarstan the status of republic, this 
was not sufficient for its ruling elite. Instead, it is the conclusion of a bilateral treaty in 1994 
which was successful in bridging the “mega-constitutional” disputes by recognising 
Tatarstan as a “state united with Russia”. For State Council speaker Farid Mukhametshin, 
the treaty provided the republic “a new status within the Russian Federation” and gave it 
the ability to develop “its own economic and political systems” (Quoted in TBDR, 
12.2.1999). The Russian Constitutional Court has ruled that the federal constitution does 
not recognise Tatarstan’s status of united or sovereign and has effectively mooted the 
recognition conferred by the treaty. Federal reforms in Russia reduced many of the 
jurisdictional political asymmetries which Tatarstan had obtained in its power-sharing 
agreements. Tatarstan itself has amended its constitution to reflect its position within 
Russia: it no longer challenges the integrity of the Russian state but articulates its status 
claims within the context of Russia’s federal design. Nevertheless, the fact that Tatarstan 
continues to insist on the need for a new treaty — even if it does not contain special 
privileges — points to the importance of recognition, even if is only symbolic and political.
In Quebec, no such progress on recognition has been achieved. On the contrary, 
the constitutional politics of Canada are marked by repeated failures to entrench Quebec’s 
status claims within the constitution. “Mega-constitutional” conflict here concerns Quebec’s 
desire to be recognised as distinct, and the inability and/or unwillingness of the federal and 
provincial governments to concede this status. Reacting to the Victoria Charter in 1971, 
Claude Ryan complained Quebec could not accept the constitutional amendments because 
they “consolidate the preponderance of the central government over the affairs of Canada 
and [...] reduce Quebec to the rank of a province like the others, without regard to its 
problems and priorities” (LD, 22.6.1971). Claims that the bilingual and bicultural nature of 
the province should be officially recognised, thus entrenching a constitutional asymmetry, 
was met by counterarguments such as Pierre Trudeau’s: “Federalism cannot work unless all 
provinces are basically in the same relation to the central government” (Quoted in Simeon, 
1972: 68). Quebec’s conception of itself as national homeland is thus contrasted to 
provincial leaders’ (and many federal leaders’) vision of Canada as a single community of 
equal provinces, and of equal rights-bearers (Cairns, 1992: 55-7). The entrenchment of 
asymmetrical status for Quebec is seen as violating the equality of citizens and provinces. 
The attempts to provide para-constitutional recognition — notably a parliamentary motion
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recognising Quebec as distinct (Canada, 1995) and the Calgary Declaration of 1997 — did 
not have the same results as in Tatarstan. Such attempts, although they recognise Quebec’s 
distinctiveness and unique character, do not entrench this status in the constitution. 
Recognition is unresolved and constitutes a persistent undercurrent in provincial and federal 
politics.
Accom m odating Claims for Jurisdiction
While the failure to obtain constitutional recognition is at the root of the ‘mega­
constitutional’ conflicts in both cases, Tatarstan and Quebec’s claims for jurisdiction are 
articulated within their countries’ federal design. The paradox is that a document which 
provokes resentment regarding recognition is simultaneously used as the reference for 
jurisdictional demands. Indeed, in Quebec and Tatarstan leaders argue not necessarily for 
radical change in the division of powers established in their constitutions, but for a more 
literal reading of its provisions in order to better protect regional autonomy.
Based on its claim to be “united with Russia”, elites in Tatarstan contended they had 
a confederal relationship with Russia in which competences were to be delegated upwards, 
not downwards. Thus, even after the 1993 federal constitution was implemented, Tatarstan 
argued its bilateral treaty laid the basis for “treaty-constitutional” relations, which in many 
cases ignored provisions of the federal constitution. A series of bilateral intergovernmental 
agreements were signed between 1992 and 1994 which institutionalised political 
asymmetries, especially regarding budgetary and fiscal capacity. As I examined, Russia’s 
constitution provides a detailed list of exclusive federal and joint competences. Federal law 
is supreme in areas of joint control, but Tatarstan enacted legislation throughout the 1990s 
in these areas based on their interpretation of their “treaty-constitutional” relationship. 
Faced with considerable legislative dissonance, Putin’s federal reforms were successful in 
reducing Tatarstan’s discretionary and unilateral exercise of authority. Legislative and 
constitutional harmonisation reasserted the supremacy of federal law in areas of joint 
jurisdiction. The bilateral agreements faded into the background as well, as Tatarstan joined 
Russia’s system of fiscal federalism.
While the republic operates largely within the confines of Russia’s federal design, 
the political rhetoric in both cases is similar, with Tatarstan’s leaders continuing to claim 
that regional autonomy must be better protected. The division of powers in the existing 
federal constitution provides a basis for centralised, even hegemonic, control by federal 
authorities. For Shaimiev, “Unfortunately, in areas of joint jurisdiction federal laws are 
adopted which regulate everything and anything without leaving room for regional 
initiatives” (NG, 1.3.2001). Shaimiev calls, in contrast, for a more cooperative federalism, in
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which the rights and obligations in areas of joint jurisdiction would be more clearly 
established for each level of government. Shaimiev’s Concept of federal reforms presented in 
2002 seeks to ensure that regions are not reduced to being executors of federal policy but 
retain a degree of autonomy. Putin’s recent announcement that the federal government will 
delegate the exercise of 114 joint competences to the regions is evidence of an ongoing 
process of intergovernmental mediation and coordination. Moreover, it shows there is a 
degree of flexibility inherent in Russia’s federal design to accommodate Tatarstan’s claims 
for jurisdiction and policy autonomy. The extent to which Putin’s latest changes will result 
in increased autonomy for Russia’s regions remains, however, to be seen.
In areas of joint jurisdiction, Russia’s constitution allows for the supremacy of 
federal law. In contrast, the division of competences in Canada’s constitution provides a 
clearer picture of the powers which belong to provinces. Notwithstanding the ‘watertight’ 
compartments established by Canada’s constitution, federal practice is characterised by the 
use of the federal spending power and resulting blurring of jurisdictional boundaries. 
Thanks to its higher fiscal capacity, Ottawa has used its spending power to create shared- 
cost programmes: conditional grants are offered in exchange for compliance with national 
policies. Over time, provincial governments have come to rely on federal financial support, 
without which it would be difficult to meet their obligations or citizens’ expectations. The 
Tremblay report considered the rise of the federal spending power as marking “a 
fundamental divergence of interpretation of Canadian federalism” (Quebec, 1956: 286). In 
practice, state-wide standards mean federal standards in areas of provincial jurisdiction, 
which is interpreted in Quebec as a violation of the federal principle and “imposition by a 
majority upon a minority nation” (Telford, 2003: 36). The Tremblay report recommended 
that the federal government must respect the division of powers and provincial autonomy 
established in the constitution (Quebec, 1956: 299).
The insistence of Quebec’s leaders for greater respect of its autonomy has led to its 
claim for a right of withdrawal from federal shared-cost programmes with compensation. 
Federal and provincial leaders have been reticent to entrench the right of withdrawal in the 
constitution. The Meech Lake Accord included a provision which would have extended the 
right of withdrawal to all provinces, as long as it “carries on a program or initiative that is 
compatible with the national objectives” (s .1 0 6 A ). The failure to constitutionalise the right 
of withdrawal has led to a reliance on the practice of ‘opting-out’. Since the 1960s, with the 
original agreements which allowed Quebec to opt-out of federal pension and social policies, 
intergovernmental agreements have been the main vector of accommodation of Quebec’s 
claims for jurisdiction. Federal-provincial agreements on immigration, and most recently 
agreements on healthcare and family leave have led to the development of a complex
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network of de facto asymmetries. A characteristic of this intergovernmental accommodation 
is the fact that is it not entrenched in the constitution: asymmetries are created de facto, not 
de jure, and powers made available to Quebec are generally available to other provinces. But 
the practice has promoted a certain flexibility and capacity to accommodate, ad hoc if 
necessary, Quebec’s demands for autonomy.
Both Quebec and Tatarstan advocate a view of competence as “watertight 
compartments”, in which the integrity of their jurisdiction is guaranteed. Yet, the realities 
and complexities of policy-making do not necessarily correspond with such a 
compartmentalised conception of competence. Quebec opposed the Social Union 
Framework Agreement in 1997 based on an argument it opposed the federal principle and 
legitimised federal interference in provincial jurisdictions. As a negotiating position, claims 
for “watertight” compartments evoke the balance between federal and regional autonomy, 
between shared- and self-rule. In reality however, as Dufour analyses, the benefits of shared 
programmes may outstrip the principle of autonomy: “even if Quebec’s position on the 
federal principle is pertinent, its total refusal of a federal role in social policy is antiquated. It 
minimises the reality of the last fifty years, during which the federal spending power was 
exercised on Quebec soil with consequences which were not always negative for citizens” 
(Dufour, 1998: 8). For his part, Shaimiev argues not for total regional autonomy. Federal 
law “should determine only general principles. Regional law would supplement it by its 
consideration of local specificities” (NG, 1.3.2001). The federal government can exercise its 
power to establish general policy objectives, but should increase the autonomy of regions in 
the implementation of these objectives.
The resistance to entrench asymmetries de jure in the constitution has led to the 
consolidation of intergovernmental negotiation and agreement as a principle means of 
accommodating claims for jurisdiction. In both cases, it is not necessarily the actual 
constitution which is the subject of resentment, but political practices which have emerged: 
Russia’s preponderant role in areas of joint jurisdiction and Canada’s use of the spending 
power and intrusions into provincial competences. Consequently, regional demands for 
increased regional autonomy tend to be secured in an ad hoc manner, as problems or 
demands arise. Below, I return to consider the institutional mechanisms which support 
these intergovernmental processes.
Accom m odating Language Policy in Tatarstan and Q uebec
I focused on language as a policy case study within my study of Tatarstan and 
Quebec to test the proposition that in states where consensus on national unity is elusive, 
granting collective rights for minorities constitutes part of the solution to the stateness
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dilemma, or unity problem. In both Quebec and Tatarstan, language is an important marker 
of difference. In both cases, language constitutes a key element of identity. Similarly, in both 
cases, claims for recognition and autonomy are made on the basis of this linguistic 
difference and specificity. However, I have found that substantial policy-capacity in 
language is not accompanied with a decrease in demands for recognition and jurisdiction. 
The constitutional disagreement persists, notwithstanding relatively successful execution of 
language policies. Yet, the autonomy over language policy and the constitutional 
asymmetries which exist to support this capacity undoubtedly diffuse conflict potential. 
Federal design which stymied instead of supporting Quebec and Tatarstan’s language 
policies would likely have provoked resentment and contestation.
One key difference between Quebec and Tatarstan is the disparity in their respective 
demographic situations and policy objectives. In Quebec, francophones constitute 80 per 
cent of the population. French is the main language of public use for nearly 87 per cent of 
the population of Quebec (Oakes, 2004: 545). Ethnic Tatars constitute just over half and 
Russians 42 per cent of the population of Tatarstan. While the overwhelming majority of 
Tatars possess some level of competence in Russian, 81.6 per cent of Russians do not 
possess any competence in Tatar (Iskhakova, 2001: 39). As I examined, even among Tatars, 
the use of Tatar is far from universal; for instance, only fifty per cent of Tatar children 
attend Tatar-language schools. Different demographic situations influence the choices and 
objectives of language policy. Consequently, a direct comparison of the policies 
implemented would be of limited use. More useful for my purposes is a comparison of 
language policy within their respective constitutional contexts. This provides a means to 
assess the extent to which Tatarstan and Quebec possess the autonomy they deem is 
required to carry out their objectives.
Quebec’s Charte de la langue franfaise (Charte) benefits from large public and political 
support in the province. It is, Rocher writes, a political “sacred cow” (Rocher, 1992b: 106). 
Court challenges or legislative amendments to the law are instant political and media events. 
Contrast this to the situation in Tatarstan: although the law is celebrated by political leaders 
and elites, it does not elicit the same degree of public support or national fervour. In 
Quebec, autonomy in language policy is considered to be the key to the survival of the 
language: “The fundamental principle of Quebec’s language policy is that if French is to 
survive and thrive in North America, it can occur only if it is given maximal chances and 
protection in Quebec, the only territory where it is the language of the majority” (Gosselin, 
2003: 10). For Camille Laurin, Quebec’s language law sought to “make Quebec a French- 
language society” instead of the bilingual Quebec which had existed until then (Laurin, 
1977: 34-5). As a result, the Charte imposes limits on the right to English-language
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instruction, guarantees a right to work in French and imposes the francisation of 
workplaces. A series of bodies exist to verify compliance and sanction violations.
This is probably the most significant difference with Tatarstan: whereas Quebec’s 
law is more coercive and defensive in nature, language policy in Tatarstan raised the status 
of Tatarstan and attempted to foster bilingualism. Tatarstan’s language law is nowhere near 
as coercive. Its objective was not to make Tatarstan a Tatar-speaking society, but to raise 
the status and utility of the language. The point of departure — in 1990 Tatar was all but 
absent from the public and state spheres — led to a policy aimed at making Tatar equal at 
least in status to Russian. The law does not impose a language of instruction: children are 
free to receive instruction in the language of their choice. Indeed, the requirement that 
Tatar and Russian be taught as a subject in equal amounts is an achievement of which 
policy-makers are particularly proud. This points to a gradual rise in the importance of the 
language issue, and the increasing place it occupies on the region’s political agenda.
The Canadian constitution does not assign jurisdiction over language to a specific 
level of government. Quebec is free to legislate on language use in areas within its 
jurisdiction (Leckey and Didier, 2004: 524). This competence was challenged, and in several 
cases was found to infringe on constitutional rights to expression, access to English- 
language education, and the constitutional obligation to use English as a language of 
Quebec’s legislature and courts. Although the rulings provoked considerable reaction, the 
law’s provisions were amended. Tatarstan’s competence over language is guaranteed by 
article 68 of the federal constitution, which creates a constitutional asymmetry providing 
republics the right to establish a state language. Contrary to Quebec, Tatarstan does not 
possess the legislative competences to constrain the use of Russian in the workplace, 
advertising and product labelling. Bilingual packaging, for instance, was found to contradict 
federal law and is available when producers voluntarily agree to provide it. As I examined in 
Chapter 5, the voluntary character of Tatarstan’s language policy has not affected the fact 
Russian remains a language with greater utility and that a large proportion of Tatar 
schoolchildren continue to attend Russian-language schools. To raise the number of Tatars 
enrolled in Tatar schools policy-makers cannot use coercive means but must increase the 
incentives. This is a complex task, which the State Programme on the Languages of 
Tatarstan for 2004-14 attempts to address with measures directly aimed at increasing the 
utility and functionality of Tatar. It will be interesting to revisit the issue in five to ten years 
to gauge whether the utility of Tatar has risen, and if not, whether this could lead to calls to 
implement a more coercive and defensive policy. Aidar Gymadiev, a former member of the 
Cabinet Department on Language and currently the editor of Sabantuy believes republican 
leaders adopted too careful an approach and “should have implemented a more assertive
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policy in the 1990s” (Interview with Gymadiev, 2004). Demographic evolution — 
particularly after the generation currently in Tatar-language schools enters the workforce — 
may contribute to strengthen the place and role of Tatar language and culture. If the utility 
of Tatar stagnates, and the State Programme fails to address the issue of the quality of Tatar 
in the republic, can we expect a shift, like that implemented in Quebec in 1974 and 1977, 
toward a more forceful assertion of the place and role of Tatar?
For the time being, however, the constitutional constraints on Tatarstan’s language 
policy capacity do not appear to be especially controversial. One exception was the decision 
to prohibit the transition to a Latin script, regarded in Tatarstan as an illegitimate federal 
interference on a purely linguistic issue. This case notwithstanding, policy-makers in 
Tatarstan are satisfied with the competences they possess to carry out their language policy. 
Consensus within Tatarstan, between Russians and Tatars, and on the legitimacy of the 
republic’s competence to carry out language policy, appears to be achieved. It is an example 
of a successful federalism and of successful use of constitutional asymmetry. It counters 
Petrov’s assertion that “Russian federalism serves as a ritual rather than as a function” 
(Petrov, 2004: 213). In the field of language, federal design provides the tools and powers 
required to implement most of Tatarstan’s current policy objectives. In Canada, as a 
constitutional issue, balance has also been achieved on Quebec’s language policy. The Charte 
is recognised to have attained many of its objectives and is an effective tool to protect the 
vitality of French in the province. This leads McRoberts to point out that autonomy over 
language is an example of the success of federalism: “the PQ government demonstrated not 
the need for independence but the possibilities for meaningful change even within the 
existing federal structure” (McRoberts, 1993: 293).
One interesting difference between Tatarstan and Quebec is the extent of the 
federal government’s own interventions and support in the area of language. Although 
satisfied with its autonomy over language policy, policy-makers in Tatarstan deplore the lack 
of support they receive from Moscow. For Kim Minnullin the fact “there is no one in 
Moscow to whom we can address our concerns and experiences regarding the 
implementation of bilingualism” creates a sense that the centre is disinterested (Interview 
with Minnullin, 2004b). Razil Valeev makes this clear: “Moscow has implemented 
programmes on the Russian language and Russian culture, but does not support the 
development of minority languages” (Interview with Valeev, 2004). The Russian 
government has adopted measures to assist Russian minorities outside Russia. Similarly, in 
2002 Tatarstan’s introduced article 14 to its constitution, which calls on the republic to take 
steps to preserve the language and identity of Tatars living outside Tatarstan. This has led 
the republic to sign twenty-one agreements with other regions to provide Tatar-language
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education. As a result, 900 schools were created in which 51,000 students receive 
instruction in Tatar, and 1000 schools where Tatar is taught as a subject (Lotfullin, 2004: 
111). Yet as Iskhakov mentions, even simple issues like sending textbooks from Tatarstan is 
complicated since no mechanisms exists to transfer funds from one region to another to 
pay for pedagogical materials (Interview with Iskhakov, 2004). Since Russia is a 
multinational state, there is a feeling that it should do more support its minority cultures, 
and assist to create mechanisms to compensate Tatarstan’s efforts. The lack of support by 
Moscow for minority languages has created resentment, as Renat Zakirov, the Chairman of 
the Executive Committee of the World Tatar Congress states: “It seems that federal 
authorities that concentrated all the financial resources didn’t think about the preservation 
and development of nationalities. It turns out that Tatarstan is alone to look after it” 
(TBDR, 30.8.2005).
Canada, on the other hand, plays a much more active role in the support of the 
French language outside Quebec. One of the key findings of the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism was that the federal government needed to take steps to raise 
the status and utility of French as a way to foster a stronger sense o f belonging by 
francophones and Quebecois (Canada, 1967). The federal government has endeavoured to 
increase the visibility and respect of French, especially since adopting the Official Languages 
Act in 1969. Since the 1970s, the federal government has provided political and financial 
support to Canada’s official minority language communities. In practice, this led to the 
development of policies and programmes aimed at francophones in provinces outside 
Quebec, and support for the English-language minority of Quebec. Although Quebec’s 
leaders tend to view Canada’s support of its Anglophone community as interference, what 
is overlooked is the federal government’s support of French language, media, and culture 
promotes the status and utility of French in Canada, which contributes to creating a context 
of linguistic choice. The paradox is that while Tatarstan views the support o f Tatar 
communities in the rest of Russia as a key objective and would like to see Moscow play a 
bigger role, in Quebec federal policies aimed at the protection of official language minorities 
place the interests of French-Canadians at odds with those of French-Quebecois.
Court rulings have confirmed both the extent and limits o f Tatarstan’s and Quebec 
autonomy in language policy. The Supreme Court of Canada’s rulings on the Charte struck 
down many of its more coercive provisions (e.g. on access to English language education 
and unilingual French signs). However, notable in the rulings such as Ford and Solski, the 
Court upheld the Charted overall objectives — the protection of French in Quebec — but 
rejected only the concrete measures implemented to reach these objectives. In Ford\ the 
Court concluded that the prohibition of English was unconstitutional but requiring the
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predominance of French was an acceptable limit to the right to expression (SCC, 1988). 
Similarly in Solski, the Court balanced the province’s policy objective requiring 
francophones to attend French-language school with the right to minority-language 
education (SCC, 2005b: par.34). Less jurisprudence exists on Tatarstan’s language law. In its 
2004 ruling, Russia’s Constitutional Court confirmed Tatarstan’s jurisdiction over language 
issues and its power to impose a language requirement in education. Tatarstan’s policy is 
constitutional to the extent it conforms with the federal Law on education and the federal 
educational curriculum, which grant it the power to require pupils in Tatarstan learn both 
Tatar and Russia as state languages (KSRF, 2004: par.3.2). The Court warned, however, that 
such a requirement is constitutional only to the extent it does not discriminate against the 
right to freely choose the language of instruction or limit the study of Russian as a state 
language (Ibid. par.3.1). The Court protected Tatarstan’s autonomy to devise a territorial 
language regime, but within that regime, it cannot offer privileged treatment to Tatar. It did 
not take position on the legitimacy of Tatarstan’s policy objectives, ruling strictly on its 
competence to legislate on the language of education. Based on this ruling and the existing 
constitutional context, if Tatarstan changed its approach and enacted more coercive 
language policies there is some doubt they would survive a court challenge.
In both cases, balance appears to have been achieved over language policy. 
Tatarstan and Quebec, although operating within different contexts and with different 
objectives, are largely satisfied with the degree of autonomy they possess. Quebec is 
recognised as the foyer of the French language; the Supreme Court recognises the legitimacy 
of its legislative objectives to protect the vitality of French in Quebec. Russia’s constitution 
recognises a right for Tatarstan to protect Tatar and implement language policy. In both 
cases, competence over language has been a means of protecting, if not recognising, 
difference, but it has not alleviated the persistence of claims for constitutional recognition. 
It is difficult to enounce a clear-cut conclusion on whether language policies have 
contributed to a political climate which fosters trust and consensus. Federal design is not 
challenged in terms of the competence it affords to the Tatarstan and Quebec governments. 
An institutional framework which hindered rather than supported the implementation of 
language policy would likely to have provoked contestation. What the persistence of 
Quebec’s and Tatarstan’s constitutional disagreements shows is that collective rights, while 
part of the solution to a stateness dilemma, are insufficient as a response to territorial 
demands for recognition and jurisdiction.
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The Sources o f Institutional Consensus
Analysis of the cases demonstrates that consensus on ‘mega-constitutional’ issues is 
lacking. In both cases, federal design does not reflect Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s claims for 
recognition of their status and greater autonomy. The persisting challenges to these states’ 
federal and constitutional design, however, has not led to paralysis. Indeed, as the policy 
case studies demonstrate, federalism has been successful in providing autonomy and policy- 
capacity in the area of language. Although the institutional design is contested, stable 
outcomes have resulted. What is the nature of this consensus? What are some of the factors 
which strengthen or weaken it?
As Cairns writes, “It is a necessary assumption of constitutional government that 
governments are law-abiding, not rogue elephants hostile by nature to any limitations on 
their conduct” (Cairns, 1992: 77). This is a crucial difference between Quebec and 
Tatarstan. The rise of Quebec’s claims during the Quiet Revolution occurred within the 
context of a long-standing institutional framework endowed with a degree of legitimacy and 
authority. Attempts were made to accommodate Quebec’s demands within the existing or 
an amended constitution. The failure to address Quebec’s demands within the constitution 
gave rise to intergovernmental agreements and de facto asymmetrical federalism as means of 
accommodation. However, even in the most trying conditions — in the aftermath of the 
1982 patriation for instance — Quebec complied with the new provisions and constraints. 
The rule of law and the maturity of federal design, even if they were contested, provided 
continuity and stability to the relationship.
The situation in Tatarstan could not have been more different at the outset of 
transition. Institutional continuity was undermined by simultaneous changes and transitions 
at the Soviet, Russian and republican levels. The absence of consensus on the republic’s 
status within the nascent Russian Federation, and Tatarstan’s own refusal to acknowledge 
let alone acquiesce to Russia’s constitutional design fostered a context where legal 
nullification, instead of consensus or the rule of law, was the norm. The bilateral treaty, 
while it did not resolve the conflicting visions of Tatarstan’s status, conferred a degree of 
stability and legitimacy to Russia’s federal design. Intergovernmental bargaining and de facto 
asymmetrical power-sharing stabilised the conflict and checked each government’s earlier 
tendencies to act as rogue elephants. The current state of federal relations in Tatarstan and 
Russia confirms that a degree of consensus on federal design has appeared. While Tatarstan 
continues to claim special status, it largely recognises both the legitimacy and authority of 
Russia’s constitution. The zero-sum brinkmanship of the 1990s has ceded to more 
manageable claims on how to increase the responsiveness of Russia’s existing federal design
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to Tatarstan’s claims. While I am unable to ascertain whether the treaty and bilateral 
accommodation caused a degree of consensus on federal design, there is no doubt that the 
process of elite accommodation helped routinise relations and increase trust between elites.
My examination of these cases has been informed by a belief that solving a stateness 
dilemma does not rest solely on getting “the initial constitutional rules right” but also on the 
development of a context and mechanisms to facilitate ongoing processes of 
accommodation (Hanson, 2001: 133). In both cases, federal design did not ‘solve’ the 
constitutional disagreements: the federal constitutions continue to be challenged by the 
governments of Tatarstan and Quebec. As Russell suggests, “constitutions can establish the 
broad grooves in which a [state] develops. What happens within those grooves [...] is 
determined not by the constitutional text but by the political forces that shape the country’s 
subsequent history” (Russell, 1994: 35). I see the characteristics of the political forces which 
have developed in the constitutional grooves in Quebec and Tatarstan as indicators of the 
mechanisms which are in place to help provide continued accommodation of 
multinationalism and institutional stability. The mechanisms are similar despite contextual 
differences in both cases.
Federal D esign  and the Centrality o f Intergovernmental Relations
As I examined in Chapter 2, federal design aims to promote a balance between self- 
and shared-rule. For Smiley and Watts, two institutional strategies contribute to fostering 
the capacity for finding balance:
Federal government concerns the protection and articulation o f  spatially delineated values 
and interests within a more comprehensive political community. For this protection there 
are two possible strategies. The first is that o f interstate federalism, which confers on the 
states or provinces the constitutionally protected jurisdiction over matters which members 
o f  some or all o f  the constituent communities believe to be the most crucial to their welfare 
and survival. The second, the intrastate strategy, provides for the protection o f  these 
territorial particularisms within the structure and operations o f  the central government itself 
(Smiley and Watts, 1985: 29).
Intra-state and inter-state federalism are not alternatives, but complements. One of the
pathologies of Canada’s federalism, and a factor which exacerbates the Quebec question, is
the weakness of federal design to accommodate claims within the institutions of federalism
and the importance of intergovernmentalism as the main interest aggregator and conflict
regulator (Watts, 1999: chap. 11). Indeed, the prominence of intergovernmental regulation
emphasises the importance of the role of political elites.
Scholars of Canadian federalism have identified the imbalance between institutions
of inter- and intra-state federalism as a key institutional lacuna. Watts contends that the
shared institutions of the federal government are crucial in a federation, to enable common
action and provide glue to hold the state together (Watts, 1999: 83). Yet institutions of
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intra-state federalism in Canada are weak, many processes are informal. Canada’s upper 
chamber, the Senate, does not live up to its role as an institution where provincial interests 
are articulated. The body, appointed by the federal government, is more attuned to party 
rather than provincial loyalties (Meekison, 1998: 109). In the federal cabinet, although 
efforts are made to balance regional and linguistic representation, “it is far more concerned 
with federal policy-making and execution than the expression and accommodation of 
provincial interests” (Smiley and Watts, 1985: 29). Prime ministers have designed their 
cabinets not with an eye to facilitating intra-state federalism, but to more effectively govern 
from the centre (Savoie, 1999; Meekison, Telford et al., 2003: 12). The centrality of party 
discipline in Canada’s parliamentary politics and traditions of executive-dominated 
government ensure that party interests, and particularly for the party in power, the 
government’s interests, trump regional representation. For Smiley and Watts, “The thrust of 
the Westminster model toward decisive and unified leadership means that minorities can be 
overridden and that they have relatively few resources to frustrate the will of the majority, as 
embodied in the policies of the incumbent government” (Smiley and Watts, 1985: 31). 
Efforts to reform Canada’s federal institutions to increase their intra-state characteristics 
(notably in the Charlottetown Accord and its proposals to adopt an elected Senate to 
increase provincial representation) failed. As a result, political institutions at the centre tend 
to embody the interests of the federal government as a separate entity rather than as an 
aggregate entity more representative of various provincial interests.
For Bakvis and Skogstad, a federal system which does not provide sufficient scope 
for the expression of regional particularities undermines the legitimacy of the system 
(Bakvis and Skogstad, 2002: 17). In Canada’s case, it is not so much the legitimacy of the 
federal institutions which has been the result, but the fact that inter-state federalism — “the 
complex process of intergovernmental meetings and agreements” (Meekison, 1998: 109) — 
has become the principal means for addressing and accommodating provincial interests. 
Gibbins links the failures of intra-state federalism to increased potential for 
intergovernmental conflict (Gibbins, 1982: 106). The prominence of inter-state federalism is 
also a consequence of Canada’s division of powers, which combines jurisdictional 
autonomy for provincial governments with policy interdependence (Bakvis and Skogstad, 
2002: 5-7). Since the fedei&l government assumes an important role in setting and funding 
state-wide policies in areas of provincial jurisdiction, provincial and federal governments are 
locked into struggles for jurisdiction and money. Competition, however, is not necessarily 
disruptive. For Pierre Trudeau, “The story of Canadian federalism is one of constant 
intergovernmental exchange and cooperation” (Quoted in Simeon, 2002: 12). The fiscal 
agreements, shared-cost programmes and countless federal-provincial agreements “have
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woven a tight network of cooperation and coordination” (Croisat, 1998: 62-3). Many of 
these agreements arise in an ad hoc fashion, existing outside the formal division of 
competences established by the constitution. But inter-state federalism is routine and 
institutionalised. First Ministers conferences (FMC) are the most prominent forum for 
federal-provincial negotiation and constitute for many the “crucial institution” of Canadian 
federalism (Smiley quoted in Gibbins, 1982: 92). Federal-provincial committees, advisory 
councils, inter-provincial conferences exist to coordinate and carry out policy. The 
Canadian Intergovernmental Conferences Secretariat, established in 1973 by the premiers 
and funded by both levels of government, oversees the coordination of intergovernmental 
meetings between various levels of federal and provincial leaders. In Quebec, the Secretariat 
for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs is responsible for the promotion and defence of 
Quebec’s interests, relations with the federal and provincial governments and analysis of 
federal programmes’ potential effects on Quebec.
With regard to Quebec, the inability to constitutionalise its claims for recognition 
has exacerbated the intergovernmental aspect of federal-provincial accommodation. Federal 
and provincial governments express different interests and speak for different 
constituencies. The federal government is a representative of a pan-Canadian nationalism 
and national identity (Kymlicka, 1998: 166). The government of Quebec, by comparison, is 
the main outlet for the expression of its national particularism (Smiley, 1971: 328). As I 
have examined, each level of government pursues competing if not conflicting 
constitutional agendas and attempts to protect their respective constitutional and political 
visions placing the onus of mediating these competing claims on their leaders. 
Intergovernmentalism has proven a flexible means to ensure ongoing accommodation of 
Quebec’s claims. Yet its limits are clear: accommodation continues as far as political leaders 
are willing to keep going. As Maclure notes, “Since 1982, Quebec has been up against a 
quasi-systematic policy of non-recognition” (Maclure, 2003: 6). This does not presage a 
resolution to the province’s constitutional disagreement. Indeed, the persistence of 
Quebec’s demands, coupled with continued resistance to provide de jure recognition ensures 
that intergovernmental, “political federalism” will remain a principal vector of multinational 
accommodation.
The federal system which has emerged in Russia since 1993 is characterised by a 
similar reliance on inter-state federalism. Many of Putin’s federal reforms sought to remove 
the influence of regional leaders at the centre. As an institution, Russia’s presidential 
representatives constitute a barrier between federal and regional government. Russia’s 
Federation Council is ineffective as a chamber of intra-state representation (Gel'man, 2001). 
Political parties are not vehicles for regional representation (I return to this issue below).
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The particularity in Russia of a ‘unified system of executive rule’ exacerbates the weaknesses 
of intra-state institutions. Especially with the return of a system of appointed leaders, the 
centre enjoys administrative control over regional governments. Indeed, it appears to be a 
system more conducive to ensuring a wide application of the president’s interests in the 
regions, rather than mechanisms for regional representation within the centre. Although the 
constitution, with its long list o f joint powers, creates the possibility for a great deal of 
policy interdependence and overlap, federal practice in these areas has tended to emphasise 
the supremacy of federal law. Putin’s reforms to the division of powers further 
strengthened the hierarchical dynamic, with regional governments viewed as executors of 
policy. Consequendy, federal institutions are viewed less as a means for providing 
representation to territorial difference within the federal administration than a means to 
strengthen federal control.
Throughout the Yeltsin period, intergovernmental relations were a key feature of 
Russia’s federal system. The de facto asymmetries which resulted from Yeltsin’s bilateral 
treaty practices shifted the balance of federalism toward an almost confederal model, where 
regional self-rule trumped federal shared-rule. Thus, federal-regional relations were 
characterised by a strong degree of head-to-head, inter-elite competition. But for Nicholson, 
“one of the benefits of Yeltsin’s approach was its elasticity” (Nicholson, 2003: 17). This 
elasticity provided Yeltsin a means to consolidate regional leaders’ loyalties while 
institutionalising a process of elite bargaining. Putin’s accession to power demonstrated the 
weak institutional foundations of the treaty practice and the extent to Yeltsin’s patrimonial 
federalism worked only to the extent that parties, particularly the centre, were ready to 
maintain it (Hughes, 2001b: 58). While the importance of bilateralism has decreased in 
Putin’s Russia, inter-state federalism remains an important characteristic of the relations 
between Kazan and Moscow. The institutionalisation of the State Council provides a degree 
of institutional continuity to inter-state federalism in Russia. It has emerged as an important 
body, if not for decision-making, than at least for multilateral federal-regional negotiation 
and discussion.
Similar to the case of Quebec, the importance of inter-state and intergovernmental 
federalism emphasises the roles of Tatarstan and Russia as exponents of competing visions 
of the political community and of their place within the state. Intergovernmental relations 
were crucial for finding ways to accommodate the republic’s status claims and mediate these 
interests. Although claims for recognition, and the constitutional disagreement persist, inter­
elite negotiation has proven effective at consolidating a framework for ongoing 
accommodation of Tatarstan’s demands and difference. For Alexseev such processes are 
encouraging signs: “The resilience of the Russian Federation depends not on how much
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power the center holds vis-a-vis. the constituent units, but on [its ability] to nurture a 
necessarily slow, ground-up evolution of formal and informal institutions that mediate 
center—periphery grievances and disputes” (Alexseev, 2001: 105). As with Quebec, the 
resilience of inter-state federalism as a means of multinational accommodation depends on 
the commitment of elites in Tatarstan and Russia to continue to engage one other.
Thus, we see that Canada and Russia exhibit a similar reliance on inter-state 
federalism, which places a premium on intergovernmental negotiation and mediation as 
means to promote an ongoing accommodation of the constitutional disagreements and 
Quebec’s and Tatarstan’s claims. A fundamental difference, however, is the existence of a 
stable “federative superstructure” in Canada. Watts defines a federative superstructure as 
encompassing “the central institutions that are responsible for areas of common jurisdiction 
and also the institutions that affect relations between the central government and the 
governments of the constituent units” (Watts, 1991: 309). Although constitutional 
consensus may be lacking, there is an acceptance in Quebec and Canada of the overall 
legitimacy of the “rules of the game” of politics, which in turns fosters increased 
institutional support of and trust in intergovernmental relations. Throughout the thesis, I 
have analysed the accommodation of multinationalism as requiring more than an agreement 
on the “constitutional rules of the game”. Intergovernmentalism and the creation of 
processes of elite negotiation are ways in which the disagreement on the constitutional rules 
of the game is bridged. I turn in the final section to examine factors on which these 
processes rest. In Russia, agreement on the rules of politics has emerged since 1993. But 
three factors — uncertainties on the role of the judicial system, territorial stability and the 
lack of democratic representation — constitute potential limits to the stability of the 
“federative superstructure”.
Limits o f Institutional Stability
Role of the Courts
Courts occupy a key position within federal political systems, expected ultimately to 
adjudicate disputes between governments. As Tierney points out courts are not immune 
from politics or the politicisation of their functions:
When political disputes surrounding sovereignty and self-determination crystallize as 
questions o f  law, courts become embroiled in attempts to provide objective legal resolution 
to intensely disputed and heavily politicized questions. These questions test the very 
legitimacy o f  the constitutional system and threaten the continued existence o f  the state 
within which, and in defence o f which, judges are expected to act (Tierney, 2003: 170).
In the disputes over status and recognition studied throughout the thesis, court rulings have
played prominent roles. Watts suggests courts perform three functions: constitutional
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interpretation, adaptation of the constitution to changing circumstances, and the resolution 
of intergovernmental conflicts (Watts, 1999: 100). On this basis, judicial institutions are all 
the more important in the cases of Quebec and Tatarstan, where disagreements on the 
constitution are prevalent and where intergovernmental relations are the main vector of 
accommodation. The way which the courts are viewed by regional leaders in both cases, 
however, could not be more different.
The Supreme Court of Canada consists of nine justices appointed by the federal 
government. By convention the federal government consults provincial governments on the 
nomination. By law three judges must come from Quebec. Overall, the Supreme Court is 
perceived as a legitimate and impartial arbiter. Indeed, for Quebec the legitimacy of the 
court as interpreter of constitutional provisions is separate from the legitimacy of the 
constitutional provisions it is called to interpret. Rene Levesque complained in 1979 that the 
Court’s ruling on provisions of the Charte de la langue franpaise would be “another example of 
outside interference in Quebec affairs” (OC, 9.6.1979), but once handed down, the 
government complied with the ruling within days (LP, 13.6.1979).
When the federal government in 1996 asked the Supreme Court to issue a reference 
on the constitutionality of Quebec’s unilateral secession, Quebec’s Minister of Justice, Paul 
Begin, reacted strongly: “the sole judge and jury of Quebec’s future is the people of 
Quebec. No judge can prevent the democratic expression of a people” (Quoted in Quebec, 
2001b: 102). Challenging the federal government’s decision to proceed with the reference, 
the government of Quebec refused to participate in what it called a “political, not legal 
proceeding”. The Court appointed an amicus curiae to argue Quebec’s position. When the 
ruling, Reference re Secession of Quebec (SCC, 1998), was handed down it was greeted by both 
Quebec and Ottawa as a victory. The Court concluded that while no constitutional right to 
unilateral secession existed, the federal government must negotiate the terms of Quebec’s 
secession after a referendum on a clear question and a clear majority. For Quebec, the 
Court “did not in any way diminish the National Assembly’s right to decide on the question 
and majority” and protected the right of the Quebec people to decide on their future 
(Lucien Bouchard quoted in Quebec, 2001c: 104). Ottawa viewed the ruling as rejecting a 
right to unilateral secession. The Court left the intricacies of the political debate on what 
constitutes a clear question and a clear majority to the politicians. On an issue as 
contentious as secession, it successfully maintained the legitimacy and impartiality of its role 
(Rocher and Verrelli, 2003: 211-2).
Russia’s Constitutional Court judges are appointed by the president and confirmed 
by the Federation Council. Although regions in the guise of their representatives in the 
Council have a greater degree of influence on the membership of the court than Canadian
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provinces, this has not affected Tatarstan’s view of the court. Indeed, the Russian 
Constitutional Court is viewed less as impartial observer than as one which upholds the 
interests of the federal government. For Khakimov, “the courts are simply not on our side” 
(Interview with Khakimov, 2004). During the 1990s, Tatarstan consistendy refused to heed 
the Court’s rulings, notably on the 1992 referendum on status. Moreover, before the 
referendum was even held, the Court had already struck down the constitutionality of 
Tatarstan’s claim to special status and its 1990 declaration of sovereignty. The Court’s June 
2000 rulings on republican sovereignty were greeted by Tatar nationalists within the TPC as 
“political aggressions against the independence of republics” and as “violating the treaty and 
not viable” (TBDR, 21.7.2000). Again, political leaders ignored the ruling by maintaining 
their claim to sovereignty in the 2002 constitution. To be fair, many rulings by the Russian 
and Tatarstan Supreme Courts on the division of competences which have annulled 
Tatarstan’s conflicting legislation are respected. It is mostly on issues of constitutional status 
and recognition that rulings are ignored. A worrisome trend is the recourse to Tatarstan’s 
own Constitutional Court, which has issued contradictory rulings on issues of state 
sovereignty and status. Regarding Tatarstan’s claims for status and jurisdiction, the courts 
are not seen as an arena for adjudication and resolution but an extension of political 
struggle. Contrary to Canada, the politicisation of Russia’s courts ties the legitimacy of the 
institution to the legitimacy of the constitutional provisions they interpret. As an arbiter of 
intergovernmental relations, then, the effectiveness of the court system is severely 
hampered. The role of judicial institutions in defusing intergovernmental conflict is 
consequently reduced. This is a sign of ongoing institutional shortcomings, which imperils 
long-term stability of Russia’s federal design.
Stability of Federal Territorial Design
In Chapter 2, in my discussion of the challenges of accommodating multinationality, 
two issues are seen to be important for successful accommodation, what O ’Leary and 
Lustick call “right-shaping” and “right-sizing”. In the thesis, I have concentrated mainly on 
issues of right-shaping — how federal design organises the distribution of powers and 
recognition. I gave less consideration to the issue of right-sizing — the “preferences of 
political agents at the centre of existing regimes to have what they regard as appropriate 
external and internal territorial borders” (O'Leary, Lustick et al., 2001: 1-14). From the point 
of view of the agents at the centre, the stability of the internal and external borders of the 
Canadian federation is secure. The potential for instability arises in discussions about the 
likelihood of a potential referendum on Quebec’s secession. In Russia, discussions on the
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territorial form of the federation occurred earlier in the transition process. The decision was 
taken to maintain the ethno-territorial structure, with republican status for Tatarstan.
There is increasing concern in Tatarstan that a reform of Russia’s territorial 
structure is in the offing. Khakimov evokes discussions about a threat of amalgamating 
Tatarstan with Ulyanovsk, the effect of which would be to reduce Tatars to a minority in 
the new territory. However, he doubts this would ever pass a vote, “even Russians in 
Tatarstan would vote against such a proposal” (Interview with Khakimov, 2004). 
Discussions on the desirability of reducing the number of federal subjects or the need to 
equalise all federal subjects and eliminate ethno-territorial distinctions have occurred 
periodically. The State Duma’s Committee on Federation and Regional Affairs organised a 
hearing on the topic of regional amalgamation in April 2004, attended by parliamentarians, 
representatives of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, Presidential Administration and 
of forty-five subjects of the federation (Kommersant, 16.4.2004). At a conference in 
Yekaterinburg in May 2005, entided “State Nationality Policy: Problems and Perspectives”, 
Sverdlovsk governor Eduard Rossel argued that “the collapse of the USSR was caused by 
the fact that the union was constituted by national republics. We need to build Russia 
according to the territorial principle so we can all be citizens of Russia (:wssiyanim)” (Vre my a 
Novostei, 27.5.2005). Although still a remote possibility, Galeev worries that the issue of 
territorial reform is gaining increased momentum and credibility, since even the Presidential 
Administration, he claims, has circulated working papers on the amalgamation of federal 
subjects (Interview with Galeev, 2004). The successful referendum on the amalgamation of 
the Taymyr and Evenk regions with Krasnoyarsk, and ongoing discussions about possible 
unification of Perm with the Komi-Permyak okrug, or Adygeia with Krasnodar show that 
territorial design is in evolution. Galeev views these trends with apprehension, and believes 
regional amalgamation “could lead to the elimination of Russia’s institutions of 
ethnofederalism and the equalisation of all subjects” (Interview in ZP, 14.10.2004).
Putin explained his decision to eliminate elections for regional leaders by linking the 
failure of regional leaders to ethnicity:
“Unfortunately, in many o f  our subjects o f  the federation, especially in the national
republics, people have been elected on ethnic lines. A person is elected not for his personal
or professional qualities. And this does not function effectively” (RG, 19.11.2004).
Putin’s reform was interpreted by some in Tatarstan, such as Tufan M in n u llin , State Council 
deputy and United Russia member, as a confirmation of the centre’s intention to eliminate 
ethno-republics (NG, 27.10.2004). Indeed, Dmitrii Rogozin, leader of the federal (and more 
nationalist) Rodina party, the reform took aim at the “absolutism of regionalistic clans” and 
at the presidents of Russia’s republics who should be pursued as “separatists and enemies of
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a united Russia” should they continue to try and sabotage the centralisation of power in
Russia” (NG, 1.11.2004). A VTsIOM survey shows a modest rise in the view that “Russia is
a multiethnic state whose citizens should have equal rights and no one should have any
privileges” from 49 per cent in 2004 to 53 per cent in 2005 (VTsIOM, 2005). Discussions
and insinuations about the status of Russia’s republics reveal an ongoing tension regarding
the form of the Russian Federation, and the place of republics and national minorities in
Russia. Indeed, Shaimiev warns a shift toward more unitary government structures, by
overlooking Russia’s diversity, creates conflict potential:
“Unfortunately, until now many politicians have been unable to forego the idea o f a unitary 
state. Certainly, under such a system it would be easier to solve certain problems. But it will 
be impossible to become, all o f  a sudden, a uni-national people. This means that the 
establishment o f  a unitary state automatically leads to the violation o f  individual rights, o f  
the rights o f  the different peoples which live in the same country. And this creates strong 
tensions in the regions” (RT, 6.6.2004).
Although it is all speculative at present, the talk of equalising Russia’s federal subjects
provokes palpable uneasiness in Tatarstan. A move toward the elimination of republican
status would most likely provoke significant opposition, if not conflict, in the republic,
particularly since Tatarstan’s competence over language policy is predicated upon that
status. Moreover, such a change would constitute a clear signal that central elites will have
abandoned the intergovernmental mode of accommodation which has prevailed since 1990.
Democracy and Rt'presentation
The electoral and political dynamic in Canadian federalism is substantially different 
than the current situation in Russia. Within the federal parliament, since 1990 the Bloc 
Quebecois has become a significant political formation. Between 1993 and 1997, the party 
formed the Official Opposition. Created in the wake of the failure of the Meech Lake 
Accord, the Bloc defines itself as “sovereignist political party... which will be present on 
the federal political scene until Quebec sovereignty is realised” (BQ, 2000: 1-2). Its existence 
ensures the prominence of nationalist grievances in Ottawa. Furthermore the party defines 
itself as the interlocutor of Quebec’s interests with Canada, “explaining to Canadians of all 
regions Quebec’s intention to conclude, on the basis of mutual interests, an economic and 
political partnership with Canada once sovereignty is achieved” (Ibid.).
The BQ provides representation of Quebec nationalism within the federal 
parliament. But its representation is exacerbated by particularities of Canada’s single­
member plurality electoral system. As Table 8.1 shows, over the last three federal general 
elections, the Bloc’s share of the seats in parliament outpaces its share of the popular vote. 
While BQ candidates stand only in Quebec, the party’s showing in the 1997, 2000 and 2004 
general elections (10.7, 14.6 and 12.4 per cent of the national vote, respectively) provided a
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disproportionate share of the seats (14.6, 12.6 and 17.5 per cent respectively). The party’s 
prominence gives Quebec nationalists a voice at the centre, but also exacerbates the 
adversarial relationship between the BQ and other state-wide parties, and between Quebec 
nationalists and the governing party.
Table 8.1: Results o f Federal General Elections in Quebec, by Year and Party (in % 
o f Votes and Seats W on)1 _________
Year BQ Liberal N D P PC/Conservatives
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
1997 37.9 58.7 36.7 34.7 2.0 0.0 22.2 6.7
2000 39.9 50.7 44.3 48.0 1.8 0.0 11.8 1.3
2004 48.9 72.0 33.9 28.0 | 4.6 0.0
00OO 0.0
A similar dynamic exists in Quebec. Since 1976, the sovereignist Parti Quebecois and 
federalist Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ) have alternated in government. While in government, 
the PQ gains the institutional presence and resources to press Ottawa to accommodate its 
demands, and as was the case in 1980 and 1995, organise a referendum on the province’s 
status within the federation. In Quebec, although the PQ’s policy is to promote sovereignty, 
it is also the only alternative to the PLQ. The PLQ, although it is a federalist party, is also 
committed to obtaining the recognition of Quebec’s status, without however advocating 
sovereignty (Pelletier, 2001). As a result, Quebec sovereignty and its constitutional claims 
are omnipresent in provincial politics and tightly wrapped into the electoral cycle. Each 
party attempts to outflank the other on its positions vis-a-vis federalism, and capitalise on 
perceptions that the federal government does or does not do enough to respond to 
Quebec’s interests and demands. In Quebec too, the electoral system has tended to over­
represent the parliamentary majority of the winning party, at the expense of a third party, 
Action democratique du Quebec. Thus, as Table 8.2 shows, the electoral victory of the PQ does 
not necessarily reveal a rise in popular support for sovereignty or secession. Victory is as 
much as function of the electoral system as it is a normal alternation of governing parties. 
Furthermore, the PQ itself it not a monolithic body: debate on the party’s stance vis-a-vis 
sovereignty is prominent. During the party congress in June 2005, positions on the party’s 
policy on sovereignty is divided: debate exists on whether a PQ government should conduct 
a referendum “immediately” after an electoral victory, “as soon as possible” after a victory, 
or as was the case in the late 1990s under Lucien Bouchard “when the winning conditions 
are present” (LP, 5.6.2005). The fact that Quebec’s constitutional disagreement is always 
present as an electoral issue introduces a degree of instability to federal-provincial politics,
1 Online sources accessed 15 August 2005: h t t p : / /w w . elections.ca.
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at the same time as it provides a forum for the representation and democratic discussion of 
the province’s status claims.
Table 8.2: Results o f Quebec General Elections, by Year and Party (in % o f Votes 
and Seats W on)2 ___________
Year j PLQ PQ ADQ
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
1994 44.4 37.6 44.7 61.7 6.5 0.8
1998 43.5 38.4 42.9 60.8 11.8 0.8
2003 | 45.9 60.8 33.2 36.0 18.1 3.2
There is no comparable electoral dynamic in Russia. Federal electoral law prohibits 
the existence of regional or national parties within the federal and regional legislatures. In 
the 2004 elections to Tatarstan’s State Council, 85 of 100 deputies were elected under the 
United Russia banner. This notwithstanding, following the elections, eleven of Tatarstan’s 
United Russia members affiliated themselves with a political movement, Tatarstan Novyi Vek 
(Tatarstan New Century, TNV) in violation of United Russia’s Charter (Molode^h ’ Tatarstana, 
8.6.2004). TNV was created by Farid Mukhametshin in 1999 (he remains its director) as a 
political movement for the expression and protection of the interests of Tatarstan. The 
current parliamentary leader of the group, also the Chairman of the parliamentary 
Committee on Economics, Investment and Industry, Marat Galeev, makes clear that TNV 
is not a party or a faction, but only a movement to advance Tatarstan’s concerns within the 
party of power. For him, leaving United Russia would be tantamount to isolating 
Tatarstan’s state interests, and abandoning all access to the levers of influence (Interview 
with Galeev, 2004).
The continued existence of TNV illustrates two things. First, since Mukhametshin 
and Galeev are prominent and active members of the parliament and political elite, the 
group’s existence received at least tacit approval by republican leadership. Second, it 
questions the nature of Russia’s party system and the extent to which United Russia, the 
party of power in Russia, is an effective vehicle for the integration of political elites. 
Regional candidate lists are established by regional branches of the party and subsequently 
approved in a party congress. But as Tatarstan’s Minister of Justice points out, the party’s 
central organs have the discretion to remove regional candidates from the list (Kurmanov, 
2004). The party’s centralisation is challenged by members of United Russia in Tatarstan. 
Following Putin’s decision to abolish elections for regional governors, the Tatarstan branch
2 Online sources accessed 15 August 2005: http:/7 www.assnat.qc.ca/fra/patrimoine/sieges.html and 
http:/Avww.assnat.qc.ca/fra/patrimoine/votes.html.
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held a congress in November 2004 during which it strongly criticised the reform and called 
on Putin to amend his proposal (RT, 14.11.2004). The lack of responsiveness by the centre 
prompted Shaimiev, who is also the Secretary of the party’s General Council, to call for a 
greater role of regional branches and increased attention by the party’s central bodies to the 
opinions and suggestions which are made by the regional branches (TBDR, 15.11.2004). 
The absence of a means to represent republican interests qua regional or national interests 
within the centre is a factor which provokes resentment.
If in a democratic state the national interests o f Russia’s peoples are not given consideration, 
we end up with a time bomb. This feeling is especially strong in Russia’s republics. Our task 
is to defend our interests so they are heard. This does not mean that our interests and 
positions must be adopted. But nevertheless, our voice must be heard (Shaimiev in RT,
20.1.2005).
For Iskhakov, the absence of national parties poses a long-term problem of “how to 
represent national interests within legislative institutions” (Interview with Iskhakov, 2004). 
As the debate over Russia’s language law and the prohibition of Tatarstan’s transition to the 
Latin script demonstrated, the neutrality of Russia’s federal political parties was severely 
questioned: “From where does the State Duma decide to dictate its will to all the peoples of 
Russia?” (Valeev in V&D, 7.5.2002). The lack of institutionalised presence of nationalities 
within political institutions exacerbates the reliance on intergovernmental mediation. If  the 
Federal Assembly cannot be counted on to take “impartial” decisions, such as on the Latin 
script, leaders in Tatarstan are likely to rely much more on intergovernmental mechanisms 
to ensure their interests and concerns are respected.
Within Tatarstan a similar dynamic has appeared. While Shaimiev has reiterated the 
importance for Russia’s nationalities of having a voice at the centre, the consolidation of the 
republican elite has prevented the expression of difference within the republic itself. The 
political situation in Tatarstan is characterised by the stability of the governing elite, and 
particularly its consolidation around Shaimiev (Interview with Faroukshin, 2004). Most of 
the leading figures, such as Shaimiev, Tatarstan State Council speaker Mukhametshin (who 
was formerly Tatarstan’s Prime Minister) have been in place since the late perestroika era. 
Control over the political agenda is provided by “the corporate solidarity of the elite, a 
sturdy and indivisible electoral machine, and the appointment system of local chief 
executives”(Matsuzato, 2001: 72). The continuity of elites has built mutual understanding 
and compromise between them, and since the electoral machine is monopolised by 
Shaimievites, “those who defy the republican leadership are quickly marginalised” 
(Matsuzato, 2001: 52).
Shaimiev and the republican leadership do not face a substantial opposition, and 
particularly little nationalist opposition. Although nationalists groups, such as the TPC and
192
Chapter 8. Comparing Federal Design and the Accommodation of Multinationalism
Ittifak continue to exist, they have little overt influence. For Khakimov, “the nationalists 
played their role, many of their demands have been realised: we have Tatar schools, there 
are Tatar-language media, we held the referendum on sovereignty” (Interview with 
Khakimov, 2004). The republican elite co-opted much of the nationalist agenda, and many 
of the individuals involved in nationalist mobilisations in the early 1990s accepted positions 
within state institutions or left the movements (Ovrutskii, 2000; Interview with Khakimov, 
2004). Consequently those nationalist organisations that continue to exist are “very weak, 
with little material support and even less ability to receive support” (Interview with 
Iskhakov, 2004).
This consolidation has also affected the ability of Tatarstan’s Russians to secure a 
voice in the political process. Aleksandr Salagaev, head of Tatarstan’s Russian Cultural 
Society (ORK), remarks that since 1990, political and economic upward mobility in the 
republic depends in great part on nationality (Interview with Salagaev, 2004), and “on the 
support of relatives and friends which are members of an elite group” (Salagaev and 
Sergeev, 2004: 174). There is no group within Tatarstan’s parliament that addresses the 
concerns of Russians (Interview with Iskhakov, 2004). Salagaev indicates it required an 
intervention by Putin to prompt Shaimiev to follow-up on a number of the ORK’s 
concerns, such as the availability of Russian-language gymnasia in the republic and 
protection of religious monuments (Interview with Salagaev, 2004).
The lack of internal political dynamism in Tatarstan has limited the appearance of 
nationalist groups and of an electoral dimension similar to Quebec’s. The absence of 
competition has increased the leadership’s room to manoeuvre and ensures that it can deal 
with Moscow largely on its own terms. However, the lack of representation of nationalities’ 
concerns points to a wider institutional lacuna. The persistence of TNV and calls by 
Tatarstan’s United Russia members for increased responsiveness to regional demands 
illustrates the political and party system does not currently provide a mechanism for the 
aggregation of their particular interests. Moreover, the institutional weakness of Russians in 
Tatarstan’s parliament leads to a polarisation of Russians’ and Tatars’ positions. Shcheglov 
points out that increasingly, Russians view republican (e.g. Tatarstam) institutions as 
defending Tatar interests: for him the Tatarstan Ministry of Education is more akin to the 
Ministry of Tatar education, etc. (Shcheglov, 2004) Although they remain stable, inter­
ethnic relations in Tatarstan may suffer from the lack of responsiveness and voice within 
republican bodies of power. The lack of voice resulting from the managed democracy, 
which is increasingly characteristic of Russia, creates the potential for future resentment and 
instability. Quebec and the institutionalised presence of sovereignist parties within federal 
and provincial legislatures may be at the other extreme, as representation facilitates a
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permanent politicisation of the Quebec question, but representation of national interests is 
a crucial avenue for the expression and democratic evolution of views and platforms.
Since Shaimiev and the current elite manage to control the expressions of Tatar 
nationalism within the republic and address Moscow on their terms, leadership change in 
the republic and the resulting reconfiguration of the elites and structures, would 
undoubtedly affect the stability of the current patrimonial arrangements. Moreover, since 
the federal president is now responsible for choosing the leader of Tatarstan, a measure 
which was adopted to increase stability and federal control may foster increased nationalist 
mobilisation or instability should Putin select a leader who possesses less clout in his 
relations with Moscow or is less willing to protect the acquis of the Tatarstan model. 
Managed democracy, while it has provided stability, has not established a basis for 
democratic expression and adjudication of competing demands. The lack of voice — of 
Tatarstan within federal parties and the federal legislature; of Tatar nationalists and Russians 
within Tatarstan’s legislature — only exacerbates the place of intergovernmentalism in the 
adjudication of claims and issues of nationalist concern. The generational change looming in 
the Tatar elite in the next ten years will likely strain these relations further.
Conclusion
The comparison between Tatarstan and Quebec shows that in both cases, the 
accommodation of multinationality is facilitated less by a consensus over the constitution 
but by processes of intergovernmental negotiation. In both cases, the constitution does not 
provide the degree of recognition or jurisdiction which Quebec’s and Tatarstan’s leaders 
deem they require. Russia has been relatively more successful than Canada at addressing 
Tatarstan’s claim for recognition with the bilateral treaty, which provided important de facto 
recognition of Tatarstan’s status claims. This mechanism helped bridge the constitutional 
conflict. In Quebec, informal attempts at recognition have been unsuccessful in addressing 
the underlying constitutional divergences. Intergovernmental accommodation and 
agreements are hallmarks of both systems.
Bilateral cooperation and negotiation have engaged the parties in ongoing processes 
of accommodation which contribute to lend stability and continuity to the federal-regional 
relationships. In both cases, language policy is an example of successful federalism: both 
Tatarstan and Quebec possess the autonomy they require, within their specific 
constitutional contexts, to enact language policy. Tatarstan’s success in implementing 
language policies is evidence that federalism and regional autonomy can work in Russia. 
Analysis of both cases demonstrates that federal design can and does promote stability even 
in the absence of consensus on the constitution. The persistence of the constitutional
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question need not lead to paralysis, as Courchene illustrates in his description of Canada- 
Quebec relations: they are “not flashing red, not flashing green, [but] remain forever 
amber” (Courchene, 2004: 1).
In both cases, I found a comparatively greater reliance on inter-state federalism than 
on intra-state federalism. This, consequently, puts a premium on intergovernmental 
relations as the main vector of multinational accommodation, accentuating the competitive 
relationship between governments and their respective constitutional positions. In this 
regard, the comparison generates two findings. First, the intergovernmental and sometimes 
ad hoc nature of accommodation does not necessarily weaken federal design. On the 
contrary, in both cases intergovernmentalism has institutionalised ongoing political 
processes which create capacity to overcome underlying constitutional disagreements.
Second, the resilience and legitimacy of Canada’s “federative superstructure” 
demonstrates the supporting role played by common rules of the political game. Although 
Quebec continues to challenge the constitution, the acceptance of these “rules” — the 
legitimacy of the courts, of the institutions of democratic representation and political 
competition — lend stability to the processes by which Quebec articulates its claims and by 
which accommodation occurs. In Russia’s relation with Tatarstan, one key development 
since 1993 has been the gradual acceptance of the republic’s place within Russia’s federal 
design. Although the fundamental constitutional conflicts remain unresolved, the kind of 
claims advanced by Tatarstan no longer challenges the integrity of the Russian state but the 
nature of its federal system. Intergovernmental relations have successfully fostered a stable 
relationship between Moscow and Kazan, albeit one which is exceedingly reliant upon 
elites’ readiness to continue to engage each other and which is increasingly dissociated from 
democratisation: claims to the rule of law are not based on a democratic regime type. As I 
have attempted to show, the relative weakness of supporting institutions — courts, the 
territorial structure and democratic representation — are elements which presage the 
potential for future instability. Increasingly, it appears that it is not the lack of consensus on 
the constitution which is most problematic in Tatarstan, but the ongoing under­
development of supportive rules of the political game.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion
In this thesis, I sought to test theoretical propositions about the role of federal 
design in the accommodation of the challenges posed by multinationalism. By employing 
case studies of two of the world’s largest and most important federations, Russian 
Federation and Canada, and two of their most problematical units, Tatarstan and Quebec, 
my goal was to examine the nature of the constitutional disagreements — the stateness 
dilemmas — and analyse the institutions and mechanisms which have been developed to 
govern these disagreements. The general question addressed in the thesis was the following: 
H ow  does federalism and federal design com e to terms with the existence o f  
multinationalism? In the cases of Tatarstan and Quebec, I viewed multinationalism as 
expressed by two kinds of claims: for recognition and jurisdiction. The federal constitutions 
of Russia and Canada are challenged as not providing sufficient constitutional recognition 
of the specificities of Tatarstan and Quebec, or sufficient guarantees of their jurisdictional 
autonomy.
The capacity of federal design to come to terms with these demands depends on the 
nature of the claims. Indeed, claims for increased autonomy are more easily accommodated 
within existing federal institutions than claims for secession. Particularly in the case of 
Tatarstan, the evolution of the nature of its demands vis-a-vis the centre is illuminative. The 
situation in the early 1990s was characterised by discourse in which Tatarstan’s leaders 
positioned the republic at arms’ length from Russia and advocated a confederal, bottom-up 
relationship with the federal government. Tatarstan’s latest constitution, in contrast, clearly 
positions the republic within the federal institutional framework; its leaders advocate not a 
confederal relationship but for the need for more federalism in Russia, particularly greater 
protection of the republic’s jurisdictional autonomy. In Quebec, demands for constitutional 
recognition have spurred several attempts at amending the federal constitution to take 
account and reflect Quebec’s status. Yet recent political history in this regard is one of 
failure; Canada’s federal and provincial governments have been reluctant to enshrine such a 
right in the constitution, particularly for a right to withdraw with compensation from shared 
programmes in areas of provincial jurisdiction. This demand has been accommodated on an 
ad hoc basis. Consequently, the ability of federal design to come to terms with 
multinationalism in these two cases is one of mitigated success. Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s 
constitutional disagreements persist, notwithstanding efforts made to accommodate their 
demands. In other words, the ‘stateness dilemmas’ are intact.
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The next questions sought to identify the processes in place to respond to these 
ongoing constitutional disagreements. H ow  does federal design address Tatarstan’s and 
Q uebec’s demands for constitutional change? What is the role o f federal practice in 
the promotion o f stability o f federal institutions? The failures to address the claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction in the constitution gave rise in both cases to mechanisms of 
intergovernmental regulation and informal accommodation. The 1994 bilateral treaty 
between Russia and Tatarstan as well as the intergovernmental power-sharing agreements 
were crucial instruments. Moreover, these intergovernmental agreements have helped 
institutionalise and routinise processes of negotiation between Kazan and Moscow, 
fostering greater stability and predictability in the bilateral relationship. Yet, as I examined, 
many elements of Tatarstan’s status claims have been ruled unconstitutional by the courts, 
and many of the powers delegated in the intergovernmental agreements have faded. The 
insistence of Tatarstan’s leadership for a new treaty, even if it devolves little if any specific 
competences to the republic, is evidence of the continuing importance of 
intergovernmentalism as a means of accommodating Tatarstan’s status claims. In addition, 
the republic’s demand for ‘real’ federalism in Russia and increased protection o f regional 
policy autonomy is evidence that Russia’s federal design continues to be challenged. In 
comparison with Canada, the treaty has proven more effective at responding to Tatarstan’s 
demand for recognition than the measures adopted to respond to Quebec’s claims. 
Intergovernmental agreements, such as the ones in the field of immigration, provide de facto 
recognition of Quebec’s specificity and of the legitimacy of its objectives to recruit and 
integrate immigrants into its French-language culture. However, it appears unlikely that the 
province’s claim for constitutional recognition will be resolved in the near future. The 
ongoing accommodation of both Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s constitutional disagreements are 
supported mainly by intergovernmentalism. Indeed, inter-elite relations, rather than formal 
constitutional change, have appeared as the main mode of accommodation. The stability of 
accommodation processes relies on the role of elites and their willingness to continue to 
engage one another.
The comparative dimension of this study sought to assess what Canada’s 
experience contributes to our understanding of federalism in Russia. The analysis 
provides clues as to the potential for ongoing accommodation of Tatarstan’s claims. Two 
elements deserve to be mentioned here. First, as I found in the previous chapter, although 
Canada is characterised by the persistence of its stateness dilemma regarding Quebec’s 
constitutional disagreements, the mechanisms of accommodation are underpinned by a 
consensus on the ‘federative superstructure’ — for instance the courts, rules of democratic 
competition and relative stability of the federal state structure. Although consensus on the
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constitution may be lacking, particularly in terms of Quebec’s demands for recognition and 
jurisdiction, the stability and legitimacy of the institutional superstructure underpins the 
processes of intergovernmental and inter-elite negotiation and accommodation. The debate 
surrounding the Supreme Court o f Canada’s Reference on Quebec’s Secession (SCC, 1998) 
illustrates the importance and legitimacy of the court’s role. However, the federal 
government’s subsequent decision to enact the Clarity Act (2000), which creates a legal 
threshold for the federal government’s recognition of the legitimacy of a future referendum 
on Quebec’s secession, illustrates the lack of consensus on the political rules which will 
underlie the struggles surrounding the results of a future referendum on sovereignty. 
Quebec’s leaders greeted the Act as constraining its citizens’ right to self-determination. As 
then Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Joseph Facal, stated, “By adhering to this 
federation, the people of Quebec neither renounced its right to choose another political 
status nor sought to subject its destiny for all time to a Parliament of which the majority of 
members originate from outside Quebec” (Evidence, Legislative Committee on Bill C-20, 
24 February 2000). A future referendum would likely be the object of further court action 
and political challenges, the resolution of which will ultimately depends on the role o f the 
federative superstructure as well as leaders’ acceptance of the results.
The discussion of the legitimacy and role of institutions that underpin the practice 
of federalism, and particularly inter-state federalism, serves to highlight what is perhaps an 
over-reliance in Russia and Tatarstan on agency, and comparatively less consensus on the 
nature of the federative superstructure. On issues of republican status, the legitimacy of 
Russia’s Constitutional Court continues to be challenged by Tatarstan. The lack of 
representation of national concerns within the political institutions at the centre and 
republic place considerable onus on inter-elite accommodation as a means to voice and 
address these demands. The bilateral relationship between Moscow and Kazan rests on the 
stability and consolidation of the political elite. Because of the reliance on inter-elite 
accommodation of Tatarstan’s status claims, increased competition or leadership change 
carries the potential to disrupt the existing balance and jeopardise the existing processes of 
intergovernmental mediation. The prominence of inter-state federalism in the regulation of 
Tatarstan’s and Russia’s relationship places the future stability of its federal design on the 
willingness and commitment of elites to continue to accommodate one another, and is 
based on a comparatively weaker role of a federative superstructure and less confidence in 
the rules of the political game.
The second element of the comparison with Canada concerns the perception 
mentioned in Chapter 1 describing Tatarstan as the Quebec of Russia. Although both 
Tatarstan and Quebec voice similar claims for recognition and difference, the persistence of
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Quebec’s sovereignty movement is a crucial difference. This politicisation and the presence 
of sovereignist parties in Ottawa and Quebec perpetuate the political and partisan dynamic 
of Quebec’s constitutional disagreement. In Tatarstan, on the contrary, the experiences of 
the 1990s and particularly since 2000 demonstrate that the nature of the republic’s claims 
has evolved since it declared sovereignty. Tatarstan’s leaders no longer adamantly claim an 
arms’ length relationship. Their persistent demands for a status of ‘united with Russia’ are 
articulated within Russia’s federal design. Thus, the republic constitutes less of a threat to 
the integrity of the Russian state. The bilateral treaty was particularly useful in addressing 
the claims for status, and although the constitutional disagreements remain, they are in a 
state of arrested development. This is reinforced by the lack of elite turnover and 
consolidation of political leadership at the centre and in the republic. Russia’s federal system 
is not imbued with the same degree of political uncertainty regarding Tatarstan’s future 
status. Consequently, I find the expression Quebec of Russia applies to Tatarstan only 
insofar as it identifies the republic as a national component of a multinational federation 
whose constitutional status continues to be the object of political challenges.
The Prospects o f Federalism in Russia
Analysts of Russian federalism have tended to view it as a federation in form more 
than function (Herd, 1999: 263; Kahn, 1999: 277; Jackson and Lynn, 2002: 92-3; Petrov, 
2004: 213). Particularly following Putin’s federal reforms, which have given rise to a more 
centralised, if not unitary, interpretation of the federal constitution at the expense of its 
more federative provisions (Hughes, 2001a; Hughes, 2001b; Sakwa, 2004: 89-90), debates 
continue on the nature of federalism in Russia. For Ross (2002: 7), the absence of a 
democratic political culture in Russia hinders the development of “real” federalism: “Russia 
is a federation without federalism”. Although the rise of unitary tendencies and the 
managed quality of Russia’s democracy are worrisome trends, my study of Tatarstan shows 
that federalism in Russia is possible and desirable. Kurashvili notes that federalism can exist 
without democracy (Kurashvili, 2000: 23). Tatarstan’s leadership is a consistent advocate of 
federalism in Russia: its demands for cooperative federalism, increased policy-making 
autonomy and for a renegotiated bilateral treaty promote an ideal of federal government. 
The republic’s language policies are convincing evidence that federalism can and still does 
exist in Russia; it is more than federalism in form only. Indeed, autonomy over language 
policy has fostered a context conducive to the protection and development of minority 
language and culture in the republic. The way in which minority rights and diversity are 
protected is an indicator of the democratic qualities of Russia’s political regime. Although 
tensions exist between republican and federal governments, Tatarstan’s success in the
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implementation of language policy points to the existence of a functional federalism in 
Russia. While federalism can exist without full-fledged democracy, the diversity inherent in 
the Russian state makes it unlikely that democracy in Russia can exist without federalism. 
Putin’s centralising reforms cast doubt on the resilience of democratic rule in Russia.
A ccom m odating the ‘Stateness Dilemma*
The comparison between Tatarstan and Quebec highlights some findings regarding 
the nature of ‘stateness dilemmas’ in multinational federations. Canada and Quebec have 
been unable to resolve their constitutional disagreement. However, the persistence of the 
stateness dilemma, the absence of a consensus on the constitution, has not led to the 
paralysis of the federations. Transitologists’ impulse to devise a constitutional and 
institutional solution to eliminate the stateness claims and foster a consensus on national 
unity underestimate the ways in which informal accommodation, intergovernmental and 
inter-elite mediation can contribute to help promote governance capacity and stability. One 
contribution of this thesis is to show that the absence of constitutional consensus does not 
necessarily lead to state instability; it can be bridged. The empirical analysis fleshes out some 
of the limits inherent to the means used to bridge these constitutional disagreements; the 
reliance on inter-state federalism and inter-elite negotiation may not benefit from robust 
enough an institutional underpinning. The existence of Tatarstan and Quebec within the 
Russian and Canadian federations, as well as the persistence of their claims, are a condition 
of politics in these states rather than obstacles to stability which need to be resolved. 
Although the politicisation of their demands may exacerbate the paradox of multinational 
federalism, it does not necessarily hinder stable outcomes. The absence of consensus on the 
constitution, therefore, becomes an ongoing feature of the politics of multinational 
federalism, the purpose of which is focused perhaps less on solving the disagreement than 
identifying means to support their ongoing accommodation.
Agreement on the rules of the game, posited to be a pre-requisite of stability, is a 
factor of successful accommodation. Keeping this metaphor, the condition of politics in 
Russia and Canada has made it exceedingly difficult to define the format of the game which 
pleases all participants. The appearance of new players changes the nature of each side’s 
field position and demands. As long as the constitutional entrenchment of claims for 
recognition and jurisdiction — the trophy — is out of reach, players continue to play the 
game. The paradox in the cases of Quebec and Tatarstan is that while leaders in both cases 
continue to aim for the trophy and demand constitutional change, it appears unlikely the 
federal and other component governments will accede to these demands. Thus, although 
the finality of the game and its rules may be in a state of flux or uncertainty, the game —
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accommodation and politics — continues. Although the rules are sometimes bent and 
ambiguities overlooked, sometimes enforced more stringently, the stability of the game 
depends on players’ willingness stay on the field, and on an accoutumance to the process and 
eventually to the overall rules of the game. Governance capacity emerges as part of the 
process itself — the politics of multinational accommodation — rather than solely from 
establishing a prior consensus on the rules and purpose of the game.
For Gagnon and Erk, it is the ongoing character of accommodation that is the pre­
eminent characteristic of multinational politics. “When there are two divergent and
essentially incompatible conceptions of the political community and, by extension,
legitimacy, there is no magic formula to solve the problem. The way forward, therefore, lies 
in the acknowledgement of the permanence of this disagreement” (Gagnon and Erk, 2002: 
321). The study of federal design and multinational accommodation as open-ended 
processes is a fruitful avenue of exploration. This thesis confirms the Hughes’ and Sasse’s 
findings that successful federalisation and accommodation of multinationality do not 
guarantee that successful democratisation will follow (Hughes and Sasse, 2001: 229-33). In 
Russia and Tatarstan, the stability of the federal regime remains distinct from the 
democratic quality of this regime.
This thesis demonstrated that the politics of accommodation in Quebec and 
Tatarstan, though they do not solve underlying constitutional disagreements and the 
stateness dilemma, nevertheless create a degree of governance capacity. Yet as I show, this 
capacity is underpinned by an acceptance of the legitimacy and desirability of the 
institutions of politics — the federative superstructure. Many studies of multinational 
accommodation (for instance, Tully, 1995; Gagnon and Tully, 2001; Requejo, 2003; Tully, 
2005) are based on a limited number of cases such as Canada, Spain and Catalonia, Belgium, 
and Scotland. This thesis shows that these theories are helpful to make sense of the Russian 
case but with one major caveat: the assumptions regarding the institutional basis of 
accommodation (that which facilitates the “acknowledgement of disagreement” (See above, 
Gagnon and Erk, 2002: 321)) must be more explicitly acknowledged. This basis is 
constituted by institutions, elites, and on an overarching consensus on the rules of the 
political game. Theories of multinational accommodation would be strengthened by their 
application to a greater number of cases and contexts, with an eye to identifying in greater 
detail the variety of roles played by elites and institutions (formal and informal) that 
facilitate or hinder accommodation.
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A Future Research Agenda
In this thesis, I concentrated mosdy on institutional factors, signalling the 
importance of elites in processes of accommodation. One dynamic which was left aside is 
the question of the motivation of political leaders. It would be instructive to further probe 
the factors which prompt elites to engage one another. Having a better idea of what 
motivates elites — whether it is out of self-interest; to ward off secessionist threats; gain or 
consolidate power; or a genuine desire to accommodate and engage in dialogue about 
difference — is likely to help in assessing the resulting stability of the accommodation 
processes. Indeed, I would surmise that accommodation which is the result of elites’ desire 
for self-preservation would be comparatively less stable and durable than if it based on a 
genuine commitment to justice and recognition of difference. Such a shift in analysis would 
further highlight leaders’ roles and their motivations. Moreover, integrating the issue of elite 
interests, particularly economic and material interests in the case of Tatarstan and Russia, 
might reveal additional factors which keep leaders at the negotiating table.
My discussion of the effectiveness of Russia’s federal design at providing a basis for 
the accommodation of multinationalism was limited to the case of Tatarstan, a prominent 
case of successful accommodation in literature on post-Soviet transitions and Russian 
federalism. Yet the case of Chechnya is a glaring example of the opposite. Such a counter­
example helps demonstrate that the nature of elites’ demands — Chechnya’s claim for 
outright independence rather than ‘sovereignty’ — as well as the relative willingness of 
leaders to engage in accommodation, are key elements in the creation of capacity for 
accommodation. Its also helps contextualise the results of the present study. Although 
Quebec and Tatarstan are viewed as persistent problems within the Canadian and Russian 
federations, they are cases of non-violent constitutional crises, where the nature of the 
claims and the political and institutional responses have facilitated peaceful solutions and 
accommodation. These findings invite further research and cross-case comparisons within 
Russia, particularly between Tatarstan and other republics. Does the Tatarstan model of 
federal-regional relations continue to play a role in the configuration of the relations 
between the federal and governments of other federal subjects? Gorenburg’s (2003) 
comparative study of nationalist mobilisation in Russia’s republics identified the bases for 
successful nationalist movements during the early 1990s. Useful would be similar 
comparative studies of reactions in the republics to Putin’s federal reforms, in order to see 
how the bilateral treaties and intergovernmental mediation, the hallmark of the Yeltsin 
administration’s approach to Russia’s ethno-territorial subjects, have fared. Importantly,
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such studies could generate evidence of whether the mode of accommodation prevalent in 
Tatarstan is unique to the republic or practiced in other cases.
Minority language rights are another area of prospective research. There is a gap in 
scholarship and empirical studies on the way in which language rights are protected in 
Russia’s regions. The constitutional status which facilitates the protection of language in 
Tatarstan serves to restrain it in others. The constitutional asymmetry created by article 68 
enable Tatarstan to adopt measures to protect the Tatar language is used in other republics 
as a means to block the recognition and protection of minority language rights. Indeed, in 
many republics, constitutional autonomy in the field of language does not guarantee the 
protection of language rights of the titular group let alone those of minority or non-titular 
groups within the same territorial unit. The federal government has adopted a personal 
language regime, guaranteeing a right to members of linguistic minorities to use and protect 
their language. But in regions such as Bashkortostan, this right is often subject to limitations 
by a territorial language policy adopted to give preferential treatment to a titular ethnicity. 
The analysis must be extended to other republics, and importantly, to cases of non- 
territorialised linguistic minorities in order to assess the extent to which Russia’s federal 
design and federal practices help or hinder the protection of minority rights and languages.
In conclusion, this thesis found that ‘successful’ accommodation of 
multinationalism in Russia and Canada is contingent on several factors: the nature of 
Tatarstan’s and Quebec’s claims for recognition and jurisdiction, the ability of federal design 
to respond to these claims, and political elites’ willingness and ability to engage one another 
to bridge and accommodate conflicting demands. The challenge is to keep developing and 
strengthening the institutional basis and the goodwill and mutual understanding on which 
accommodation rests. In a nutshell, the findings are twofold. First, process matters: federal 
institutions are supported and strengthened by the role and activities of political elites. 
Asymmetry is not unstable per se, as it was useful in these cases to establish a process of 
ongoing accommodation and negotiation. Second, this process helps reinforce the regime in 
place, but as the examination of the case of Tatarstan shows, it is not necessarily conducive 
to a consolidation of democratic governance. In terms of possible directions of federal 
development in Russia, although Putin’s reforms centralised power, they have not led to the 
development of greater institutional solidity. The fact that federal design and federal 
practices rest on a relatively weak institutional foundation serves to undermine their 
legitimacy and prospective endurance. For the time being however, multinational 
federalism, although it can be a risky and uncertain venture, has proven capable in Russia 
and Canada to provide a framework for stable governance and outcomes.
203
Sources
Sources
List o f Interviews
Bairamova, Luiza K. (2004). Professor of Philology, Kazan State University. Kazan: Kazan 
State University, 29 June 2004.
Bastarache, Michel (2004). Justice, Supreme Court of Canada. Ottawa: Supreme Court of 
Canada, 6 December 2004.
Bilodeau, Roger (2004). Lawyer, Heenan Blaikie LLP. Former Deputy Attorney General 
and Deputy Minister of Justice for New Brunswick. Ottawa: Offices of Heenan 
Blaikie LLP.
Cardinal, Linda (2004). Professor of political science and Director, Chaire de recherche sur 
la francophonie et les politiques publiques. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 15 
December 2004.
Dumas, Guy (2004). Associate Deputy Minister, Secretariat a la politique linguistique. 
Quebec: Offices of the Secretariat, 7 December 2004.
Faroukshin, Midkhat (2004). Professor of Political Science, Kazan State University. Kazan: 
Kazan State University, 23 April 2004.
Galeev, Marat G. (2004). Chairman, State Council Committee on Economy, Investment 
and Property. Kazan: Tatarstan State Council, 8 June 2004.
Galiakhmetov, Ildar R. (2004). Manager, Department of Education, City of Kazan. Kazan: 
Department of Education of City of Kazan, 4 June 2004.
Gosselin, Jacques (2004). Director, Secretariat a la politique linguistique. Quebec: Offices of 
the Secretariat, 7 December 2004.
Gymadiev, Aidar (2004). Editor, Sabantuy Newspaper. Kazan: Editorial Offices.
Iskhakov, Damir (2004). Chief Academic Collaborator. Department of Ethnology, Institute 
of History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. Kazan: Offices of Institute of History, 4 
June 2004.
Khakimov, Rafael S. (2004). State Advisor to President on Political Affairs. Kazan: 
Presidential residence, Kremlin, 12 April 2004.
Minnullin, Kim M. (2004). Director, Cabinet of Ministers’ Department on the Development 
of the Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan. Kazan: Cabinet of Ministers of 
Tatarstan, 17 May and 11 June 2004.
Nizamova, Lilia (2004). Dotsent, Department of Sociology. Kazan: Kazan State University, 
17 May 2004.
Sagitova, Lilia B. (2004). Senior Academic Collaborator. Department of Ethnology, Institute 
o f History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. Kazan: Offices of Institute of History, 
24 June 2004.
Salagaev, Aleksandr (2004). Director, Russian Cultural Society. Kazan, 22 June 2004.
Sauvageau, Benoit (2004). Member of Parliament for Repentigny, former Bloc Quebecois 
Spokesperson on Official Languages. Ottawa: House of Commons, 14 December 
2004.
Shaikhieva, Faria R. (2004). Collaborator. Cabinet of Ministers' Department on the
Development of the Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan. Kazan: Cabinet of 
Ministers of Tatarstan, 11 June 2004.
Tremblay, Johane (2004). General Counsel, Director of Legal Services of the Office of the 
Commissioner of Official Languages. Ottawa: Office of the Commissioner of 
Official Languages, 17 December 2004.
Valeev, Razil I. (2004). Chairman of Tatarstan State Council on Science, Culture and 
National Questions. Kazan: Tatarstan State Council, 1 June 2004.
Zaznaev, Oleg I. (2004). Dotsent, Department of Political Science. Kazan: Kazan State 
University, 25 May 2004.
204
Sources
Zheleznov, Boris (2004). Professor, Department of Law. Kazan: During Conference
“Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya: Federalizm v Rossii, Kanade i Bel'gii: opyt 
sravnitel'nogo issledovaniya”, 18 May 2004.
Bibilography
Alexseev, M. A. (2001). “Decentralization Versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia’s 
Endurance.” Journal of Peace Research 38 (1): 101-6.
Almond, G. A. (1956). “Comparative Political Systems.” Journal of Politics 18 (3): 391-409.
Amoretti, U. M. (2004). Federalism and Territorial Cleavages. Federalism and Territorial
Cleavages. U. M. Amoretti and N. Bermeo, Eds. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press: 1-23.
Bairamova, L. K. (1993). Mevfetnicheskie i mesfkonfessional’nye otnosheniya v Rispublike Tatarstan, 
Conference proceedings, Kazan.
Bairamova, L. K. (1997). “Ravnopravie yazykov neitralizuet konflikty.” Nauchnii Tatarstan 
(2): 8-12.
Bairamova, L. K. (2001). Tatarstan: Yasykovaya simmetriya i asimmetriya. Kazan: Izdatel’stvo 
Kazanskogo Universiteta.
Bairamova, L. K. (2004). Professor of Philology, Kazan State University. Interview with 
Author. Kazan: Kazan State University, 29 June 2004.
Bakvis, H. and G. Skogstad (2002). Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and 
Legitimacy. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Banting, K. G. and R. Simeon, Eds. (1985). Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional 
Change. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Barry, B. (1989). Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy. Democracy, Power 
and Justice Oxford, Clarendon: 100-35.
Bastarache, M., Ed. (1986). Les droits linguistiques au Canada. Cowansville: Editions Yvon 
Blais.
Bastarache, M. (2004a). Justice, Supreme Court of Canada. Interview with Author. Ottawa: 
Supreme Court of Canada, 6 December 2004.
Bastarache, M., Ed. (2004b). Les droits linguistiques au Canada. Deuxieme edition. Cowansville: 
Editions Yvon Blais.
Baubock, R. (2000). Why Stay Together? A Pluralist Approach to Secession and Federation. 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies. W. Kymlicka and W. Norman, Eds. London, Oxford 
University Press: 366-94.
Behiels, M. D. (2004). Canada’s Francophone Minority Communities: Constitutional Renewal and the 
Winning of School Governance. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Beissinger, M. R. (2002). Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State: A  Tidal 
Approach to the Study of Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Belanger, C. (2001). The Powers of Disallowance and Reservation in Canadian Federalism. Online 
source accessed 10 August 2005
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/federal/disallow.htm.
Bermeo, N. (2005). Position Paper for the Working Group on Federalism, Conflict Prevention and 
Settlement. 3rd International Conference on Federalism, Brussels.
Bouchard, P. and R. Y. Bourhis (2002). “Introduction: La Charte de la langue frangaise. 
Bilan, enjeux et perspectives.” Revue d’amenagement linguistique. Fall 2002.
Bourassa, R. (1971). Journaldes debats. Quebec: Assemblee nationale du Quebec. 23 June 
1971.
Bourassa, R. (1975). Journal des debats. Quebec: Assemblee nationale du Quebec. 18 March 
1975: 1.
Bourgault, P. (1966). Un Quebec unilingue fran^ais! Online audio clip, accessed 30 June 
2005: h ttp :// archives.radio-canada.ca/IDC-0-17-1300- 
7518/politique economie/loi 101/.
205
Sources
BouthiUier, G. (1981). Aux origines de la planification linguistique quebecoise. L ’Etat et la
planification linguistique. Tome II: Etudes de casparticuliers. A. Martin, Ed. Quebec, Office 
de la langue fransaise .
BouthiUier, G. andj. Meynaud (1972). Ee choc des langues au Quebec 1760-1970. Montreal: 
Presses de l’Universite du Quebec.
BQ (2000). Declaration de principe et orientations du Bloc Ouehecois. Online source accessed 31 
August 2005:
http ://www.blocquebecois.org/ archivage/Declaration_orientations_2000.pdf.
Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bunce, V. (1999). Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cairns, A. C. (1985). The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada. Redesigning the State: 
The Politics of Constitutional Change. K. G. Banting and R. Simeon, Eds. Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press: 95-145.
Cairns, A. C. (1992). Charter versus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform. Montreal 
& Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Canada (1940). Report. Ottawa: Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations.
Canada (1965). Rapportpreliminaire de la Commission royale d’enquete sur le bilinguisme et le 
biculturalisme. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer.
Canada (1967). Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. General 
Introduction: The Official Languages. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer.
Canada (1970). Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Ottawa: Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.
Canada (1978). A  Future Together. Ottawa: Report of the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on 
Canadian Unity.
Canada (1991). Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future: Report to the People and Government of Canada. 
Ottawa: The Forum.
Canada (1992). A  Renewed Canada. Ottawa: Report of Special Joint Committee of the Senate 
and the House of Commons.
Canada (1995). “Motion on recognition of Quebec as distinct society.” House of Commons 
Journals no.275 (35th Parliament, 1st session).
Canada (2003). The N ext Act: New Momentum for Canada’s Linguistic Duality. The Action Plan for 
Official Languages. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
Canada (2005a). Equalisation Program. Online source accessed 11 August 2005: 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/FEDPROV/eqpe.html.
Canada (2005b). Federal Transfers to Provinces and Territories. Online source accessed 11 August 
2005: http://www.fin.gc.ca/FEDPROV/ftpte.html.
Canada (2005c). Federal Tran fers to Quebec. Online source accessed 11 August 2005: 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/FEDPROV/mtpe.html#Quebec.
Canada-Quebec (1971). Agreement relative to the presence of orientation officers o f the 
Department of Immigration of Quebec in federal immigration offices outside 
Canada. 18 May 1971.
Canada-Quebec (1975). Agreement concerning information, recruitment and selection of 
foreign nationals residing outside of Canada for permanent residence or temporary 
employment in the Province of Quebec. 17 October 1975.
Canada-Quebec (1978). Agreement between the Government of Canada and the
Gouvernement du Quebec with regard to co-operation on immigration matters and 
on the selection of foreign nationals wishing to settle either permanently of 
temporarily in Quebec. 20 February 1978.
Canada-Quebec (1991). Canada-Quebec Accord on Immigration.
206
Sources
Cardinal, L. (2004). Professor of political science and Director, Chaire de recherche sur la 
francophonie et les politiques publiques. Interview with Author. Ottawa: University of 
Ottawa, 15 December 2004.
Carens, J. H. (1995). Is Quebec Nationalism Just? Perspectives from Anglophone Canada. Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Cashaback, D. (2003). “Risky Strategies? Putin’s Federal Reforms and the Accommodation 
of Difference in Russia.” journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (3).
Castonguay, C., P. Dubuc, et al. (2002). Earose n ’estpas Earousse: Regards critiques - Ea
Commission des Etats generaux sur la situation de la langue fran$aise au Quebec. Montreal: 
Editions Trois-Pistoles et Editions du renouveau quebecois.
Chevrier, M. (1997). Des lois et des langues au Quebec: Principes et moyens de la politique linguistique 
quebecoise. Quebec: Ministere des Relations internationales.
Cholette, G. (1993). E  Office de la languefranffise de 1961 a 1974. Quebec: Institut quebecois 
de la recherche sur la culture.
Clark, W. A. (1998). Presidential Prefects in the Russian Provinces: Yeltsin’s Regional 
Cadres Policy. Elites and Eeadership in Russian Politics. G. Gill, Ed. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan.
Coalson, R. (2004). “Russian Ad Giant Losing its Grip.” R F E /R E  Media Matters, 4 (11), 18 
June 2004.
Council of Europe (CoE) (2002). Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities: Opinion on the Russian Federation. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 13 September 2002.
Concept (2002). Kontseptija ra^granicheniyapolnomochii meffidu organamigosudarstvennoi vlasti, 
organamigosudarstvennoi vlastisub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami mestnogo 
samoupravleniya po obshchim voprosam organi^ atsii organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti i mestnogo 
samoupravlenija. Komissiya pri Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po podgotovke 
predlozhenii o razgranicheniya predmetov vedeniya i polnomochii mezhdu 
federal’nymi organami rosudarstvennoi vlasti, organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti 
sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami mestnogo samoupravleniya. Published in 
I^vestia, 25 July 2002. Online source accessed 25 July 2002: ’
http://izvestia.ru/politic/article21570.
Connor, W. (1984). The National Question in Marxist-Eeninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Coppieters, B. (2001). Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus. London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs.
Courchene, T. J. (2004). The Changing Nature of Quebec-Canada Relations: From the 1980 
Referendum to the Summit of the Canadas. Kingston: IIGR Working Paper 2004(2).
Commission de protection de la langue fran^aise (CPLF) (2002). Rapport annuel degestion 
2001-2002. Quebec: Commission de protection de la langue fran9aise.
Croisat, M. (1998). Le partage des pouvoirs dans le federalisme canadien : Une perspective 
comparee. Ee federalisme de demain : reformes essentielles. G. A. Beaudoin, J. A. Magnet, 
B. Pelletier, G. Robertson and J. Trent, Eds. Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur: 59-66.
Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Davis, H., P. Hammond, et al. (2000). “Media, Language Policy and Cultural Change in
Tatarstan: Historic vs. Pragmatic Claims to Nationalism.” Nations and Nationalism 6
(2): 203-26.
Dikshit, R. D. (1975). ThePolitical Geography of Federalism: A n  Inquiry into Origins and Stability. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Dowley, K. M. (1998). “Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia: Comparative Regional 
Government Strategies.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (4): 359-80.
Drobizheva, L. (2003). Dialog kak rychag vlasti. Eitematumaya Ga^eta. 17 September 2003: 4.
Drobizheva, L. (2004). Author’s Notes from Public Lecture on Ethnosociology. Centre for 
Sociology of Culture, Kazan State University, 15 May 2004.
207
Sources
Duchacek, I. D. (1987 [1970]). Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics. 
London: University Press of America.
Dufour, C. (1998). Rapport sur le projet dUnion sociale en regard de la vision quebecoise du federalisme 
canadien. Montreal: Ecole nationale d’administration publique.
Dumas, G. (2004). Associate Deputy Minister, Secretariat a la politique linguistique. Interview 
with Author. Quebec: Offices of the Secretariat, 7 December 2004.
Duplessis, M. (1946). Declaration. Conferencefederale-provinciale. 29 avril 1946. Ottawa: King’s 
Printer.
Duplessis, M. (1950). Discours d’ouverture. Conference federale-provinciale au sujet de la Constitution. 
10-12janvier 1950. Ottawa: King’s Printer.
Elazar, D. J. (1987). FLxploringFederalism. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Erk, J. and A.-G. Gagnon (2000). “Constitutional Ambiguity and Federal Trust:
Codification of Federalism in Canada, Spain and Belgium.” Regional and Federal 
Studies 10(1): 92-111.
Faroukshin, M. (2004). Professor of Political Science, Kazan State University. Interview with 
Author. Kazan: Kazan State University, 23 April 2004.
Filippov, M., P. C. Ordeshook, et al. (2004). DesigningFederalism: A  Theory of Self Sustaining 
Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Foley, M. (1989). The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, Abeyances* and Political Temperament in the 
Maintenance of Government. London: Routledge.
Gagnon, A.-G. and J. Erk (2002). Legitimacy, Effectiveness, and Federalism: On the
Benefits of Ambiguity. Canadian Federalism: Performance, Fffectiveness, and Legitimacy. H. 
Bakvis and G. Skogstad, Eds. Toronto, Oxford University Press: 317-30.
Gagnon, A.-G. and J. Tully, Eds. (2001). Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Galeev, M. G. (2004). Chairman, State Council Committee on Economy, Investment and 
Property. Interview with Author. Kazan: Tatarstan State Council, 8 June 2004.
Galiakhmetov, I. R. (2004). Manager, Department of Education, City of Kazan. Interview with 
Author. Kazan: Department of Education of City of Kazan, 4 June 2004.
Ganiev, F. A. (1997). “Funktsionirovanie tatarskogo yazyka kak gosudarstvennogo.” 
Nauchnii Tatarstan (3-4): 114-6.
Garaev, F. M. (2002). Avtoreferat: Sotsiolingvicheskie problemy reali^atsii Zakona “0 yasykakh
Narodov Respubliki Tatarstan**. Institut Yazyka, literatury i iskusstva im. Ibragimova. 
Kazan: Tatarstan Academy of Sciences.
Garipov, Y. Z. and H. M. Faller (2003). The Politics of Language Reform and Bilingualism 
in Tatarstan. Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries. F. 
Daftary and F. Grin, Eds. Budapest, Open Society Institute: 163-83.
Gel’man, V. (2000). Subnational Institutions in Contemporary Russia. Institutions and Political 
Change in Russia. N. Robinson, Ed. London, MacMillan: 85-105.
Gel’man, V. (2001). The Rise and Fall of Federal Reform in Russia: PONARS Policy Memo 
238.
Gemar, J.-C. (1983). Les trois etats de la politique linguistique du Quebec: D*une societe traduite a une 
societe d’expression. Quebec: Editeur officiel du Quebec.
Gibbins, R. (1982). Regionalism: Territorialpolitics in Canada and the United States. Toronto: 
Butterworths.
Goble, P. (2000). Shaimiev Urges Division of Powers. R F E /R L  Russian Federation Report. 30 
August 2000. 2.
Goble, P. (2001). “Is there a Quebec in Russia’s Future?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 24 
July 2001.
Goble, P. (2005). “Non-Russian Broadcasts Threatened by Moscow Corporate Reform.” 
R F E /R L  Media Matters 12 April 2005.
Gorenburg, D. (2003). Minority Ethnic Mobilisation in the Russian Federation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
208
Sources
Gorenburg, D. (2005). Tatar language Policies in Comparative Perspective: Why Some Revivals Fail 
and Some Succeed. Conference Paper: Debating Language Policies in Canada and 
Europe, University of Ottawa.
Gosselin, J. (2003). “L’evolution de la legislation linguistique au Quebec.” Revue 
d’amenagement linguistique (105).
Gosselin, J. (2004). Director, Secretariat a la politique linguistique. Interview with Author. 
Quebec: Offices of the Secretariat, 7 December 2004.
Graney, K. E. (1999). Projecting Sovereignty: Statehood and Nationness in Post-Soviet
Russia. Department of Political Science: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Unpublished 
PhD Thesis.
Graney, K. E. (2001). Projecting Sovereignty in Post-Soviet Russia: Tatarstan in the 
International Arena. Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order. M. 
Keating and J. McGarry, Eds. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Gray,J. (2000). Two Faces of Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
GSRF (Gosudarstvennyi Sovet Rossiiskoi Federatsii — State Council of the Russian
Federation) (2002). “Proekt Kontseptsii gosudartvennoi politiki po razgranicheniyu 
predmetov vedeniya i polnomochii mezhdu federal’nym, regional’nym i 
munitsipal’nym urovnyami vlasti.” Ka^anskii Federalist (1).
Guboglo, M. N., Ed. (1997). Federalism vlasti i vlast’federali^ma. Moscow: IntelTekh.
Gymadiev, A. (2004). Editor, Sabantuy Newspaper. Interview with Author. Kazan: Editorial 
Offices.
Hanson, S. E. (2001). Defining Democratic Consolidation. Postcommunism and the Theory of 
Democray. R. D. Anderson Jr., M. S. Fish, S. E. Hanson and P. G. Roeder, Eds. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press: 126-51.
Hay, C. and D. Wincott (1998). “Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism.” Political 
Studies (46): 951-7.
Hayday, M. (2001). “Confusing and Conflicting Agendas: Federalism, Official Languages 
and the Development of the Bilingualism in Education Program in Ontario, 1970- 
1983.” Journal of Canadian Studies 36 (1): 50-79.
Hayday, M. (Forthcoming 2005). Bilingual Today, United Tomorrow. Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Herd, G. P. (1999). “Russia: Systemic Transformation or Federal Collapse?” Journal of Peace 
Research 36 (3): 259-69.
Hogg, P. W. (1985). Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd Edition. Toronto: Carswell.
Hogg, P. W. (1988). Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated. Toronto: Carswell.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Houle, F. (1999). Des identites nationales dans le regime federal canadien. Dislocation et 
permanence: L ’invention du Canada au quotidien. C. Andrew, Ed. Ottawa, Presses de 
l’Universite d’Ottawa.
Hughes, J. (1996). “Moscow’s Bilateral Treaties Add to Confusion.” Transition 2 (19): 39-44.
Hughes, J. (2001a). From Federalisation to Recentralisation. Developments in Russian Politics 5. 
Z. Y. Gitelman, S. White and A. Pravda, Eds. Basingstoke, Palgrave: 128-46.
Hughes, J. (2001b). Managing secession potential in the Russian Federation. Regions in
Conflict Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union. G. Sasse, Ed. London, Frank 
Cass: 36-68.
Hughes, J. and G. Sasse, Eds. (2001). Regions in Conflict: Ethnicity and Territory in the Former 
Soviet Union. London: Frank Cass.
Huskey, E. (2001). Political Leadership and the Center-periphery Struggle: Putin’s
Administrative Feforms. Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's 
Transition. L. Shevtsova, Ed. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace: 113-42.
Hyde, M. (2001). “Putin’s Federal Reforms and Their Implications for Presidential Power in 
Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 53 (5): 719-43.
209
Sources
Iskhakov, D. (1997). Problemy stanovleniya i transformatsii tatarskoi natsii. Kazan: Master Lain.
Iskhakov, D. (1998a). Sovremennyi natsionalizm Tatar. Suverennyi Tatarstan. Sovremennyi 
natsionalizm Tatar. D. Iskhakov, Ed. Moscow, TsIMO.
Iskhakov, D., Ed. (1998b). Suverennyi Tatarstan. Dokumenty i materialy. Khronika. Moscow: 
TsIMO.
Iskhakov, D., Ed. (1998c). Suverennyi Tatarstan. ‘Model* Tatarstana*. Moscow: TsIMO.
Iskhakov, D., Ed. (1998d). Suverennyi Tatarstan. Sovremennyi natsionalizm Tatar. Moscow: 
TsIMO.
Iskhakov, D. (2004). Chief Academic Collaborator. Department of Ethnology, Institute of 
History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. Interview with Author. Kazan: Offices of 
Institute of History, 4 June 2004.
Iskhakova, Z. A. (2001). Dvuyaychie vgorodakh Tatarstana (1980-P0egody). Kazan: Fiker.
Iskhakova, Z. A. (2003a). Yazyk kak faktor stabil’nosti i konfrontatsii. Aktual*nye voprosy 
tatarskogoyasykoznaniya. M. Z. Zakiev and F. S. Bayazitova, Eds. Kazan, Fiker.
Iskhakova, Z. A. (2003b). Yazyk kak faktor stabil’nosti i konfrontatsii. Aktualnye voprosy 
Tatarskogoyasykozpaniya, lypusk 2 Kazan Fiker: 112-19.
Ittifak (1991). “Programme of the Tatar Party of National Independence Ittifak.” Panorama 
(6): 15-25.
Jackson, L. J. and N. J. Lynn (2002). “Constructing ‘Federal Democracy’ in Russia: Debates 
Over Structures of Power in the Regions.” RegionalandFederalStudies 12 (1): 91-125.
Johnson, D. (1968). Constitutional Conference. Proceedings. First Meeting February 5, 1968. Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer.
Johnson, D. (1990 [1965]). Egalite ou independance. Outremont: VLB.
Kahn, J. (1998). Federalism, Democracy and Asymmetry: Issues in Comparative
Perspective. Federalism: Choices in Taw, Institutions and Polity. A  Comparative Approach 
with Focus on the Russian Federation. K. Malfliet and L. Nasyrova, Eds. Leuven: Garant.
Kahn, J. (1999). Federal Facade: Problems in the Development of Russian Federalism. 
Unpublished PhD thesis. Oxford: Oxford University.
Kahn, J. (2002). Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of haw in Russia. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Katznelson, I. (1997). Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics. Comparative 
Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman, Eds. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 81-112.
Keating, M. (2001). Plurinational Democray: Stateless Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Khadiullin, I. G. (1999). Realizatsiia Zakona “O Yazykakh narodov Respubliki Tatarstan” v 
obrazovatelnykh uchrezhdeniyakh. Yasykovaia Situatsiia v Respublike Tatarstan: 
Sostoyanie i Perspektivy, Chast 1. Kazan: 59-67.
Khairullin, I. K., L. V. Gorokhova, et al., Eds. (1998). Yazykovayapolitika v Respublike 
Tatarstan: Dokumenty i materialy 20-30egg. Kazan: Magarif.
Khairullin, I. K., K. M. Minnullin, et al., Eds. (1999). Yaykovaya situatsiya v Respublike 
Tatarstan: Sostoyanie iperspektivy. Kazan: Master Lain.
Khakimov, R. S. (1990). “Ne privelegii, a zashchita.” Panorama (4).
Khakimov, R. S. (1996). “Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View From Tatarstan.” 
Security Dialogue 27 (1): 69-80.
Khakimov, R. S. (1997). Asimmetrichnost’ Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Bzglyad iz Tatarstana.
Asimmetrichnost*federatsii. A. A. Zakharov, Ed. Moscow, Moskovskii obshchestvennyi 
nauchnyi fond: 61-76.
Khakimov, R. S. (2004). State Advisor to President on Political Affairs. Interview with Author. 
Kazan: Presidential residence, Kremlin, 12 April 2004.
Kharisov, F. (2002). Address to Congress by Minister of Education. Third All Tatar World 
Congress, Kazan.
210
Sources
Kondrashov, S. (2000). Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988-92. London: 
MacMillan.
KSRF (Konstitutsionny sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii — Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation) (1992). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o 
proverke konstitutsionnosti Deklaratsii o gosudarstvennom suverenitete Tatarskoi i'i'R  ot 30 
avgusta 1990 goda, Zakona Tatarskoi i ’i'R  ot 18 aprelya 1991 goda ‘Ob i^ meneniyakh i 
dopolneniyakh Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo Zakona) Tatarskoi SSR”, postanovleniya Verkhovnogo 
Soveta Respuhliki Tatarstan ot 21 fevralya 1992 goda “O provedenii referenduma Respubliki 
Tatarstana po voprosu o gosudarstvennom statuse Respubliki Tatarstan. 3-P. 13 March 1992.
KSRF (1997). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke
konstitutsionnostipoloyheniy absatsa vtorogo punkta 2 stati i stati 20 Zakona Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii ot 27 dekabrya 1991 goda “Ob osnovakh nalogovoi sistemy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii”. 
5-P. 21 March 1997.
KSRF (1998a). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke 
konstitutsionnosti Lesnogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1-P. 9 January 1998.
KSRF (1998b). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke 
konstitutsionnosti otdel’nykh polosfeniy chasti pervoi stati 92 Konstitutsii Respubliki 
Baskhkortostan, chasti pervoi stati 3 Zakona Respubliki Baskhkortostan “O Presfdente 
Respubliki Baskhkortostan” (v redaktsii ot 28 avgusta 1997goda) i statei 1 i 7 Zakona 
Respubliki Baskhkortostan “O tyborakh Respubliki Baskhkortostan”. 12-P. 27 April 1998.
KSRF (2000a). Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po yaprosu gruppy deputatov 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy o proverke sootvetstviya Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii otdel’nykh 
poloyheniy konstitutsiy Respubliki Adygeya, Respubliki Bashkortostan, Respubliki Ingushetiya, 
Respubliki Komi, Respubliki Osetiya-Alaniya i Respubliki Tatarstan. 92-0. 27 June 2000.
KSRF (2000b). Postavlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke
konstitutsionnosti otdel’nykh polo^heniy Konstitutsii Respubliki A ltai i Federal’nogo %akona 
“Ob obshchikh printsipakh organi^ atsii %akonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh 
organovgosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 10-P. 7 June 2000.
KSRF (2001a). Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po khodataistvu
polnomochnogo predstavitelya Presfdenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Privolspskom federal’nom okruge 
ob ofitsial’nom r a f’yasnenii opredeleniya KSRF ot 27 iyunya 2000 goda. 65-0. 19 April
2001 .
KSRF (2001b). Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po yaprosu Soveta Repub liki 
Gosudarstvennogo Soveta -  Xase Respubliki Adygeia o proverke sootvetstviya Konstitutsii 
Ressiiskoi Federatsii punkta 1 stati 76 Konstitutsii Respubliki Adygeia. 260-0. 13 
November 2001.
KSRF (2002). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Ressiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke
konstitutsionnosti chasti vtoroi stati 69, chasti vtoroi stati 70 i stati 90 Konstitutsii Respubliki 
Tatarstan, a taksfe punkta 2 stati 4 i punkta 8 stati 21 Zakona Respubliki Tatarstan “O 
tyborakh nardonykh deputatov Respubliki Tatarstan” v svyasf s yhaloboigra^danina M.M. 
Salyamova. 2-P. 22 January 2002.
KSRF (2003). Konstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Postavlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda 
Rossiiskogo Federatsii po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti polo^henii statei 115 i 231 GPK 
EJ’F i’R, statei 26, 251 i 253 GPK Ressiiskoi Federatsii, statei 1, 21 i 22 federal’nogo %akona 
‘O Prokuratore Ressiiskoi Federatsii” v svyasq s ^aprosamigosudarstvennoro sobraniya - 
kurultaya Respubliki Bashkortostan, Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan i 
Verkhovnogo Suda Respubliki Tatarstan. 18 July.
KSRF (2004). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Ressiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke
konstitutsionnosti polosfeniy punkta 2 stati 10 Zakona Respubliki Tatarstan ‘O yaykakh  
narodov Respubliki Tatarstan ”, chasti vtoroi stati 9 Zakona Respubliki Tatarstan “O 
gosudarstvennykh Respubliki Tatarstan i drugikhyasykakh v Respublike Tatarstan ”, punkta 2 
stati 6 Zakona Respubliki Tatarstan “Ob obrayovanii” ipunkta 6 stati 3 Zakona Ressiiskoi 
Federatsii “O yasykakh narodov Ressiiskoi Federatsii” v syyasq s tfaloboi gra^hdanina S. I.
211
Sources
Khapugina i ^aprosami Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan i Verkhovnogo Suda 
Respubliki Tatarstan. 16-P. 16 November 2004.
KSRT (Konstitutsionnyi Sud Respubliki Tatarstan — Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Tatarstan) (2003a). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Respubliki Tatarstan po delu o 
tolkovanii otdel’nykh polozhenii statei 5, 21, 91 Konstitutsii Respubliki Tatarstan. 9-P. 30 
May 2003.
KSRT (2003b). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Respubliki Tatarstan po delu o tolkovanii
polo^henija chasti pervoi stati 1 Konstitutsii Respubliki Tatarstan. 8-P. 7 February 2003.
KSRT (2003c). Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Respubliki Tatarstan po delu o tolkovanii 
polozfeniya chasti pervoi stati 8 v ego v%aimosvya%i s chast’yu pervoi stati 4 Konstitutsii 
Respubliki Tatarstan. 23 December 2003.
Kurashvili, K. T. (2000). Federativnaya organi^ atsiya Rossiiskogo gosudarstva. Moscow: 
Kompaniya Sputnik.
Kurchakov, R. and R. S. Khakimov (1989). “Khozyaistvennyi mekhanizm soyuznyi 
respubliki.” Voprosy Ekonomiki (12).
Kurmanov, M. (2004). Author’s notes. Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya: Federalizm v 
Rossii, Kanade i Bel’gii: opyt sravnitel’nogo issledovaniya, Kazan.
Kuzio, T. (2001). “Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?” Politics 21
(3): 168-77.
Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship: A  UberalTheoy of Minority Rights. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Kymlicka, W. (1998). Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. Toronto: 
Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2001). Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship. 
London: Oxford University Press.
Laforest, G. (1995). Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream. Montreal & Kingston: McGill- 
Queen’s University Press.
Lankina, T. (2003). Federal, Regional Interests Shape Local Reforms. Russian Regional Report. 
29 September 2003. 8.
Laporte, P. (1965). Livre blanc. Quebec: Ministere des Affaires culturelles.
LaSelva, S. V. (1996). The Moralfoundations of Canadian federalism: Paradoxes, achievements, and 
tragedies of nationhood. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Laurin, C. (1977). jL a politique quebecoise de la langue franfaise. Quebec: Editeur officiel du 
Quebec.
Laurin, C. (1999). Une traversee du Quebec. Montreal: L’Hexagone.
Leckey, R. and E. Didier (2004). Le droit linguistique prive. Les droits linguistiques au Canada. 
Deuxieme edition. M. Bastarache, Ed. Cowansville, Editions Yvon Blais.
Lesage, J. (1964). Discours d’ouverture, Conferencefederale-provinciale, 26-29 novembre 1963. Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer.
Lesage, J. (1965). Speech by Jean Lesage. Vancouver: Canadian Club.
Linz, J. J. and A. Stepan (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
Linz, J. J. and A. Stepan (1997). Toward Consolidated Democracies. Consolidating the Third 
Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. L. Diamond, M. F. Plattner, Y.-h. Chu and 
H.-m. Tien, Eds. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press: 14-33.
Livingstone, W. S. (1952). “A note on the nature of federalism.” Political Science Quarterly 67
(1): 81-95.
Lotfullin, M. (2004). “Obrazovanie na rodnom yazyke v Rossii: pravo i real’nost’.” Kazanskii 
Federalist (9): 110-6.
Lysenko, V. (1997). Razdelenie vlasti i opyt Rossisskoi Federatsii. Federalizm vlasti i vlast’ 
federalizma. M. N. Guboglo, Ed. Moscow, IntelTekh.
212
Sources
Maclure, J. (2003). Quebec Identity: The Challenge of Pluralism. Montreal & Kingston: McGill- 
Queen’s University Press.
MacMillan, C. M. (1998). The Practice of language Rights in Canada. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.
March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational Basis of Politics. 
New York: The Free Press.
Matsuzato, K. (2001). “From Ethno-Bonapartism to Centralized Caciquismo:
Characteristics and Origins of the Tatarstan Political Regime, 1990—2000.” Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17 (4): 43-77.
May, S. (2001). Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language. 
Harlow: Pearson.
McAndrew, M. (2002). “La loi 101 en milieu scolaire: Impacts et resulats.” Revue 
d’amenagement linguistique (Automne 2002): 69-82.
McAndrew, M. and P. Lamarre (1996). “The Integration of Ethnic Minority Students
Fifteen Years after Bill 101: Linguistic and Cultural Issues Confronting Quebec’s 
French-Language Schools.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 28 (2): 40-63.
McAuley, M. (1997). Russia’s Politics of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McDougall, B. (1991). Notes for an Address on the Occasion of the Signing of the Canada- 
Quebec Accord on Immigration.
McFaul, M. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. 
London: Cornell University Press.
McRae, K. (1998). Official Bilingualism: From the 1960s to the 1990s. Language in Canada. J. 
Edwards, Ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
McRoberts, K. (1993). Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis [Third edition]. Toronto: Oxford 
University Press.
McRoberts, K. (1997). Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity. Toronto: Oxford 
University Press.
McRoberts, K. (2001). “Canada and the Multinational State.” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 34 (4): 683-713.
McWhinney, E. (1979). Quebec and the Constitution 1960-1978. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.
Meekison, J. P. (1998). Federalism for the Future: Essential Reforms. Le federalisme de demain 
: reformes essentielles. G. A. Beaudoin, J. A. Magnet, B. Pelletier, G. Robertson and J. 
Trent, Eds. Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur: 109-17.
Meekison, J. P., H. Telford, et al. (2003). The Institutions of Executive Federalim: Myths 
and Realities. Canada: The State of the Federation 2002. H. Lazar and H. Telford, Eds. 
Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Mikheev, S. (2002). Ispolnyaetsya dva goda prezidentskim namestnikam. I^vestia. 12 May
2002.
Mill, J. S. (1964 [1861]). Considerations on Representative Government. London: Longman.
Milne, D. (1986). Tug of War: Ottawa and the Provinces under Trudeau and Mulroney. Toronto: 
James Lorimer.
Milne, D. (1991). Equality or Symmetry: Why Choose? Options for a New Canada. R. L. Watts 
and D. M. Brown, Eds. Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 285-307.
Minnullin, K. M. (1999). Informatsiya po voprosam vosstanovleniya tatarskogo alfavita, 
osnovannogo na latinskoi grafike. Kazan: Tatarstan Cabinet Department on 
Development of Languages of Peoples of Tatarstan.
Minnullin, K. M. (2002). Interview with Kim Minnullin. Tatarshie kray a: no. 47.
Minnullin, K. M. (2004a). Author’s notes. Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya: Federalizm 
v Rossii, Kanade i Bel’gii: opyt sravnitel’nogo issledovaniya, Kazan.
Minnullin, K. M. (2004b). Director, Cabinet of Ministers’ Department on the Development 
of the Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan. Interview with Author. Kazan: Offices of 
Government of Tatarstan, 17 May and 11 June 2004.
213
Sources
Morin, C. (1976 [1972]). Quebec versus Ottawa: The Struggle for Self-Government 1960-72.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Morin, C. (1994). Les choses comme elles etaient: Une autobiographiepolitique. Montreal: Boreal.
Mukharyamova, L. M., I. B. Morenko, et al. (2004). “Problema dostupnosti vysshego
obrazovaniya dlya uchashchikhsya natsional’nykh shkol: Etnosotsial’nye aspekty.”
Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya. Online version accessed 18 August 2005:
http ://socis.isras.ru/SocIsArticles/2004_03/muxaryamovaetal.doc (3): 59-66.
Musina, R. N. (2005). Ethnic Identity of Tatars and Russians in Post-Soviet Tatarstan. Conference 
Paper: ICCEES World Congress, Berlin.
n.a. (2003). Briefing materials for Shaimiev Interview. Uchitel’skaya Ga^eta.
Nafiev, S. Kh. (2001). “Nasha zadacha—obespechit’ verkhvenstvo prava.” Vestnik 
Konstitutsionnogo Suda Respubliki Tatarstan (1): 93-6.
Nafiev, S. Kh. (2004). Author’s notes of conference paper. Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya: 
Federalizm v Rossii, Kanade i Bel’gii: opyt sravnitel’nogo issledovaniya, Kazan.
Neroznak, V. P., Ed. (2002). Gosudarstvennje i titul’nyeyasyki Rossii. Moscow: Academia.
Newman, W. J. (2004). The Official Languages A ct and the Constitutional and Legislative Recognition 
of Language Rights in Canada. Languages, Constitutionalism and Minorities 
Conference, University o f Ottawa.
Nicholson, M. (2003). Characterising Centre-Periphery Relations in the Yeltsin Era. Russian 
Regions and Regionalism: Strength Through Weakness. G. P. Herd and A. Aldis, Eds. 
London, Routledge Curzon: 3-18.
Nizamova, L. (2004). Dotsent, Department of Sociology. Interview with Author. Kazan: Kazan 
State University, 17 May 2004.
Noel, A. (2000). Without Quebec: Collaborative Federalism with a Footnote. Montreal: 
Institute for Research on Public Policy. March.
Norman, W. (1995). The Ideology of Shared Values: A Myopic Vision of Unity in the
Multi-nation State. Is Quebec Nationalism Just? Perspectives from Anglophone Canada.]. H. 
Carens, Ed. Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press.
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Oakes, L. (2004). “French: A Language for Everyone in Quebec?” Nations and Nationalism 
10 (4): 539-58.
OCOL (2005). Annual Report 2004-2005. Volume II. Ottawa: Office of the Commissioner 
of Official Languages.
O ’Donnell, G. and P. C. Schmitter (1986). Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Offe, C. (1998). ““Homogeneity” and Constitutional Democracy: Coping With Identity 
Conflicts Through Group Rights.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (2): 113-41.
O ’Leary, B., I. S. Lustick, et al., Eds. (2001). Right-Sisjng the State: The Politics of Moving Borders. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Oliver, M. (1993). “The Impact o f the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 
on Constitutional Thought and Pratice in Canada.” International Journal of Canadian 
Studies (7-8): 315-32.
Oliver, P. (1999). “Canada’s Two Solitudes: Constitutional and International Law in
Reference re Secession of Quebec.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 6: 
65-95.
Opalski, M. (2001). Can Will Kymlicka be Exported to Russia? Can Liberal Pluralism be
Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. W. Kymlicka 
and M. Opalski, Eds. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 298-319.
OQLF (Office quebecois de la langue fran^aise) (2004). Rapport annuel degestion 2003-2004. 
Quebec: Office quebecois de la langue fran9aise.
OQLF (2005). Les caracterisriques linguistiques de la population du Quebec : profil et 
tendances 1991-2001. Quebec: Office quebecois de la langue fran9aise.
214
Sources
Oracheva, O. (1998). Russian Federalism: The view from Perm. Russian Regional Report. 3.
Ordeshook, P. C. and O. Shvetsova (1997). “Federalism and Constitutional Design.” Journal 
of Democracy 8 (1): 27-42.
Ovrutskii, L. M. (2000). “Razgovory s Khakimovym.” Panorama Forum (23).
Ovrutskii, L. M. (2004). Journalist, writer. Interview with Author. Kazan: Ovrutskii’s residence, 
14 June 2004.
Pascal, E. (2000). Defining Federalism in Russia: The Emergence of Bilateralism in Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations. Unpublished PhD Thesis: University Michigan.
PCH (Department of Canadian Heritage) (2004a). Official Languages: Annual Report 2003- 
2004. Volume 1: Results of the Official Languages Support Programs. Ottawa: 
Canadian Heritage.
PCH (2004b). Official Languages: Annual Report 2003-2004. Volume 2: Results of the
Activities of the Designated Federal Departments and Agencies. Ottawa: Canadian 
Heritage.
Pearson, L. B. (1975). Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Tester B. Pearson. Volume 3: 
1957-1968. London: Victor Gollancz.
Pelletier, B. (2001). \Jn projet pour le Quebec: Affirmation, autonomie et leadership. Rapport final. 
Quebec: Comite special du Parti liberal du Quebec sur l’avenir politique et 
constitutionnel de la societe quebecoise.
Peters, B. G. (1996), Political Institutions, Old and New. A  New Handbook of Political Science. 
R. E. Goodin and H.-D. Klingemann, Eds. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 205- 
20.
Peters, B. G. (1998). Comparative Politics: Theory and Method. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Petrov, N. (2004). Federalism. Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist
Political Reform. M. McFaul, N. Petrov and A. Ryabov, Eds. Washington, CEIP: 213- 
38.
Picard, J.-C. (2003). Camille Taurin: T ’homme debout. Montreal: Boreal.
Plourde, M. (1985). Ta langue franpaise au Quebec. Quebec: Editeur officiel du Quebec.
Plourde, M. (1988). Ta politique linguistique du Quebec: 1977-1987. Montreal: Institut quebecois 
de recherche sur la culture.
PLQ (1980). Une nouvellefederation canadienne. Montreal: La Commission constitutionnelle du 
Parti liberal du Quebec.
Pozner, V. (2004). Pryamaya Svyaz’. Kazan. 16 April 2004.
PQ (Parti Quebecois) (2001). Programme du Parti Quebecois. Edition 2001. Parti Quebecois.
Online source accessed 30 August 2005: http://www.pq.org/nv/index.php?pq=22.
Proulx, J.-P. (1989). “Le choc des Chartes: histoire des regimes juridiques quebecois et 
canadien en matiere de langue d’enseignement.” Themis 23 (1): 67-172.
Przeworski, A. (1986). Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy. 
Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. G. O ’Donnell, P. C. 
Schmitter and L. Whitehead, Eds. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Putin, V. (2000). The State of Russia: A  way to an effective state. Annual Address to the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation.
Putin, V. (2001). Annual State of the Nation Address to Federal Assembly. 3 April 2001.
Putin, V. (2002). Annual State of the Nation Address to Federal Assembly. 18 April 2002.
Putin, V. (2003). Annual State of the Nation Address to Federal Assembly. 16 May 2003.
Putin, V. (2005). Opening Address to State Council: Online source accessed 4 July 2005: 
www.kremlin.ru.
QSC (Quebec Superior Court) (1978). Blaikie et al. v. Attorney General of Quebec. 85 DLR (3d) 
252.
Quebec (1956). Rapport de la Commission royale d'enquete sur les problemes
constitutionnels. Volume 3: Analyse des besoins et recommandations. Quebec: 
Commission royale d'enquete sur les problemes constitutionnels.
215
Sources
Quebec (1972a). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on 
Language Rights in Quebec. Book I: The Language of Work. Quebec: Editeur officiel du 
Quebec.
Quebec (1972b). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on 
Language Rights in Quebec. Book II: Language Rights. Quebec: Editeur officiel du 
Quebec.
Quebec (1972c). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on 
Language Rights in Quebec. Book III: The Ethnic Groups. Quebec: Editeur officiel du 
Quebec.
Quebec (1980). La nouvelle entente Quebec-Canada. Proposition du Gouvernement du
Quebec pour une entente d'egal a egal: la souverainete-association. Quebec: Editeur 
officiel.
Quebec (1985). Projet d'accord constitutionnel: Propositions du Gouvernement du Quebec. 
Quebec: Editeur officiel.
Quebec (1986). Rapport. Considerations et propositions de reorganisation du cadre
instiutionnel de la Charte de la langue frangaise. Quebec: Groupe de travail sur la 
Charte de la langue frangaise.
Quebec (1991). Report of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec. 
Quebec: Commission sur l'avenir politique et constitutionnel du Quebec.
Quebec (1996a). La francisation des entreprises: Une responsabilite a partager. Quebec: 
Groupe de travail tripartite sur la francisation des entreprises. Decembre 1996.
Quebec (1996b). Le frangais langue commune: Politique gouvernementale relative a l'emploi 
et a la qualite de la langue frangaise dans l’Administration. Quebec: Ministere de la 
Culture et des Communications.
Quebec (1996c). Le frangais langue commune: Proposition de politique linguistique.
Quebec: Ministere de la Culture et des Communications.
Quebec (1996d). Le frangais langue commune: Rapport du comite interministeriel sur la 
situation de la langue frangaise. Quebec: Ministere de la Culture et des 
Communications.
Quebec (1998). Une action concertee pour une francisation reussie: Orientations 
gouvernementales. Quebec: Ministere des Relations avec les citoyens et 
l'Immigration.
Quebec (2001a). Le frangais, une langue pour tout le monde. Quebec: Commission des 
Etats generaux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue frangaise au Quebec.
Quebec (2001b). Positions du gouvernement du Quebec dans les domaines constitutionnel et 
intergouvememental de 1936 a mars 2001. Quebec: Secretariat aux affaires 
intergouvernementales canadiennes.
Quebec (2001c). Positions du Quebec dans les domaines constitutionnel et
intergouvememental. Quebec: Secretariat aux affaires intergouvernementales 
canadiennes.
Quebec (2002). Resolution de 1'Assemblee nationale du Quebec. 17 April 2002, Online 
source accessed 31 August 2005
http: /  /  www.saic.gouv.qc.ca/publications /  resolutions /20020517.pdf.
Ragin, C. C. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Reddaway, P. (2002). “Is Putin’s Power More Formal than Real?” Post-Soviet Affairs 18 (1): 
31-40.
Reddaway, P. and R. Orttung (2004). Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Federal-Regional 
Reforms Volume I. London: Rowman & Litdefield.
Remillard, G. (1986). Allocution de Gil Remillard, ministre delegue aux Affaires intergouvernementales 
canadiennes. Colloque: Une collaboration renouvelee du Quebec et de ses partenaires 
dans la Confederation, Mont-Gabriel.
216
Sources
Remillard, G. (1987). Under What Conditions Would Quebec Sign the Constitution Act of 
1982. Quebec Since 1945: Selected Readings. M. D. Behiels, Ed. Toronto, Copp Clark 
Pitman: 209-20.
Requejo, F. (2001). Political Liberalism in Multinational States: The Legitimacy of Plural and 
Asymmetrical Federalism. Multinational Democracies. A.-G. Gagnon and J. Tully, Eds. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 110-35.
Requejo, F. (2003). Value Pluralism and Multinational Federalism. The Conditions of Diversity 
in Multinational Democracies. A.-G. Gagnon, M. Guibernau and F. Rocher, Eds. 
Montreal, IRPP: 15-40.
RF (Rosssiiskaya Federatsiya — Russian Federation) (1991). O yazykakh narodov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. With amendments to 2002.
RF (1996a). Ob obrazovanii. With amendments to 2003.
RF (1996b). Ukaz Prezidenta RF “Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniya o poryadke raboty po
razgranicheniyu predmetov vedeniya o polnomochii mezhdu federal’nymi organami 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii i a vzaimnoi peredache osushchestvleniya chasti svoikh polnomochii 
federal’nymi organami ispolnitel’noi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 12 March 
1996, N . 370.
RF (1998). Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniya ob obespechenii 
kontrolya za soblyudeniem soglashenii o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniya i 
polnomochii mezdu federal’nymi organami ispolnitel’noi vlasti i organami 
ispolnitel’noi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 2 February 1998, N . 129.
RF (1999). Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i 
ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 95- 
F3. 6 October 1999.
RF (2000a). O poryadke formirovaniya Soveta Federatsii Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. 113-F3. 5 August 2000.
RF (2000b). Polozhenie o poryadke vedenii federal’nogo registra normativnykh pravovykh 
aktov sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 29 November 2000, N . 904.
RF (2000c). Ukaz Prezidenta RF “O dopolnitel’nykh merakh po obespecheniyu edinogo 
pravogo prostranstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 10 August 2000, N . 1486.
RF (2000d). Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudarstvennom Sovete Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. N . 602. 1 September 2000.
RF (2001a). Federal’naya tselevaya programma “Russkii yazyk” na 2002-2005 gody.
RF (2001b). Federal’naya tselevaya programma: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie
Respubliki Tatarstan do 2006 goda: Postanovlenie RF 24 August 2001, no. 625: 
h ttp ://www.programs-gov.ru/ext/139/content.htm.
RF (2001c). Protokol zasedanii Prezidiuma Gosudarstvennogo Soveta No.6. Presidium 
Gosudarstvennogo Sovieta RF. Moscow. 20 February 2001.
RF (2004). Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii O poryadke rassmotreniya kandidatur na 
dolzhnost’ vyshego dolzhnostnogo litsa (rukovoditelya vyshego ispolnitel’nogo 
organa gosudarstvennoi vlasti) sub”ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. N. 1603. 27 
December 2004.
RF (2005a). O gosudarstvennom yazyke Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 53-F3.
RF (2005b). Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii O vnesenii izmenenii v Polozhenie o 
poryadke rassmotreniya kandidatur na dolzhnost’ vyshego dolzhnostnogo litsa 
(rukovoditelya vyshego ispolnitel’nogo organa gosudarstvennoi vlasti) sub”ekta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, utverzhdennoe Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 27 
dekabrya 2004 g. No. 1603. No. 756. 29 June 2005.
Riker, W. H. (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Robertson, G. (2000). Memoirs of a Very Civil Servant. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Robinson, N., Ed. (2000). Institutions and Political Change in Russia. London: MacMillan.
Rocher, F., Ed. (1992a). Bilan quebecois du federalisme canadien. Montreal: vlb editeur.
217
Sources
Rocher, F. and N. Verrelli (2003). Questioning Constitutional Democracy in Canada: From 
the Canadian Supreme Court Reference on Quebec Secession to the Clarity Act. The 
Conditions of Diversity in Multinational Democracies. A.-G. Gagnon, M. Guibernau and F. 
Rocher, Eds. Montreal, IRPP.
Rocher, G. (1992b). Autour de la langue: crises et debats, espoirs et tremblements. he Quebec 
en jeu: comprendre les grands defis. G. Daigle and G. Rocher, Eds. Montreal, Presses de 
l’Universite de Montreal.
Rocher, G. (2002). “Les dilemmes identitaires a l’origine de l’engendrement de la Charte de 
la langue fran9aise.” Revue d’amenagement linguistique.
Romney, P. (1999). Getting It Wrong: How Canadians Forgot Their Past and Imperilled 
Confederation. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Rorlich, A.-A. (1999). “History, Collective Memory and Identity: The Tatars of Sovereign 
Tatarstan.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32: 379-96.
Ross, C. (2000). “Federalism and Democratization in Russia.” Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 33: 403-20.
Ross, C. (2002). Federalism and Democratisation in Russia. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.
RSFSR (Rossiiskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika) (1990).
Deklaratsiya O gosudartvennom suverenitete Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi 
Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki. 12 June 1990.
Russell, P. H. (1994). The Politics of Mega-Constitutional Change: Lessons From Canada. 
Evaluating Federal Systems. B. De Villiers, Ed. Dordrecht, Juta & Co: 30-40.
Rustow, D. A. (1970). “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” Comparative 
Politics 2 (3): 337-64.
Ryan, C. (1989). ha reconciliation: une perspective quebecoise. Conference on language rights and 
policies, Kingston.
Safiullin, F. (2004). Novosti s “Latinskogo Fronta”: Online source accessed 22 August 2005: 
h ttp :// fandas-safiullin.ru/?topic_id—3&id=80.
Safiullin, F. (2005). Obrashchenie v UNESCO: Online source accessed 22 August 2005: 
h ttp :// fandas-safiullin.ru/?topic_id=3&id=85.
Sagitova, L. B. (2004). Senior Academic Collaborator. Department of Ethnology, Institute 
of History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. Interview with Author. Kazan: Offices of 
Institute of History, 24 June 2004.
Sakwa, R. (2002). Federalism, Sovereignty and Democracy. Regional Politics in Russia. C. Ross, 
Ed. Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1-22.
Sakwa, R. (2004). Putin: Russia’s Choice. London: Routledge.
Salagaev, A. (2004). Director, Russian Cultural Society. Interview with Author. Kazan, 22 June 
2004.
Salagaev, A. and S. A. Sergeev (2004). Respublika Tatarstan. Sarnye vliyatel’nye lyudi Rossii 
2003. Coll., Ed. Moscow, Institut situatsionnogo analiza i novykh tekhnologii.
Sasse, G. (1999). Bringing the Regions Back In: The Crimean Issue in Post-Soviet Ukraine. 
Doctoral Thesis. London: University of London.
Sasse, G. (2001). The ’New1 Ukraine: A State of Regions. Regions in Conflict: Ethnicity and
Territory in the Former Soviet Union. J. Hughes and G. Sasse, Eds. London, Frank Cass.
Sasse, G. (2002). “Conflict-Prevention in a Transition State: The Crimean Issue in Post- 
Soviet Ukraine.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8 (2): 1-26.
Sauvageau, B. (2003). “Etat de la politique linguistique canadienne.” hAction nationale (93): 
72-81.
Sauvageau, B. (2004). Member of Parliament for Repentigny, former Bloc Quebecois 
Spokesperson on Official Languages. Interview with Author. Ottawa: House of 
Commons, 14 December 2004.
SCC (Supreme Court of Canada) (1979). Blaikie v. Quebec (Attorney General). 2 SCR 1016.
Supreme Court of Canada (1981). Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution. 1 SCR 753.
218
Sources
Supreme Court of Canada (1982). Reference re: Amendment of Canadian Constitution. 2 SCR 793.
Supreme Court of Canada (1984). Attorney General (Quebec) vs. Quebec Protestant School Boards. 2 
SCR 66.
Supreme Court of Canada (1988). Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General). 2 SCR 712.
Supreme Court of Canada (1998). Reference re Secession of Quebec. 2 SCR 217.
Supreme Court of Canada (2005a). Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attomy General). 2005 SCC 
15.
Supreme Court of Canada (2005b). Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General). 2005 SCR 14.
Schmitter, P. C. and T. L. Karl (1994). “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and
Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Go?” Slavic Review 53 (1): 173- 
85.
Seidle, F. L. and G. Bishop (2005). Public Opinion on Asymmetrical Federalism: Growing Openness 
or Continuing Ambiguity. Asymmetry Series No. 2. Kingston: Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University.
Shaforostov, A. (2004). Centralisation of the Media Market: Tatarstan’s Mass Media Absorbed by 
Holdings. Online source accessed 17 August 2005: 
h ttp ://www.tatmedia.ru/obzor_press/mediarinokl /.
Shaikhieva, F. R. (2004). Collaborator.Cabinet of Ministers’ Department on the
Development of the Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan. Interview with Author. 
Kazan: Offices of Government of Tatarstan, 11 June 2004.
Shaimiev, M. (2004). Annual Address to State Council. Published in Respublika Tatarstan. 27 
March 2004.
Shakhrai, S. (1997). Rol’ dogovornykh protsessov v ukreplenii i razvitii rossiiskogo 
federalizma. Federalism vlasti i vlast’federali^ma. M. N. Guboglo, Ed. Moscow, 
IntelTekh.
Shakhrai, S. (2001). Uroki “tatarskoi modeli” otnoshenii s Tsentrom. Ne^avisimaya Ga^eta. 27 
February 2001.
Sharafutdinova, G. and A. Magomedov (2004). Volga Federal Okrug. Dynamics of Russian 
Politics: Putin’s Federal-Regional Reforms Volume I. P. Reddaway and R. Orttung, Eds. 
London, Rowman & Littlefield.
Shcheglov, M. Y. (2004). Komu reshat’ problemy russkikh v Tatarstane? Zve^daPovolyh’ya. 
Kazan. 27 May, 3 June, 10 June, 17 June 2004.
Simeon, R. (1972). Federal-Provincial Diplomay: The Making of Recent Polity in Canada. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press.
Simeon, R. (2002). Political Science and Federalism: Seven Decades of Scholarly Engagement.
Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Affairs, Queen’s University.
Smiley, D. V. (1970). Constitutional Adaptation and Canadian Federalism Since 1945. Ottawa:
Documents of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume 4.
Smiley, D. V. (1971). “The Structural Problem of Canadian Federalism.” Canadian Public 
Administration 14 (3): 326-43.
Smiley, D. V. and R. L. Watts (1985). Intrastate Federalism in Canada. Volume 39 of the Studies of 
the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Propects for Canada. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press.
Smith, B. (1975). Ea loi 22: l e  Parti Quebecois aurait-ilfait mieux? Montreal: Editions du jour.
Smith, G. (1998). “Russia, Multiculturalism and Federal Justice.” Europe-Asia Studies 50 (8): 
1393-411.
Smith, J. (2002). Informal Constitutional Development: Change by Other Means. Canadian 
Federalism: Peformance, Effectiveness, andlegitimaty. H. Bakvis and G. Skogstad, Eds. 
Toronto, Oxford University Press: 40-58.
Solnick, S. (1995). “Federal Bargaining in Russia.” East European Constitutional Review 4 (4): 
52-7.
219
Sources
Solnick, S. L. (1998). Will Russia Survive? Center and Periphery in the Russian Federation. 
Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building. B. R. Rubin and J. Snyder, Eds. 
London, Routledge: 58-80.
Solomon, P. H., Ed. (2003). Making Federalism Through Taw: Canadian Experience and Prussian 
Reform Under Putin. Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies.
SPL (Secretariat a la politique linguistique) (2001). Plan strategique en matiere de politique 
linguistique pour 2001-2004. Quebec: Secretariat a la politique linguistique.
SPL (2004). Papport annuel de gestion 2003-2004. Quebec: Secretariat a la politique linguistique.
SPL (2005). Plan strategique en matiere de politique linguistique 2005-2008. Quebec: Secretariat a la 
politique linguistique.
Steinmo, S. and K. Thelen (1992). Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. 
StructuringPolitics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. S. Steinmo, K. 
Thelen and F. Longstreth, Eds. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1-33.
Stepan, A. (2000). “Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective.” Post-Soviet Affairs 16
(2): 133-76.
Stepan, A. (2001). Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stoliarov, M. (2003). Federalism and the Power of Dictatorship in Russia. London: Routledge.
Stoner-Weiss, K. (1997). Federalism and Regionalism. Developments in Russian Politics 4. S. 
White, A. Pravda and Z. Y. Gitelman, Eds. Basingstoke, MacMillan: 229-50.
Stoner-Weiss, K. (2004). Russia: Managing Territorial Cleavages Under Dual Transition. 
Federalism and Territorial Cleavages. U. M. Amoretti and N. Bermeo, Eds. Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press: 301-26.
Symons, G. L. (2002). “The State and Ethnic Diversity: Structural and Discursive Change in 
Quebec’s Ministere d’Immigration.” Canadian Ethnic Studies 34 (3): 28-46.
Tagirov, I. R. (2000). Istoriya national*noigosudarstvennosti Tatarskogo naroda i Tatarstana. Kazan: 
Tatarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo.
Tarlton, C. D. (1965). “Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical 
Speculation.” The Journal of Politics 27 (4): 861-74.
Tatarstan (1992). Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan.
Tatarstan (1994a). Gosudarstvennaya programma po sokhraneniyu, izucheniyu i razvitiyu 
yazykov narodov Respubliki Tatarstan 1994-2004.
Tatarstan (1994b). Postanovlenie Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki Tatarstan “Ob obrazovanii 
Komiteta pri Kabinete Ministrov Respubliki Tatarstan po realizatsii Zakona 
Respubliki Tatarstan “O yazykakh narodov Respubliki Tatarstan”. No. 365. 29 July 
1994.
Tatarstan (1997). Zakon Ob obrazovanii.
Tatarstan (2002). Konstitutsiya Respubliki Tatarstan.
Tatarstan (2004a). Gosudarstvennaya Programma po sokhraneniyu, izucheniyu i razvitiyu 
gosudarstvennykh yazykov Respubliki Tatarstan i drugikh yazykov v Respublike 
Tatarstan, 2004-14.
Tatarstan (2004b). O gosudarstvennykh yazykakh Respubliki Tatarstan i drugikh yazykakh v 
Respublike Tatarstan.
Tatarstan (2005). Statistics on the Development of National Education in Tatarstan 1991-2004. 
Online source of the Tatarstan Ministry of Education accessed 17 August 2005: 
http://www.tatedu.ru/index.php?link=138&st=623&type=3&str=l&parent_m=13 
5.
Telford, H. (2003). “The Federal Spending Power in Canada: Nation-Building or Nation- 
Destroying?” Publius 33 (1): 23-44.
Thomas, D. M. (1997). WhistlingPast the Graveyard: Constitutional Abeyances, Quebec, and the 
Future of Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Tierney, S. (2003). The Constitutional Accommodation of National Minorities in the UK 
and Canada: Judicial Approaches to Diversity. The Conditions of Diversity in
220
Sources
Multinational Democracies. A.-G. Gagnon, M. Guibernau and F. Rocher, Eds. 
Montreal, IRPP.
Tishkov, V. (1997). Nationalism and Conflict After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame. London: 
Sage.
Tolz, V. (1998). “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post- 
Communist Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 50 (6): 993-1022.
Treisman, D. S. (1996). “The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet 
Russia.” British Journal of Political Science 26 (2): 299-335.
Tremblay, J. (2004). General Counsel, Director of Legal Services of the Office of the
Commissioner of Official Languages. Interview with Author. Ottawa: Office of the 
Commissioner of Official Languages, 17 December 2004.
Trudeau, P. E. (1968). Federalism and the French Canadians. Toronto: Macmillan.
Trudeau, P. E. (1969). Federal-Provincial Grants and the Spending Power of Parliament. Ottawa: 
Government of Canada.
Trudeau, P. E. (1988a). There Must be a Sense of Belonging. With a Bang, Not a Whimper. D. 
Johnston, Ed. Toronto, Penguin.
Trudeau, P. E. (1988b). We the People of Canada. With a Bang N ot a Whimper. D. Johnston, 
Ed. Toronto, Penguin.
TSSR (Tatarskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika — Tatar Soviet Socialist
Republic) (1990). Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist 
Republic. 30 August 1990.
Tsvetkova, M. (2003). Deputaty razreshili ubol’nyat’ gubernatorov. Gayeta.ru. 21 February 
2003.
Tully, J. (1995). Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Tully, J. (2001). Introduction. Multinational Democracies. A.-G. Gagnon and J. Tully, Eds. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1-34.
Tully, J. (2005). “Recognition and Dialogue: The Emergence of a New Field.” Critical Preview 
of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (3): 84-106.
Umnova, I. A. (1998). Konstitutsionnye osnovy sovremennogo Rossiiskogo federalif^ ma. Moscow:
Delo.
USSR (1990a). Eaw on the Demarcation of the Powers of the USSR and the Members of the Federation. 
26 April 1990.
USSR (1990b). Eaw on the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR, 24 April 1990.
Vaillancourt, Y. (1992). Un bilan de 1’opting out du Quebec des programmes federaux a frais 
partages dans le domaine social (1964-1992). Bilan quebecois du federalisme canadien. F. 
Rocher, Ed. Montreal, vlb editeur.
Valeev, R. I. (2004). Chairman of Tatarstan State Council on Science, Culture and National 
Questions. Interview with Author. Kazan: Tatarstan State Council, 1 June 2004.
VSRT (Verkhovnyi Soviet Respubliki Tatarstan — Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan) (1992). 
Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan O raz”yasnenii 
formulirovki voprosa referenduma Respubliki Tatarstan, naznachennogo na 21 
marta 1992 goda. 16 March 1992.
VTsIOM (All Russian Centre for Opinion Research) (2005). Rossiya razdrazhayut
nezhelanie predstavitelei drugikh natsional’nostei adaptirovat’sya i konkurentsiya s 
ikh storony. Press-vypusk no. 267. Moscow: VTsIOM. Online document accessed 23 
August 2005: http://www.wciom.ru/?pt=45&article=1606.
Walker, E. W. (1996). “The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Tatarstan and Asymmetrical Federalism 
in Russia.” The Harriman Review (Spring 1996).
Wallot, J.-P., Ed. (2002). Le debat qui n’apas eu lieu: La Commission Pepin-Robarts quelque vingt 
ans apres. Ottawa: Les Presses de l’Universite d’Ottawa.
Watts, R. L. (1991). The Federative Superstructure. Options for a New Canada. R. L. Watts 
and D. M. Brown, Eds. Toronto, University of Toronto Press: 309-36.
221
Sources
Watts, R. L. (1999). Comparing Federal Systems. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press.
Weaver, R. K. and B. A. Rockman, Eds. (1993). Do Institutions Matter? Washington: 
Brookings Institution.
Webber, J. (1994). Reimagining Canada: Language, culture, community, and the Canadian constitution. 
Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Wertheim, S. (2003). Linguistic Purism, Language Shift and Contact-Induced Change in Tatar. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Linguistics: University of California 
Berkeley.
Wheare, K. C. (1946). Federal Government. London: Oxford University Press.
Yalden, R. (1989). “Liberalism and Language in Quebec: Bill 101, the Courts, and Bill 178.” 
University of Toronto Faculty Law Review 47: 973-94.
Yeltsin, B. N. (1994). The Viewfrom the Kremlin. London: Harper Collins.
Yeltsin, B. N. (1997). The Might of the State Grows Through the Independence of the 
Regions. Rossiiskie Vesti. 1 November 1997: 3.
Yusupov, R. A. (1997). Zakon “Oyasykakh narodov Respubliki Tatarstan Problemy ego reali^atsii 
b lysshem uchebnom ^avedenii. Aktual’nye problemy dvuyazychiya v RT, Naberezhnye 
Chelny: Naberezhnye institut nepreryvnogo pedagogicheskogo obrazovaniya.
Zakiev, M. Z. and N. X. Sharypova, Eds. (1991). FunktsionaTnoe ra^vitie tatarskogoyasfyka v 
usloviyakhperestroiki. Kazan: IYaLI.
Zheleznov, B. (1996). Pravovoi status Respubliki Tatarstan. Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe 
izdatel’stvo.
Zheleznov, B. (2004a). Author's notes. Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya: Federalizm v 
Rossii, Kanade i Bel’gii: opyt sravnitel’nogo issledovaniya, Kazan.
Zheleznov, B. (2004b). Professor, Department of Law. Conversation with author. Kazan:
During Conference “Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya: Federalizm v Rossii, 
Kanade i Bel’gii: opyt sravnitel’nogo issledovaniya”, 18 May 2004.
Zverev, A. (1998). Qualified Sovereignty: The Tatarstan Model for Resolving Conflicting 
Loyalties. Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia. M. Waller,
B. Coppieters and A. Malashenko, Eds. London, Frank Cass.
Zverev, A. (1999). The Value of the Tatarstan Experience for Georgia and Abkhazia. Federal 
Practice: Exploring Alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia. B. Coppieters, D. Darchiashvili 
and N. Akaba, Eds. Brussels, VUB University Press: 91-110.
222
